Opinion issued September 16, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00653-CR ——————————— PERCY SEMIEN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1681014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Percy Semien was convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty-five
years’ imprisonment. In five issues, Semien challenges his conviction. We affirm.
I. Background
Semien shot Jaden LaCour at a Houston Citgo station late in the evening on
June 14, 2020. That day, Semien and Bobby Blake Okoro attended a graduation party for Felix Ugorji. Evidence1 shows that from around 9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
that evening, Semien’s, Felix’s, and Okoro’s phones were in an area consistent with
the Felix residence.
At 11:40 p.m., Semien’s phone made a forty-second call to Javonte Vining’s
phone. At the time, Semien’s phone and Okoro’s phone were in an area consistent
with the Citgo station, and Javonte’s phone was in an area consistent with LaCour’s
residence.
At 11:48 p.m., Semien’s phone made a twenty-two-second call to Javonte’s
phone; Javonte’s phone was now nearer to the Citgo station.
At 11:50 p.m., Javonte’s phone made a twenty-two-second call to Semien’s
phone; both men’s phones were then in the area consistent with the Citgo station,
and it appears Javonte’s phone made the call while he and LaCour were parked by
the gas pumps at the station.
Per surveillance video from the Citgo station (which was seven minutes
slower than the actual time), at around 11:51 p.m., LaCour exited Javonte’s vehicle
and Semien and Okoro walked up. Okoro stayed behind the vehicle while Semien
spoke with LaCour by the side of the vehicle. After speaking for around fifty
1 Using cell phone usage and location data, police were able to create a chronology and mapping of events that occurred on June 14, 2020, which was presented to the jury via a demonstrative slideshow.
2 seconds, LaCour appears to raise a hand, and Semien began running away with
LaCour lunging his direction. While he was starting to run away, Semien fired a
pistol at LaCour. A testifying police officer described these events: “It appears Mr.
LaCour raised his hand up as if he was handing something off as the second
individual [Semien] was taking it from him. . . . The second individual is discharging
a firearm in the direction of Mr. LaCour.”
The video shows that, after Semien and Okoro ran away, LaCour took a few
steps and went down to the ground. The police officer testified that a still picture
taken from the surveillance video shows LaCour on the ground, and both of his hands
were on the ground with nothing in them. It appears LaCour then reached for his
pocket while lying down.
Evidence shows that, after the shooting, at around 12:44 a.m. on June 15,
2020, Semien’s phone and Okoro’s phone were at an area consistent with the Semien
Police officers were dispatched to the scene shortly after the shooting and
found LaCour lying on the ground with other men trying to help him. Officers found
a black and silver pistol on the ground next to LaCour, within the reach of his right
hand. Officers also collected over $2,000 in cash belonging to LaCour.
The pistol had a sixteen-round-capacity magazine with thirteen rounds in it
and one round in the pistol’s chamber. Three cartridge casings were found at the
3 scene and determined to have been fired from the same gun, which was not the pistol
found next to LaCour.
LaCour was declared deceased on June 15, 2020, dying from his gunshot
injuries. LaCour’s autopsy revealed he had sustained two gunshot wounds, with one
bullet entering through his stomach and exiting his back and the other bullet going
through his right thigh.
Through their investigation, which included viewing the Citgo station
surveillance video and speaking with witnesses, police developed Semien as a
suspect. On September 6, 2020, a police investigator Mirandized and interviewed
Semien. During the interview, Semien claimed to not remember much, saying he
did not recall going to Ugorji’s graduation party, seeing Okoro in June 2020, or
going to the Citgo station. When asked why he shot LaCour, Semien denied
shooting him and repeatedly denied being there, even when shown proof that he had
been there, told others had identified him as being there, and informed he had been
charged with murder.
Later that day, Semien made a call from jail during which he said, “I didn’t
have nothing to do with that crime. Didn’t have nothing to do with that murder at
all in no type of way possible.”
4 As discussed in more detail below, Okoro testified at trial that he and Semien
were approached by a stranger holding a gun at the Citgo station, and Semien shot
the stranger in self-defense and to save Okoro.
During closing, Semien’s counsel argued that the State did not meet its burden
to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt self-defense or defense of another. The jury
convicted Semien of murder and sentenced him to sixty-five years’ imprisonment.
Semien now appeals.
II. Self-Defense and Defense of a Third Person
In his first and second issues, Semien contends that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of Semien having acted in self-defense
and defense of a third person.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
Evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction if “any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). In
conducting a legal-sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict without substituting our judgment for that of the jury.
McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Dunham, 666
S.W.3d at 482. The jury is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be attached
to witnesses’ testimony. Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482. “The jury may reasonably
5 infer facts from the evidence presented, credit the witnesses it chooses, disbelieve
any or all the evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit.”
Mottin v. State, 634 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet.
ref’d).
When the defendant raises self-defense or defense of a third person, he bears
the burden to produce evidence supporting the defense, but the State bears the burden
of persuasion to disprove the raised issues. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592,
608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“[T]he State’s burden of persuasion ‘is not one that
requires the production of evidence; rather it requires only that the State prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (citation omitted)). Thus, the State must both
prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and persuade
the jury that the defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of a third person
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 609; Rankin v. State, 617 S.W.3d 169, 181–82
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).
The jury charge provided two theories under which the jury could convict
Semien of the offense of murder: (1) he intentionally or knowingly caused LaCour’s
death by shooting him with a deadly weapon, a firearm; or (2) he intentionally caused
serious bodily injury and intentionally or knowingly committed an act clearly
dangerous to human life by shooting LaCour with a deadly weapon, a firearm,
causing LaCour’s death. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2).
6 The charge also submitted self-defense and defense of a third person.
“[D]eadly force used in self-defense or in defense of another is a defense to
prosecution for murder if that use of force is ‘justified.’” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at
606 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.02). Under the Penal Code, “a person is justified
in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes
the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or
attempted use of unlawful force.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(a). A person is justified
in using deadly force if the actor would be justified in using force under section 9.31
and when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is
immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use
of unlawful deadly force. Id. § 9.32(a). Similarly, a person is justified in using
deadly force against another to protect a third person if the actor would be justified
in using deadly force under section 9.32 and “the actor reasonably believes that his
intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person.” Id. § 9.33.
B. Analysis
Semien argues the evidence clearly establishes that he acted in self-defense
and defense of a third person because of Okoro’s eyewitness testimony. Okoro
testified that, while his group was dropping people off after the graduation party,
they stopped at the Citgo station because he wanted to buy “some cigarillos.”
According to Okoro, while he and Semien were walking toward the station’s store,
7 a stranger (identified as LaCour at trial) approached them, pulled out a tan-colored
gun, and told Okoro to step back. Okoro testified he did not know the person, and
it did not appear to him that Semien knew them either. Okoro stated the stranger
spoke to Semien for two or three minutes, at some point, pulling out money. Per
Okoro, the stranger had his gun drawn the entire interaction. Okoro testified that the
stranger then lunged toward Semien, and Semien shot the stranger in self-defense,
also saving Okoro’s life. Okoro testified he and Semien ran away and had not seen
or spoken to each other since. Okoro denied knowing or ever communicating with
Javonte. Okoro also acknowledged that when he spoke with officers in June 2020,
he did not tell them the full story for how the shooting occurred because he was
scared, but did say the stranger pulled out a gun and that he feared for his life.
Semien contends Okoro’s account of the shooting was corroborated by the
surveillance video and officer testimony that the video showed LaCour was moving
toward Semien at the time of the shooting. According to Semien, the video shows
Okoro stopping as they walked toward LaCour and then start backing up and shows
Semien running away with LaCour following at the time of the shooting. Semien
also argues that the pistol found within the reach of LaCour’s right hand already had
a round chambered, meaning it was ready to fire and supporting that LaCour was the
aggressor. For the following reasons, we conclude the evidence supports the jury’s
rejection of Semien’s defensive theories.
8 The surveillance video shows Semien and Okoro approached the vehicle next
to which LaCour was standing. Semien walked directly up to LaCour, and Okoro
stopped behind the vehicle. Nothing in the way the men moved indicates either
moved backward, hesitated, or were startled, in response to LaCour drawing a gun
on them. Okoro did take two small steps backward at one point, but those appear to
be because he was casually moving back and forth instead of standing still, not
because of something LaCour did. Okoro appeared relaxed during the fifty seconds
that Semien and LaCour spoke.
Additionally, the surveillance video negates Okoro’s account that a random
stranger approached the men at the Citgo station. To the contrary, the video shows
Semien and Okoro purposefully walking toward LaCour to speak with him. And the
police investigation proved that LaCour was not a random stranger but someone
riding with Javonte, whose phone had called, or been called by, Semien’s phone
three times shortly before the meeting, supporting a finding that the meeting was
planned by the men.
Another inconsistency was that Okoro testified LaCour pulled out a tan-
colored gun, but the evidence proved LaCour’s pistol was black and silver. And the
State’s firearm expert testified that, while a round in the pistol’s chamber meant
someone had prepared the pistol to shoot, it was unknown when the round was
9 chambered, meaning it could have occurred long before the meeting or even when
LaCour was on the ground.
The video further shows that, after LaCour and Semien spoke for around fifty
seconds, LaCour appears to raise a hand, and Semien then started running away with
LaCour lunging in his direction. While he was starting to run away, Semien fired a
pistol at LaCour. LaCour quickly dropped to the ground, and the video shows that
he did not have anything in his hands. LaCour then appeared to reach into his pocket,
and police later found the pistol near LaCour’s right hand. The pistol had blood on
it, and DNA testing of the pistol grip provided “very strong support” that LaCour
was a contributor to the DNA. Accordingly, this evidence supports a finding that
LaCour did not pull out the pistol until after he was shot.
Semien argues that the quality and angles of the video do not support the
foregoing description of events but support that LaCour started lunging and
following Semien immediately before the shooting. We agree that the quality and
angles of the video do not give a perfect, unobstructed view of what transpired. And
we agree the video does show that LaCour was moving in Semien’s direction at the
time of the shooting. However, the video is sufficient to support that LaCour did
not have a gun in his hands when he dropped to the ground after the shooting and
that he reached for something in his pocket. Circumstantial evidence supports that
10 he was reaching for his pistol after the shooting because it was found next to his right
hand with his blood on it.
Semien’s interview with the police investigator also provided reason for the
jury to reject his defensive theories. Despite the investigator showing Semien a
picture of himself at the crime scene, Semien obstinately denied being there. The
jury could have reasonably believed that, if Semien fired the shots to defend himself
and Okoro against an aggressor who pulled a gun on them, he would have told the
investigator that account instead of repeatedly denying any involvement. See Dugar
v. State, No. 14-17-00059-CR, 2018 WL 1611645, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Apr. 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The jury
also had reason to doubt appellant’s claim of self-defense because he did not report
the shooting to police and, in his custodial interrogation, he initially denied that he
had shot a gun.”). Even later that day, when on a call from jail, Semien continued
to deny any involvement instead of explaining he acted defensively.2
In sum, the jury could have reasonably rejected Semien’s defensive theories
because evidence contradicted material parts of Okoro’s story and supported that
Semien shot LaCour when he was unarmed. See Gonzales v. State, No. 01-23-
2 Semien challenges the believability of this evidence, noting that the officer who proved up the jail call because he recognized Semien’s voice on the call also admitted that inmates sometimes use each other’s “SPN numbers” and that the caller identified himself as “P. LO.” These were credibility issues for the jury to resolve. 11 00544-CR, 2025 WL 1958112, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 17, 2025,
no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“We agree with the State that
the jury, in its role as factfinder, could have rationally rejected the appellant’s self-
defense claim based on credibility.”); Coons v. State, No. 01-16-00201-CR, 2017
WL 1326079, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 11, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (“The jury’s decision to reject appellant’s
defensive claim ultimately hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.”). The
evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that Semien murdered LaCour and its rejection of self-defense and defense of
another beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule Semien’s first and second issues.
III. Closing Argument
In his third and fourth issues, Semien contends the trial court abused its
discretion, and deprived him of due process, when it failed to grant his request for a
mistrial based on a statement made during the State’s closing argument.
A mistrial is the trial court’s remedy for improper conduct that is “so
prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and
futile.” Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quotation
omitted). It is a remedy appropriate only for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and
incurable errors. Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We
12 review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion.
Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. When determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a mistrial, we balance the three Mosley factors: (1) the
prejudicial effect; (2) the curative measures taken; and (3) the strength of the
evidence supporting the conviction. See Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011) (extending factors from Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998), to evaluating improper jury argument that violated defendant’s
constitutional rights).
Semien complains about the State’s following rebuttal argument:
Now, the only evidence that we have heard that would support self- defense, and remember the Defendant has to be justified in using self- defense in order to be able to use defense of a third person, and the only thing we have heard is [Okoro’s] statement that [Semien] saved his life that day. [Okoro] is lying, because after three years he now mysteriously has to say that on the stand? He talked to officers after this happened. He told you that. He cooperated. Deputy Davis told you that. And he told you he didn’t tell the police these things then. But after three years he’s created this ulterior reality in his mind, because he’s scared of the police, because he’s scared of the Defendant. He didn’t want to be here, because he’s scared of the Defendant. (Emphasis added.) After the State made this argument, Semien objected “Outside
the record,” which the trial court sustained. Semien requested an instruction to
disregard, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard “the last statement made
by the Prosecutor.” The trial court then denied Semien’s request for a mistrial.
13 Semien argues the State’s remark that Okoro created a self-defense, defense-
of-another narrative because he feared Semien “served to gut” the defenses and
deprive him of due process. We disagree. Even if it were improper, which we need
not decide, the State’s argument that Okoro fabricated his story because he feared
Semien was a relatively minor point compared to the State’s other arguments based
on evidence that Semien undisputedly shot and killed LaCour but then lied to police
about not being involved, that Okoro did not tell police Semien had shot LaCour
defensively, and that parts of Okoro’s story were negated by the evidence,
particularly that they were approached by a random stranger at the Citgo station.
Moreover, the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the objected-to
argument, which we presume the jury did. See Griffin v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404, 417
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (“[W]e generally presume the jury
followed the trial court’s instructions [and] a mistrial is required only in those
‘extreme circumstances’ where the prejudice is ‘incurable.’” (citation omitted)).
The objected-to argument was not so egregious to be incurable by the
instruction to disregard and did not cause the jury to convict Semien when it
otherwise would have acquitted him, depriving him of a fair trial. Accordingly, the
14 trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Semien’s request for the
extraordinary remedy of a mistral.3 We overrule Semien’s third and fourth issues.
IV. Photographs and Video
In his fifth issue, Semien contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted over his Texas Rule of Evidence 403 objections autopsy photographs and
video of the police officer performing CPR on LaCour.
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This
deferential standard requires that we uphold a trial court’s admissibility decision
when that decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Fowler v. State,
544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A trial court judge is given
considerable latitude on evidentiary rulings. Id.
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. TEX. R. EVID. 402. In pertinent
part, under Rule 403, the “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. “Rule 403 favors the
3 Moreover, even if we reviewed this issue under the harm analysis for constitutional error (which Semien argues applies notwithstanding that he made no constitutional objection in the trial court) instead of under the Mosley factors, we would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State’s argument did not contribute to Semien’s conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). 15 admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will
be more probative than prejudicial.” Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010).
In determining the prejudicial effect of photographs, a court should consider
the number, size, color, and detail of the photographs, whether they are gruesome
and show nudity, and whether the photographed body had been altered since the
crime to the appellant’s detriment. See Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). Crime scene photographs are almost always relevant because
they depict the reality of the offense and may show the manner of its occurrence.
Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “If a
photograph is competent, material and relevant to the issue on trial, it is not rendered
inadmissible merely because it is gruesome or might tend to arouse the passions of
the jury, unless it is offered solely to inflame the minds of the jury.” Erazo v. State,
144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quotation omitted). “The
considerations for determining the admissibility of audiovisual recordings under
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 are generally the same as those for determining the
admissibility of photographs.” Williams v. State, No. AP-77,053, 2017 WL
4946865, at *27 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017) (not designated for publication).
16 B. Analysis
Semien first complains about six photographs that show the entrance and exit
gunshot wounds on LaCour’s body. Semien objected to these photographs under
Rule 403, arguing that any probative value of the photographs was substantially
outweighed by the danger of (1) unfair prejudice because of their graphic nature, and
(2) needlessly presenting cumulative evidence because a photograph of LaCour’s
body and a diagram of his gunshot wounds were already admitted into evidence.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Semien’s
objection. The photographs are not unduly graphic but reflect the gunshot wounds
on LaCour’s body with little blood and in a manner not reflected on the other
photograph and diagram.4 The trial court reasonably could have concluded these
photographs aided the jury in understanding precisely where and how LaCour was
shot, an important fact in this close-range shooting case in which Semien is claiming
self-defense. See Heath v. State, No. 01-19-00794-CR, 2021 WL 4095243, at *7
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 9, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (“The photographs were probative to show the extent of the injuries
Heath inflicted on the complainants and the state of the bodies when paramedics
4 On appeal, Semien complains that two of the photographs show LaCour’s buttocks and a portion of his pubic area. He did not object on this specific basis in the trial court or ask to have the nudity redacted or blurred. Regardless, these areas of LaCour’s body are seen simply because of where the bullets struck him and are not depicted in a manner that would inflame or upset the average juror. 17 encountered them.”). Therefore, the probative value of the photographs was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
Semien next complains about the admission of a responding police officer’s
soundless body-camera video, showing him performing CPR on LaCour shortly
after the shooting, which resulted in LaCour beginning labored breathing. Later in
the video, hospital staff is seen working to save LaCour but with little ability to see
LaCour in the video. At trial, Semien objected to this video under Rule 403 due to
unfair prejudice because it shows LaCour dying and being cumulative of the autopsy
photographs. The State responded that the video was important in the chain of events
leading to LaCour’s death.
We again hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
Semien’s objection. While the video does show LaCour, with his eyes rolled
backward, receiving CPR, it does not depict gruesome violence and shows the scene
as left by Semien after he shot LaCour and as the police found it. See Sonnier v.
State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“[W]hen the power of the
visible evidence emanates from nothing more than what the defendant has himself
done we cannot hold that the trial court has abused its discretion merely because it
admitted the evidence.”); Luna v. State, No. 05-17-01188-CR, 2018 WL 3490875,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
18 publication) (concluding trial court did not abuse discretion admitting video of dying
shooting victim receiving CPR; “the video does nothing more than reflect the
gruesomeness of the offense, which is not a sufficient reason for excluding
evidence”). Moreover, there is little risk of unfair prejudice arising from the video
because it is undisputed Semien shot LaCour, and LaCour receiving CPR and later
dying from his injuries does not affect whether Semien shot him in self-defense or
not, i.e., the video did make it more likely the jury would reject Semien’s defenses.
See West v. State, No. 01-18-00228-CR, 2019 WL 2750592, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] July 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(rejecting Rule 403 argument regarding audio of dying victim; “the jury was well
aware that a murder had occurred and that nearby witnesses attempted life-saving
efforts”). The probative value of the video was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
We overrule Semien’s fifth issue.
V. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Andrew Johnson Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).