Peppertree Hill Landowner's Ass'n v. Cipriani

24 V.I. 192, 1989 WL 1739904, 1989 V.I. LEXIS 48
CourtSupreme Court of The Virgin Islands
DecidedMay 3, 1989
DocketCivil No. 201/89
StatusPublished

This text of 24 V.I. 192 (Peppertree Hill Landowner's Ass'n v. Cipriani) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peppertree Hill Landowner's Ass'n v. Cipriani, 24 V.I. 192, 1989 WL 1739904, 1989 V.I. LEXIS 48 (virginislands 1989).

Opinion

ELTMAN, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

At issue in this case is whether a homeowner’s association acted reasonably and in good faith in declining to approve the use of a certain roofing material for a house under construction by a member homeowner, and whether the owner should be ordered to remove the roof which was constructed contrary to the directive of the association. The plaintiff prevails on both issues.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Peppertree Hill Landowner’s Association, Inc. (“Peppertree”), is the successor in interest of Estate Montpellier Homes, Inc., the developer of the Mary’s Fancy subdivision of Peppertree Hill on St. Croix. The defendant, Jerome Cipriani (“Cipriani”), owns property in the subdivision, 140 Mary’s Fancy, on which he is constructing a home. The defendant’s property is subject to a number of restrictive covenants contained in a 1968 Declaration of Protective Building Restrictions affecting all of the plots in the subdivision. Paragraph 3 of the declaration provides:

Prior Approval of Dwelling and Site Use Plans. All plans must first be submitted to Developer for approval, which will not be unreasonably withheld; however, Developer’s opinion of aesthetic harmoney (sic) or appearance shall be a valid reason for such approval or disapproval. The approval of plans herein required shall apply to the overall use of the site as well as all structures, laundry and service areas, recreational areas, tall plantings, fences and windbreaks, plans for which shall be submitted prior to actual construction in order to protect each homeowner from inconvenience, unsightliness or obstruction of view. Developer reserves the sole right to approve or disapprove all such plans and the installations called for thereon, subject only to the exercise of good faith in making such decisions. No structures of any type nor tall plantings shall be placed upon the premises without such plans showing the location thereof being first submitted to Developer and approved in writing. Plans for modifications, variations and subsequent additions shall likewise be first submitted for approval in writing before any construction begins.

[194]*194Cipriani undertook to build a house on his property and, as required by the declaration, submitted his plans to the Peppertree Building Committee. The plans, which specified that the roof would be covered with Hypalon or its equivalent, were approved. However, thereafter, Cipriani decided to use asphalt shingles for his roof, a modification from the original plans. In late February, he was alerted by Peppertree representatives that the shingles, which at that point were at the construction site but not yet applied, were not approved. Barbara Badger, the president of Peppertree, asked Cipriani to contact the Building Committee about the proposed modification, but Cipriani refused and said, in effect, that he would do what he pleased with his property. Cipriani then began to install the shingles. Mike Brady, the head of the Building Committee, also contacted the defendant but he too had no success in stopping the work until the substitute material could be considered. In the face of the defiance by Cipriani of the restrictive covenant and the authority of the Association to enforce the covenant, Peppertree has sought injunctive relief. A preliminary injunction was entered, stopping the work with the roof partially covered with shingles, following which the Building Committee met and rendered a written decision which disapproved the use of such material.

DISCUSSION

Cipriani does not dispute that he is subject to the restrictive covenant which requires prior approval by Peppertree of his building plans. He argues, however, that the covenant must be strictly construed against the plaintiff and that Peppertree has failed to carry its burden of showing reasonableness and good faith in its decision to disallow the use of asphalt shingles on his roof. While he now concedes that he was perhaps unwise in applying the roof covering after he was asked not to do so until the Building Committee could decide whether or not to approve the material, he contends that the balance of equities favors his being able to retain the shingles in any event.

The type of restrictive covenant at issue will be strictly interpreted in favor of limiting the restraint. Donaghue v. Prynnwood Corp., 255 N.E.2d 326 (Mass. 1970). The refusal to approve plans must be based on a reasonable determination and in the exercise of good faith. Id.; Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc., 211 P.2d 302 (Cal. 1949); Urban Farms, Inc. v. Seel, 217 A.2d 888 (N.J. [195]*1951966). In Donaghue, supra, heavily relied upon by the defendant, the plans for a proposed house in a subdivision needed to be approved by the developer. The developer rejected a flat-roof design for aesthetic reasons only, and particularly because the developer’s neighbors, friends of his, objected and he was attempting to please them. The covenant was not enforced on account of the unreasonable, subjective and arbitrary rejection of the design, and the homeowner was permitted to retain his roof even though he had constructed it before obtaining court approval.

Here, the facts are quite different. The Building Committee, at least two of whose members are familiar with construction and construction materials, apparently considered rather carefully the suitability of asphalt shingles. Granted, there were some preconceived attitudes, and approval was withheld before full investigation. However, it was the defendant who created that problem by modifying the previously approved building plan without notice to Peppertree and then commencing installation of the substitute roof covering before the Building Committee had an opportunity to review the proposed modification. Once the defendant was preliminarily enjoined from installing any more shingles, the plaintiff was able to investigate, deliberate and set forth in writing the reasons for its rejection of the use of asphalt shingles.

Among the particular concerns of the Building Committee was not only the durability of the roof and whether the value of Cipriani’s house, and by implication the value of other houses in the neighborhood, would be preserved, but also the safety of asphalt shingles. Because the typical Virgin Islands residence, and Cipriani’s in particular, is- built with a cistern which is filled from rainwater running off the roof, the Building Committee was entitled to consider whether a proposed material presents an actual or potential health hazard. It is at least conceivable that Peppertree could be exposed to liability either to the defendant or to a subsequent purchaser of his home for negligently approving a roof covering which it knew or should have known was unsafe for that application and which made the cistern water toxic.

The plaintiff investigated the question of safety and learned that Owens-Corning Co., a manufacturer of such shingles, does not recommend their application in an area where rainwater is caught and saved for domestic consumption. All that means, Cipriani contends, is that Owens-Corning has not had the benefit of studies on the health hazards of asphalt shingles used for such purpose. [196]*196But the testimony of Dr.

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Related

Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc.
211 P.2d 302 (California Supreme Court, 1949)
Urban Farms, Inc. v. Seel
217 A.2d 888 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1966)
Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp.
255 N.E.2d 326 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
24 V.I. 192, 1989 WL 1739904, 1989 V.I. LEXIS 48, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peppertree-hill-landowners-assn-v-cipriani-virginislands-1989.