Pepin v. Pepin

429 A.2d 1005, 1981 Me. LEXIS 767
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedApril 3, 1981
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 429 A.2d 1005 (Pepin v. Pepin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pepin v. Pepin, 429 A.2d 1005, 1981 Me. LEXIS 767 (Me. 1981).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Roger Pepin, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, York County, affirming a decree of divorce and division of marital property entered in the District Court, District Ten, on August 20, 1979. The husband concedes that the real estate, which he claims was unjustly divided, is marital property. We affirm the judgment.

The District Court determined that the marital property had a value of $75,000. The wife testified that she brought into the marriage approximately $2,500. The District Court found that during the approximately six years of marriage the wife was an active homemaker. The court also found that she contributed substantial labor to the improvements on the property. The court awarded the wife real estate valued at $25,000 as her share of the marital property. “The division of marital property is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the divorce court.” Bryant v. Bryant, Me., 411 A.2d 391, 393 (1980). We find no abuse of discretion.

Contrary to the requirements of M.R.Civ.P. 75A(aX2), the defendant-appellant’s brief did not contain a statement of the facts of the case. Neither did the brief contain any citation of authority other than a citation to 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(l). The standard by which this Court reviews distribution of marital property by the divorce court is well established. See, e. g., Bryant v. Bryant, supra, and cases therein cited. Without notice to the Court and presumably without notice to the appellee, the appellant failed to appear at the time established for oral argument. These circumstances justify assessment of treble costs.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Cross-appeal dismissed. 1

Treble costs awarded appellee.

All concurring.

1

. The plaintiff, Diane Pepin, did not cross-appeal from the District Court to the Superior Court for review of the District Court’s decision not to award alimony. We will not enter *1006 tain her purported cross-appeal from the Superior Court judgment affirming the District Court. See generally Littlefield v. Littlefield, Me., 292 A.2d 204 (1972).

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Related

Axtell v. Axtell
482 A.2d 1261 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1984)
Estate of Bonin
457 A.2d 1123 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1983)
Crooker v. Crooker
432 A.2d 1293 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
429 A.2d 1005, 1981 Me. LEXIS 767, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pepin-v-pepin-me-1981.