Pep Boys - Manny, Moe & Jack of Delaware, Inc. v. the Conlin Trust

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 14, 2024
• Docket: A-0834-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0834-22

PEP BOYS - MANNY, MOE & JACK OF DELAWARE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THE CONLIN TRUST, THE CONLIN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, THE CONLIN FAMILY TRUST, and GREAT RAILING INC.,

Defendants-Appellants. ___________________________

Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided March 14, 2024

Before Judges Smith and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. C-000042-21.

Peter J. Bonfiglio, IV, argued the cause for appellants (Ward, Shindle & Hall, attorneys; Peter J. Bonfiglio, IV, of counsel and on the briefs). Neal A. Thakkar argued the cause for respondent (Sweeney & Sheehan, PC, attorneys; Neal A. Thakkar, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants appeal the trial court's order denying their motion to vacate

plaintiff Pep Boys' default judgment entered against them pursuant to Rule 4:50-

1. Defendants argue the court committed error by finding they failed to show

excusable neglect and a meritorious defense. We affirm for the following

reasons.

We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history. The lawsuit

which led to the entry of default judgment against defendants originates in a

boundary dispute involving three contiguous tracts of land located in

Williamstown, New Jersey. The tracts are: 1074 North Black Horse Pike

(center tract); an adjacent tract to the northwest (NW tract); and an adjacent tract

to the southeast (SE tract).

In 2006, co-defendant Great Railing leased both the NW and SE tracts for

its business operations. In 2010, plaintiff began leasing the center tract. The

lease terms included a provision stating plaintiff had leased an "entire building

of approximately 7,200 square feet situated on a lot of 1.812 acres . . . as shown

on the Survey/Exhibit A." Exhibit A to the lease was a map depicting the center

A-0834-22 2 tract with a building in its southern half. In 2011, Great Railing allegedly

entered into a verbal agreement with the owner of the center tract, which

permitted Great Railing to use a portion of it as a storage yard despite plaintiff's

lease of the site.

Between 2013 and 2019, the Conlin Family Limited Partnership (CLP)

bought the NW tract, the Conlin Family Trust (CFT) bought the SE tract, and

the Conlin Trust (CT) bought the center tract. The record shows that Mario

Conlin was, at all relevant times, a key person in each of those business entities.

He was a partner in CLP, and a trustee of both CFT and CT.

On October 21, 2021 plaintiff sued defendants, alleging Great Railing

wrongfully encroached on plaintiffs' leased property by: storing materials;

parking without permission; and improperly dropping off Great Railing

shipments. Plaintiff's theories included breach of contract, trespass, nuisance,

negligence, and intentional interference with contractual relations. Plaintiff

sought to enjoin Great Railing from further encroachment on its leased property

and sought damages. The record further shows Mario Conlin was, at all relevant

times, a principal of Great Railing.

Plaintiff's complaint was personally served on each defendant on

November 10, 2021. Brandy Conlin, Mario Conlin's spouse, accepted service at

A-0834-22 3 the business address listed for CLP, CFT, and CP, which is also the residence of

Mario and Brandy Conlin. Plaintiff served Great Railing at the company's office

on the NW tract. The complaint was accepted by Dave Porter, who

acknowledged that he was authorized to accept service on behalf of Great

Railing. When defendants failed to answer, plaintiff entered default against each

of them. Plaintiff next successfully moved for default judgment, and a proof

hearing was conducted by the trial court on June 6, 2022. After, considering the

proofs, the court awarded $54,237.91 in trespass damages, $54,237.91 in rent

abatement for damages flowing from breach of contract, $110,000 in nuisance

damages, $100,000 in intentional interference damages, $250,000 in punitive

damages, reimbursement to plaintiff for the cost of erecting a barrier between

the plaintiff's business and co-defendant Great Railing, and costs.

After the default judgment award was entered, defendants finally sprang

into action. They moved to vacate the default judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-

1(a) in September 2022. The parties filed certifications and briefs, and after a

hearing the court found, among other things: plaintiff properly served the

Conlin entities, CLP, CFT, and CP, and that Brandy Conlin represented to the

process server she was authorized to accept service on behalf of each of them;

plaintiff properly served Great Railing; that Dave Porter was authorized to

A-0834-22 4 accept service on behalf of Great Railing because he was performing service for

the company; and finally, that defendants failed to show a substantial deviation

from the proper service of process. Concluding that improper service was the

sole theory offered to support defendants' excusable neglect argument, the trial

court ended the analysis, finding defendants failed to make such a showing.

For the sake of completeness, the court considered defendants' meritorious

defense argument that plaintiff's lease provided for plaintiff's use of the structure

only, and not the center tract lot itself. The court reviewed the lease agreement

and the property survey and summarily rejected that argument. Finding

defendants failed to show excusable neglect or a meritorious defense, the trial

court denied the motion to vacate default judgment. Defendants appealed.

While not articulated with specificity in their merits brief, we can assign

defendants' contentions on appeal under Rule 4:50-1 to two of the rule's six

categories of relief: excusable neglect under subsection (a); and void judgment

for improper service under subsection (d). When applying the rule,

a court's obligation is "to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments

and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have

authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." LVNV Funding, LLC v.

Deangelo, 464 N.J. Super 103, 109 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Manning Eng'g,

A-0834-22 5 Inc. v. Hudson Cty. Park Comm'n., 74 N.J. 113, 1290 (1977)). Decisions

whether to vacate a default judgment are left to the sound discretion of the trial

court. "We review a motion under Rule 4:50-1 to vacate final judgment under

an abuse of discretion standard." 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Roberto,

477 N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023).

Defendants' arguments are meritless. Giving deference to the court's well-

supported findings, ibid, we affirm for the reasons expressed in its statement of

reasons. We conclude the trial court's denial of the motion is not unjust on this

record. Deangelo, 464 N.J. Super at 109.

To the extent we have not addressed defendants' remaining arguments, we

conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion.

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-0834-22 6