Perez v. Santiago

59 A.D.3d 692, 873 N.Y.S.2d 734

This text of 59 A.D.3d 692 (Perez v. Santiago) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perez v. Santiago, 59 A.D.3d 692, 873 N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Salvatore Battaglia and Michele Battaglia appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), dated December 3, 2007, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by the plaintiff Sandra Barreto on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendants Salvatore Battaglia and Michele Battaglia which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by the plaintiff Sandra Barreto is granted.

The appellants established, prima facie, that the respondent did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident through the submissions of the respondent’s deposition testimony and the affirmed medical reports of their examining neurologist, orthopedist, and radiologist (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). In opposition, the respondent failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The unaffirmed report of the respondent’s treating physician did not constitute competent medical evidence, and, in any event, was based upon examinations of the respondent made some three years prior to the motion for summary judgment (see Batista v Olivo, 17 AD3d 494 [2005]; Frier v Teague, 288 AD2d 177 [2001]; Hand v Bonura, 283 AD2d 608 [2001]; Mohamed v Dhanasar, 273 AD2d 451 [2000]). In addition, neither [693]*693the respondent nor the physician who examined her for purposes of opposing the summary judgment motion adequately discussed the three-year period of time between the cessation of her medical treatments and the more recent examination. Moreover, there was no competent medical evidence to substantiate the examining physician’s claim of a bulging lumbar disc. Indeed, the respondent’s own submissions indicated that the MRI taken shortly after the accident did not reveal any disc bulges or herniations, or any other injuries. Furthermore, the respondent failed to proffer competent medical evidence that she was unable to perform substantially all of her daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days subsequent to the subject accident (see Sainte-Aime v Ho, 274 AD2d 569 [2000]; DiNunzio v County of Suffolk, 256 AD2d 498 [1998]). Skelos, J.P., Santucci, Angiolillo, Dickerson and Chambers, JJ., concur.

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Related

Toure v. Avis Rent a Car Systems, Inc.
774 N.E.2d 1197 (New York Court of Appeals, 2002)
Gaddy v. Eyler
591 N.E.2d 1176 (New York Court of Appeals, 1992)
Batista v. Olivo
17 A.D.3d 494 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
DiNunzio v. County of Suffolk
256 A.D.2d 498 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1998)
Mohamed v. Dhanasar
273 A.D.2d 451 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)
Sainte-Aime v. Ho
274 A.D.2d 569 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)
Hand v. Bonura
283 A.D.2d 608 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2001)
Frier v. Teague
288 A.D.2d 177 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
59 A.D.3d 692, 873 N.Y.S.2d 734, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-santiago-nyappdiv-2009.