Perkins v. Comm'r

2008 T.C. Memo. 261, 96 T.C.M. 352, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 259
United States Tax Court·Decided November 20, 2008·No. No. 14587-06L·Unpublished·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

RICHARD A. PERKINS, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Perkins v. Comm'r
No. 14587-06L
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2008-261; 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 259; 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 352;
November 20, 2008, Filed
Perkins v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2008-103, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 103 (T.C., 2008)
*259
Richard A. Perkins, Pro se.
Christopher J. Sheldon, for respondent.
Jacobs, Julian I.

JULIAN I. JACOBS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JACOBS, Judge: On April 16, 2008, this Court rendered a Memorandum Opinion, Perkins v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2008-103 (Perkins I), in which we decided that respondent's proposed enforcement action to collect by levy assessments for additions to tax and interest for 1995 and 2000 against petitioner could not proceed. We remanded the matter to respondent's Appeals Office for reconsideration as to if and when petitioner was financially disabled for purposes of section 6511(h). 1

Background

Petitioner resided in Arizona when he filed his petition.

Petitioner and his wife belatedly filed joint returns for 1995 and 2000 on which they reported tax of $ 4,219 and $ 5,892, respectively. Respondent assessed additions to tax and interest with respect to the tax shown on each return.

Petitioner filed a joint return for 1999 on February 26, 2004. That return showed, and respondent does not dispute, that petitioner overpaid his 1999 tax liability by $ 1,922. All of petitioner's 1999 tax payments were made through withholding *260 credits.

Petitioner argued that he should be permitted to apply the 1999 overpayment to amounts owed for 1995 and 2000. The central dispute in Perkins I, as well as herein, was whether petitioner timely filed a claim for a refund of his 1999 Federal income tax overpayment. Because petitioner filed that claim on February 26, 2004, it would generally be barred by the section 6511 period of limitations. Petitioner claimed the statute was tolled, and the section 6511 period of limitations did not bar his claim for refund of his 1999 overpayment, because he was "financially disabled" within the meaning of section 6511(h).

In Perkins I we found that respondent's Appeals settlement officer misapprehended the applicable law in considering whether petitioner was financially disabled, and thus we remanded the case to respondent's Appeals Office for reconsideration. The remand necessitated our preventing respondent from proceeding with his proposed enforced collection action until respondent's Appeals settlement officer could reconsider petitioner's claim that he was financially disabled.

Pursuant to our order to remand, on July 18, 2008, one of respondent's Appeals settlement officers met with *261 petitioner to discuss the issue of tolling the statute of limitations pursuant to section 6511(h). She provided petitioner with the applicable guidelines, found in Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960, to be used in deciding whether a taxpayer is financially disabled. Petitioner agreed to attempt to obtain the documentation required under the guidelines to substantiate his financial disability claim. When respondent did not receive the relevant documentation, respondent issued a supplemental notice of determination on September 26, 2008, in which respondent concluded that petitioner was not financially disabled within the meaning of section 6511(h). Consequently, respondent denied petitioner's claim to have his overpayment for 1999 applied to offset his tax liability for 1995 and 2000.

Discussion

In Perkins I we described the statutory framework regarding enforced collection activity by the Secretary. Petitioner's sole argument as to the procedures that have been employed thus far is that respondent's proposed levy should not proceed because petitioner's 1999 overpayment is available to offset his 1995 and 2000 tax liabilities.

As we noted in Perkins I:

As directed by section 6511(h), the *262 Commissioner has prescribed guidelines that are to be used in deciding whether a taxpayer is financially disabled. According to Rev. Proc. 99-21, sec. 4, 1999-1 C.B. 960, 960

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Perkins v. Comm'r, 2008 T.C. Memo. 261, 96 T.C.M. 352, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 259 (tax 2008).

2008 T.C. Memo. 261 (Perkins v. Comm'r) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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