Perez v. Moshulu Footcare

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Perez v. Moshulu Footcare

1 A.D.3d 209, 767 N.Y.S.2d 221, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11924

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 18, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 1 A.D.3d 209 (Perez v. Moshulu Footcare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Perez v. Moshulu Footcare, 1 A.D.3d 209, 767 N.Y.S.2d 221, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11924 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Kenneth Thompson, J.), entered on or about May 16, 2002, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the action as time-barred, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This action for podiatric malpractice, commenced in November 1999, was properly dismissed as time-barred in light of testimonial and documentary evidence indicating that plaintiff was last treated by defendant doctor in October 1996 (see CPLR 214-a). Although plaintiff contends that her treatment with defendant continued beyond that date, the record does not contain evidence probative of that contention, much less that the claimed treatment continued sufficiently long to come within the statutory period (see e.g. De Peralta v Presbyterian Hosp., 121 AD2d 346 [1986]).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find [210]*210them unavailing. Concur—Saxe, J.P, Sullivan, Rosenberger, Friedman and Gonzalez, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Kenneth Thompson, J.), entered on or about May 16, 2002, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the action as time-barred, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

This action for podiatric malpractice, commenced in November 1999, was properly dismissed as time-barred in light of testimonial and documentary evidence indicating that plaintiff was last treated by defendant doctor in October 1996 (see CPLR 214-a). Although plaintiff contends that her treatment with defendant continued beyond that date, the record does not contain evidence probative of that contention, much less that the claimed treatment continued sufficiently long to come within the statutory period (see e.g. De Peralta v Presbyterian Hosp., 121 AD2d 346 [1986]).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find [210]*210them unavailing. Concur—Saxe, J.P, Sullivan, Rosenberger, Friedman and Gonzalez, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

1 A.D.3d 209, 767 N.Y.S.2d 221, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11924, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-moshulu-footcare-nyappdiv-2003.

Opinion

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