Perez, Mark v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 26, 2013·No. 05-11-01575-CR·Published

Opinion

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed April 26, 2013.

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-11-01575-CR No. 05-11-01576-CR

MARK PEREZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-25780-M & F10-19371-M

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Lang-Miers, Myers, and Richter 1 Opinion by Justice Richter

Appellant Mark Perez appeals his convictions of assault and taking a prohibited

substance into a correctional facility. Appellant entered an open plea of true to the State’s Motion

to Adjudicate in the assault case, and a plea of guilty and true to the enhancement allegations in

the indictment in the prohibited substance case. The trial court granted the State’s Motion to

Adjudicate in the assault case, found appellant guilty of assault as charged in the indictment, and

found the enhancement allegations to be true. In the prohibited substance case, the trial court

found appellant guilty and found the enhancement allegations to be true. In each case, the trial

1 The Honorable Martin E. Richter, Retired Justice, sitting by assignment. court assessed a punishment of 35 years in prison and ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

In two issues, appellant contends his original plea in the prohibited substance and probation

revocation proceeding was not entered into freely and voluntarily and the trial court judge abused

his discretion by failing to grant a continuance for appellant to be medicated prior to sentencing.

The background of this case and the evidence adduced at the hearings are well known to the

parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts to those necessary to address appellant’s

complaints on appeal. We issue this memorandum opinion because the law to be applied in this

case is well settled. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

Background

In July 2007, appellant pleaded guilty to assault of a family member with an enhanced

range of punishment due to previous convictions. The trial court assessed punishment of two

years deferred adjudication and community supervision. In January 2010, appellant’s assault

case was transferred to the 194th District Court which modified the conditions of appellant’s

supervision and required him to serve a term of confinement in a substance abuse treatment

facility. The court ordered that appellant be confined in county jail until a space at the facility

became available.

In April 2010, while in county jail, appellant’s wife came to visit him. Upon her

departure, appellant was searched and found to have marijuana hidden in his sock. In May 2010,

a motion to revoke probation and proceed with adjudication of guilt was filed in the original

assault case alleging the prohibited substance offense as a violation of his deferred probation.

In August 2010, appellant pleaded guilty to the prohibited substance charge and true to

the allegations that he violated the terms of his probation in the assault case. The trial judge

assessed punishment for each charge, the assault and prohibited substance, at 35 year’s

-2- imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice with each

sentence to run concurrently.

Analysis

Appellant argues his pleas were involuntary because he needed medication and he

received an unfair trial when the trial judge failed to grant a continuance for appellant to be

medicated. The State responds that appellant’s pleas did not become unknowing or involuntary

merely because he may not have fully understood everything that was happening during the

hearing.

We review the record as a whole and determine voluntariness by the totality of the

circumstances. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam).

When the trial court properly admonished appellant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a

prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. Id. No plea of guilty shall be

accepted by the court unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is

made freely and voluntarily. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(b) (West Supp. 2011).

Here, the record shows the trial court admonished appellant both orally and in writing.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a), (c) (West Supp. 2011). At the plea hearing, after

calling both cause numbers, the court and the appellant engaged in a clear exchange where

appellant entered pleas of guilty and true. Appellant’s attorney then called Mrs. Perez,

appellant’s mother, to testify on behalf of her son. While appellant’s mother testified about

appellant being in an accident and having a severe head injury that caused him anxiety for which

he presently needed medication, she also testified she was aware of two prior assaults committed

before his head injury. Next, the appellant testified he was aware of a plea offer but he wanted to

go before the court and ask the judge for probation. On the record, appellant’s attorney told

-3- appellant the offer was still available and asked the appellant if he wanted to take the offer or

continue before the court. Appellant answered, “I want to continue.” Appellant testified he had

an anxiety disorder and prior to jail he was on medication for his anxiety. He explained he

received marijuana while incarcerated and when asked what he was “using it for” he answered,

“Well, basically so I could be able to, you know, stay cool, really, basically.” After

approximately twenty pages of testimony, appellant and his attorney participated in the following

colloquy:

ATTORNEY: Earlier - - do you have problems with your memory a lot?

APPELLANT: Yes, I do Tim Jeffrey.

ATTORNEY: Sometimes when you answer the prosecutor, you are saying things that sometimes don’t make sense. Do you know you are saying things that don’t make sense?

APPELLANT: I didn’t mean to say? What did I say is wrong?

ATTORNEY: What I am saying, you need help, don’t you?

APPELLANT: I could say I need medication.

ATTORNEY: Do you think - - and did you see Dr. Clayton, correct?

APPELLANT: Yes, I did.

ATTORNEY: And she said you are competent and everything?

APPELLANT: Yes.

...

ATTORNEY: Have you been confused by any of these questions here?

ATTORNEY: And you are trying to answer them like you are not sure all the time whether they are right or not?

-4- APPELLANT: Yes, Tim Jeffrey.

ATTORNEY: I will pass the witness. Can we approach, Your Honor?

COURT: You may.

(Discussion off the record.)

COURT: You may call your next witness, Mr. Jeffrey.

ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I rest - - I don’t rest. I would like to ask for a continuation to see if we can get him under medication for a couple of weeks, even Dr. Clayton’s evaluation said that he would be beneficial for some of that medication. Right now I am not sure he understands the questions that he is being asked. And for instance, I don’t think that he would, you know, answer a question that he knew he was going to be searched so he put marijuana in his sock. I don’t think that is a rational response to that question. So I would ask for some kind of continuance to get medication in a couple of weeks and come back here and see that there is any difference.

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