Perkins v. Guidry

191 So. 3d 1182, 2016 WL 2342682
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 4, 2016
DocketNo. 15-1177
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 191 So. 3d 1182 (Perkins v. Guidry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perkins v. Guidry, 191 So. 3d 1182, 2016 WL 2342682 (La. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

GREMILLION, Judge.

I/The plaintiff, Andre Perkins, appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendant, Dr. Tricia N. Guidry, finding that she did not breach the standard of care following the death of his wife, Eboni Perkins, and their unborn son (Hunter). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves the most tragic of circumstances. Andre and Eboni, who was twenty-eight years old, were expecting their first child. At .twenty-three weeks gestation, Eboni was admitted by her obstetrician, Dr. Guidry, to Women and Children’s Hospital in Lake Charles on Friday, February 3, 2005, with a diagnosis of idiopathic thrombocytopenia purpura (ITP).1 In the early morning hours of Monday, February 7, 2005, both Eboni .and her unborn son died. Along with cardiac arrest, the cause of death listed on Eboni’s death certificate was “Thromboembofic Thrombocytopenia Purpura” or TTP.2-

[1185]*1185Andre, individually and on behalf of the estate; of Eboni, filed a claim pursuant to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act on February 3, 2006. The medical review panel rendered an opinion in favor of Dr. Guidry on July 23, 2008. Andre filed a petition for damages on October 3, 2008. In November 2009, Dr. Guidry filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied. Following a jury 12trial, the trial court rendered judgment in May 2016, in favor of'Dr. Guidry. ’ Andre now appeals and assigns as error:

1. The trial court committed legal error by refusing to grant appellant’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of whether appellant had proved the applicable standard of care.
2. The trial court committed legal error by giving confusing and legally insufficient jury instructions that stated that the plaintiff was required to prove three elements, i.e., the applicable standard of care, a breach of the standard of care, and a causal relationship between the breach and the harm, while simultaneously providing the jury with a verdict form which omitted any reference to proof of the applicable standard of care.
3. The jury committed manifest error by failing to conclude that appellee, Dr. Trida Guidry, violated her duty to provide her patient, Eboni Perkins, with informed consent regarding the proposed medical and surgical management.
4. The jury committed manifest error by failing to conclude that the appel-lee deviated from applicable standards-of care with regard to, the decedent’s, medical and surgical management.

Directed Verdict

Perkins argues that the trial court legally erred in failing to grant his directed verdict as to the first prong of La.R.S. 9:2794, because the appellee had judicially confessed that Perkins had proved the applicable standard of care., The trial court refused to grant the directed verdict on the grounds'that'it might mislead" the jury as to the evidence.

A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for directed verdict. Vallery v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 429 So.2d 513 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 434 So.2d 109.1 (La.1983). In Guidry v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc., 14-1108, pp. 17-18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/8/15), 164 So.3d 266, 279, writs denied, 15-900, 15-903 (La.9/11/15), 176 So.3d 1038, we summarized the standard for reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion for directed verdict:

| sIn Melancon v. Lafayette Insurance Co., 05-762, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/29/06), 926 So.2d 693, writs denied, 06-974, 06-1006 (La.6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1291, 1293, this court noted that while Article 1810 does not establish standards for the grant of a directed verdict, such standards have been jurispruden-tially established. These standards were enumerated by this court in Carter v. Western Kraft Paper Mill, 94-524, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/94), 649 So.2d 541, 544 (citations omitted):
[A] directed verdict should only be granted when the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of one party that the court believes reasonable people could not reach a contrary verdict. It is appropriate, not when there is a preponderance of evidence, but only [1186]*1186when the evidence overwhelmingly points to one .conclusion. The propriety of granting a directed verdict must be .evaluated in light of the substantive .law underpinning the plaintiffs claims.
Under the foregoing legal principles the question is not whether in our view the plaintiff has proven his case against defendants by a< preponderance of the evidence, but rather, whether; upon viewing the evidence submitted, we conclude that "reasonable people could not have reached a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants-'
Questions of credibility should not be resolved by a directed verdict. Making credibility evaluations is one of the primary- duties of a jury and the trial court may not take this duty from the jury unless the party opposing the directed verdict has failed to produce sufficient evidence upon which reasonable and fair-minded persons could disagree. Evaluations of credibility play no part in reaching a decision on a motion for directed verdict.

In medical malpractice cases, an appellate court reviews the factual determinations of the trial court using the manifest error standard of review:

An appellate court, in reviewing a [factfinder’s] factual conclusions, must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole: there must be.no reasonable factual basis for. the trial court’s conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Kaiser v. Hardin, 06-2092, pp. 11-12 (La.4/11/07), 953 So.2d 802, 810; Guillory v. Insurance Co. of North America, 96-1084, p. 5 (La.4/8/97), 692 So.2d 1029, 1032. This test requires a reviewing court to do more than simply review the record for some evidence, which supports or controverts the trial court’s finding. The court must review the entire |4record to determine whether the trial court’s finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Guillory, 09-0075 at p. 16, 16 So.3d at 1118: Kaiser, 06-2092 at p. 12, 953 So.2d at 810. The issue to be resolved on review is not whether the jury was right or wrong, but whether the [factfinder’s][ ][ ] conclusion was a reasonable one. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973).

McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 10-2775, pp. 16-17 (La.7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1218, 1231.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2794 states in pertinent part:

A. In a malpractice action based on the negligence of a physician licensed under R.S. 37:1261 et seq., a dentist licensed under R.S. 37:751 et seq., an optometrist licensed under R.S. 37:104Í et seq., or a chiropractic physician licensed under R.S. 37:2801 et seq., the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving:

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191 So. 3d 1182, 2016 WL 2342682, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perkins-v-guidry-lactapp-2016.