Perez v. Internal Revenue Service

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided March 29, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-00215·Unknown

Opinion

* * *

JOSEPH PEREZ, Case No. 2:23-cv-00215-CDS-EJY

Plaintiff, Order and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION v. ECF No. 1

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application and Civil Rights Complaint alleging the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) and six individual agents (the “Individual Agents”) violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1, 1-1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is complete and granted below. Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). However, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a federal court must dismiss a prisoner’s claim if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). In making this determination, the court treats all material factual allegations as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). A. Background Facts. Plaintiff brings claims against the IRS and Individual Agents Linda Aponte, Marjorie Gallagher, Pamela Weems-Baker, Deidre Moran, Sterling Hickerson, Jr., Melissa Franklin, and Unknown Agents. ECF No. 1-1 at 3-4. Plaintiff contends the IRS improperly deposited his three Economic Impact Payments (the “stimulus checks”), totaling $3,200, into another person’s bank account. Id. at 3. Plaintiff says the Individual Agents knew Plaintiff had not received his stimulus checks because he sent communications to the IRS alerting the agency to this problem. Id. at 5. Attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint are responses to Plaintiff’s communications in which the IRS stated it needed additional time to respond to Plaintiff’s concerns. Id. at 21, 23-25. Plaintiff claims he is receiving “atypical” treatment because he is an inmate. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges the above facts demonstrate the Individual Agents violated his (1) Eighth Amendment rights through deliberate indifference, atypical treatment, negligence, and cruel and of IRS policies. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages of $3,200 from each Defendant, along with interest that has accrued over the past two years. Id. at 8. B. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims Fail.

1. Plaintiff’s claims against the IRS and Individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s claims against the IRS and Individual Agents in their official capacities fail because these claims are barred by sovereign immunity. More specifically, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief effectively from the United States as he sued the IRS, a federal agency, for money damages based solely on Defendants’ performing their official duties. When it is clear “that any relief granted would expend itself on the public treasury or interfere with the public administration of the tax system … the action is really against the United States.”1 “[A] suit against IRS employees in their official capacity is essentially a suit against the United States … As such, absent express statutory consent to sue, dismissal is required.”) (internal citations omitted).2 For this reason, Plaintiff’s claims against the IRS and the Individual Agents in their official capacities are barred as a matter of law and the Court recommends all such claims be dismissed with prejudice. 2. Plaintiff’s Individual Capacity Claims. To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against the Individual Agents in their individual capacities, these claims also fail. While individual capacity claims are not barred by sovereign immunity,3 Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment claims arise under the Eighth Amendment, which applies only to punishments imposed after “a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”4 The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take

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Perez v. Internal Revenue Service, (D. Nev. 2023).

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