Peramas v. King County Sheriffs Office

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: September 15, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01569
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CARMEN PERAMAS, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-1569-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 JEREMY DAVY and KAREN DAVY, 11 Defendants. 12 13

14 Pro se Plaintiff Carmen Peramas files this action in forma pauperis (“IFP”), 15 suing Covington police deputies Jeremy Davy and Karen Davey under 42 U.S.C. § 16 1983. Dkt. No. 6. Peramas’s complaint centers on family court proceedings involving 17 a protection order and child custody dispute, and she generally alleges the 18 defendants improperly interfered with or influenced these proceedings. Dkt. No. 6 19 at 7. For reasons discussed below, Peramas’s complaint fails to state a claim on 20 which relief may be granted and is DISMISSED. 21 When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the 22 action if the court determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 23 1 claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 2 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing

3 complaints under § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts necessarily consider only the operative 4 complaint. See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 5 that an amended complaint supersedes the original and renders the original of no 6 legal effect). 7 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed 8 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be

9 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 10 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. 11 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro 12 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 13 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 14 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 15 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.1988) (per

16 curiam))). But even so, the duties imposed on district courts by Section 1915(e) are 17 unwavering, and when an IFP plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be 18 granted, the action must be dismissed. 19 Even construing Peramas’s complaint liberally, the Court finds that her 20 complaint suffers from several fundamental defects. To state a claim under Section 21 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived

22 them of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 23 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is “procedural 1 device for enforcing substantive provisions of the Constitution and federal 2 statutes”). Although Peramas alleges that Karen Davy helped obtain an “unlawful

3 protection order” and that she “intercepted” court documents, these conclusory 4 allegations fail to identify any constitutional right that was violated or explain how 5 the defendants’ alleged conduct caused a deprivation of such rights. Dkt. No. 6 at 7. 6 And much of the complaint consists of assertions that the defendants were 7 improperly “siding with” other parties rather than describing concrete acts that 8 caused legally cognizable harm to Peramas. Dkt. No. 6 at 12. The complaint’s focus

9 on family court proceedings and protection orders does not transform the 10 defendants’ alleged involvement into a constitutional violation. Without factual 11 allegations connecting the defendants’ specific conduct to a deprivation of 12 constitutional rights, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 13 Section 1983. 14 Thus, the Court DISMISSES the complaint WITHOUT prejudice. However, 15 the Court GRANTS Peramas leave to file an amended complaint that sufficiently

16 pleads facts stating a plausible claim for relief within FOURTEEN (14) days of this 17 order. See Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (district courts 18 “ordinarily must grant leave to amend when [they] dismiss[ ] claims under Rule 19 12(b)(6)”). If Peramas fails to file an amended complaint by the deadline or if the 20 amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the Court will dismiss 21 this case in its entirety.

22 23 1 Dated this 15th day of September, 2025.

2 Zo 2 □□□ 3 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23