Perez v. New York City Housing Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Perez v. New York City Housing Authority

99 A.D.3d 624, 952 N.Y.2d 876

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 25, 2012

StatusPublished

This text of 99 A.D.3d 624 (Perez v. New York City Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Perez v. New York City Housing Authority, 99 A.D.3d 624, 952 N.Y.2d 876 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).

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Opinion

Respondent’s determination has a rational basis. The evidence shows that petitioner did not become an authorized occupant of her grandmother’s apartment prior to the latter’s death in February 2007 (see Matter of Valentin v New York City Hous. Auth., 72 AD3d 486 [1st Dept 2010]). Even if the grandmother’s Permanent Permission Request to add petitioner and petitioner’s daughter to her family composition had not been denied, petitioner would still have been ineligible for [625]*625remaining-family-member status, since the request was submitted only weeks before the grandmother died and petitioner would not have satisfied the one-year continuous authorized occupancy requirement (see Matter of Daniels v New York City Hous. Auth., 66 AD3d 579 [1st Dept 2009]).

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondent did not implicitly approve of her residence in the apartment. A governmental agency cannot be estopped from discharging its statutory duties when a claimant does not meet the eligibility requirements for succession rights to the apartment, even if the managing agent acquiesced in petitioner’s occupancy (see Matter of Schorr v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 10 NY3d 776 [2008]; Taylor v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 73 AD3d 634 [1st Dept 2010]). Moreover, petitioner’s mental health and her status as a single parent whose daughter is asthmatic are mitigating factors and hardships that the hearing officer was not required to consider (see Matter of Fermin v New York City Hous. Auth., 67 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2009]). Nor did the payment of rent by petitioner confer succession rights on her (see Matter of Adler v New York City Hous. Auth., 95 AD3d 694 [1st Dept 2012]).

We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Gonzalez, P.J., Moskowitz, Acosta, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.

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Respondent’s determination has a rational basis. The evidence shows that petitioner did not become an authorized occupant of her grandmother’s apartment prior to the latter’s death in February 2007 (see Matter of Valentin v New York City Hous. Auth., 72 AD3d 486 [1st Dept 2010]). Even if the grandmother’s Permanent Permission Request to add petitioner and petitioner’s daughter to her family composition had not been denied, petitioner would still have been ineligible for [625]*625remaining-family-member status, since the request was submitted only weeks before the grandmother died and petitioner would not have satisfied the one-year continuous authorized occupancy requirement (see Matter of Daniels v New York City Hous. Auth., 66 AD3d 579 [1st Dept 2009]).

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondent did not implicitly approve of her residence in the apartment. A governmental agency cannot be estopped from discharging its statutory duties when a claimant does not meet the eligibility requirements for succession rights to the apartment, even if the managing agent acquiesced in petitioner’s occupancy (see Matter of Schorr v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 10 NY3d 776 [2008]; Taylor v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 73 AD3d 634 [1st Dept 2010]). Moreover, petitioner’s mental health and her status as a single parent whose daughter is asthmatic are mitigating factors and hardships that the hearing officer was not required to consider (see Matter of Fermin v New York City Hous. Auth., 67 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2009]). Nor did the payment of rent by petitioner confer succession rights on her (see Matter of Adler v New York City Hous. Auth., 95 AD3d 694 [1st Dept 2012]).

We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Gonzalez, P.J., Moskowitz, Acosta, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.

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99 A.D.3d 624, 952 N.Y.2d 876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-new-york-city-housing-authority-nyappdiv-2012.

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