1 WO MH 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Eric Perez, No. CV 19-05602-PHX-MTL (JFM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Charles L. Ryan, et al., 13 Defendants.
14 15 On November 8, 2019, Plaintiff Eric Perez, who is in the custody of the Arizona 16 Department of Corrections (ADC) and is represented by counsel, filed a civil rights 17 Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 15, 2020, he filed a Motion for 18 Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 4). Plaintiff has paid the 19 filing and administrative fees. 20 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 22 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 24 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 25 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 26 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 27 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 1 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 2 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 3 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 5 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 8 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 9 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 10 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 11 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 12 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 13 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 14 II. Complaint 15 In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues former ADC Director Charles L. Ryan; 16 current ADC Director David Shinn; Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis Warden 17 Berry Larson; ASPC-Lewis Assistant Deputy Warden Lindsay Chavez; Correctional 18 Officers (COs) Denault, Palomino, Coscorelli, Hill, Wickware, Reyes, and Soliz; Sergeants 19 Fink, Aven, and Parra; and Nurse Raymond Ramirez for violations of the Eighth 20 Amendment. Plaintiff is seeking money damages, along with attorney’s fees and costs. 21 The following factual summary derives from Plaintiff’s Complaint and is taken as true 22 solely for the purposes of the statutory screening process. 23 Plaintiff states that he had a history of assisting the Tucson Police Department 24 (“TPD”) prior to entering Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) custody in March 25 2015. (Doc. 1 at 6.) A TPD Lieutenant and the Assistant Legal Defender wrote letters to 26 the Judge, recommending that Plaintiff be housed in protective custody due to Plaintiff’s 27 purported role as a confidential informant. (Id. at 7.) 28 Plaintiff was housed at the Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis. On 1 November 9, 2017, when Plaintiff returned to his cell after showering, Plaintiff alleges that 2 Defendant Denault opened all the cell doors in Plaintiff’s pod, “knowing that [Plaintiff] 3 would be assaulted as a result.” (Id.) Two inmates, “Monster” and “Insane,” proceeded to 4 run into Plaintiff’s cell; assault him by punching him in the face; and leave, locking the cell 5 door behind them. (Id.) 6 Later that day, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Fink and Aven escorted him to 7 speak with Defendant Chavez, leaving Plaintiff’s cell door open so that, as Plaintiff claims, 8 other prisoners could steal his belongings. (Id. at 8-9.) Defendant Chavez told Plaintiff 9 that the CO who had been working in the control room had alleged that Plaintiff exposed 10 himself to her while he was in the shower. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff denied the accusation and 11 suggested that Defendant Chavez “check the pod camera recording.” (Id.) Plaintiff was 12 then escorted by Defendants Fink and Aven to the Inmate Movement Office to receive a 13 change in housing. (Id.) 14 After being rehoused,1 Plaintiff explained his situation to his new inmate, “Mono.” 15 Both Mono and Plaintiff believed they had been housed together so that Mono could assault 16 Plaintiff. (Id.) Mono allegedly sent another inmate, “30,” to Plaintiff’s former pod; 30 17 reported to Plaintiff that inmates in Plaintiff’s former pod were circulating rumors that 18 Plaintiff was a confidential informant and had exposed himself to Defendant Denault. (Id. 19 at 10.) 20 After lunch the next day, Defendant Palomino allegedly opened all the pod’s doors 21 by using the “security override” feature. (Id.) At that point, 30 entered Plaintiff’s cell and 22 assaulted him, punching him in the face and body. (Id.) Plaintiff says that 30 told him the 23 “‘staff’ wanted [Plaintiff] to get ‘f---ed up’ in retaliation for exposing himself to another 24 CO” and that after he had been assaulted, he would be forgiven. (Id. at 10-11.) Later that 25 day, Plaintiff was moved to a new cell in the Buckley Unit. (Id. at 11.) There, one of the 26 inmates allegedly told Plaintiff that the COs had announced during mealtime that Plaintiff
27 1 It appears Plaintiff was moved to ASPC-Lewis’s Buckley Unit. 28 1 had exposed himself to a female CO. (Id.) Plaintiff was then transferred to the Refuse to 2 House (“RTH”) Unit. (Id.) 3 On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff was told by two inmates who had heard he was 4 coming from the RTH Unit, “You better not come out, if you do you’re getting f---ed up.” 5 (Id.) Plaintiff asked a CO who had witnessed the exchange if he would write an Incident 6 Report. (Id.) The CO agreed. (Id.) Later that day, Plaintiff received a letter from an 7 inmate in 4-D pod who stated that Plaintiff “had better not go to 4-D Pod” or he would get 8 “smashed.” (Id.) The letter also stated that people were “waiting for [Plaintiff] and that 9 CO ‘Costco’”—Defendant Coscorelli—“had already filled everyone in about [Plaintiff] 10 having exposed himself to [Defendant] Denault.” (Id.) That night, Plaintiff’s mother 11 advised Defendant Chavez that her son was in a dangerous situation because staff and 12 inmates had been “spreading rumors about him and allowing assaults.” (Id. at 12.) 13 On November 17, 2017, Defendants Hill and Wickware allegedly allowed an inmate 14 to enter the RTH Unit and announce to several cells that Plaintiff was an “S.O.,” or sex- 15 offender, and that inmates would be compensated with drugs if they “smash[ed]” him. (Id.) 16 At 11:30 that night, Defendant Reyes and another CO allegedly opened the cell doors of 17 four inmates who then entered Plaintiff’s cell, assaulted him, and left, locking the door 18 behind them. (Id.) As a result of that assault, Plaintiff claims he sustained injuries to his 19 face, ribs, and teeth. (Id. at 12, 13.) 20 On November 19, 2017, Plaintiff visited Defendant Ramirez, a nurse, for the injuries 21 to his head, face, and chest. (Id.) Defendant Ramirez wrote that Plaintiff’s breathing was 22 painful but that he showed no signs of distress. (Id.) He also gave Plaintiff ibuprofen and 23 an order for medical ice. (Id.) Ramirez did not send Plaintiff to a provider for examination, 24 however, and Plaintiff was not seen by a dentist until four months later. (Id.) 25 On November 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed an informal complaint regarding the assault. 26 On December 2, 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from an inmate “Solo” warning of 27 additional assaults. (Id.) The following day, Plaintiff told a CO II that he feared for his 28 life and needed to be transferred. (Id.) That CO II took Plaintiff to the Inmate Movement 1 Office, where Plaintiff then wrote out a statement regarding the November 17, 2017 assault 2 and provided four threatening letters that he had received from other inmates. (Id. at 14.) 3 Defendant Parra attached the letters to Plaintiff’s statement and, according to Plaintiff, 4 advised Plaintiff that he had heard about staff directing attacks against Plaintiff and would 5 document all the information he had obtained about the assault. (Id.) 6 Plaintiff was then transferred to Bachman Detention Unit, where he was housed 7 with two inmates who told Plaintiff they had heard from staff that Plaintiff was a 8 confidential informant who had exposed himself to a female CO. (Id.) They also stated 9 that they planned to “f--- him up.” (Id.) Plaintiff notified staff about their threat and was 10 moved to the Stiner Unit. (Id.) 11 On December 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Health Needs Request (“HNR”) seeking 12 treatment for the pain in his ribs and surrounding area. (Id.) Three days later, he filed 13 another HNR in which he provided a more detailed account of his injuries, stated that he 14 was in severe pain, and that he was experiencing blurred vision as a result of the blows he 15 had suffered to his head. (Id. at 14-15.) On December 11, 2017, Plaintiff was seen by a 16 nurse, who told Plaintiff he would be sent for x-rays later that week. (Id. at 15.) 17 On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff had x-rays taken at the medical complex, where 18 he also spoke to a CO who allegedly confirmed that other COs had said they would not 19 help Plaintiff because he was a “piece of s---.” (Id. at 16.) The following day, Plaintiff was 20 transferred to Rast Max Unit. (Id.) Plaintiff’s new cellmate said he knew about the alleged 21 exposure incident and Plaintiff’s confidential informant status and told Plaintiff he needed 22 to leave the pod. (Id.) 23 On December 17, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an HNR requesting a psychological 24 appointment and a transfer to the pod for seriously mentally ill inmates (“SMI”) inmates. 25 (Id.) The following day, just before midnight, Plaintiff was transferred to a new cell in an 26 unidentified unit. (Id.) 27 On December 21, 2017, Plaintiff submitted another HNR, stating that he continued 28 to suffer “tremendous pain” in his ribs. (Id.) On January 2, 2018, Defendant Soliz 1 allegedly told Plaintiff’s neighbor inmate that he should not “mess with” Plaintiff because 2 Plaintiff was a confidential informant. (Id.) Later that day, Soliz told other inmates in the 3 pod the same thing. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff claims that Soliz also instructed another inmate 4 to tamper with Plaintiff’s foodtrap door so that Plaintiff would get in trouble.2 (Id.) 5 On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed an appeal from his November 27, 2017 6 grievance, to which he had received no reply. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff also asked to speak with 7 a sergeant about his housing situation. (Id.) At some point, Plaintiff submitted another 8 HNR concerning the pain in his ribs and was seen on the nurse’s line. 9 On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff submitted another HNR concerning the pain in his 10 ribs. (Id. at 20.) On February 5, 2018, he was seen on the nurse’s line. On February 6, 11 2018, he filed another HNR concerning his rib pain, headaches, and blurred vision. (Id.) 12 He was seen for these conditions on February 8, 2018. (Id.) On February 21, 2018, he was 13 seen by on-site dental urgent care for severe pain in his upper front teeth. (Id.) On March 14 14, 2018, Plaintiff was seen by a dentist. (Id.) The dentist noted considerable damage in 15 three of his teeth and recommended extraction of one tooth. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, 16 the trauma he had suffered during the November 17, 2017 assault caused the nerves in his 17 tooth to become necrotic. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff elected to have a root canal instead of an 18 extraction “in an effort to save his front teeth for as long as possible.” (Id.) But the teeth 19 eventually had to be extracted. (Id. at 22.) 20 On May 30, 2018, Plaintiff had a classification review. (Id. at 21.) Although 21 Plaintiff wished to be reclassified out of maximum custody, he did not feel safe anywhere 22 in ASPC-Lewis and was unable to go to “SMI table time,” recreation, or “CO classes” 23 because he believed his life was in danger. (Id. at 22.) 24 On December 1, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an HNR requesting an appointment with 25 an eye doctor because he was still experiencing blurred vision and headaches. (Id.) 26 Plaintiff says that he is unable to read for any length of time without getting a painful
27 2 According to Plaintiff, “[t]ampering with a foodtrap door is a punishable offense 28 that leads to loss of privile[]ges and other disciplinary actions against the person whose foodtrap door is tampered with.” (Doc. 1 at 18.) 1 headache, and his teeth eventually had to be extracted. (Id.) In addition, dangerous rumors 2 continue to follow Plaintiff and cause him to live in a state of fear for his life. (Id. at 22.) 3 In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a failure-to-protect claim, alleging that Defendants 4 Denault, Fink, Chavez, Palomino, Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, Reyes, and Soliz spread 5 rumors about Plaintiff’s confidential informant status and alleged act of exposure even 6 though they knew such rumors would put him in danger. According to Plaintiff, these 7 Defendants also failed to prevent the harm they knew would result from such rumors, 8 thereby causing Plaintiff to be assaulted and injured, in violation of his Eighth Amendment 9 rights. (Id.) 10 In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts a failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claim, 11 alleging that Defendants Ryan, Larson, Fink, Aven,3 Chavez, and Parra maintain an 12 unwritten custom and practice of permitting front-line correctional officers—including 13 Defendants Denault, Fink, Chavez, Palomino, Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, Reyes, and 14 Soliz—to control prisoners by spreading rumors that they know will prompt assaults and 15 that this custom and practice caused him to be assaulted and injured. 16 In Count Three, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ramirez failed to provide 17 constitutionally adequate medical care when he refused to send Plaintiff to a provider for 18 examination, despite his knowledge that Plaintiff had potentially serious injuries. 19 According to Plaintiff, Ramirez’s conduct led to the extraction of teeth that could have 20 been saved by timely dental intervention. 21 III. Failure to State a Claim 22 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 23 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 24 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 25 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 26
27 3 Although Defendant Aven is not listed in Count Two, he is included among the Defendants identified elsewhere as the “Supervisory Defendants,” and is not named in any 28 other count. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Accordingly, the Court construes Count Two as having been asserted against Defendant Aven. 1 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 2 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 3 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371- 4 72, 377 (1976). 5 A. Defendant Fink 6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fink left Plaintiff’s cell door open so that other 7 prisoners could steal his belongings while Plaintiff was speaking with Defendant Chavez. 8 This allegation is not sufficient to state a claim for failure to protect against Defendant 9 Fink, as there is no indication that the failure to close Plaintiff’s cell door on that occasion 10 placed him at substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 11 (1994) (to state a claim for threat to safety under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must 12 allege facts to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk 13 of serious harm and that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks). 14 Moreover, any loss of property that Plaintiff suffered as a result of Fink’s conduct 15 is not compensable under § 1983. A claim for lost property would arise, if at all, under the 16 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “[T]he Due Process Clause is simply 17 not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, 18 liberty, or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Even unauthorized 19 and intentional deprivations of property do not violate the procedural requirements of the 20 Due Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available. 21 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The availability of a common-law tort suit 22 against a state employee constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Id. at 534-35. 23 Moreover, Arizona provides a meaningful and adequate post-deprivation remedy through 24 the prison grievance system, specifically Department Order (DO) 909(8.0) (formerly DO 25 909.09). Dennison v. Ryan, 522 F. App’x 414, 417-18 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing DO 909.09); 26 Aldrete v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 2011 WL 30959, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2011) (same); see 27 also Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 918 (9th Cir. 2000) (both state tort claims and prison 28 grievance procedures provide adequate post-deprivation remedies). Accordingly, the 1 Court will dismiss Count One insofar as it asserts a claim against Defendant Fink. 2 B. Defendant Ramirez 3 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 4 violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must 5 allege (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition 6 could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain 7 and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 8 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 9 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 10 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both 11 know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware 12 of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 13 exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate 14 indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond 15 to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 16 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official 17 intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison 18 doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 19 (1976); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 20 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due 21 care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross 22 negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of Corr., 23 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 24 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical 25 malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does not 26 amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 27 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is 28 insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley 1 v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference 2 must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction 3 of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 4 At best, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Ramirez suggest that Ramirez was 5 negligent. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts regarding his appointment with Ramirez 6 to show that Ramirez was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. 7 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in Count Three, and this Count will be 8 dismissed. 9 C. Official Capacity Claims 10 Assuming that Defendants Denault, Palomino, Chavez, Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, 11 Reyes, and Soliz could be sued in their official capacities, such claims would be duplicative 12 of the official capacity claims asserted in Count Two. Accordingly, the official capacity 13 claims against these Defendants will be dismissed. 14 IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will Be Required 15 Plaintiff has stated a claim in Count One against Defendants Denault, Chavez, 16 Palomino, Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, Reyes, and Soliz in their individual capacities. 17 Plaintiff has also stated a claim in Count Two against Defendant Shinn in his official 18 capacity and Defendants Ryan, Larson, Fink, Aven, Chavez, and Parra in their individual 19 and official capacities. 20 V. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 21 In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiff 22 seeks an order requiring Defendants to transfer Plaintiff to a facility where he will be safe 23 from attacks. According to the Motion, Plaintiff was stabbed by Inmate “Monster” on 24 December 19, 2019, despite the fact that Monster had attacked Plaintiff two years prior, as 25 described in the Complaint, and should never have been allowed to gain access to Plaintiff. 26 Based on this incident, Plaintiff argues that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his 27 failure to protect and failure to train and supervise claims; (2) he is likely to suffer 28 irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction because Defendants have continued to 1 expose him to a risk of attack by other inmates; (3) the balance of equities tips in Plaintiff’s 2 favor; and (4) the public interest favors an injunction. 3 Defendants Denault, Chavez, Palomino, Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, Reyes, Soliz 4 Shinn, Larson, Fink, Aven, and Parra will be required to respond to the Motion.4 5 IT IS ORDERED: 6 (1) Count One is dismissed as against Defendant Fink. 7 (2) Count Three is dismissed. 8 (3) Defendant Ramirez is dismissed. 9 (4) The official capacity claims against Defendants Denault, Palomino, 10 Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, Reyes, and Soliz are dismissed. 11 (5) The following Defendants must answer, or otherwise respond by appropriate 12 motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal 13 Rules of Civil Procedure, to the following portions of the Complaint: 14 (a) Defendants Denault, Chavez, Palomino, Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, 15 Reyes, and Soliz must answer Count One, in their individual 16 capacities; 17 (b) Defendants Ryan, Larson, Fink, Aven, Chavez, and Parra, must 18 answer Count Two in their individual and official capacities; and 19 (c) Defendant Shinn must answer Count Two in his official capacity. 20 (6) Plaintiff must either serve each Defendant or seek a waiver of service for 21 each Defendant. 22 (7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 23 complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 90 days of the 24 filing of the Complaint, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. 25 R. Civ. P. 4(m). 26
27 4 Because Defendant Ryan no longer serves as the Director of the Arizona 28 Department of Corrections, he will not be required to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion seeking prospective injunctive relief. 1 (8) Within 7 days of being served with the Complaint and the Motion for 2| Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, Defendants Denault, Chavez, | Palomino, Coscorelli, Wickware, Hill, Reyes, Soliz, Shinn, Larson, Fink, Aven, and Parra 4} must file a response to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiff may file a reply within 5 days of service of Defendants’ response. 6 (9) | Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that 8 | does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 9 (10) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 11 | authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is assigned to the standard track pursuant to 12 | Rule 16.2(b)(3) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 Dated this 21st day of January, 2020. 14
Michael T. Liburdi 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28