Perficient, Inc. v. Gupta

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJuly 6, 2021
Docket4:21-cv-00759
StatusUnknown

This text of Perficient, Inc. v. Gupta (Perficient, Inc. v. Gupta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perficient, Inc. v. Gupta, (E.D. Mo. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

PERFICIENT INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) CASE NO: 4:21CV759-HEA ) PAWAN GUPTA, ) ) Defendant. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against Defendant, [Doc. No. 3]. Defendant opposes the motion and a hearing was held on June 30, 2021. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint and all Exhibits thereto, the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and the opposition Memorandum. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is hereby GRANTED. In determining whether to issue a TRO, the Court must consider the following four factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movants; (2) the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movants will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494,

497 (8th Cir. 2013). The party requesting injunctive relief bears the “complete burden” of proving that an injunction should be granted. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1987).

Defendant was formerly the Principal for Plaintiff’s Order Management Systems (“OMS”) practice. Defendant recently resigned from Plaintiff and joined Blue Yonder, Inc. (“Blue Yonder”), Plaintiff’s competitor with respect to OMS solutions, as a Vice President.

Pursuant to the Verified Complaint and briefing in support of Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendant is operating in violation of multiple contractual agreements with Plaintiff including post-separation restrictions. These restrictions include a

covenant: (1) not to compete with Plaintiff by performing competitive duties for a business offering similar products or services for twenty-four months following his separation from the restricted area, i.e. metropolitan areas in which Plaintiff offers its products and services, (2) not to solicit or attempt to solicit current or

prospective Plaintiff customers or attempt to encourage them to terminate, modify or not renew their business relationship with Plaintiff for a period of twenty-four months, (3) not to solicit or attempt to solicit current Plaintiff employees to terminate their employment relationship with Plaintiff, and (4) not to disclose or cause to be

disclosed any of Plaintiff’s confidential or proprietary information or trade secrets. Defendant has been in contact with one or more Plaintiff clients with whom he previously dealt while a Plaintiff employee, including Plaintiff client Sally

Beauty. Although Defendant argues that Sally Beauty was also a client of Blue Yonder, nothing in the agreements limits the solicitation of Plaintiff’s clients if that client was also a client of a competitor. Defendant’s declaration fails to deny Defendant’s solicitation by reason of his employment by Plaintiff. Defendant

merely argues that Sally Beauty was a client but fails to declare that his interaction with Sally Beauty did not rely and use Plaintiff’s goodwill. Indeed, Defendant’s interaction with Sally Beauty specifically references Plaintiff. By communicating

with Plaintiff’s clients to offer services competitive to the services offered by Plaintiff, it appears from the Verified Complaint and Exhibits Defendant’s conduct constitutes a breach of one or more of his post-separation contractual obligations. Further, by offering competing products and services on behalf of Blue

Yonder, it appears from the Verified Complaint and Exhibits that Defendant’s conduct constitutes a breach of one or more of his post-separation contractual obligations. Defendant argues that he is offering a product whereas Plaintiff offers

services. This argument is unavailing. Plaintiff sells third party products that require servicing and implementation. Defendant sells its own products that require servicing and implementation. Prior to the Sally Beauty communication,

Plaintiff did not believe Defendant was in breach of the agreements since Plaintiff thought Defendant was simply selling products. Upon discovery of Defendant’s interactions with Sally Beauty, Plaintiff determined that Defendant was likely

breaching the agreements through the competitive effect of selling the software and providing management thereof. Likelihood of Success on the Merits The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of

several of its claims, including its request for enforcement of the Agreements, as well as its request for injunctive relief in order to protect the disclosure of its confidential information and trade secrets.

Under Missouri law, non-compete covenants are enforced if they are reasonable under the circumstances and their enforcement serves legitimate protectable interests. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C. v. Barton, 614 F.3d 893, 908 (8th Cir. 2010). Defendant contends that the Agreements are overly broad, and the

motion is based on speculation. The Court finds that the Agreements at issue are narrowly-tailored efforts by Plaintiff to keep its information secret and retain competitive advantage, and it is more than adequately limited in scope. With respect to scope, the Agreements are reasonable under the circumstances because Defendant was a high level and highly compensated

executive. His noncompetition covenant limits his employment for a reasonable period. Whelan Security Co. v. Kennebrew, 379 S.W.3d 835, 846-47 (Mo. banc 2012)(“Considerable precedent in Missouri supports the reasonableness of a two-

year non-compete agreement. . .”); Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 16-cv-1181-JAR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101473, *6 (Aug. 3, 2016) (“the non-competition agreement at issue limits [defendant’s] employment for only one year, which is reasonable”). Indeed, Missouri courts have held that non-compete agreements with

a restrictive time period much longer than a one-year restriction are reasonable. See, e.g., Whelan, 379 S.W.3d at 846-47; Alltype Fire Prot. Co. v. Mayfield, 88 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Mo. App. 2002) (finding a two-year limitation on employment

reasonable); Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sands, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93303, at *9 (W.D. Mo. July 9, 2014) (holding a three-year non-compete agreement is enforceable). Courts applying Missouri law also readily enforce geographical limitations

that span nationwide. See, e.g., Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris, 586 F. Supp. 704, 710 (E.D. Mo. 1984)(enforcing two-year, worldwide limitation); Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. App. 1993) (enforcing a nationwide non-

compete for five years). Enforcing the Agreement also serves legitimate protectable interests of Plaintiff. An employer has a legitimate protectable interest in its confidential and

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Related

United States v. W. T. Grant Co.
345 U.S. 629 (Supreme Court, 1953)
Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C. v. Barton
614 F.3d 893 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc.
640 F.2d 109 (Eighth Circuit, 1981)
United Healthcare Insurance Co. Aarp v. Advancepcs
316 F.3d 737 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Home Instead, Inc. v. David Florance
721 F.3d 494 (Eighth Circuit, 2013)
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Mid-States Paint & Chemical Co. v. Herr
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Osage Glass, Inc. v. Donovan
693 S.W.2d 71 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1985)
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Tucker
768 S.W.2d 595 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1989)
Alltype Fire Protection Co. v. Mayfield
88 S.W.3d 120 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2002)
Sigma Chemical Co. v. Harris
586 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Missouri, 1984)
Systematic Business Services, Inc. v. Bratten
162 S.W.3d 41 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2005)
Cape Mobile Home Mart, Inc. v. Mobley
780 S.W.2d 116 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1989)
Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards
869 S.W.2d 239 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1993)
H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc. v. Enchura
122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Missouri, 2000)
Whelan Security Co. v. Kennebrew
379 S.W.3d 835 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2012)
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners
811 F.2d 414 (Eighth Circuit, 1987)

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