Perez v. Lochard

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Perez v. Lochard

7 A.D.3d 349, 775 N.Y.S.2d 862, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6740

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 13, 2004

StatusPublished

This text of 7 A.D.3d 349 (Perez v. Lochard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Perez v. Lochard, 7 A.D.3d 349, 775 N.Y.S.2d 862, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6740 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Barry Salman, J.), entered on or about September 11, 2003, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant landlord argues that she took reasonable measures to close her building and that plaintiff was merely a squatter at the building whose injury by reason of the building’s concededly hazardous condition was not foreseeable and, accordingly, was not an eventuality for which she may be held accountable. However, the evidence adduced on the motion raises triable issues as to whether defendant did in fact close her building, or at least take reasonable measures to do so, and as to whether de[350]*350fendant knew or should have known that her building was being used for residential purposes, despite its unsafe condition (see Scurti v City of New York, 40 NY2d 433 [1976]). Concur— Tom, J.P., Andrias, Sullivan, Ellerin and Williams, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Barry Salman, J.), entered on or about September 11, 2003, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant landlord argues that she took reasonable measures to close her building and that plaintiff was merely a squatter at the building whose injury by reason of the building’s concededly hazardous condition was not foreseeable and, accordingly, was not an eventuality for which she may be held accountable. However, the evidence adduced on the motion raises triable issues as to whether defendant did in fact close her building, or at least take reasonable measures to do so, and as to whether de[350]*350fendant knew or should have known that her building was being used for residential purposes, despite its unsafe condition (see Scurti v City of New York, 40 NY2d 433 [1976]). Concur— Tom, J.P., Andrias, Sullivan, Ellerin and Williams, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

7 A.D.3d 349, 775 N.Y.S.2d 862, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6740, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-lochard-nyappdiv-2004.

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