Perez v. Ward

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Perez v. Ward

271 A.D.2d 590, 706 N.Y.S.2d 160, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4320

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 17, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 271 A.D.2d 590 (Perez v. Ward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Perez v. Ward, 271 A.D.2d 590, 706 N.Y.S.2d 160, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4320 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered June 25, 1999, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that for a landlord to be liable for injuries resulting from a hazardous lead condition, it must be established, inter alia, that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been corrected (see, Putnam v Stout, 38 NY2d 607).

In the instant case, the defendants received notice of the hazardous condition several weeks after the initial diagnosis of the infant plaintiff’s condition. After the defendants made out [591]*591a prima facie case for summary judgment, the plaintiffs, in opposition, submitted evidence that the infant plaintiff may have sustained additional injury by continuing to ingest lead paint chips after the defendants had notice. The Supreme Court properly concluded that there are issues of fact whether, once the defendants had actual notice of the hazardous condition, they took reasonable and diligent efforts to abate the condition (see, Andrade v Wong, 251 AD2d 609; Brown v Marathon Realty, 170 AD2d 426; see also, Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d 628). O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered June 25, 1999, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that for a landlord to be liable for injuries resulting from a hazardous lead condition, it must be established, inter alia, that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been corrected (see, Putnam v Stout, 38 NY2d 607).

In the instant case, the defendants received notice of the hazardous condition several weeks after the initial diagnosis of the infant plaintiff’s condition. After the defendants made out [591]*591a prima facie case for summary judgment, the plaintiffs, in opposition, submitted evidence that the infant plaintiff may have sustained additional injury by continuing to ingest lead paint chips after the defendants had notice. The Supreme Court properly concluded that there are issues of fact whether, once the defendants had actual notice of the hazardous condition, they took reasonable and diligent efforts to abate the condition (see, Andrade v Wong, 251 AD2d 609; Brown v Marathon Realty, 170 AD2d 426; see also, Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d 628). O’Brien, J. P., S. Miller, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

271 A.D.2d 590, 706 N.Y.S.2d 160, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-ward-nyappdiv-2000.

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