Pepco, Inc. v. in Re Ferguson

1987 OK CIV APP 15, 734 P.2d 1321, 1987 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 106
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedMarch 10, 1987
Docket65327
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 1987 OK CIV APP 15 (Pepco, Inc. v. in Re Ferguson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pepco, Inc. v. in Re Ferguson, 1987 OK CIV APP 15, 734 P.2d 1321, 1987 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 106 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

BAILEY, Judge:

This case comes on review of the Workers’ Compensation Court’s award of death benefits to decedent employee’s spouse and children. At trial, it was shown that decedent was an employee, officer and director of Pepeo, Inc. in Norman, Oklahoma, and lived in Edmond, Oklahoma with his wife and three children. Pepeo, Inc. is in the business of real estate management and investment, and has established a policy of community service and projects an image as supportive of community activities. The nature of Pepeo, Inc.’s business required that decedent travel rather extensively in and out of the state of Oklahoma in furtherance of Pepco’s business.

On April 18,1984, decedent left his office in Norman shortly before 5:00 p.m. With him, decedent took several business files and documents which were required for completion of a real estate transaction in Oklahoma City and Tulsa, scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m. the next morning, April 19, and which meeting, decedent was required to attend for his employer. Decedent often took work home with him in the evenings, and maintained at home office equipment and a home computer that was used to communicate with the employer’s computers in Norman. Evidence showed that decedent intended to attend a youth baseball game and pick up his wife for dinner that evening, and attend the business meeting the next morning. However, at 5:05 on April 18, decedent was involved in an automobile collision in south Oklahoma City on Interstate Highway 35, resulting in his death. Another Pepeo employee was required to complete decedent’s mission of the next morning at a later date due to decedent’s demise.

Testimony by decedent's employer, Pat Powers, and Pepco’s inhouse counsel confirmed that decedent was required to attend the April 19 meetings in Oklahoma City and Tulsa for the employer. This testimony also showed that decedent did work often at home on company business, and that decedent’s performance of the business of the employer at home provided benefits to the employer’s business. There was also testimony that decedent’s participation in youth baseball was encouraged by and provided a benefit to the company, by enhancing the company’s image and reinforcing the company’s committment to community service. Based on all the evidence, the Trial Court ruled that decedent’s death arose out of and in the course of the employment, and awarded death benefits to decedent’s dependents. This appeal ensued.

Initially, the laws of the State of Oklahoma indulge a presumption that, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, a claim for injury or death of an employee comes within the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 85 O.S. 1981 § 27; Matter of Death of May, 586 P.2d 738 (Okl.1978). Any reasonable doubt is to be resolved in favor of the claimant. Matter of May, supra, 586 P.2d 738, 740.

On the other hand, it is clear that injuries sustained by an employee while going to and from the employer’s place of business or premises do not arise out of and in the course of the employment. *1323 Fluor Engineers & Contractors, Inc. v. Kessler, 561 P.2d 72 (Okl.1977); Schell v. Blue Bell, Inc., 637 P.2d 914 (Okl.App. 1981). Likewise, injuries sustained by an employee while engaged in social and/or recreational activities do not arise out of and in the course of the employment. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Williams, 639 P.2d 1222 (Okl.1981). The “going and coming” rule is subject to exceptions, however, as where the employment creates the necessity of travel or where the employer provides transportation, or where the employee is charged with a special task outside his regular duties, or is engaged in a dual purpose mission. Schell, supra, 637 P.2d 914, 916. Similarly, the social/recreational exclusion is subject to exceptions as where the recreation occurs on the employer’s premises as a regular incident of the employment, where the employer expressly or impliedly induces or requires participation in such activities, or where the employer derives a benefit from the employee’s recreational and/or social activities beyond the “intangible value” of the employee’s health. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., supra, 639 P.2d 1222, 1224.

Previous holdings of our Supreme Court have recognized the “dual purpose” exception. See, Qualls Transfer & Storage v. Cummings, 505 P.2d 183 (Okl.1972); Cochran v. Maassen Tool & Supply Co., 204 Okl. 60, 226 P.2d 953 (1951). In those cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the test from the New York courts for liability arising from injuries sustained by an employee while engaged in mixed purpose missions:

“In the matter of Marks Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181, 182, 183, the New York Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, says: We do not say that service to the employer must be the SOLE CAUSE of the journey, BUT AT LEAST MUST BE A CONCURRENT CAUSE. To establish liability, the inference must be permissible that the trip would have been made though the private errand was cancelled. * * * The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee created the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. * * If, however, the work has no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand remained undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk.” Cochran v. Maassen Tool & Supply Co., supra, 226 P.2d 953, 956. (Emphasis added.)

In Marks v. Gray, Justice Cardozo stressed the importance of concurrent causation. As Professor Larson notes:

“[Justice Cardozo] said it was sufficient if the business motive was a concurrent cause of the trip. He then defined ‘concurrent cause’ by saying that it meant a cause which would have occasioned the making of the trip even if the private mission had been cancelled. One detail must be stressed to make this rule complete: it is not necessary, under this formula, that, on failure of the personal motive, the business trip would have been taken BY THIS PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME. It is enough that someone sometime would have had to take the trip to carry out the business mission. Perhaps another employee would have done it; perhaps another time would have been chosen; but if a special trip would have had to be made for this purpose, and if the employer got this necessary item of travel accomplished by combining it with his employee’s personal trip, rather than an incidental appendage or afterthought.” 1 Larson, The Law of Work-mens’ Compensation, § 18.13, pp. 4-267-268. (Emphasis original.)

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Bluebook (online)
1987 OK CIV APP 15, 734 P.2d 1321, 1987 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pepco-inc-v-in-re-ferguson-oklacivapp-1987.