OPINION
MIRABAL, Justice.
After the trial court overruled a motion to suppress evidence, appellant, Francisco Perez, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of marihuana in a usuable quantity of more than five pounds and less than 50 pounds. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment, in accordance with a plea bargain agreement, at five years confinement, probated, and a $2000 fine. We affirm.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress based on what appellant contends was an illegal arrest that tainted his consent to search the automobile where marihuana was found.
On February 17, 1989, Houston Police Officer M.L. Gant was assigned to the Narcotics Division, Airport Detail. Gant testified he received a telephone call around 4:00 p.m. from a Drug Enforcement Agency agent named Sosa, who was stationed at the airport in Atlanta. Sosa informed Gant a male suspect came to the counter and purchased one-way tickets to Houston for himself and a female. The suspect paid for the tickets in cash and was acting very nervous; he acted like he didn’t know what name to give the ticket agent when she was issuing the tickets. Sosa thought it was possible the male suspect might be involved in a narcotics transaction, and she gave Gant a full description of him.
Gant and a fellow officer, Bernias, observed the two suspects leaving the plane with two other males in Houston. The suspects appeared to be nervous and were glancing back over their shoulders as they walked down the concourse. When they reached the main lobby, they met appellant. The suspects and appellant shook hands, began talking, and walked toward the luggage area. After bypassing the luggage area, they proceeded toward the exit for private and passenger cars, which is at a different end of the terminal than the exit for taxis.
The officers, who were not in uniform, walked up and identified themselves as police officers to appellant and his companions. The female continued walking toward the exit, where Gant caught up with her and asked her to come back into the terminal. After she returned to the group, she stated that she was not flying with the others. The officer then asked for her ticket, and she pointed to one of the male suspects to indicate that he had the ticket. She acted scared. The police asked the group if they would mind talking with the officers. The suspects agreed to the questioning.
Bernias spoke with appellant, while Gant spoke with the others about two to four feet away. Bernias asked appellant whether he knew the other men in the group, and appellant said no. When Bernias asked why appellant had approached the other people and had shaken their hands, his answer was that he was a friendly type and was just talking to them. Appellant said he had come to the airport to pick up his girlfriend, and that he had arrived in a taxi. Bernias asked appellant if he would stick around while Bernias asked the other folks some questions. According to appellant’s testimony, he stayed, but he believed he could have walked out if he had wanted to.
While Bernias was talking to appellant, Gant was talking to the other people. He told the group he had information from Atlanta, he asked if the suspects were transporting narcotics, and he asked if he could look through the female suspect’s purse. The female became irate and dumped the contents of her purse out on the floor. The purse contained several small pieces of marihuana and a bag with $5,000 in cash. The female suspect was acting angry and was crying.
Bernias then assisted Gant in interviewing Mr. Lipsey, one of the other suspects. $25,000 in cash was found in Mr. Lipsey’s jacket.
[514] The officers then asked the suspects and appellant to move to a more private place, and they all walked to the customs area. Access to this area is by coded card, and the enclosure is not open to the public. Someone on the inside opened the door when the officers knocked. Once in the customs area, Gant asked one of the male suspects if he would mind if the police searched his bag. The police found another $5,000.
While in the customs area, appellant was questioned repeatedly by Officer Bernias about how he came to the airport. Appellant reiterated that he used a taxi. Officer Bernias then asked appellant if he had car keys. Appellant stated he had car keys, but that his car was at home. After the officer asked appellant again about the location of his car, appellant said his car was outside in the parking lot. Bernias then asked appellant if he would show the officer his car, and appellant agreed. The officer walked outside, following appellant, and requested permission to look in the car and search the trunk. Bernias said he advised appellant at least three times that he had the right to refuse to allow the search. After appellant consented, Bernias found a duffel bag in the trunk that contained marihuana. Bernias then handcuffed appellant and read him his Miranda1 warnings.
Appellant testified he did not consent to the search of his automobile, and he repeatedly asked to call a lawyer. The officers said appellant did not ask to call a lawyer.
In four points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of his illegal arrest and questioning, including the search of his automobile, because: (1) the police conduct in stopping him constituted an illegal arrest; (2) his detention was for an unreasonable period of time without reasonable cause for suspicion that he had committed a crime; (3) the police conduct in taking him to the nonpublic customs clear-anee area constituted an illegal arrest; and (4) the search of his automobile and the seizure of the marihuana were not conducted pursuant to a valid consent by appellant, but were the result of coercion by police officers.2
The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses in a pretrial hearing and, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed. Freeman v. State, 723 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Walker v. State, 588 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980). On appellate review, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Walker, 588 S.W.2d at 924.
Applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably concluded from the evidence:
1. The initial encounter between appellant and the police in the open lobby area by the exit door did not constitute a detention or a stop.
2. When the officers, appellant, and the other suspects moved to the customs area, appellant was “seized” or “detained” at that point, for investigatory purposes, but appellant was not under arrest.
3. The lawful investigatory detention was temporary and lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and therefore the detention did not constitute an arrest requiring probable cause.
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OPINION
MIRABAL, Justice.
After the trial court overruled a motion to suppress evidence, appellant, Francisco Perez, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of marihuana in a usuable quantity of more than five pounds and less than 50 pounds. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment, in accordance with a plea bargain agreement, at five years confinement, probated, and a $2000 fine. We affirm.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress based on what appellant contends was an illegal arrest that tainted his consent to search the automobile where marihuana was found.
On February 17, 1989, Houston Police Officer M.L. Gant was assigned to the Narcotics Division, Airport Detail. Gant testified he received a telephone call around 4:00 p.m. from a Drug Enforcement Agency agent named Sosa, who was stationed at the airport in Atlanta. Sosa informed Gant a male suspect came to the counter and purchased one-way tickets to Houston for himself and a female. The suspect paid for the tickets in cash and was acting very nervous; he acted like he didn’t know what name to give the ticket agent when she was issuing the tickets. Sosa thought it was possible the male suspect might be involved in a narcotics transaction, and she gave Gant a full description of him.
Gant and a fellow officer, Bernias, observed the two suspects leaving the plane with two other males in Houston. The suspects appeared to be nervous and were glancing back over their shoulders as they walked down the concourse. When they reached the main lobby, they met appellant. The suspects and appellant shook hands, began talking, and walked toward the luggage area. After bypassing the luggage area, they proceeded toward the exit for private and passenger cars, which is at a different end of the terminal than the exit for taxis.
The officers, who were not in uniform, walked up and identified themselves as police officers to appellant and his companions. The female continued walking toward the exit, where Gant caught up with her and asked her to come back into the terminal. After she returned to the group, she stated that she was not flying with the others. The officer then asked for her ticket, and she pointed to one of the male suspects to indicate that he had the ticket. She acted scared. The police asked the group if they would mind talking with the officers. The suspects agreed to the questioning.
Bernias spoke with appellant, while Gant spoke with the others about two to four feet away. Bernias asked appellant whether he knew the other men in the group, and appellant said no. When Bernias asked why appellant had approached the other people and had shaken their hands, his answer was that he was a friendly type and was just talking to them. Appellant said he had come to the airport to pick up his girlfriend, and that he had arrived in a taxi. Bernias asked appellant if he would stick around while Bernias asked the other folks some questions. According to appellant’s testimony, he stayed, but he believed he could have walked out if he had wanted to.
While Bernias was talking to appellant, Gant was talking to the other people. He told the group he had information from Atlanta, he asked if the suspects were transporting narcotics, and he asked if he could look through the female suspect’s purse. The female became irate and dumped the contents of her purse out on the floor. The purse contained several small pieces of marihuana and a bag with $5,000 in cash. The female suspect was acting angry and was crying.
Bernias then assisted Gant in interviewing Mr. Lipsey, one of the other suspects. $25,000 in cash was found in Mr. Lipsey’s jacket.
[514] The officers then asked the suspects and appellant to move to a more private place, and they all walked to the customs area. Access to this area is by coded card, and the enclosure is not open to the public. Someone on the inside opened the door when the officers knocked. Once in the customs area, Gant asked one of the male suspects if he would mind if the police searched his bag. The police found another $5,000.
While in the customs area, appellant was questioned repeatedly by Officer Bernias about how he came to the airport. Appellant reiterated that he used a taxi. Officer Bernias then asked appellant if he had car keys. Appellant stated he had car keys, but that his car was at home. After the officer asked appellant again about the location of his car, appellant said his car was outside in the parking lot. Bernias then asked appellant if he would show the officer his car, and appellant agreed. The officer walked outside, following appellant, and requested permission to look in the car and search the trunk. Bernias said he advised appellant at least three times that he had the right to refuse to allow the search. After appellant consented, Bernias found a duffel bag in the trunk that contained marihuana. Bernias then handcuffed appellant and read him his Miranda1 warnings.
Appellant testified he did not consent to the search of his automobile, and he repeatedly asked to call a lawyer. The officers said appellant did not ask to call a lawyer.
In four points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of his illegal arrest and questioning, including the search of his automobile, because: (1) the police conduct in stopping him constituted an illegal arrest; (2) his detention was for an unreasonable period of time without reasonable cause for suspicion that he had committed a crime; (3) the police conduct in taking him to the nonpublic customs clear-anee area constituted an illegal arrest; and (4) the search of his automobile and the seizure of the marihuana were not conducted pursuant to a valid consent by appellant, but were the result of coercion by police officers.2
The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses in a pretrial hearing and, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed. Freeman v. State, 723 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Walker v. State, 588 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980). On appellate review, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Walker, 588 S.W.2d at 924.
Applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably concluded from the evidence:
1. The initial encounter between appellant and the police in the open lobby area by the exit door did not constitute a detention or a stop.
2. When the officers, appellant, and the other suspects moved to the customs area, appellant was “seized” or “detained” at that point, for investigatory purposes, but appellant was not under arrest.
3. The lawful investigatory detention was temporary and lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and therefore the detention did not constitute an arrest requiring probable cause.
4. Appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his car, and the consent was not tainted by any illegal detention.
Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search of his car.
[515] No stop or detention occurs, for fourth amendment purposes, if a police officer merely approaches a person in a public place and asks questions, as long as the person is free to walk away. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98,103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Holladay v. State, 805 S.W.2d 464, 471 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702, 704-706 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer during the questioning, without more, does not convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification, Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-OS, 103 S.Ct. at 1323-24; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877-78, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (5-4 decision).
In the present case, when appellant and his three companions were near the private car exit of a crowded Intercontinental Airport, the police officers, in plain clothes, came up to them, identified themselves as police officers, and asked if they would mind talking. Appellant and the others said they didn’t mind talking. Officer Bernias testified that, if appellant and his companions had said they didn’t want to talk to the officers, the officers would have just let them go. Officer Gant testified appellant and his friends were told they could leave. Appellant testified and acknowledged that, even after the female suspect had dumped out her purse on the floor, appellant supposed he “still could have walked out the door.”
It is relevant that one police officer spoke with appellant, while another police officer spoke with the described suspect and his companions, two to four feet away. The officer speaking to appellant did not mention the tip they had from Atlanta, did not say he was conducting an investigation, and did not ask to see appellant’s identification. Rather, the officer asked appellant if he knew the other men in the group, and when appellant said “no,” the officer asked why appellant had come to the airport, and asked how he had gotten there. That was the sum total of the officer’s questions to appellant, other than to ask if appellant would mind staying around while the officer asked the other people some questions. Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that, at that point, he thought he was free to go if he wanted to.
In our opinion, the evidence supports the conclusion that a reasonable person, from appellant’s point of view, would have believed he was free to leave. Therefore, the trial court could have reasonably, and properly, concluded there was no seizure of appellant at that point in time. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877-78; United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir.1982); Daniels, 718 S.W.2d at 706.
When the female suspect angrily dumped her purse contents on the floor, they were all in front of the exit doors; the female suspect was mad and crying and causing a scene. The officers then asked the appellant and his three companions if they would mind moving away from the doors to another location. There was a lot of pedestrian traffic around the exit doors at the time. Appellant, his companions, and the officers, moved around the corner to the customs clearance area. A customs agent opened the locked door from the inside to let them in. They met in the very large customs inspection room that has numerous counters for travelers to place their baggage on for inspections. The room is “ten times bigger” than the trial court’s courtroom, “or maybe even larger.” They did not go into the smaller offices; they stood and talked in the large area. At that moment, there were no international passengers deplaning and going through the customs lines.
In our opinion, once appellant was in the customs area, it would have been reasonable for him to believe he was being detained and was not free to leave. However, not all seizures of the person must be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98,103 S.Ct. at 1324-24; Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d at 704. Since a temporary detention represents a lesser intrusion on an individual’s security and integrity than a formal arrest, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the pur[516] pose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580-81, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Temporary detention for questioning on less than probable cause is warranted where the public interest involved is the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious crimes. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-498, 103 S.Ct. at 1323-24.
The fact the suspects were moved to a private area does not, in itself, taint the detention. “[T]here are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory detention, such as from an airport concourse to a more private area.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 504-05, 103 S.Ct. at 1328.
To justify an investigative detention, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts that, in light of the officer’s experience and general knowledge, lead the officer to the reasonable conclusion that criminal activity is underway and that the detained person is connected with the activity. Holladay, 805 S.W.2d at 47; Daniels, 718 S.W.2d at 705; Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Pickens v. State, 712 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref’d). By the time the group moved to the customs area, the officers were aware of the following facts:
* A DEA agent from Atlanta had called Officer Gant and told him a suspect had purchased two one-way tickets to Houston for himself and a female. He paid cash and was extremely nervous; he acted like he didn’t know what name to give the ticket agent when she was issuing the tickets. The Atlanta agent thought it was possible the suspect might be involved in a narcotics transaction, and gave a full description of the suspect.
* The described suspect and his companions appeared very nervous as they deplaned in Houston; as they walked down the concourse, they looked back several times.
* Appellant shook hands with the suspects when they got to the main lobby, and they all proceeded downstairs, past the baggage claim area, and toward the exit for private cars, which is at a different end of the terminal than the exit for taxis.
* When asked, the female suspect told an officer she was not flying with the other suspects, yet when the officer asked to see her ticket, she pointed to one of the male suspects, indicating he had the ticket. She acted scared.
* An officer said he had information from Atlanta, asked if the suspects were transporting narcotics, and asked if he could look through the female suspect’s purse; at that point she became irate and dumped the contents of her purse onto the floor. The purse contained a small bag with $5000 cash, plus several small pieces of marihuana. The female suspect was acting angry and was crying.
* Another officer was speaking to appellant two to four feet away from the group. He asked appellant if he knew the other men in the group, and appellant said “no.” When asked why he had approached the other people and had shaken their hands, his answer was that he was a friendly type and was just talking to them. He said he came to the airport to pick up his girlfriend, and that he had arrived in a taxi. The officer asked appellant if he would stick around while he asked the other people some questions; appellant stayed, although he believed he could have walked out if he wanted to.
* The same officer who had spoken to appellant then assisted in interviewing Mr. Lipsey, one of the other suspects. $25,000 in cash was found in Mr. Lip-sey’s jacket.
* At that point, the officers asked if the group would mind moving to a more private place, and then they all walked to the customs inspection area. The officers suggested moving because it was crowded by the exit door and the female was causing a scene, and the officers were suspicious that the group might be involved in illegal activity because “they were lying about a lot of things,” and they were carrying substantial sums of cash.
[517] In our opinion, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, was sufficient to support a conclusion by the trial court that the officers had reasonable suspicion, based on specific, ar-ticulable facts, that led them to the reasonable conclusion that criminal activity was underway, and that appellant was connected with the activity. Therefore, we believe the trial court could have reasonably concluded an investigative detention in a more private part of the airport was justified.
The next issue is whether the detention exceeded the limited scope permissible for seizures on suspicion short of probable cause.
An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 1325-26. The investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. Id. at 501, 103 S.Ct. at 1326. If the detention becomes prolonged, it can no longer be considered an investigative stop; but there is no rigid time limitation on the permissible length of an investigative stop. The propriety of the stop’s duration is judged by assessing whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).
In Sharpe, the Court specifically rejected the contention that a 20 minute stop is unreasonable, per se; the length of the detention alone does not transfer an investigative stop into a de facto arrest. 470 U.S. at 686,105 S.Ct. at 1575. If the police act diligently and reasonably, and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay, a 20-minute detention is not too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop. Id.
In the present case, there was conflicting testimony regarding the length of time the parties were detained in the customs area prior to arrest. Officer Bernias testified the conversations in the hallway by the exit door lasted 10 to 15 minutes, and that a total of 20 to 25 minutes elapsed from the time he observed appellant first shake hands with the other suspects, to the time appellant consented to the search of his vehicle. The trial court could reasonably have concluded the investigatory detention in the customs area lasted between five and 15 minutes.
Further, it is relevant that appellant was not taken to a small room where he was questioned alone by two officers, nor was his checked luggage retrieved by police and brought to the room during his questioning, nor did the police hold onto his identification during the questioning, as occurred in Royer. In the present case, appellant was in a large room, approximately 10 times the size of a court room, and he was conversing with Officer Bernias while the other three suspects were talking with the other officers. They were all standing within a few feet of each other. Officer Bernias testified as follows:
[By Prosecutor]: Q: When you got to the customs [area], what happened then?
[By Bernias]: A: I interviewed Mr. Perez while Sergeant Feiner and Officer Gant were interviewing the other folks.
Q: What was the purpose in interviewing Mr. Perez?
A: His story was he had arrived in a taxicab and I didn’t feel that he had arrived in a taxicab because of the exit he was taking. I asked him several times and each time he said that he had arrived in a taxicab.
I asked him if he had any car keys and his answer was he had car keys in his pocket but his answer was the car is at home.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I asked him again, “Where is your car?”
He told me that his car was located at the parking lot outside.
Q: What did you do at that point?
[518] A: I asked him if he would show me his vehicle.
Q: Where did you go for him to show you the vehicle.
A: After he responded in the positive, I walked out with him and I took Officer Johnson who is an airport police officer and we walked outside.
Q: Did he show you where his vehicle was?
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: When you got to the vehicle, what happened?
A: He walked out the west side of the building to the parking lot closest to the terminal and Mr. Perez showed me a brown Cadillac that he stated was his car.
Q: What did you do next?
A: I asked Mr. Perez if I could look in the car and search the trunk of it.
Q: Did he agree to that?
A: Yes, ma’am, he did.
Q: Did you give him any warnings or tell him anything?
A: After he answered in the positive to allow me to search, I advised him at least three times before I opened the trunk that he had the right to refuse me.
Q: Did he indicate to you he didn’t want you to look in the trunk?
A: No, ma’am. Each time he answered in the positive.
Q: Did he indicate to you he wanted to talk to a lawyer before that?
A: No, ma’am, he did not.
Q: Now, how did you get into the trunk?
A: With his keys. He handed the keys back to me and I used his key to unlock the trunk.
When Officer Bernias opened the trunk, he found a duffel bag that smelled strongly like marihuana. At that point, the officer handcuffed appellant and read him his Miranda warnings. The duffel bag contained approximately 50 pounds of marihuana, having a street value of approximately $35,000.
In our opinion, the evidence supports the conclusion that appellant voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk of his car. If a defendant voluntarily consents to a search of his belongings while he is justifiably being detained on reasonable suspicion, the products of the search are admissible against him. Royer, 460 U.S. at 503, 103 S.Ct. at 1327.
We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the police officers did not exceed the limits of a permissible investigatory detention, and that the fruits of the search were admissible. As stated by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer, each case must be judged on its own facts.
We do not suggest that there is a litmus paper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop. Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, we must render judgment.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 511, 103 S.Ct. at 1331.
We overrule appellant’s four points of error.
We affirm the judgment.
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting.