UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SEGUNDO PEREIRA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-3836 (TJK) MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, Chairman, Fed- eral Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Segundo Pereira was removed from his position as head of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s diversity-and-inclusion office. And when the agency needed to hire someone to fill
that role, it declined to reinstate him. Pereira sued the agency under Title VII, arguing, among
other things, that the agency’s decisions to remove and then to not reinstate him were based on his
race, sex, and national origin, and that the latter decision was also motivated by retaliatory animus
for challenging his removal. Defendant moves for summary judgment. For the reasons explained
below, the Court will grant the motion and enter judgment for Defendant.
I. Background
Pereira is a white Hispanic man. In mid-2014, he was hired as Director of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (“OMWI”),
the agency’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office responsible for its diversity-and-in-
clusion program. ECF No. 29-1 ¶ 1. Pereira was hired by Barbara Ryan, a white non-Hispanic
woman, who was the FDIC’s chief operating officer and chief of staff, and who served as Pereira’s
direct supervisor during the relevant time. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. While OMWI Director, Pereira spearheaded
significant restructuring efforts. ECF No. 29 at 7–13. About a year after Pereira was hired, in the fall of 2015, senior FDIC management received
a series of complaints about his leadership and management of OMWI. For example, employees
there reported that:
• “[T]hings are not going well. Segundo does not know or understand the OMWI
programs, is not trustworthy, and creates turmoil among the staff. . . . He uses trickery, manipu-
lates people, pits employees against each other, and threatens staff. . . . Some staff are contem-
plating filing complaints, going to the [Office of Inspector General] or going to Congress.” ECF
No. 29-1 ¶ 4.
• “As the Director of OMWI, Mr. Pereira has created an environment of unfair treat-
ment, discrimination, coercion and retaliation,” id. ¶ 6, including by “intimidation, character as-
sassination, manipulation, and harassment, and how it creates a hostile work environment,” id. ¶ 8.
• “[M]orale, comradery, sense of teamwork has gotten lower or is non-existent” in
OMWI. Id. ¶ 7. 1 See generally id. ¶¶ 4–14, 25–26.
In response, Ryan asked the FDIC’s ombudsman to conduct an informal review—or “pulse
check”—of OMWI. The ombudsman’s subsequent report found leadership and management prob-
lems with Pereira as well as another member of senior management at OMWI, Melodee Brooks.
ECF No. 29-1 ¶ 19. At the start of 2016, based on both the results of the pulse check and her own
observations of Pereira as his direct supervisor, Ryan reassigned Pereira to another executive man-
agement position outside OMWI. Id. ¶ 15. She explained that Pereira’s management had created
1 At times, Plaintiff argues that certain facts are disputed because they lack context or are otherwise unreliable. But the Court treats these facts as undisputed as far as Plaintiff concedes that they in fact occurred. See Mason v. Geithner, 811 F. Supp. 2d 128, 143 n.6, 147 nn.14–15, 148 nn.17–18, 154 n.27 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 122 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (response is “infirm” when the statement is admitted but facts are claimed to be “mischaracterized,” “dis- torted,” or “biased and unfair”).
2 “significant turmoil” in OMWI, and staff harbored a “deep level of mistrust and resentment” to-
ward him. Id. ¶ 18. Moreover, in Ryan’s view, Pereira had not accepted responsibility or acted to
address these issues, which led to an unprecedented number of EEO complaints against him. Id.
As far as Ryan was concerned, Pereira’s management threatened the reputation and functioning of
the FDIC and OMWI. Id.
Ryan appointed Avelino Rodriguez, another white Hispanic man, to take Pereira’s place
on an interim basis. ECF No. 29-1 ¶¶ 16–17. And after the FDIC conducted a more formal survey
of OMWI employees to investigate these concerns with management, in March and April 2016,
Pereira’s reassignment was made permanent. Id. ¶¶ 22–24. In 2018, the OMWI Director position
was filled permanently by Saul Schwartz, a non-Hispanic white man. Id. ¶¶ 31–36. Ryan, who
made the decision, elected not to reinstate Pereira because of her prior concerns about his perfor-
mance as OMWI Director a few years beforehand. Id. ¶ 37. Among the factors Ryan weighed in
making her decision was Pereira’s performance rating of III (on a scale from I to V) that she gave
him on his 2015 managerial performance appraisal. Id. ¶¶ 41–46.
Pereira first brought an EEO complaint in mid-2017, after he had been detailed out of
OMWI on an interim basis. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 2. After Ryan made the decision not to reinstate
him, Pereira brought two more EEO complaints against Ryan and the FDIC. Id. In December
2020, Pereira sued. The FDIC moves for summary judgment. ECF No. 27.
II. Legal Standard
Under the Federal Rules, a court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences
accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their favor.” Lopez v. Council on Am.-
3 Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate spe-
cific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Courts “are not to make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence.” Lopez, 826 F.3d at 496 (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.
Cir. 2006)). But the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Lopez, 826 F.3d at 496 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986)). If the evidence “is merely color-
able, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249–50 (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, federal employers may not discriminate “based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). “Where, as here, the plain-
tiff has no direct evidence that the adverse employment actions of which she complains were
caused by prohibited discrimination,” the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973)). In disparate-treatment cases, a plaintiff’s prima
facie case “consists a showing that ‘(1) [the plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference
of discrimination.’” Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 267 F. Supp. 3d 246, 255 (D.D.C. 2017)
4 (quoting Chappell-Johnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 2
If a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, “the burden ‘must shift to the employer to ar-
ticulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the’ adverse action.” Webster, 267 F. Supp.
3d at 255 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the employer does so, then the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext. But “where an employee has suffered an adverse em-
ployment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the de-
cision, the district court need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out
a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490,
494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted). Under those circumstances, “the district court must
resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury
to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that
the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin?” Id.
Pereira claims that Ryan’s decision to remove him as Director of OMWI and not to rein-
state him were motivated by racial and national-origin discrimination. 3 The FDIC has articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for these decisions: Ryan’s view that the turmoil at OMWI
2 The D.C. Circuit recently overruled its prior precedent requiring “objectively tangible harm” for discrimination cases under Title VII, holding that “an employer that transfers an em- ployee or denies an employee’s transfer request because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII by discriminating against the employee with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (en banc), overruling Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But actionable retaliation claims, at least, “are [still] limited to those where an employer causes ‘ma- terial adversity,’ not ‘trivial harms.’” Black v. Guzman, No. 22-1873 (BAH), 2023 WL 3055427, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2023) (quoting Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (alteration in original). Pereira’s retaliation claim is addressed below. 3 Pereira has abandoned any claim that he suffered discrimination because of his sex.
5 was due, at least in part, to Pereira’s management, and that Pereira had not accepted responsibility
or acted to address the problems he helped create. ECF No. 29-1 ¶ 17. The FDIC is entitled to
summary judgment on these claims because Pereira has not produced sufficient evidence to show
that the FDIC’s proffered reason was a pretext, and that the real reason was discriminatory.
Pereira, for this part, first tries to shift the blame for the problems at OMWI to Brooks, and
to hold her up as a comparator, to show that Ryan unlawfully discriminated against him. Pereira
asserts that even before he arrived at OMWI, there were problems there caused by Brooks, who
was then the acting Director. ECF No. 29 at 6. Yet, Pereira argues, Ryan “fully supported”
Brooks. Id. at 6; see ECF No. 29-4 ¶ 2. Pereira attributes this support to the fact that Brooks is
black. ECF No. 29 at 2. Thus, he asserts, because of support from Ryan, after Pereira arrived at
OMWI, Brooks remained there as senior deputy director and could continue to cause the same
problems, for which Ryan unfairly blamed him. Id. at 7–9; see ECF No. 31-2 at 4. Pereira also
suggests that Brooks “instigated a campaign to undermine and ultimately oust” him from the role
to replace him. ECF No. 29 at 30. Finally, Pereira says, Brooks was not removed from OMWI at
the same time as Pereira; it was almost another year before Ryan removed Brooks from her post
there, only to reinstate her after her EEO complaint was resolved. ECF No. 27-31 at 4–8.
The evidence supporting these theories is not enough to show pretext or that Ryan discrim-
inated against Pereira based on his race and national origin, either in removing him or failing to
reinstate him. Most obviously, there is no evidence that Ryan harbored any bias against Pereira
based on his race or national origin. To the contrary: at first, Ryan replaced Pereira with another
white Hispanic man, the demographic against whom she was purportedly biased. ECF No. 29-1
¶¶ 16–17. More importantly, it was Ryan herself who made great efforts to hire Pereira for the
role, barely a year beforehand, in the first place. Because “it would be odd to select [him] and then
6 immediately start ginning up reasons to dismiss [him],” “it is difficult to impute to” the same per-
son “an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire.” Vatel v. Alli-
ance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 4
Pereira’s suggestions that Brooks was the cause of all the problems at OMWI or that Ryan’s
comparative treatment of her evinces discrimination against him get him nowhere, either. Nothing
about Brooks’ alleged management shortcomings suggest that the separate reasons Ryan had to
replace Pereira were pretextual, especially when those reasons were documented in both the
FDIC’s ombudsman’s pulse check and the later, more formal management report. And to the
extent Pereira simply disagrees with the portion of the blame Ryan assigned to him for the tumul-
tuous state of the office, such a subjective disagreement with his supervisor is of no moment. See
Ey v. Off. of Chief Admin. Officer of U.S. House of Representatives, 967 F. Supp. 2d 337, 344
(D.D.C. 2013). In addition, even assuming Brooks is an apt comparator to Pereira—even though
Brooks was never hired as Director—Ryan’s treatment of the two hardly supports a claim of dis-
crimination. Indeed, Ryan initially passed over Brooks for the Director job in favor of Pereira.
Like Pereira, Brooks was ultimately removed from OMWI because of Ryan’s concerns about her
management, even if she was eventually reinstated after her own claims of discrimination were
settled. But notably, she was not placed in the Director’s role to which Pereira believes he is
entitled.
Pereira also cites as evidence of discrimination against him Brooks’ comment that she
4 Pereira also argues that Ryan discriminated against him by incorporating negative com- ments into his 2015 managerial performance appraisal but not incorporating the same ones in Brooks’ evaluation. ECF No. 29 at 34. There is no evidence that unlawful discrimination had anything to do the incorporation of these comments. And in any event, both Pereira and Brooks received overall ratings of three out of five, and both appraisals contained negative comments from Ryan. ECF No. 29-1 ¶¶ 42–47. Compare ECF No. 27-20 with ECF No. 27-21.
7 could not “believe that the FDIC [had] selected a Hispanic as the OMWI Director” and a related
comment by another OMWI employee. ECF No. 29-4 ¶ 3; ECF No. 31-2 at 4–5. Pereira claims
that Brooks “instigated a campaign to undermine and ultimately oust” him from the role with hopes
of replacing him. ECF No. 29 at 30. Although he does not say so, in effect Pereira tries to leverage
these statements and Brooks’ supposed actions under a “cat’s paw” theory, in which “the company
official who makes the decision to take an adverse employment action has no discriminatory ani-
mus but is influenced by previous company action that is the product of a like animus in someone
else.” Njang v. Whitestone Grp., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 172, 187 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted).
Under such a theory, Pereira needs to show that his “[direct] supervisor perform[ed] an act moti-
vated by [discriminatory] animus . . . intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment
action” and that doing so caused the action. See Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (citation omitted).
The record here cannot sustain a “cat’s paw” theory because there is insufficient evidence
supporting several links in the chain. To begin, it is not clear that any actions undertaken by
Brooks—Pereira’s subordinate, rather than his supervisor—could support a “cat’s paw” theory.
See Morris, 825 F.3d at 668; Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 n.4 (2011). And even if
they could, given that Brooks is not Pereira’s supervisor, Pereira would need to show Ryan “acted
negligently by allowing [Brooks’] acts to achieve their desired effect though [Ryan] knew (or rea-
sonably should have known) of the discriminatory motivation.” McCullough v. Whitaker, No. 14-
cv-296 (RDM), 2019 WL 171404, at *6 n.1 (D.D.C. 2019) (alteration in original omitted) (quoting
Velazquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 274 (1st Cir. 2014)). 5
5 Though several Circuits have extended “cat’s paw” liability to the actions of co-workers, not just supervisors, the D.C. Circuit has not weighed in. See McCullough v. Whitaker, 2019 WL
8 Pereira has not even attempted to make that showing.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
Brooks caused the tide of complaints against Pereira. On this point, Pereira points only to his own
conclusory allegations, as well as statements by OMWI employees Greg Cofer and Lisa Brown
Jones. 6 Among other things, according to Cofer, Brooks lied to one employee that Pereira “was
trying to get rid of him” in “an effort to undermine Mr. Pereira’s authority in the OMWI staff.”
ECF No. 31-2 at 5. And Jones said that “Brooks manipulated OMWI employees to think nega-
tively against [Pereira] because she wanted the Director position.” ECF No. 31-3 at 5. But none
of this comes close to evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Brooks—as
opposed to the complainants themselves—was responsible for the many complaints against Pereira
made by OMWI staff. True, some complaints were anonymous, but others were signed by OMWI
employees willing to stand by their claims. See, e.g., ECF No. 27-4 at 65–73 (complaints from
OMWI employee regarding Pereira’s “intimidation, character assassination, manipulation, and
harassment, and how it creates a hostile work environment”). And on their face, these detailed
complaints appear to have been based on these employees’ personal observations of Pereira, rather
than anything Brooks said or did, or even misunderstandings that could be attributed to someone
trying to manipulate them. See, e.g., id. at 57–58. Finally, that the FDIC’s ombudsman’s pulse
check and later, its more formal report found problems with Brooks’ management (in addition to
171404, at *6 n.1. Those that have extended it require negligence by the decisionmaker. See, e.g., Velazquez-Perez, 753 F.3d at 274. Cf. Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“To establish liability when a plaintiff is harassed by his or her co-workers, the plaintiff must prove that the employer was at least negligent in not preventing or correcting the harass- ment.”). 6 Pereira also cites a statement of Amy Del Valle that is not included in the record. ECF No. 29 at 30.
9 Pereira’s) undermines Pereira’s assertion that the complaints about OMWI management were
wholly ginned up by Brooks. See ECF No. 30-12 at 1.
Closely connected to Pereira’s argument that these complaints stemmed from Brooks’ cam-
paign against him, he also asserts that they were false, and argues that this too shows that Ryan’s
decision to fire him was pretextual. Of course, a plaintiff can show pretext with evidence that the
reasons the employer gives for a supposedly discriminatory action are false. See St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515–17 (1993). But Pereira fails to show that any of the specific
factual allegations in these complaints—let alone some substantial number of them—were false.
And in any event, setting aside a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, the real question is whether Ryan
genuinely believed that, collectively, those complaints (and her own personal observations) de-
picted a problem with Pereira’s management that justified the actions she took. That is so because
“the issue is not ‘the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons offered . . . [but] whether the em-
ployer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.’” Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 86 F.3d
1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (alterations in original) (quoting McCoy v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co.,
957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)). Pereira provides no reason to question Ryan’s honest belief
in this regard.
At most, Pereira can point to evidence that undermines one of the specific bases for Ryan’s
decision to remove him: that Pereira had misled her about the number of OMWI employees he had
reassigned. ECF No. 29 at 28–29. While Pereira was Director, Ryan accused him of “being less
than forthright with [her] regarding the number of people [he] reassigned” because, according to
Ryan, he told her that he had reassigned only two people but in fact he had “reassigned more.”
ECF No. 29-4 ¶ 5. Pereira supplies a factual explanation for why this was a misunderstanding,
and why, assuming he is right, Ryan was wrong. ECF No. 29 at 15–17, 29. But at most, this
10 points to a misunderstanding, and Pereira does not explain why all the other reasons behind Ryan’s
decision were false or pretextual, too.
Next, Pereira argues that Ryan’s decision to hire Schwartz as permanent OMWI Director
smacks of discrimination because he was “objectively more qualified” than Schwartz. ECF No.
29 at 31–32. To support such an inference, Pereira needs to show his credentials were “stark[ly]
superior” to that of the successful candidate. Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir.
2003); see also Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“In order to justify an
inference of discrimination, the qualifications gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative
of discrimination.”). He has not come close to making that showing. The agency provided rea-
soned justifications for hiring Schwartz, including the improvement in OMWI’s functioning while
he was in charge, see ECF No. 27-2 at 30, and Pereira even admits, “I don’t contest [Schwartz’s]
qualifications,” just that “I do not believe his credential and qualifications exceed mine,” ECF No.
27-17 ¶ 24. But merely arguing he is marginally more qualified is insufficient, because courts are
ill-equipped to second-guess an employer’s weighing of the qualifications of competing candidates
without any other evidence of discrimination. See generally Fischbach., 86 F.3d at 1183 (The
Court will not “second-guess an employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably discrimina-
tory motive.” (citation omitted)).
Pereira also says the selection process used to hire Schwartz is evidence of discrimination.
See ECF No. 29 at 32–34. Preselection of one candidate over another may “shed[] light on an
employer’s motivation for a hiring decision.” Oliver-Simon v. Nicholson, 384 F. Supp. 2d 298,
310 (D.D.C. 2005). But even “if there had been favoritism in [the] selection process, courts have
held that ‘[p]reselection . . . does not violate Title VII when such preselection is based on the qual-
ifications of the party and not on some basis prohibited by Title VII.’” Baylor v. Powell, 459 F.
11 Supp. 3d 47, 59 (D.D.C. 2020) (citation omitted).
Even if the process here suggested that Schwartz were favored—even preselected—over
Pereira for the position, that does not suggest unlawful discrimination. The FDIC restricted appli-
cants for the permanent Director position to those who had held it on a permanent or acting basis
for at least one year. ECF No. 29 at 34. In addition, the FDIC issued an “excepted service”
vacancy announcement that allowed attorneys to apply without needing to satisfy certain require-
ments linked to the non-attorney “merit-promotion internal candidates” announcement. Id. at 33.
So both Pereira and Schwartz (the latter of whom was serving as acting Director at the time) were
eligible to apply—and did. See id. at 31. Pereira argues that the OMWI Director position did not
call for legal expertise that justified attorneys, such as Schwartz, being allowed, or even solicited,
to apply. See id. at 33. But even if the “excepted service” announcement were intended to allow
Schwartz to apply, at most a jury could find that the process was crafted to make him eligible, not
to exclude Pereira because of Pereira’s race or national origin. See Kilby-Robb v. Devos, 246 F.
Supp. 3d 182, 198 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[F]avoritism based on criteria other than [race, color, age, or
other protected characteristics] . . . does not violate the federal anti-discrimination laws and does
not raise an inference of discrimination.”) (citation omitted). To repeat, even if Ryan had in fact
preselected Schwartz because of his qualifications, including the job he did as acting Director, that
does not bespeak unlawful discrimination against Pereira.
B. Retaliation
Title VII, likewise, prohibits federal employers from retaliating against an employee for
engaging in protected activities such as filing an EEO complaint alleging employment discrimina-
tion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In retaliation cases, a plaintiff must show she “engaged in protected
activity, as a consequence of which her employer took a materially adverse action against her.”
12 Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). As above, without direct
evidence of retaliation, the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. Lath-
ram, 336 F.3d at 1089 n.3; see Kirkland v. McAleenan, No. 13-cv-194 (RDM), 2019 WL 7067046,
*23 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2019). Should the plaintiff satisfy her initial burden, and the employer ar-
ticulates a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show pretext. And in that situation, as with discrimination, “the ‘central question’ left
for the Court to decide is whether ‘the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to find that the employer’s asserted [legitimate] reason was not the actual reason,’ but a pretext
for unlawful . . . retaliation.” Davis v. Vilsack, No. 17-cv-245 (TJK), 2023 WL 6065012, at *6
(D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (citing Brady, 520 F.3d at 494).
After Pereira was removed from his position as OMWI Director, he filed a series of EEO
complaints with the FDIC, and now argues that the agency’s decision not to reinstate him in that
role was made in retaliation for that protected activity. See ECF No. 29 at 31. But he offers no
evidence beyond what was insufficient to show evidence of discrimination, described above, for a
jury to find that the agency’s explanation for removing him from the Director position and not
reinstating him was pretextual, and that the actual reason was retaliatory. He relies mainly on the
FDIC’s selection of Schwartz as his permanent replacement. Id. But for the reasons already ex-
plained, nothing about that hiring provides a basis on which a reasonable jury could conclude that
the FDIC was motivated by unlawful discrimination or retaliation. Without more, Pereira’s retal-
iation claim fails alongside his claim of discrimination.
13 IV. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: February 6, 2024