DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS Nos. 24-CV-0862 & 24-CV-1110 JOAN PEOPLES, APPELLANT,
V.
CIH PROPERTIES, APPELLEE.
Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2024-CAB-004546)
(Juliet J. McKenna, Judge)
(Submitted April 22, 2026 Decided August 20, 2026)
Jonathan H. Levy and Fran Swanson were on the brief for appellant.
Margaret Fonshell Ward and Megan G. Freeman were on the brief for appellee.
Before EASTERLY, DEAHL, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
EASTERLY, Associate Judge: Joan Peoples appeals the Superior Court’s ruling dismissing with prejudice her claims against her landlord, CIH Properties, under Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). We hold that Ms. Peoples adequately pled claims that CIH violated the warranty of habitability and that a CIH employee sexually assaulted her, and we reverse the dismissal of those two claims. We conclude that Ms. Peoples did not adequately plead a claim that CIH discriminated against her based on race, but we hold that the Superior Court erred when it dismissed that claim with prejudice.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Joan Peoples, representing herself, sued her landlord CIH Properties (hereinafter CIH) in the Civil Division of Superior Court. Ms. Peoples used the two- page complaint form created by the court and available on the court’s website, which directs the filer to: (1) “Write a short and plain statement of your claim, including any relevant facts, dates, and locations”; (2) explain “what relief [you are] requesting from the Court[,] [i]nclud[ing] any request for money damages”; and (3) “[s]tate any other information[] of which the Court should be aware.” In the statement of her claim, Ms. Peoples wrote:
I am being discriminated against by CIH Properties by way of race, retaliation, and a victim of sexual assault by one of their employees. Each time I put in for a maintenance request it is ignored until I am forced to contact an outside agency–and still the work is undone. I recently complained about mice, nothing was done, except a doorstrip and promised visits from Kenmore Extermination. They have an infestation problem.
In her request for relief she wrote:
I am seeking monetary damage for being humiliated, emotional distress, repetitive retaliation, and years of harassment. In addition, I am seeking monetary damage for sexual assault in the amount of (350,000.00) three hundred fifty thousand dollars.
Lastly, she identified as other information the court should be aware of the fact that
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[t]he owner allowed the staff to place a fake camera in their elevators and pretended a level of safety was in place.
Under the camera, I was sexually assaulted by their employee and the manager, Latasha Sidbury, stated she was going to view the camera to see the incident. When I phoned DC Police, she stated the camera was not real. She further spoke negative about me to staff, vendors and residents causing them to treat me like a nuisance and caused them not to want to do work in my apartment. I’m renting and the apartment my daughter resides [sic]. My daughter is a victim of second-hand discrimination.
CIH filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement. CIH asserted that Ms. Peoples’s complaint “fail[ed] to allege the elements of a legally viable claim” and thus warranted dismissal pursuant to Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Ms. Peoples did not file a timely response to CIH’s motion. Although the court stated that it was permitted “to treat unopposed motions as conceded,” it acknowledged that it still “ha[d] a duty to consider [the motion’s] merits—but not with the degree of scrutiny that the Court would apply if the non-moving party had objected.” The court identified allegations of race discrimination and retaliation, sexual assault, and uninhabitable housing conditions, and in evaluating the merits of these claims, determined that each claim was vague and conclusory. The court explained,
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges discrimination based upon race and retaliation by the Defendant. In addition to failing to cite to any dates or details of alleged discriminatory or retaliatory mistreatment, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks any facts to support a reasonable inference that she is being
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discriminated against due to her race, which itself is not identified, or any basis for her claim of retaliation. Plaintiff also alleges that she has been a victim of sexual assault by one of Defendant’s employee[s], but neglects to identify the employee by name or position and again fails to state when this assault allegedly occurred. Viewed in the light most favorable, Plaintiff complains of housing conditions, however the allegations of the Complaint that her maintenance requests have been ignored are too vague and ambiguous to enable the Defendant to meaningfully investigate, respond or defend against such claims.
The court noted that it had “considered directing Plaintiff to file a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) [of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure] to address these deficiencies” but “in the absence of any Opposition or other response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,” it had “determined that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to . . . Rule 12(b)(6).”
Five days after the court issued its order, Ms. Peoples filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied. Now represented by Legal Aid DC, Ms. Peoples appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Legal Framework
We review the Superior Court’s ruling that Ms. Peoples’s complaint did not contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim de novo, “presuming the complaint’s
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factual allegations to be true and construing them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Holmes v. District of Columbia, 267 A.3d 1028, 1032 (D.C. 2022) (alteration in original). “A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) [of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure] if it does not satisfy the pleading standard in Rule 8(a),” which “requires a pleading to contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 543 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Rule 8(a)). As our local Rule 8(a) mirrors the federal Rule 8(a), we adhere to the Supreme Court’s construction of the federal rule as set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). “While this pleading standard requires a plaintiff to allege more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation, it does not require detailed factual allegations.” Holmes, 267 A.3d at 1032 (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 1034 (observing that “a plaintiff is not required to exhaustively detail each and every pertinent fact”). Stated affirmatively, “a complaint need only plead facts sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face rather than merely speculative or conceivable.” Sonmez v. WP Co. LLC, 330 A.3d 285, 313 (D.C. 2025) (citation modified). “Facial plausibility is not an onerous test[.] [I]t does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence supporting the claim.”
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Id. (citation modified); see also District of Columbia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 320 A.3d 1073, 1084 (D.C. 2024) (A “complaint need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”) (internal quotation omitted). “If the complaint satisfies that low bar, it may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 313; Amazon.com, Inc., 320 A.3d at 1079 (“If the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations, the case must not be dismissed even if the court doubts the plaintiff will ultimately prevail.”) (internal quotation omitted).
As noted above, the trial court in this case acknowledged that, notwithstanding Ms. Peoples’s failure to file an opposition to CIH’s motion to dismiss, it still “ha[d] a duty to consider [the motion’s] merits—but not with the degree of scrutiny that the Court would apply if the non-moving party had objected.” We assume without deciding that the court was correct about its duty to conduct a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis despite the absence of an opposition to the motion to dismiss, but if a court treats the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as a contested issue, as it did in this
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case, 1 it must employ the one and only benchmark for the sufficiency of a complaint: whether it satisfies the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) as interpreted by this court, see supra.2
B. Claims
1. Warranty of Habitability
In her complaint, Ms. Peoples alleged that, despite “recently complain[ing]
about mice,” her landlord had done “nothing . . . except a doorstrip and promised visits from Kenmore Extermination. They have an infestation problem.” The Superior Court correctly characterized this allegation as a complaint about “housing
1 CIH argues that the trial court correctly dismissed Ms. Peoples’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12-I(e) and urges us to affirm the trial court’s dismissal ruling on that basis. We are unsure whether the trial court could have reasonably exercised its discretion to dismiss Ms. Peoples’s case pursuant to its general authority to grant unopposed motions under Rule 12-I(e). See Nat’l Voter Contact Inc. v. Versace, 511 A.2d 393, 397 (D.C. 1986) (describing Rule 12-I(e) as a “superior judicial housekeeping device” which “convey[s] authority [inter alia] to grant unopposed motions for extensions of time, for compelled discovery, for withdrawal of counsel,” and warning that its use in the 12(b)(6) context “must be given careful scrutiny”). But we need not address this question because we understand the court to have dismissed Ms. Peoples’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12-I(e).
2 In conjunction with its reference to employing a lesser degree of scrutiny, the Superior Court cited Murray v. District of Columbia, 870 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 2005). But in Murray we were reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant an unopposed motion to dismiss a prisoner’s complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to effect proper service. We said nothing about how a trial court should conduct its review to ensure that claims are properly pled under Rule 12(b)(6).
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conditions.” See Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[A] warranty of habitability, measured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units covered by those Regulations and that breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract.”); see also Pajic v. Foote Prop., LLC, 72 A.3d 140, 148 (D.C. 2013) (holding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged “the legal elements of a viable claim” of a breach of the implied warranty of habitability even though he described only his landlord’s “fail[ure] to timely repair both his air conditioning, when it broke down in the height of summer, and a leak and hole in his bathroom ceiling”). On appeal, Ms. Peoples has endorsed the Superior Court’s legal framing and argues more specifically that the mice allegation is “a quintessential breach of contract claim, based on the breach of the warranty of habitability.”
One of the standards set out in the D.C. Housing Code prohibits landlords from “rent[ing] or offer[ing] to rent any habitation . . . unless the habitation and its furnishings are . . . free from rodents or vermin.” 14 D.C.M.R. § 400.3. A landlord “must have [had] notice, actual or constructive, of defective conditions that constitute a breach” of the implied warranty of habitability, George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 49 (D.C. 1983), and a reasonable amount of time to have taken the necessary corrective action. See Wright v. Hodges, 681 A.2d 1102,
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1105 (D.C. 1996) (“[A]pplication of the implied warranty [of habitability] is contingent upon the tenant’s affording the landlord notice of defective conditions and a reasonable time within which to make repairs.”) (first alteration in original) (quoting Robert S. Schoshinksi, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 3:16, at 127-28 (1980)). We conclude that Ms. Peoples adequately pled a claim of breach of the warranty of habitability under 14 D.C.M.R. § 400.3. She identified herself as a renter and indicated that CIH, the entity she submitted maintenance requests to, was her landlord. She identified a housing code violation, specifically, “an infestation problem” with mice. And she alleged she had provided notice, via both “a maintenance request” and a more “recent[] complain[t]” when “nothing was done.” The trial court’s assessment, echoed by CIH on appeal, that these allegations were “too vague and ambiguous to enable the Defendant to meaningfully investigate, respond [to] or defend against such claims” 3 holds Ms. Peoples to too high a pleading standard. Her complaint gave CIH “fair notice of what [her] . . . claim [wa]s and the grounds upon which it rest[ed],” Amazon.com, Inc., 320 A.3d at 1079, and to the extent CIH needed more information “to meaningfully investigate, respond [to] or
3 We disagree with Ms. Peoples that the Superior Court “ignor[ed] the [m]ice [i]nfestation [c]laim” in its order dismissing her complaint.
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defend against such claims,” it could seek that information in discovery. 4
2. Sexual Assault
In her complaint, Ms. Peoples alleged that she was “sexually assaulted by [CIH’s] employee” in an elevator and that upon reporting the incident to “the manager, Latasha Sidbury,” and requesting video footage, Ms. Sidbury told her that the camera in the elevator “was not real.” She further alleged that “[t]he owner had allowed the staff to place [the] fake camera in their elevators and pretended a level of safety was in place.” And she indicated that she had been retaliated against after she reported this attack.
On appeal, Ms. Peoples argues that she pled sufficient facts to support a sexual assault claim under a respondeat superior theory of liability. The Superior Court analyzed her factual allegations in this manner: after observing that Ms. Peoples had alleged “that she had been a victim of sexual assault by one of [CIH’s] employees,” it ruled that this claim was insufficiently pled because it “neglects to identify the employee by name or position and . . . fails to state when this assault allegedly
4 CIH argues in its brief that Ms. Peoples “provided no factual allegations regarding notice of the infestation, including how or to whom any notice was given.” But we conclude that the Superior Court could reasonably infer that if she “put in for a maintenance request,” she used the notice mechanism for maintenance requests supplied by CIH.
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occurred.” 5 But we disagree that Ms. Peoples was required to identify the employee who attacked her by name in her complaint; rather, CIH could probe the identity of her attacker in discovery. See supra Part II.A.; cf. World Wrestling Ent., Inc. v. Unidentified Parties, 770 F.3d 1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that district court’s “granular focus on the ‘identity’ of unnamed Defendants” in denying plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order was improper and that such an order can be issued against unidentified individuals). Similarly, we disagree that Ms. Peoples was required to plead the specific date of the attack in her complaint. See Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2nd Cir. 2019) (holding that despite the complaint’s failure to include “any definite or specific dates” of the alleged events creating a cause of action in a Section 1983 action, it “substantially complies with Rule 8”). 6
5 For the first time on appeal, CIH argues that Ms. Peoples failed to plead sufficient facts to show that her attacker was acting within the scope of their employment. Although it is a close question, we conclude Ms. Peoples’s allegation that the sexual assault happened while in an elevator with a CIH employee viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Peoples supports an inference at this stage that the employee was on the premises while working.
6 As if alleging that it has been harmed by Ms. Peoples’s pro se complaint, CIH argues that the complaint’s lack of a date of incident, name of the offending employee, or description of what the assault entailed was “unquestionably deliberate and inexcusable.” These assertions appear to reflect a misunderstanding of our pleading standards and undeservedly chastise Ms. Peoples for her pro se status. Ms. Peoples’s inclusion of the first name of her alleged assailant in her motion for reconsideration does not necessarily reflect that she knew this individual’s name at
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3. Race Discrimination
In her complaint, Ms. Peoples asserted, “I am being discriminated against by CIH Properties by way of race . . . Each time I put in for a maintenance request it is ignored until I am forced to contact an outside agency–and still the work is undone.” On appeal, Ms. Peoples argues that “[t]his was sufficient to state a claim under the District’s Human Rights Act, which prohibits ‘refus[ing] or restrict[ing] facilities, services, repairs or improvements for a tenant’ ‘wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on’ ‘race,’ D.C. Code § 2-1402.21(a)(4).”
The Superior Court concluded that this claim was inadequately pled because, “[i]n addition to failing to cite to any dates or details of alleged discriminatory or retaliatory mistreatment, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks any facts to support a reasonable inference that she is being discriminated against due to her race, which itself is not identified, or any basis for her claim of retaliation.” We agree with the Superior Court that Ms. Peoples’s complaint did not contain sufficient facts to state a claim of race discrimination because it lacks even “minimal support for the proposition that [CIH defendants] were motivated by discriminatory intent.” Francis
the time she filed her initial complaint. And even if she did, she may simply have been unaware that she ought to have included the name on her complaint form.
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v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 73 (2nd Cir. 2021). 7 Ms. Peoples conclusorily asserts that she had been discriminated against and alleges that she has been ignored, but she offers no facts to show that her alleged mistreatment was on the basis of race, as opposed to another reason (e.g., miscommunication, incompetence, personal dislike), or that others of a different race were treated more favorably than she. See id.
Our decisions in Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267, 280 (D.C. 2016) and Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 296, do not compel a different conclusion. 8 In Poola, we reversed the trial court’s ruling dismissing the plaintiff’s discrimination claim, explaining that while some of her allegations were vague, she pled “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [discrimination].” 147 A.3d at 276. But the amended complaint in Poola contained
7 The Second Circuit in Francis interpreted a claim of race discrimination against the plaintiff’s landlord under the Fair Housing Act (FHA)—the federal analogue to Section 2-1402.21. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (making it unlawful, inter alia, “[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”), with D.C. Code § 2-1402.21(a)(1) (making it unlawful, inter alia, “[t]o interrupt or terminate, or refuse or fail to initiate or conduct any transaction in real property; or to require different terms for such transaction; or to represent falsely that an interest in real property is not available for transaction” or to “refuse or restrict facilities, services, repairs or improvements for a tenant or lessee,” “based on the actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin . . . .”).
8 Ms. Peoples also cites a federal trial court decision from the Eastern District of Louisiana, but that ruling is not precedential even in its own jurisdiction.
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considerably more factual detail than Ms. Peoples’s complaint. Id. at 278-79 (describing how the plaintiff’s complaint detailed “that she is a South Asian woman,” included the dates that she was denied re-appointments, alleged a “culture of discrimination against non-African Americans and women,” and alleged that the same adverse employment actions were not taken “against African Americans or males”). And Sonmez is not on point. Although the plaintiff in that case had filed a “highly detailed complaint,” 330 A.3d at 297, the Superior Court erroneously dismissed their discrimination claim on the ground that the complaint did not “support a plausible inference” that the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse employment action “was false or that discrimination was the real reason for” the adverse actions, id.at 318. We reversed, explaining that, at the 12(b)(6) stage, the plaintiff “does not have the burden of rebutting the [defendant’s] explanations as pretextual or insufficient.” Id. at 319.
Although Ms. Peoples failed to state a claim of race discrimination, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this claim with prejudice. Because “[a] dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is an adjudication on the merits,” it is generally “assumed to be with prejudice,” Freyberg v. DCO 2400 14th Street, LLC, 304 A.3d 971, 981 (D.C. 2023). And yet, we have repeatedly held that courts should give pro se plaintiffs notice of pleading requirements and the opportunity to remedy potential deficiencies in their pleadings. See Padou v. District
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of Columbia, 998 A.2d 286, 292 (D.C. 2010) (“[P]ro se litigants are allowed more latitude than litigants represented by counsel to correct defects in service of process and pleadings.”); MacLeod v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 A.2d 977, 980 (D.C. 1999) (“In matters involving pleadings, service of process, and timeliness of filings, pro se litigants are not always held to the same standards as are applied to lawyers.”). Additionally, each of the Superior Court’s stated concerns regarding Ms. Peoples’s race discrimination claim was related to vagueness and lack of detail. Unlike claims for which the court determines there is “no set of facts in support of [the plaintiff’s] claim which would entitle [her] to relief,” Sass v. District of Columbia, 316 F.2d 366, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1963), these problems might have been remedied by providing Ms. Peoples an opportunity to amend her complaint. 9 See 2 Moore’s Federal
9 Ms. Peoples argues on appeal that the Superior Court should have granted CIH’s motion in the alternative for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), in lieu of dismissal. In the era of notice pleading, requiring Ms. Peoples to file a more definite statement, not dismissal, would have been the appropriate course of action under this court’s precedent. See Emerine v. Yancey, 680 A.2d 1380, 1384 (D.C. 1996). But it is unclear whether filing a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) continues to be the appropriate procedural response to a vague and conclusory complaint after this court’s adoption in Potomac Dev. Corp. of the Iqbal/Twombly standard, which requires a plaintiff to plead “sufficient factual matter” which, if accepted as true, would “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 28 A.3d at 544; see also 2 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 9.08[2] (2026) (explaining that Rule 12(e) “is addressed to the matter of unintelligibility, rather than want of detail”). Without resolving the proper function of Rule 12(e), we hold that the court did not err by dismissing the race discrimination claim instead of ordering a more definite statement, but that it should have dismissed the claim without prejudice.
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Practice, § 15.15[3] (3d ed. 2026) (“Courts should not dismiss the complaint unless it is beyond a doubt that there are no facts to support relief . . . [t]his proposition is especially true for pro se plaintiffs, for whom the court should grant leave to amend at least once if there is any indication of a valid claim.”). We also take into consideration Ms. Peoples’s use of the court’s form to submit her complaint. The form has little space to elaborate on one’s claims and appears to limit how much information is expected or permitted. See supra Part I. Ms. Peoples filled all the space available.
Given Ms. Peoples’s pro se status and her unsuccessful effort to detail her claims using the court’s form, the Superior Court should have advised her of the particular deficiencies in the complaint and dismissed her complaint without prejudice so that she could attempt to refile. See Williamson v. St. Martin’s Apartments, L.P., 234 A.3d 187, 193 (D.C. 2020) (acknowledging that “someone (whether the court, lawyers staffing the court resource centers, or others)” must “provid[e] pro se litigants with the necessary knowledge to participate effectively in the trial process”) (alteration in original); Padou, 998 A.2d at 292-93 (“[T]he trial court has a responsibility to inform pro se litigants of procedural rules and the consequences of noncompliance, including at least minimal notice of pleading requirements.”) (citation modified).
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
So ordered.