Perez v. Lister

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedSeptember 26, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-02059
StatusUnknown

This text of Perez v. Lister (Perez v. Lister) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perez v. Lister, (S.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ORLANDO PEREZ, ) M46724, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 22-cv-2059 vs. ) ) OFFICER LISTER, ) WARDEN MONTI, ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge: Plaintiff Orlando Perez, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) at Centralia Correctional Center (Centralia), brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 7). Initially, Plaintiff filed a standalone Motion for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 1), but he was directed to file a complaint because a motion for injunctive relief is not a proper document to initiate litigation. Plaintiff has now filed a complaint concerning Defendant Lister’s conduct towards him, and he has renewed his request for an injunction. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 7) is before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth

Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The Complaint Plaintiff alleges that on August 28, 2022, some cells at Centralia were without power. (Doc. 7 at 3). Defendant Lister, who presumably responded to the situation, said that “somebodies doing some bullsh*t and when I find out there will be hell to pay.” Later the same day, Plaintiff alleges that other inmates saw Lister enter his cell without a

shakedown slip or warrant, and outside of the presence of him and his cellmates. On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff alleges that Lister somehow planted rubber gloves in his cell, and then called him to his cell and insisted there was a tattoo machine inside. As part of this incident, Lister lifted Plaintiff’s shirt and insisted that a tattoo was brand new, although Plaintiff claims the tattoo was old and was documented in his inmate file. Lister

used the discovery of the gloves to pull Plaintiff aside to “blackmail, coerce, and threaten [him].” (Doc. 7 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Lister tried to get him to form an allegiance with Lister based on race. Lister threatened disciplinary action or a potential inability to earn good time credit if Plaintiff did not cooperate. Plaintiff seeks the preservation of video footage that he believes would reveal

Lister’s actions. He states “see records or documents if produced by DOC where I began exhausting remedies for later litigation in these records.” (Doc. 7 at 5). Although he does not explicitly say so, it sounds like Plaintiff got some sort of disciplinary ticket from Lister. Plaintiff seeks a restraining order against Lister. He also seeks compensatory damages. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this conduct he has suffered headaches, loss

of appetite and loss of sleep. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is premised on the same facts. (Doc. 1). In support of his complaint, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance on August 29, 2022. (Doc. 7 at 8). The grievance was deemed a non-emergency on September 1, 2022. (Id.)

Analysis Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be based on a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation. See e.g., Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”) citing

Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994). “A complaint must contain enough details to connect an individual defendant’s actions with a discrete harm. See e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, to state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish not only that a state actor violated his constitutional rights, but also that said violation caused the plaintiff an injury

or damages. Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming summary judgment against an inmate because he did not identify an injury beyond minor scratches). Plaintiff does not identify any specific legal theories in association with his claims, beyond the assertion that his complaint is filed pursuant to § 1983. However, pro se pleadings are reviewed with great deference, so the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s pleadings in a light most favorable to him. Under this standard of review, it is possible that Plaintiff

intended to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, because he noted that his cell was searched without a warrant or shakedown slip. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. Generally, the validity of a search is reviewed by balancing the need for a search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). However, the Supreme Court

has explicitly held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches does not apply to those conducted “within the confines of a prison cell.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 517, 526 (1984). Because Plaintiff’s allegations relate to the search of a prison cell, he cannot state a claim against Defendant Lister under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment.

As to Plaintiff’s allegations that Lister attempted to blackmail him, or otherwise harassed him, “most verbal harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.” Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff’s allegations are that Lister tried to coerce him to cooperate with internal affairs, and that Lister has taunted him in front of other inmates. From the face of the complaint,

these instances of harassment appear relatively isolated, and have not led to any material harm to Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state any claim against Lister on the basis of harassment. As the Court noted above, Plaintiff hinted at the existence of disciplinary proceedings, but he did not fully explain if those ever occurred, or what happened as a

result of any such proceedings.

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Related

Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Abdi A. Sheik-Abdi v. Martin E. McClellan
37 F.3d 1240 (Seventh Circuit, 1994)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Ronald Beal v. Brian Foster
803 F.3d 356 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Levi A. Lord v. Joseph Beahm
952 F.3d 902 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Jonathan Chambers v. Kul Sood
956 F.3d 979 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Anthony Mays v. Thomas Dart
974 F.3d 810 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)

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Perez v. Lister, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perez-v-lister-ilsd-2022.