Perez v. Ozone Park Lumber

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Perez v. Ozone Park Lumber

290 A.D.2d 427, 738 N.Y.S.2d 580, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 251

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 14, 2002

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 290 A.D.2d 427 (Perez v. Ozone Park Lumber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Perez v. Ozone Park Lumber, 290 A.D.2d 427, 738 N.Y.S.2d 580, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 251 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barron, J.), dated August 29, 2001, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the third-party complaint is dismissed.

The third-party defendant met its burden of proving, by competent admissible evidence (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Fitzpatrick v Chase Manhattan Bank, 285 AD2d 487), that the plaintiffs injuries did not rise to the level of “grave injuries” within the meaning of Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 (see, Castro v United Container Mach. Group, 96 NY2d 398; Dunn v Smithtown Bancorp, 286 AD2d 701; Fitzpatrick v Chase Manhattan Bank, supra; Curran v Auto Lab Serv. Ctr., 280 AD2d 636; Ibarra v Equipment Control, 268 AD2d 13). In opposition to the motion, the third-party plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the third-party defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. S. Miller, J.P., O’Brien, McGinity, Schmidt and Townes, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barron, J.), dated August 29, 2001, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the third-party complaint is dismissed.

The third-party defendant met its burden of proving, by competent admissible evidence (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Fitzpatrick v Chase Manhattan Bank, 285 AD2d 487), that the plaintiffs injuries did not rise to the level of “grave injuries” within the meaning of Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 (see, Castro v United Container Mach. Group, 96 NY2d 398; Dunn v Smithtown Bancorp, 286 AD2d 701; Fitzpatrick v Chase Manhattan Bank, supra; Curran v Auto Lab Serv. Ctr., 280 AD2d 636; Ibarra v Equipment Control, 268 AD2d 13). In opposition to the motion, the third-party plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the third-party defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. S. Miller, J.P., O’Brien, McGinity, Schmidt and Townes, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

290 A.D.2d 427, 738 N.Y.S.2d 580, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-ozone-park-lumber-nyappdiv-2002.

Opinion

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