Percival Dyer v. Claudia Fernanda Juarez Gonzalez; Nathan Innuria; George Farah; Farah Law Group, PLLC

CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
DecidedMay 28, 2026
Docket01-25-00476-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Percival Dyer v. Claudia Fernanda Juarez Gonzalez; Nathan Innuria; George Farah; Farah Law Group, PLLC (Percival Dyer v. Claudia Fernanda Juarez Gonzalez; Nathan Innuria; George Farah; Farah Law Group, PLLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Percival Dyer v. Claudia Fernanda Juarez Gonzalez; Nathan Innuria; George Farah; Farah Law Group, PLLC, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

Opinion issued May 28, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00476-CV ——————————— PERCIVAL DYER, Appellant V. FARAH LAW FIRM, CLAUDIA FERNANDA JUAREZ GONZALEZ, WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, SURETY BOND, AND NANCY HAMREN, Appellees

On Appeal from the 157th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-43320

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Percival Dyer, proceeding pro se, has filed a notice of appeal from

the trial court’s April 28, 2025 order denying her motion for reconsideration.

We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. An order denying a motion for reconsideration is not independently

appealable. See Joseph v. Altman Specialty Plants, LLC, No. 14-24-00532-CV,

2024 WL 4234272, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 19, 2024, no pet.)

(mem. op.); Digges v. Knowledge Alliance, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 463, 464 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In her notice of appeal, appellant specified that

she sought to appeal the trial court’s April 28, 2025 order, which denied appellant’s

motion for reconsideration of her previously filed motion for reinstatement.1 This is

not an appealable order.2 See Avni v. Harris Cnty., No. 01-18-00998-CV, 2019 WL

3720625, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 8, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to reconsider or set aside did not

constitute appealable order).

“[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.”

Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal

1 The trial court dismissed appellant’s case on August 27, 2024. Appellant filed a motion for reinstatement on December 26, 2024, which the trial court denied. On February 18, 2025, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of her motion for reinstatement. It is the trial court’s denial of that motion for reconsideration that appellant now seeks to appeal. 2 Even if the trial court’s April 28, 2025 order denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration was an appealable order, appellant’s notice of appeal, filed on June 24, 2025, was not timely filed as to that order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (generally requiring notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after judgment is signed); Santiago v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 05-15-00342-CV, 2015 WL 2375400, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (request for findings of fact and conclusions of law did not extent time to file notice of appeal where appellants made request following trial court’s order on post-judgment motion).

2 quotations omitted); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759,

763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (jurisdiction fundamental in

nature and cannot be ignored). If this case is an appeal over which the Court has no

jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. V.I.P. Royal Palace, LLC v. Hobby Event

Ctr. LLC, No. 01-18-00621-CV, 2020 WL 3579563, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] July 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d at 763.

On April 9, 2026, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that the Court

lacked jurisdiction over her appeal and directed appellant that, unless a response was

provided within fourteen days, in writing, demonstrating that this Court had

jurisdiction over the appeal, the appeal would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Appellant did not adequately respond.3

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Guiney.

3 In response to the Clerk’s notice, appellant filed a motion to abate and an amended motion to abate. Nothing in her motions indicates that this Court has jurisdiction over her appeal or that abatement of appellant’s appeal would correct the jurisdictional issue. Appellant’s motions are denied.

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Related

Digges v. Knowledge Alliance, Inc.
176 S.W.3d 463 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Royal Independent School District v. Ragsdale
273 S.W.3d 759 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)

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Percival Dyer v. Claudia Fernanda Juarez Gonzalez; Nathan Innuria; George Farah; Farah Law Group, PLLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/percival-dyer-v-claudia-fernanda-juarez-gonzalez-nathan-innuria-george-txctapp1-2026.