Perez v. Carusillo

Opinion

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IVAN PEREZ v. NINA CARUSILLO (SC 21085)

Mullins, C. J., and D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and denying her petition to adjudicate her the de facto parent of E and C, the plaintiff’s two biological children from a prior marriage. The parties started dating following the death of the plaintiff’s former wife and married about eighteen months later, when E and C were nine and seven years old, respectively. During the marriage, the defendant formed a close relationship with the children, held them out as her own children, and assisted the plaintiff with their upbringing. The plaintiff encouraged and permitted the children to develop their relationships with the defendant and allowed them to call her “mom.” He claimed, however, that he had no intention of making the defendant the children’s legal mother and he had declined the defendant’s numerous requests to adopt them. After approximately five and one-half years of marriage, the plaintiff commenced this dissolution action. In evaluating the defendant’s petition to adjudicate her the de facto parent of E and C, the trial court found that she had established the first six statutory (§ 46b-490 (a)) criteria for de facto parentage by clear and convincing evidence but determined that she had failed to prove the seventh criterion, namely, that continuing the relationship between the defendant and the children was in their best interests. Because § 46b-490 does not enumerate specific factors for courts to consider when determining whether it is in the best interests of a child to continue a relationship, the trial court looked to the factors set forth in the statute (§ 46b-56 (c)) governing custody and visitation determinations to guide its analysis. The court determined that the factor set forth in § 46b-56 (c) (5), the wishes of the children’s parents as to custody, was the factor that should be assigned the most weight in that context. Insofar as the plaintiff opposed the defendant ’s petition, the court denied it and granted the plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the children. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court had misapplied the provisions of the Connecticut Parentage Act (§ 46b-450 et seq.) in various ways when it denied her petition, including by importing into the de facto parentage analysis the best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c). Held:

The defendant’s appeal was not moot as to E, even though she had reached the age of majority during the pendency of the appeal, because the defendant timely filed her petition seeking de facto parentage pursuant to statute (§ 46b-491 (b)) before E had reached the age of eighteen, and a favorable

*

The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

appellate determination could afford the defendant meaningful and practical relief through legal recognition of the parent-child relationship, which gives rise to multiple, cognizable legal interests that survive a child’s attainment of majority age.

The trial court misapplied the statutory criterion set forth in § 46b-490 (a) (7) in denying the defendant’s petition for adjudication as a de facto parent, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment only with respect to the denial of her petition and remanded the case for the trial court to evaluate the petition in accordance with the proper legal framework.

Section 46b-490 (a) (7), by its plain terms, focuses on the relationship between the person seeking de facto parentage and the child, and asks whether continuing that relationship is in the child’s best interest, but it does not define the phrase “best interest of the child,” set forth any factors that should be considered in determining a child’s best interest, or refer to any other statute that might supply such factors.

Although it was not improper for the trial court to look beyond § 46b-490 (a) (7) for guidance concerning what factors might bear on the best interest of a child in the de factor parentage context, the court, by importing wholesale the factors for custody and visitation determinations set forth in § 46b-56 (c) into the de facto parentage best interest analysis, improperly focused on the plaintiff’s wishes as to custody rather than on the children’s best interests.

This court concluded that the factors for determining the best interest of a child enumerated in the provision (§ 46b-475 (a)) of the Connecticut Parentage Act, which addresses competing claims of parentage among multiple claimants , provide useful and appropriate guidance for trial courts undertaking the best interest inquiry analysis under § 46b-490 (a) (7), even if resort to those factors may not be required in every case.

Moreover, the best interest determination under § 46b-490 (a) (7) is necessarily fact intensive and holistic, and the factors enumerated in § 46b-475 (a) or any relevant factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) do not encompass all relevant considerations for purposes of the best interest analysis under § 46b-490 (a) (7), as the age of the child at the time of adjudication, the length of time during which the petitioner assumed a parental role, the nature and depth of that relationship, the harm that would result from nonrecognition of de facto parentage, and other factors bearing on the disruption of the relationship or the likelihood of other harm to the child can also inform the best interest analysis.

The trial court, in concluding pursuant to § 46b-490 (a) (7), that it was not in the children’s best interests for the defendant to be adjudicated their de facto parent, improperly and unnecessarily focused on the heterosexual nature of the parties’ marriage and, in effect, precluded the defendant from prevailing on her petition merely because of the nature of the parties’ relationship, as the Connecticut Parentage Act does not condition eligibility for de facto parentage on a petitioner’s sexual orientation, marital status, or family structure.

Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that, even if this court concluded that the trial court had misapplied § 46b-490 (a) (7), a remand was unnecessary on the ground that this court could uphold the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s petition on the alternative ground that she had failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff had fostered or supported a bonded and dependent relationship between the defendant and the children that was parental in nature, as § 46b-490 (a) (6) requires. Although a parent’s opposition to the adoption of his or her child is unquestionably relevant evidence bearing on whether that parent fostered or supported a bonded and dependent relationship that is parental in nature, nothing in the text of § 46b-490 (a) (6) suggested that a fit parent’s refusal to consent to adoption is dispositive of whether an individual seeking an adjudication of de facto parentage has established the statutory criterion. Rather, the inquiry under § 46b-490 (a) (6) is a broad and fact intensive one that looks at the parent’s conduct throughout the course of the relationship between the petitioner and the children. In addition, this court declined to resolve the plaintiff’s sufficiency challenge with respect to § 46b-490 (a) (6) before the trial court, on remand, has an opportunity to consider all of the evidence under the proper legal framework, as the trial court’s misapplication of § 46b-490 (a) (7) may have affected the manner in which it evaluated evidence relevant to § 46b-490 (a) (6).

Argued April 13—officially released September 8, 2026

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the defendant filed a cross complaint and a petition to adjudicate her the de facto parent of the plaintiff’s children; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Sanchez-Figueroa, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage, denying the defendant’s petition for de facto parenthood, and granting certain other relief, from which the defendant appealed. Reversed in part; further proceedings.

Leslie I. Jennings-Lax, for the appellant (defendant). Stacie L. Provencher, with whom were Dana M. Hrelic and, on the brief, Campbell D. Barrett, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

DANNEHY, J. The Connecticut Parentage Act (CPA), General Statutes § 46b-450 et seq., establishes a comprehensive framework for establishing legal parent- child relationships in Connecticut. Among the multiple statutory avenues through which a person may establish legal parent status, one permits a court to adjudicate a person a child’s de facto parent upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-490 (a). This appeal requires us to consider the meaning and proper application of certain criteria in that section.

The defendant, Nina Carusillo, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Ivan Perez, and denying her petition to be adjudicated the de facto parent of the plaintiff’s two biological daughters from his previous marriage. The defendant claims that the trial court misapplied the CPA in various respects including, for example, by importing into the de facto parentage analysis the best interest factors governing custody and parenting plan determinations . We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

I

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff and the defendant were married on December 19, 2016. On January 18, 2022, the plaintiff commenced this dissolution action, alleging that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The defendant filed an answer and cross complaint, seeking, among other relief, an adjudication pursuant to § 46b-490 that she is the de facto parent of E, born in September 2007, and C, born in April 2009.

Following a multiday trial on the plaintiff’s dissolution complaint and the defendant’s de facto parentage petition, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and denying the defendant’s petition. In denying the defendant’s petition, the court made extensive findings regarding the parties’ relationship, the defendant’s relationship with the children, and the circumstances surrounding the children’s upbringing. We begin with a summary of those findings.

A

At the time of trial, the plaintiff was fifty-four years old and employed as a mental health counselor at a Connecticut mental health center. He had previously worked as a fire captain for a municipal fire department for twenty-six years and retired from that position in 2016. The defendant was forty-nine years old and worked as a physician assistant in the gynecological oncology department at a New Haven hospital. Prior to the parties’ marriage, the plaintiff had been married to a woman named Rose, who is the biological mother of E and C. Rose was diagnosed with stage four cancer in 2013 and died in January 2015. Rose’s illness and death were hard on the plaintiff. He managed, at least initially, with the help of his mother and sister. His mother moved into the family home to assist with the care of the children. With their support, the plaintiff was able to balance his two careers, spend some overnights with Rose at the hospital, and maintain a semblance of normalcy for his children.

The plaintiff and the defendant first met during Rose’s treatment. The defendant worked on Rose’s treatment team and, through that role, became well acquainted with the plaintiff, the children, and Rose’s extended family. During the period of Rose’s illness, the children knew the defendant as “mommy’s doctor.” The defendant was very fond of the children, having interacted informally with them during that time.

Following Rose’s death, the plaintiff and the defendant remained in contact. The defendant had helped the children sell Girl Scout cookies, taking orders from many of her coworkers, which resulted in a need to deliver hundreds of boxes of cookies. Although the plaintiff had vowed never to return to the hospital where Rose had been treated following Rose’s death, he found himself obligated to deliver the cookies there in late March or early April 2015. During that visit, the parties spoke briefly, and the defendant asked whether the plaintiff would return to share photographs of E’s upcoming recitals or first communion celebration. He did so the following month.

Soon thereafter, the plaintiff encountered the defendant again. Because his place of employment is located across the street from the hospital where the defendant works, the plaintiff frequently dined at its cafeteria and happened to see the defendant there during one such visit. They exchanged small talk about the children, and the defendant again asked him to share photographs of an upcoming event. A few weeks later, in May 2015, the plaintiff returned to the hospital to share photographs of E’s first communion. Following that visit, the plaintiff asked the defendant to join him for appetizers. Although the defendant was initially reluctant, believing the plaintiff was still grieving, she ultimately agreed. The parties began dating in June 2015.

As the relationship developed, the defendant became increasingly involved in the children’s lives. During 2015 and 2016, she regularly participated in family activities with the plaintiff and the children, including trips to the beach, attendance at community events, holiday celebrations , and a family trip to Cape Cod. She also began visiting the plaintiff’s home more frequently, spending time with both the plaintiff and the children there. Members of Rose’s extended family also included the defendant in family gatherings and activities involving the children. The defendant developed an intimate and affectionate relationship with the girls.1 The parties’ relationship became more serious in 2016, and the plaintiff proposed to the defendant in November 1 The trial court found that the children “clearly enjoyed” their time together with the defendant, “as the evidence shows that, during the Durham Fair, the girls were holding the parties’ hands. During the parties ’ trip to Cape Cod in October 2015, the parties and the girls stayed in a hotel, shared a room and each of the parties shared a twin-size bed with one of the girls. During Thanksgiving of 2015, the testimony showed that the plaintiff was having emotional difficulty around the of that year. The children reacted to the engagement with great excitement, and the parties married the following month.2 Although the defendant initially continued to maintain her separate residence in a nearby town, she spent substantial time at the plaintiff’s home with the children and eventually sold her home and moved into the plaintiff’s home on a full-time basis in May 2018.

After moving in full-time, the defendant resided in the plaintiff’s home until late January or early February 2020, when, following a disagreement, the plaintiff asked her to leave. The defendant returned to the plaintiff’s home in June 2020, when both parties decided to work on the marriage. The defendant continued to live there until August 2022, when, after the dissolution action was commenced, the court ordered that the plaintiff have exclusive possession of the property.

While the parties lived together, they jointly participated in caring for the children and shared the day-to-day parenting responsibilities, including preparing meals and transporting them to various activities and medical appointments. Although the defendant regularly assisted with the children’s daily care, these responsibilities were not hers solely, and she was not the primary decision maker for the children. The plaintiff was the sole first holidays after Rose’s passing, and Thanksgiving dinner was held at the defendant’s home . . . . During the Christmas holiday in 2015, the parties and the girls celebrated together in the [plaintiff’s] home. The credible testimony from the parties and the witnesses revealed that the defendant began to have increased contact with the girls and developed a more intimate relationship with them.”

2 Around this time, the plaintiff had made the decision to retire from the fire department, where he had worked for the past twenty-six years. The department’s human resources office informed him that, “if he were to marry prior to his retirement, the spousal benefits of 60 percent of his pension would be preserved.” The trial court found that the parties, after discussions, agreed to expedite their wedding date prior to his retirement. The court found that the plaintiff “wanted the defendant to have this benefit, hoping also that he would be the first to die as he did not want to experience a similar loss again.” The court also found that the defendant agreed to the expedited marriage in order to secure the financial benefits she believed would help the children if something were to happen to the plaintiff.

decision maker for the children’s schedules, appointments , transportation, and overall care, coordinating any assistance provided by the defendant or others. As to finances, the plaintiff was the sole financial provider for the children’s medical, educational, and religious needs, and paid the household expenses, including the defendant’s health insurance and the children’s expenses. The defendant contributed by purchasing groceries and financially supporting some of the children’s activities.

The plaintiff likewise continued to make decisions regarding the children’s religious upbringing in the Roman Catholic faith, including arranging for their receipt of the holy sacraments, religious education, and confirmation preparation. The defendant supported those efforts by assisting them with learning their prayers, transporting them to Confraternity of Christian Doctrine (CCD) classes and church activities, and helping them complete confirmation requirements. Although not Catholic herself, the defendant supported the plaintiff’s decision to raise the children in that faith and became increasingly involved in helping them through their religious milestones.

The defendant filled various gaps in the children’s upbringing. She assisted with personal care and puberty related matters, including helping them style their hair in ways that the plaintiff found difficult, and helped them learn to use feminine hygiene products. She also helped them complete homework, proofread papers, write poetry, and served as an additional source of emotional and physical support. The children developed a close and loving bond with the defendant, and the defendant held them out as her own children. The children consider the defendant’s parents their additional grandparents and the defendant’s sister their aunt. The plaintiff acknowledged that the defendant and the children have a good relationship and that the defendant is nurturing and compassionate; he encouraged and supported their bond and welcomed the defendant’s contributions.3 3 The guardian ad litem for the children testified that the defendant “did things as a mother would do” and “acted as a parent in every way.”

At some point, the children asked the plaintiff to allow them to call the defendant “mom,” explaining that it would be easier for them in public and would allow them to fit in with their peers. Although the plaintiff was initially hesitant, he recognized that, having lost their mother, they wished to be like other children, and he approved their request. He testified that he had no intention of making the defendant the children’s legal mother and that he had declined the defendant’s numerous requests to adopt them; nonetheless, he encouraged and permitted the children to develop their relationships with her. The plaintiff himself gave the defendant Mother’s Day cards from 2017 through 2022.

Although the defendant left the plaintiff’s home for periods of time, particularly from January or February through June 2020, and again in August 2022 through the time of the dissolution hearing, that separation did not affect the relationship between the defendant and the children. The defendant maintained access to the children during those times, and she still slept at the plaintiff’s home at certain times during the 2020 separation.

B

After making extensive findings, the trial court then evaluated the criteria for establishing de facto parentage under § 46b-490 (a). That provision, which will be discussed in greater detail in part II of this opinion, requires that the person seeking to be adjudicated the de facto parent satisfy seven statutory criteria by clear and convincing evidence. See General Statutes § 46b-490 (a) (1) through (7). The court found that the first six statutory criteria for de facto parentage had been proven by clear and convincing evidence but concluded that the defendant failed to prove the seventh criterion—that “[c]ontinuing the relationship between the person and According to the guardian ad litem, the children “already refer to [the defendant] as mom” and “want [the defendant] to be mom.” The guardian ad litem further testified that she reviewed text messages between the defendant and the children, which appeared loving, appropriate, and indicative of the relationship that had developed between them.

the child is in the best interest of the child.” General Statutes § 46b-490 (a) (7).

As to that seventh criterion, the trial court observed that § 46b-490 (a) (7) does not enumerate specific factors for courts to consider in determining whether continuing the relationship between the person and the child is in the best interest of the child. The court reasoned, however, that the legislature’s use of the phrase “best interest” was significant because courts are regularly required to make best interest determinations when resolving custody and visitation disputes. The court therefore concluded that the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-56 (c),4 governing custody and visitation 4 General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) provides: “In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so, may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The physical and emotional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (5) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (11) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12) the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (13) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (14) the child’s cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b- 1, has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the child determinations, should be considered in making its best interest determination in the de facto parentage context.

The trial court proceeded to explain that “the wishes of the [children’s] parents as to custody,” as contemplated in § 46b-56 (c) (5) of the custody statute, was the factor that “should be assigned the most weight in this context.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Relying on the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s petition , the court concluded “that it is in the best interests of the children for the plaintiff to have sole legal and physical custody of them.” Although finding that the defendant had developed a loving, trusting, and parental bond with the children, and acknowledging both the children’s stated preference and the recommendation of the guardian ad litem (GAL) in favor of de facto parentage, the court stated that “the wishes of a child’s fit and sole parent as to custody carry as much if not greater weight than the recommendation of a GAL in a situation like this [in which] the nature of the relationship did not go beyond that of a typical heterosexual relationship.” The court stated that, “[when] a fit single parent opposes a third party’s claim of de facto parentage over a child in the context of a typical heterosexual relationship that began after the parent’s status as a legal parent over the child was established, a GAL’s recommendation may not be enough to overpower the wishes of a fit parent.” (Emphasis omitted.) The trial court further reasoned that granting de facto parentage under these circumstances would be inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying the CPA. Examining the CPA’s legislative history, the court concluded that it was enacted principally to address inequities affecting same-sex couples, unmarried couples, and families formed through assisted reproduction, not to elevate a stepparent in a traditional heterosexual has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall articulate the basis for its decision.”

marriage to legal parent status over the objection of a fit parent. Although the court acknowledged that the CPA does not categorically prohibit a stepparent in a heterosexual marriage from obtaining de facto parent status, it expressed the view that the CPA’s provisions “are generally not appropriately applied to situations concerning parentage in married heterosexual relationships .” The court viewed the defendant as a soon to be former stepparent whose claim to legal parentage lacked clear support within the intended scope of the CPA.

The trial court also identified practical concerns counseling against shared parentage, including the parties’ inability to communicate effectively or jointly make parenting decisions. Although the court acknowledged the children’s maturity and their stated desire that the petition be granted, it concluded that those preferences were not dispositive and carried less weight than the plaintiff’s constitutional rights as a fit parent. Finally, the trial court observed that the children, who were already sixteen and fifteen years old, respectively, would soon reach adulthood and would thereafter be capable of maintaining their relationship with the defendant independently. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant ’s petition for de facto parentage. At the same time, however, recognizing the significance of the defendant’s long-standing relationship with the children, the court awarded her third-party visitation. This appeal followed.5

II

DISCUSSION

The defendant advances numerous arguments in support of her claim that the trial court misconstrued the provisions of § 46b-490 in adjudicating her de facto parentage petition. Before we can reach the merits of those arguments, however, we must first address a threshold jurisdictional issue. 5 The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

A

General Statutes § 46b-491 (b) provides in relevant part that “[a] person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child shall file a petition with the court before the child reaches eighteen years of age. . . .” Although there is no dispute that the defendant timely filed her petition before either child reached the age of eighteen, the defendant has informed us that, during the pendency of this appeal, E turned eighteen. There is some suggestion in the briefing that E’s attainment of age eighteen may render this appeal moot with respect to E.

“Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 289 Conn. 362, 366, 957 A.2d 821 (2008). “It is a [well settled] general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Emma F., 315 Conn. 414, 423, 107 A.3d 947 (2015). “[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219, 225, 802 A.2d 778 (2002).

The defendant contends that E’s attainment of majority age does not render the appeal moot. She argues that the CPA requires only that a petition be commenced before the child reaches eighteen years of age and that nothing in the statutory scheme requires that the proceedings be fully adjudicated before that time. The defendant further contends that practical relief remains available to her because an adjudication of de facto parentage carries significant legal consequences that extend beyond a child’s minority. Specifically, she argues that recognition of a legal parent-child relationship establishes enduring kinship rights and obligations affecting, among other things, probate and inheritance matters, conservatorship and guardianship proceedings, the administration of estates, medical decision-making, disposition of remains, and other incidents of familial status.

The plaintiff does not take a definitive position on the issue of mootness. He acknowledges that the plain language of § 46b-491 (b) requires only that the petition be filed before the child reaches eighteen years of age, but he notes that no Connecticut appellate court has yet addressed whether a de facto parentage action remains justiciable after a child attains majority age during the pendency of the proceedings.

The plaintiff is correct that no court of this state has addressed whether a child’s attainment of age eighteen renders moot a timely filed petition to establish de facto parentage of that child under the CPA. The Appellate Court has, however, addressed the effect of a child’s attaining age eighteen during the pendency of other family law appeals—specifically, appeals challenging a trial court’s custody or visitation orders. See, e.g., A. A.-M. v. M. Z., 225 Conn. App. 46, 54–55, 313 A.3d 1288 (2024); Nowacki v. Nowacki, 144 Conn. App. 503, 508–509, 72 A.3d 1245, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 939, 79 A.3d 891 (2013). The Appellate Court has held that a child’s attainment of age eighteen renders moot an appeal challenging a custody or visitation order because no practical relief remains available to the appellant in those circumstances. E.g., A. A.-M. v. M. Z., supra, 54–55; Nowacki v. Nowacki, supra, 508–509. Those decisions appear to rest on the premise that existing custody and visitation orders terminate by operation of law when a child turns eighteen and that a court lacks jurisdiction to issue such orders with respect to a person of that age. See, e.g., A. A.-M. v. M. Z., supra, 54–55; Nowacki v. Nowacki, supra, 508–509.

The relief sought by the defendant in the present appeal, however, is materially different from the relief sought in cases solely involving custody and visitation orders. The defendant seeks an adjudication of legal parentage itself—a determination that, unlike a challenge to custody or visitation orders, is not dependent on the child’s status as a minor. Indeed, recognition of a legal parent-child relationship gives rise to a constellation of cognizable legal interests that survive a child’s attainment of majority age. See, e.g., General Statutes § 7-294mm (notification of death); General Statutes § 19a-571 (removal of life support); General Statutes § 45a- 437 (intestate succession); General Statutes § 45a-438b (inheritance). Thus, even though E has now turned eighteen years of age, a favorable appellate determination could still afford the defendant meaningful and practical relief through legal recognition of that relationship. We therefore conclude that the present appeal is not moot as it pertains to E.6

B

Turning to the merits of the defendant’s claim, we address her contention that, although the trial court 6 Our conclusion that the present appeal is not moot as to E is buttressed by the plain language of § 46b-491 (b). As the parties aptly recognize, that statute requires that a person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child “file a petition with the court before the child reaches eighteen years of age”; it does not, however, require that the litigation be completed, or that judgment be rendered, before the child reaches that age. General Statutes § 46b-491 (b). This strongly suggests that a petition to be adjudicated a child’s de facto parent can be adjudicated after the child turns eighteen, so long as the petition is timely filed before the child turns eighteen. Notably, the CPA defines “ ‘[c]hild’ ” as “a person of any age whose parentage may be determined under [§§] 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive.” General Statutes § 46b-451 (6). This further suggests that a de facto parentage petition can be adjudicated after a child turns eighteen.

The plaintiff points out, however, that E’s attainment of majority age could have practical consequences if the case is remanded for further proceedings concerning the de facto parentage claim, most notably, that adjudication of parentage at that time would affect the rights of a person who is now a legal adult. The plaintiff’s concern warrants attention. Significantly, the CPA is silent as to the effect of a child’s correctly determined that she had proven by clear and convincing evidence the first six criteria for de facto parentage under the CPA; see General Statutes § 46b- 490 (a) (1) through (6); it erred in concluding that she had failed to prove the seventh criterion set forth in § 46b-490 (a) (7)—that continuation of the relationship between her and the children was in the children’s best interests. In support of her claim, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly imported the custodial best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) into its de facto parentage analysis and accorded dispositive weight to the plaintiff’s wishes based on that provision and the plaintiff’s constitutional rights as a fit parent, effectively giving the plaintiff unilateral veto power over her parentage claim. She also argues that the trial court improperly and inappropriately focused on the heterosexual nature of the parties’ marriage, suggesting that the CPA was primarily meant to apply to same-sex couples and not to a stepparent under the circumstances presented in this case. The defendant argues that the trial court’s construction and application of the CPA are inconsistent with both its text and purpose.

The plaintiff in response argues that the trial court did not misapply § 46b-490 (a) (7) in concluding that the defendant had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that granting her de facto parentage petition is in the children’s best interests. Although he provides little explanation for why it was appropriate for the trial court to import the best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) in assessing the defendant’s de facto parentage claim, or why the heterosexual nature of the parties’ relationship was relevant to the inquiry, he contends that the concept of best interest is clearly intended to attainment of majority age during the pendency of de facto parentage proceedings. The CPA does not address whether such child becomes a necessary party to the proceedings; nor does it specify what consideration , if any, a court should afford that individual’s views when applying the statutory criteria for de facto parentage. Although the plaintiff mentions these issues, neither party fully briefed them, and the resolution of these issues is not necessary to our decision. We leave their resolution, therefore, to the parties and the trial court on remand.

confer broad discretion on the trial court to give weight to one or more of a multitude of factors in view of the unique facts and circumstances of each case and each child. He argues that the court’s consideration of his wishes was appropriate because a legal parent’s wishes are a central inquiry when a court reviews a petition for de facto parentage.

For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant that the trial court misapplied the statutory criterion set forth in § 46b-490 (a) (7) in denying her petition for de facto parentage. Because the court’s decision rests on a misapplication of the governing statute, the judgment with respect to the petition cannot stand, and a remand is required for the defendant’s petition to be evaluated under the proper legal framework.

Enacted in 2021 and modeled after the Uniform Law Commission’s 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, the CPA established a comprehensive statutory framework under which legal parent-child relationships may be established in Connecticut. See Public Acts 2021, No. 21-15. Recognizing that parent-child relationships arise in a wide variety of contexts, and that existing law contained significant gaps that left certain families without clear legal avenues for obtaining recognition and protection of parent-child relationships, the legislature created various pathways through which legal parentage may be established. See General Statutes § 46b-471; 64 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 2021 Sess., pp. 2615–23, remarks of Senator John A. Kissel; 64 S. Proc., supra, pp. 2624–25, remarks of Senator Alex Kasser; 64 H.R. Proc., Pt. 3, 2021 Sess., pp. 1778–79, remarks of Representative Steven Stafstrom. Those pathways include, among others , giving birth to a child (except for persons acting as surrogates), establishment of a statutory presumption of parentage, acknowledgment of parentage, adjudication as the child’s de facto parent, adoption, intended parentage through assisted reproduction, and intended parentage through a surrogacy agreement. See General Statutes § 46b-471.

The defendant challenges the interpretation and application of the CPA’s de facto parentage provisions. Our standard of review in such circumstances is plenary. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 554, 565, 937 A.2d 13 (2007). “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 699, 12 A.3d 783 (2011). In discerning that intent, we are guided by the well established principles set forth in General Statutes § 1-2z.7 See, e.g., Woodbridge Newton Neighborhood Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council, 349 Conn. 619, 635, 321 A.3d 363 (2024). We begin our analysis with the language of § 46b-490 (a), which provides: “In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of a person who claims to be a de facto parent of the child, if there is only one other person who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child, the court shall adjudicate the person who claims to be a de facto parent to be a parent of the child if the person demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that:

“(1) The person resided with the child as a regular member of the child’s household for at least one year, unless the court finds good cause to accept a shorter period of residence as a regular member of the child’s household;

“(2) The person engaged in consistent caretaking of the child which may include regularly caring for the child’s needs and making day-to-day decisions regarding the child individually or cooperatively with another legal parent;

“(3) The person undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation;

7 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

“(4) The person held out the child as the person’s child; “(5) The person established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature;

“(6) Another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship required under subdivision (5) of this subsection; and “(7) Continuing the relationship between the person and the child is in the best interest of the child.”8 The defendant primarily takes aim at the court’s interpretation and application of the “best interest” criterion contained in § 46b-490 (a) (7). She and the plaintiff disagree on whether the trial court’s analysis properly conformed with the mandates of that provision. In order for us to determine whether the trial court’s analysis comported with the provision’s requirements, we must ascertain the provision’s meaning.

8 Section 46b-491, which sets forth certain standing and pleading requirements for commencing a de facto parentage proceeding, provides in relevant part: “(a) A proceeding to establish parentage of a child under this section may be commenced only by a person who: (1) Is alive when the proceeding is commenced; and (2) claims to be a de facto parent of the child.

“(b) A person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child shall file a petition with the court before the child reaches eighteen years of age. The child is required to be alive at the time of the filing. The petition shall include a verified affidavit alleging facts to support the existence of a de facto parent relationship with the child. The petition and affidavit shall be served on all parents and legal guardians of the child and any other party to the proceeding.

“(c) An adverse party, parent or legal guardian may file a pleading and verified affidavit in response to the petition that shall be served on all parties to the proceeding.

“(d) The court shall determine on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits whether the person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent has presented prima facie evidence of the criteria for de facto parentage as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-490 and, therefore, has standing to proceed with a parentage action. The court, in its sole discretion, may hold a hearing to determine disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing. . . .”

The plaintiff stipulated that the defendant met the prima facie statutory requirements for de facto parenthood and agreed to an interim order of contact between the defendant and the children.

Section 46b-490 (a) (7), by its plain terms, focuses on the relationship between the person seeking de facto parentage and the child, and asks whether continuing that relationship is in the child’s best interest. Notably, the provision does not define “best interest of the child,” and it neither sets forth any factors that should be considered in making that determination nor incorporates by reference any other statute that might supply them.

The phrase “best interest of the child” is well established in family and juvenile law and has been used by our legislature in a host of statutes. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 17a- 112 (k), 45a-717 (b), (e) and (g), 45a-727a, 46b-56 (c) and 46b-129 (c) (6). We must therefore inquire whether the phrase is a legal term of art that has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law” requiring that it “be construed and understood accordingly.” General Statutes § 1-1 (a). We have explained that “[l]egal terms . . . absent any legislative intent shown to the contrary, are to be presumed to be used in their legal sense. . . . Words with a fixed legal or judicially settled meaning must be presumed to have been used in that sense. . . . In ascertaining legislative intent [r]ather than using terms in their everyday sense, [t]he law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co., 304 Conn. 679, 689, 41 A.3d 1013 (2012); see also Police Dept. v. State Board of Labor Relations, 225 Conn. 297, 301 n.6, 622 A.2d 1005 (1993) (“[w]here a statute does not define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed in the law and in dictionaries” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

To start, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “best interests of the child” as a standard in family law “by which a court determines what arrangements would be to a child’s greatest benefit, often used in deciding child-custody and visitation matters and in deciding whether to approve an adoption or a guardianship.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) p. 196. That standard has long been used in Connecticut for deciding custody disputes; see, e.g.,

Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 298, 37 A. 679 (1897); and has become a fixture in this state’s family and child welfare laws. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 17a-112 (k) and 46b-56 (c).

Given the enduring use of that phrase in our law, this court has had occasion to examine its meaning in various contexts. We have said that the phrase “itself does not have a precise meaning” and that “[s]tandards of mathematical precision are neither possible nor desirable in [family law]; much must be left to the trial judge’s experience and judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 165, 425 A.2d 939 (1979). As such, we have been reluctant to affix a specific definition to the phrase “in different contexts as opportunities to do so have arisen”; Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 429, 717 A.2d 676 (1998); but have said in general terms that “best interests of the child include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment.” Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777, 699 A.2d 134 (1997). The best interest standard has thus been established and understood as a broad, fact-specific inquiry focused on what arrangements best advance the child’s welfare in a given context. See, e.g., In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 206–207, 662 A.2d 107 (1995); Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); In re Appeal of Kindis, 162 Conn. 239, 242, 294 A.2d 316 (1972).

In some statutes employing the “best interest of the child” language, the legislature has enumerated nonexhaustive factors for courts to consider in making that determination; in others, like § 46b-490 (a), it has not. Compare General Statutes §§ 17a-112 (k), 46b-56 (c), 46b-475 and 46b-536 (d), with General Statutes §§ 17a- 42, 46b-132a and 46b-490 (a). When the legislature supplies nonexhaustive factors, those factors give courts parameters for the best interest inquiry in that particular context while still permitting consideration of other relevant circumstances. When a statute employs the “best interest of the child” phrase but provides no factors to consider, courts must resort to the phrase’s established legal meaning, requiring them to identify and weigh factors appropriate for the specific context, all in service of the overarching inquiry into what will best advance the child’s welfare. Cf. State v. Anonymous, supra, 179 Conn. 165 (“[Although] that standard itself does not have a precise meaning, it does not lack metes and bounds. Our case law has defined and circumscribed that standard over the years in custody disputes between parents and between parent and nonparent as well as in child neglect cases.”).

In our view, the use of the “best interest of the child” standard in § 46b-490 (a) (7) incorporates this familiar legal meaning, requiring trial courts, as a part of the de facto parentage determination, to undertake a broad, fact-specific inquiry to determine whether “[c]ontinuing the relationship between the person and the child is in the best interest of the child.” The issue we must decide is whether the trial court applied this standard in its adjudication of the defendant’s petition.

In evaluating whether the defendant proved the seventh criterion, the trial court concluded that “consideration of the best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) is appropriate” in determining de facto parentage under § 46b-490 (a) (7). Section 46b-56 (c) sets forth the applicable factors for a court to consider when determining the best interest of the child for purposes of custody and visitation orders. The trial court went on to focus primarily on § 46b-56 (c) (5)—“the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody”—finding the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s petition to be the “most pertinent” consideration. The trial court, for example, stated (1) “the wishes of the plaintiff as to the custody of the children is a factor that the court may elect to consider and assign weight to in making its best interest determination ,” (2) “the court believes that a fit parent’s wishes as to custody is the most pertinent factor in a case like this,” (3) “the court has considered the applicable factors enumerated in § 46b-56 (c) and concludes that ‘the wishes of the [children’s] parents as to custody’ is the factor that should be assigned the most weight in this context,” (4) “[t]o be sure, the wishes of a child’s fit and sole parent as to custody carry as much if not greater weight than the recommendation of a GAL in a situation like this,” and (5) “[t]wo considerations support the court’s view that, in the context of a de facto parenthood petition, in a typical heterosexual relationship [when] the opposing party is the only legal parent of the child, is a fit parent, and fully supports the child, the wishes of that legal parent as to custody should be the primary factor the court assigns weight to in determining whether continuing the bonded and dependent parental relationship between the petitioner and the child is in the best interest of the child.” (Emphasis added.)

The defendant contends that, in construing the statute in this manner, the trial court improperly considered the best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c) and, in doing so, conflated the distinct issues of parentage and custody, gave dispositive weight to the plaintiff’s wishes in ruling on the parentage petition, and “ignored other, more relevant definitions of ‘best interest of the child’ ” in reaching its conclusion. She contends that the court’s analysis created an anomalous result in which the plaintiff was given an effective veto over her petition, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff previously encouraged and fostered the defendant’s parental relationship with the children. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant that the trial court misapplied § 46b-490 (a) (7).

The trial court correctly reached the best interest determination required by § 46b-490 (a) (7) only after it concluded that the defendant had established, by clear and convincing evidence, each of the first six statutory criteria set forth in § 46b-490 (a) (1) through (6). And, although it was not error for the court to then look beyond § 46b-490 (a) (7) for guidance concerning what factors might bear on the best interests of the children in the de facto parentage context, particularly because the provision did not enumerate specific factors to consider, its wholesale importation of the § 46b-56 (c) framework into the de facto parentage analysis and its overriding focus on § 46b-56 (c) (5) and the plaintiff’s wishes as to custody were misguided. The factors enumerated in § 46b-56 (c) were crafted for a different purpose than that of the de facto parentage provisions—they govern disputes between two parents over custody and visitation. And many of those factors presuppose an established parental relationship and are directed toward adjudicating competing claims between parties whose parental status is already fixed, not toward the relevant question that was before the trial court in the present case—whether the defendant is a parent.

Section 46b-56 (c) (5), for example, directs a court to consider “the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody . . . .” By its plain terms, specifically the use of the plural, “parents,” that factor assumes a scenario in which the parties are already parents and is concerned with their wishes as to “custody . . . .” General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (5). Similarly, § 46b-56 (c) (7), which considers the willingness of each parent to facilitate a continuing relationship between the child and the other parent, and § 46b-56 (c) (9), which examines each parent’s ability to be actively involved in the child’s life, implicitly assume the existence of two legal parents between whom the child’s time and relationship will be divided.

To be sure, some factors in § 46b-56 (c) are relevant to a de facto parentage inquiry as it pertains to whether “[c]ontinuing the relationship” is in the child’s best interest . “The physical and emotional safety of the child”; General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (1); “the child’s adjustment” to “home, school and community environments”; General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (10); and “the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment”; General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (11); speak to child welfare in terms general enough to retain relevance in a variety of contexts, including in most parentage determinations.

But, by importing the § 46b-56 (c) factors wholesale into the de facto parentage best interest analysis under § 46b-490 (a) (7), and, in turn, focusing so heavily on the plaintiff’s wishes as to custody, the trial court applied criteria tailored to disputes between already established legal parents in a context very different than the one presented and strayed from the ultimate focus of the provision—the children’s best interests—and centered the focus instead on the plaintiff’s wishes. This was improper.9 That is not to say that considering the plaintiff’s wishes has no place in the de facto parentage analysis. Section 46b-490 (a) (6) specifically requires that the person seeking parentage prove that “[a]nother parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship” between the person seeking parentage and the child. The court can of course consider any objections the parent may have to the person’s parentage petition in determining whether the parent fostered or supported the relationship, but an objection to the petition is only one aspect of this inquiry. Whether the parent “fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship” between the person seeking parentage and the child; General Statutes § 46b-490 (a) (6); is a broader inquiry 9 The plaintiff argues that, to the extent we agree with the defendant that the trial court conflated the adjudication of parentage with a custody determination, this court should treat such conflation as error induced by the defendant’s actions. He contends that the defendant failed to “limit her proposed orders at trial to an adjudication of legal parentage” and that she “put the existential cart before the horse and sought orders of legal custody and parenting time in her proposed orders before the question of parentage was even resolved.” The plaintiff’s contention is without merit. The defendant’s proposed orders reasonably requested, as a threshold matter, that the court adjudicate her a parent under § 46b-490 (a) and then separately set forth her proposed custody arrangements. Presenting proposed orders in this sequenced fashion was entirely reasonable given that the parentage petition was brought in conjunction with the dissolution proceeding and that the court would be resolving all related issues together following the hearing. Nothing the defendant did encouraged or prompted the trial court to commit the error of which she now complains. See, e.g., Independent Party of CT-State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn. 681, 724, 200 A.3d 1118 (2019).

that focuses on the parent’s conduct during the course of the relationship between the person seeking parentage and the child.10 Nothing in the statute suggests that a parent’s present wishes as to that petition have or should have dispositive weight or that the parent must expressly consent to the petition in order for the petition to be granted.11 See Martin v. MacMahan, 264 A.3d 1224, 1235 (Me. 2022) (“[i]f such consent were required, there could be no litigation of any de facto parentage claim because a legal parent’s objection would necessarily defeat the claim”).12 The defendant contends that, instead of using the best interest factors set forth in § 46b-56 (c), the court 10 Although a parent’s present position on whether a petitioner should be adjudicated a de facto parent is more appropriately considered under § 46b-490 (a) (6), a parent’s reasons for why continuing the relationship between the petitioner and the child is not in the child’s best interest should be considered by the trial court in making its best interest determination under § 46b-490 (a) (7). 11 In considering the plaintiff’s wishes as to the defendant’s parentage petition, the trial court also referenced Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000), and certain principles, namely, the presumption that fit parents act in their child’s best interest . Although most courts that have considered the issue have found Troxel inapposite when a person seeks recognition of an existing parent- child relationship, because the plaintiff does not challenge the CPA’s constitutionality, we need not decide, among other issues, whether the constitutional principles of Troxel are pertinent to a question of de facto parentage, whether the CPA’s framework—with its heightened standing requirements, pleading standards, and clear and convincing burden of proof—adequately safeguards the constitutional interests of legal parents, whether there are retroactivity concerns in applying the CPA, whether treating a person adjudicated to be a de facto parent as the legal equivalent of a parent for purposes of custody and visitation determinations impermissibly infringes on the constitutional rights of a legal parent who has parented the child since birth, or what weight, if any, should be afforded to the child’s independent interests once a parental relationship has been established by clear and convincing evidence . See footnote 14 of this opinion. We thus confine our analysis to the interpretation and application of the CPA itself. See, e.g., Kinney v. State, 285 Conn. 700, 710, 941 A.2d 907 (2008) (“legislative enactments carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

12 General Statutes § 46b-551 provides: “In applying and construing the provisions of sections 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive, consideration should have used other statutory definitions of “best interest,” including, for example, the legislative findings that the legislature set forth in the adoption context in § 45a-727a. Section 45a-727a, titled “[l]egislative findings re best interests of child,” provides: “The General Assembly finds that: (1) The best interests of a child are promoted by having persons in the child’s life who manifest a deep concern for the child’s growth and development ; (2) The best interests of a child are promoted when a child has as many persons loving and caring for the child as possible; and (3) The best interests of a child are promoted when the child is part of a loving, supportive and stable family, whether that family is a nuclear, extended, split, blended, single parent, adoptive or foster family.” Although some of the concepts embedded in those findings may be relevant in certain circumstances to a de facto parentage analysis, it was not error for the trial court to not have expressly referenced or considered those findings on the facts of this case, especially when there is no indication in § 46b-490 (a) (7) that the court was required to do so. Indeed, when the legislature has preferred those findings to be utilized, it expressly has said so. See General Statutes § 45a-727 (b) (2) (“[t]he report shall indicate . . . whether the best interests of the child would be served in accordance with the criteria set forth in section 45a-727a”).

The defendant further argues that the trial court should have, but failed to, consider the definition of “best interest,” as it is defined in the CPA itself. Section 46b-475 (a) provides: “Except as provided in public act 21-15, in a proceeding to adjudicate competing claims of parentage of a child by two or more persons, the court shall adjudicate parentage in the best interest of the child, based on:

“(1) The age of the child; “(2) The length of time during which each person assumed the role of parent of the child; shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.”

“(3) The nature of the relationship between the child and each person;

“(4) The harm to the child if the relationship between the child and each person is not recognized;

“(5) The basis for each person’s claim to parentage of the child;

“(6) Other equitable factors arising from the disruption of the relationship between the child and each person, or the likelihood of other harm to the child; and “(7) Any other factor the court deems relevant to the child’s best interests.” The defendant recognizes that § 46b-475 (a) is not a “[perfect] fit” because it applies to “ ‘competing claims of parentage,’ ” which we are not presented with in the present case. She argues nonetheless that this should still be the starting point for trial courts in the context of a best interest determination under § 46b-490 (a) (7) because it includes specific terms covering the given subject matter.

We agree that § 46b-475 (a) is not a perfect fit for the present context. That provision addresses competing claims of parentage among multiple claimants, and the legislature has not expressly directed courts to apply its factors when adjudicating a de facto parentage petition under § 46b-490 (a) (7). Nevertheless, we agree with the defendant that the factors enumerated in § 46b-475 (a) provide useful and appropriate guidance for trial courts undertaking the best interest inquiry under § 46b-490 (a) (7), even if resort to those factors may not be required in every case.

The reason is straightforward. Although § 46b-475 (a) was designed to resolve competing claims of parentage, its operative focus is on each claimant’s relationship with the child and the child’s well-being—an inquiry that is, at its core, the inquiry a court must conduct when determining whether “[c]ontinuing the relationship between the person and the child is in the best interest of the child” under § 46b-490 (a) (7). Both provisions require the court to look carefully at the nature of the relationship between the person and the child, and both ultimately ask whether the child’s welfare is served by legal recognition of that relationship.

As we explained, the best interest determination under § 46b-490 (a) (7) is necessarily fact intensive and holistic. The age of the child at the time of adjudication, the length of time during which the petitioner assumed a parental role, the nature and depth of that relationship, the harm that would result from its nonrecognition, and other factors bearing on the disruption of the relationship or the likelihood of other harm to the child can each inform whether continuing the relationship is in a child’s best interest under § 46b-490 (a) (7). To be clear, we do not suggest that the § 46b-475 (a) factors or the relevant factors from § 46b-56 (c) exhaust the relevant considerations . Other circumstances particular to the child or the petition may bear on the best interest inquiry, and trial courts retain flexibility to account for them.

The defendant next argues that the trial court, in concluding that it was not in the children’s best interests for the defendant to be adjudicated their de facto parent, improperly and unnecessarily focused on the heterosexual nature of her marriage to the plaintiff and, in effect, precluded her from prevailing on her petition because of the nature of that relationship. She further contends that the court improperly suggested that her status as stepparent weighed against recognition as a de facto parent. According to the defendant, stepparents are directly within the class of parental actors whom the law was intended to benefit. We agree.

In evaluating best interests under § 46b-490 (a) (7), the trial court referenced the heterosexual nature of the defendant’s marriage to the plaintiff at least six times in its decision. In so doing, the trial court examined the legislative history of the CPA, stating that it “overwhelmingly indicates that the provisions of the CPA expanding legal parentage status, like providing a procedure for a de facto parenthood petition, are generally not appropriately applied to situations concerning parentage in married heterosexual relationships.” The court opined that the law instead was “designed with same-sex couples, unmarried couples, and couples who use alternative reproductive techniques in mind.” In further evaluating the seventh criterion, the trial court stated that “nothing in the CPA or its legislative history supports the proposition that our legislature intended stepparents to be able to use a petition for de facto parenthood to be named a legal parent of a child over the opposition of a fit parent who supports the child.” The court nonetheless declined to foreclose the possibility entirely, stating: “That is not to say that granting a stepparent’s de facto parenthood petition in the context of a married heterosexual relationship is categorically prohibited by the CPA—the statute itself does not state as much, and no appellate court in Connecticut has had occasion to interpret it in such a manner—but the legislative history casts doubt on the notion that doing so is appropriate under these particular circumstances.”

The trial court’s analysis and reasoning are flawed in several respects. First, the plain language of the CPA forecloses the trial court’s reasoning. Nothing in the statutory scheme conditions eligibility to seek de facto parentage on the petitioner’s sexual orientation, marital status, or a particular family structure. To the contrary, § 46b-491 (a), which governs standing to bring a de facto parentage action, broadly provides that “[a] proceeding to establish parentage of a child under this section may be commenced only by a person who: (1) Is alive when the proceeding is commenced; and (2) claims to be a de facto parent of the child.” The law defines a “ ‘[p]erson’ ” as “a natural person of any age.” General Statutes § 46b-451 (16). Likewise, the criteria for establishing de facto parentage under § 46b-490 (a) focus on the existence , nature, and quality of the relationship, as well as whether another parent has fostered and supported that relationship. The statute does not create conditions based on the petitioner’s marital status, sexual orientation, or relationship to the legal parent.

The lack of such conditions found in the de facto parentage provisions is reinforced by the CPA’s express command that “[a] parent-child relationship extends equally to every child and parent, regardless of the marital status or gender of the parent or the circumstances of the birth of the child.” General Statutes § 46b-472. This provision reflects a deliberate legislative choice to detach the legal recognition of a parent-child relationship from traditional assumptions concerning marriage, gender, and family composition. By treating the defendant’s participation in a married heterosexual relationship and her status as a stepparent as factors weighing against her petition, the trial court introduced distinctions that the legislature affirmatively rejected.13 Second, because the CPA is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation on this point, and the trial court did not conclude otherwise, the court’s resort to legislative history is inconsistent with well established principles of statutory construction. Section 1-2z makes clear that “extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered” unless the court first determines that the statutory language is ambiguous. See, e.g., In re Elianah T.-T., 326 Conn. 614, 621, 165 A.3d 1236 (2017). Because the CPA’s plain and unambiguous language resolves the issue before us, the legislative history relied on by the trial court cannot alter that meaning and should not have been considered. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in interpreting and applying the CPA in adjudicating the defendant’s de facto parentage petition.

C

The plaintiff contends that, even if we conclude that the trial court misapplied § 46b-490 (a) (7), a remand is 13 The defendant makes a passing comment in her brief that equal protection concerns are implicated by the trial court’s application of a different standard to a stepparent in a same-sex marriage than to a similarly situated stepparent in a heterosexual marriage. Because we decide that the plain language of the CPA does not support the trial court’s analysis, we do not reach any equal protection issues that may be raised by the challenged interpretation of the act.

unnecessary. Instead, he urges us to uphold the denial of the defendant’s petition for de facto parentage on the alternative ground that the defendant failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff fostered or supported a bonded and dependent relationship between the defendant and the children that was parental in nature, as required by § 46b-490 (a) (6). More specifically, he argues that (1) a parent who, like the plaintiff, declined previously to consent to adoption cannot, as a matter of law, be found to have fostered or supported the requisite relationship under § 46b-490 (a) (6), and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he did so. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s first contention, and we decline to address the second at this juncture.

As to the plaintiff’s first contention, although he does not challenge the constitutionality of the CPA,14 he contends that his refusal to consent to the defendant’s adoption of the children was dispositive of the sixth criterion and, therefore, precluded a finding that he fostered or supported the requisite parental relationship. He maintains that the state should not adjudicate an individual to be a child’s coparent when a fit parent opposes conferring that status. Nothing in the text of § 46b-490 (a) (6), however, suggests that a fit parent’s refusal to consent to adoption is dispositive of whether a stepparent has established that statutory criterion. As we explained, the inquiry under that provision is a broad and fact intensive one that focuses on the parent’s conduct throughout the course of the relationship between the petitioner and the child. See part II B of this opinion. Although a parent’s opposition to adoption is unquestionably relevant evidence bearing on whether the parent fostered 14 In his brief, the plaintiff states that an “existing legal parent’s constitutional rights are protected by the heightened standing requirement” under the law and that the law’s “substantive requirements prevent parents from being subjected to unwarranted and unjustified litigation .” And, at oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel confirmed that the plaintiff is not challenging the constitutionality of the CPA but reserved the right to do so if this court remanded the matter for a new hearing.

or supported a bonded and dependent relationship that is parental in nature, it does not, as a matter of law, foreclose a finding that the parent nevertheless fostered or supported such a relationship. A parent reasonably may foster or support such a relationship through his or her conduct while simultaneously declining to specifically formalize it through the distinct, and often complicated, process of adoption. Here, for example, the defendant points to evidence that the plaintiff referred to her as the children’s mother, permitted the children to do the same, involved her in the children’s daily care, health care, and religious upbringing, and coordinated his work schedule with hers so that one of them was always available to care for the children.

As to the plaintiff’s related contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination concerning the sixth criterion, we decline to weigh in on that question at this juncture. As we explained in part II B of this opinion, the court improperly focused too heavily on the plaintiff’s wishes when determining whether continuation of the relationship between the defendant and the children was in the children’s best interests under § 46b-490 (a) (7). We also explained, however, that a parent’s wishes are relevant under § 46b-490 (a) (6) insofar as they bear on whether that parent fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship between the petitioner and the child. The trial court’s memorandum of decision does not reflect any consideration of this evidence in its analysis of § 46b-490 (a) (6). Because the court’s misapplication of § 46b-490 (a) (7) may have affected the manner in which it evaluated evidence relevant to § 46b-490 (a) (6), we cannot conclude that its analysis under the latter provision would necessarily remain unchanged on remand. Accordingly, we decline to resolve the plaintiff’s sufficiency challenge with respect to § 46b-490 (a) (6) before the trial court has had the opportunity to consider all the relevant evidence under the proper legal framework.

In sum, because the trial court’s decision on the defendant ’s de facto parentage petition rests on a misapplication of the governing law, a new hearing is required.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the denial of the defendant’s de facto parentage petition and the case is remanded for further proceedings for reconsideration of the petition according to law; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.