IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION
CHATIQUA C. PERDUE Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:18cv156 VS. : JUDGE WALTER H. RICE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, : Defendant. :
DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DOC. #17) IN THEIR ENTIRETY; DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO SAID JUDICIAL FILING (DOC. #20) OVERRULED; JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER, REVERSING COMMISSIONER’S DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED AND, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT; CAPTIONED CAUSE REMANDED TO THE DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER, UNDER THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; TERMINATION ENTRY
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a decision of the Defendant Commissioner denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits. On May 7, 2019, the United States Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendations (Doc. #17), recommending that the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act be reversed and that the captioned cause be remanded to the Defendant Commissioner, under the Fourth Sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for proceedings consistent with his opinion. Based upon the citations of authority set
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations (Doc. #17) and in the Plaintiff's Response to Defendant’s Objections (Doc. #21), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of this Court’s file, including the Administrative Transcript (Doc. #6), and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in their entirety and, in so doing, orders the entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Commissioner, concluding that the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. The Defendant’s Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #20) are overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act is reversed, and the captioned cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations. In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the Magistrate Judge’s task is to determine if that decision is supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court, upon objections being made to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations, is required to make a de novo review of those recommendations of the report to which objection is made. This de novo review, in turn, requires this Court to re-examine all the relevant evidence, previously reviewed by the Magistrate Judge, to determine whether the findings of the Secretary [now Commissioner] are supported by “substantial evidence.” Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6" Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 678 F.2d 653, 654 (6" Cir. 1982). This Court’s sole function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner’s findings must be affirmed if they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed.2d 126 (1938); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6" Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401. Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6" Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6"" Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). To be substantial, the evidence “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” LeMaster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6" Cir. 1986), quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, supra. In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 □□□ Cir. 1978); Ellis, supra; Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6" Cir. 1984); Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365 (6" Cir. 1984); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6" Cir. 1984), However, the Court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility. Garner, supra. The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security and proceedings on Claimant’s application for social security disability benefits are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, Commissioner of Social Security, 246 F.3d 762 (6" Cir. 2001). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION
CHATIQUA C. PERDUE Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:18cv156 VS. : JUDGE WALTER H. RICE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, : Defendant. :
DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DOC. #17) IN THEIR ENTIRETY; DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO SAID JUDICIAL FILING (DOC. #20) OVERRULED; JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER, REVERSING COMMISSIONER’S DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED AND, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT; CAPTIONED CAUSE REMANDED TO THE DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER, UNDER THE FOURTH SENTENCE OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; TERMINATION ENTRY
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a decision of the Defendant Commissioner denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits. On May 7, 2019, the United States Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendations (Doc. #17), recommending that the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act be reversed and that the captioned cause be remanded to the Defendant Commissioner, under the Fourth Sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for proceedings consistent with his opinion. Based upon the citations of authority set
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations (Doc. #17) and in the Plaintiff's Response to Defendant’s Objections (Doc. #21), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of this Court’s file, including the Administrative Transcript (Doc. #6), and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in their entirety and, in so doing, orders the entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Commissioner, concluding that the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. The Defendant’s Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #20) are overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act is reversed, and the captioned cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations. In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the Magistrate Judge’s task is to determine if that decision is supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court, upon objections being made to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations, is required to make a de novo review of those recommendations of the report to which objection is made. This de novo review, in turn, requires this Court to re-examine all the relevant evidence, previously reviewed by the Magistrate Judge, to determine whether the findings of the Secretary [now Commissioner] are supported by “substantial evidence.” Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6" Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 678 F.2d 653, 654 (6" Cir. 1982). This Court’s sole function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner’s findings must be affirmed if they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed.2d 126 (1938); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6" Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401. Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6" Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6"" Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). To be substantial, the evidence “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” LeMaster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6" Cir. 1986), quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, supra. In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 □□□ Cir. 1978); Ellis, supra; Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6" Cir. 1984); Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365 (6" Cir. 1984); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6" Cir. 1984), However, the Court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility. Garner, supra. The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security and proceedings on Claimant’s application for social security disability benefits are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, Commissioner of Social Security, 246 F.3d 762 (6" Cir. 2001). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. even if the Curt as a trier of fact would have arrived at a different conclusion. Elkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6 Cir. 1981).
In addition to the foregoing, in ruling as aforesaid, this Court makes the following, non-exclusive, observations: lL. This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Administrative Law Judge erred in evaluating the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Bhat, and, accordingly, the Defendant’s conclusion of non-disability is not supported by substantial evidence. On remand, the Defendant should not only properly evaluate the opinion of said treating physician, but should also consider the other allegations of error made by the Plaintiff. 2. In this matter, proof of disability is not strong with opposing evidence lacking in substance. Accordingly, a remand for the payment of benefits is not proper; rather, given that evidence of disability is not overwhelming, a remand for further administrative considerations, as outlined above, is proper. Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6" Cir. 1994).
WHEREFORE, based upon the aforesaid, this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. #17) in their entirety, having
concluded that the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant’s Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #20) are overruled. Judgment will be ordered entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Commissioner, pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further administrative proceedings during which the Administrative Law Judge should properly evaluate the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Bhat, as well as analyzing, within the context of the proper evaluation of Dr. Bhat’s opinions, the other objections that Plaintiff put forth in objecting to the Defendant's initial finding of non-disability.
The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.
September 26, 2019 bJoer I ies 2 WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Copies to: Counsel of record