Peoples v. San Diego Unified School District

41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383, 138 Cal. App. 4th 463, 6 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2973, 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 697, 2006 Daily Journal DAR 4243, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 486
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 23, 2006
DocketD046848
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383 (Peoples v. San Diego Unified School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peoples v. San Diego Unified School District, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383, 138 Cal. App. 4th 463, 6 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2973, 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 697, 2006 Daily Journal DAR 4243, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

Opinion

HALLER, J.

In May 2004, the San Diego Unified School District (District) notified Demetria Peoples, a sixth-grade teacher, it would not rehire her for the next school year. Peoples petitioned for a writ of mandate challenging the termination because the District did not give her proper notice of the termination. The court found the District’s notice was untimely under Education Code section 44929.21, and thus ordered the District to reinstate Peoples as a permanent certificated teacher and to compensate her for accrued benefits and backpay. The District appeals. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Peoples began her employment with the District during the 1999-2000 school year. At that time, she held a “Pre-Intern Certificate” from the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing. Peoples then obtained a *466 University Internship Multiple Subjects Credential in 2000, and taught in a District elementary school as a participant in the San Diego City Schools University Urban Teacher Intern Program (university intern program), a program authorized by the Teacher Internship Act of 1967 (Ed. Code, 1 § 44450 et seq.). This internship program seeks to “enhance the preparation of teachers so that their learning combines theory and practice.” (Welch v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1428 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 374].)

Peoples completed the university intern program in 2001, but continued to teach in a District elementary school as a university intern under her university intern credential during the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years. At the end of the 2002-2003 school year, in June 2003, Peoples obtained a preliminary multiple subjects credential, which is a clear (nonintemship) credential. At this time, the District reelected Peoples to a teaching position requiring certification qualifications.

During the 2003-2004 school year, Peoples taught sixth grade under her clear credential. At the end of the year, Peoples was given a summary performance evaluation stating her objectives were met and that she was an “asset” to the elementary school. However, by a letter dated May 27, 2004, the District notified Peoples she would not be rehired (referred to under the Education Code as being “reelected”) for employment in the 2004—2005 school year. (See § 44929.21.) The District gave this notice under law permitting a school district to terminate a teacher without cause after his or her first year of probationary employment. (Ibid.; see Grimsley v. Board of Trustees (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1440, 1444-1448 [235 Cal.Rptr. 85].)

Peoples claimed this notice was untimely because she was in her second year of probationary employment and therefore section 44929.21 required the District to notify her of its decision not to rehire on or before March 15, 2004. The District countered that Peoples had worked as a probationary employee for only one year because her previous employment under her internship credential did not count toward the consecutive two-year requirement under section 44929.21.

After informal attempts to resolve the issue failed, Peoples filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, requesting the court to order the District to deem her reelected for the 2004—2005 school year because she was not given the statutorily required notice on or before March 15, 2004. After a

*467 hearing, the court agreed with Peoples’s arguments and granted the petition, ordering the District to reinstate Peoples as a permanent certificated teacher and to compensate her for accrued benefits and backpay.

DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that Peoples was employed as a probationary teacher on a clear (nonintemship) credential during the 2003-2004 year, and that the District gave Peoples notice in May 2004 that it would not rehire her for the next year. Peoples argues that this notice violated the applicable statutes because the District was required to provide notice before March 15, 2004 that it would not reemploy Peoples in the next school year. She relies on section 44929.21, which provides that a probationary teacher employed for two consecutive years “shall be deemed reelected” for the next school year if not given contrary notice by March 15. (§ 44929.21, subd. (b); see Summerfield v. Windsor Unified School Dist. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1029 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 233].) Peoples additionally relies on section 44466, which sets forth the circumstances under which one year of employment as a university intern may be considered in computing the two-year teaching requirement for obtaining tenure. 2

The District contends that section 44929.21 is inapplicable because it applies only after a teacher had been a probationary employee for two years. As it did below, the District claims that Peoples worked as a probationary employee only for one year because her previous employment under a university intern credential could not count toward the statute’s two-year tenure requirement. (§ 44929.21, subd. (b).)

Because the facts are undisputed and the issue turns solely on the interpretation of relevant statutes, we conduct a de novo review. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 62 P.3d 54] (Kavanaugh).) “[W]e independently review the superior court’s legal conclusions about the meaning and effect of statutory provisions.” (Welch v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427.) In so doing, our goal is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent, looking first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. (Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 919.) If the language of the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, we look to the legislative history to aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. (Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1055 [80 *468 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 968 P.2d 539].) We are further guided by the fundamental rule “ ‘ “that the objective sought to be achieved by a statute as well as the evil to be prevented is of prime consideration in its interpretation.” . . .’ ” (Watson Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 69, 77 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 343].)

Our analysis begins with section 44929.21, subdivision (b), the code section requiring a school district with more than 250 students to provide certain employees with notice of nonreelection before March 15 of the school year. That code section provides:

“Every employee of a school district. . .

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41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383, 138 Cal. App. 4th 463, 6 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2973, 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 697, 2006 Daily Journal DAR 4243, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 486, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peoples-v-san-diego-unified-school-district-calctapp-2006.