SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 6D23-492 Lower Tribunal No. 20-CA-002396 _____________________________
PEOPLE’S TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v.
PAUL GUNSSER,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. _____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County. Sherra Winesett, Judge.
November 9, 2023
TRAVER, C.J.
People’s Trust Insurance Company (“People’s Trust”) and Paul Gunsser both
appeal the final judgment entered in Gunsser’s favor.1 Water overflow from a
deteriorated cast iron plumbing system damaged Gunsser’s home. But Gunsser’s
homeowner’s insurance policy did not cover the costs to tear out and fix his home’s
1 This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A), 9.110(g). concrete slab to access the system. This is because a water damage exclusion
(“WDX”) endorsement overwrote the original policy provision that would have
covered Gunsser’s loss caused by water discharging from his plumbing system and
the tear out and replacement costs to access the deteriorated pipes. The WDX
endorsement applied here because the deterioration, rust, and corrosion that caused
the plumbing system’s deterioration is “an act of nature.” While Gunsser bought a
limited water damage coverage (“LWD”) endorsement that modified the WDX
endorsement and covered his sudden and direct accidental water damage up to
$10,000, the LWD endorsement did not include tear out and replacement costs
coverage. In finding that the WDX endorsement applies, we affirm the trial court’s
ruling on this issue. And in concluding the LWD endorsement did not cover tear out
and replacement costs, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment with instructions
to enter an amended final judgment excluding these damages.
I. Background and Operative Policy Provisions
People’s Trust insured Gunsser under an all-risk policy. As a typical all-risk
policy, Gunsser’s policy covered all losses unless specifically excluded. See, e.g.,
Kokhan v. Auto Club Ins. Co. of Fla., 297 So. 3d 570, 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). For
this loss, four policy sections are at issue. The first two sections set the initial scope
of People’s Trust’s coverage if the plumbing leak warranted tear out and replacement
of Gunsser’s concrete slab to access the corroded plumbing system. Under those
2 sections, the water loss and tear out and replacement costs would be covered under
the policy. The last two sections of the policy, the WDX and LWD endorsements,
however, overrode the first two sections to exclude tear out and replacement costs.
First policy section. The first section of Gunsser’s policy outlined the basic
parameters of what the policy covered and excluded. It insured “against direct
physical loss to property,” including Gunsser’s dwelling. But the policy excluded,
among other occurrences, any loss caused by wear and tear, rust, or other corrosion.
Thus, because rust and corrosion damaged Gunsser’s cast iron plumbing system, he
would have no coverage but for a significant exception. That exception created
coverage for discharge or overflow from a plumbing system and added coverage for
tear out and replacement of any part of Gunsser’s house necessary to access and fix
the system. Thus, the scope of the exception is significant. By its nature, the
subsequent destruction and replacement of a concrete slab, unaffected by a water
leak, is not a “direct physical loss to property.” It is, rather, indirect or ancillary.
Even so, the first policy section illustrates that without the WDX endorsement, there
was no question that People’s Trust agreed to pay for Gunsser’s tear out and
replacement costs “unless the loss was otherwise excluded”:
3 SECTION I – PERILS INSURED AGAINST A. Coverage A – Dwelling and Coverage B – Other Structures 1. We insure against risk of direct physical loss[2] to property described in Coverages A and B. 2. We do not insure, however, for loss: .... c. Caused by: .... (5) Any of the following: (a) Wear and tear, marring, deterioration; (b) Mechanical breakdown, latent defect, inherent vice or any quality in property that causes it to damage or destroy itself; (c) Smog, rust or other corrosion; .... Exception to c. (5) Unless the loss is otherwise excluded, we cover loss to property covered under Coverage A or B resulting from accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam within a: i. Storm drain, or water, steam or water pipe, off the “residence premises”; or ii. Plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or household appliance on the “residence premises”. This includes the cost of tearing out and replacing any part of a building necessary to repair the system or appliance. However, such tear out and replacement coverage only applies to other structures if the water or steam causes actual damage to a building on the “residence premises”.
Second policy section. The second policy section at issue, standing alone, did
not alter coverage here. It merely defined “water” in a manner that did not affect
2 The underlined and italicized portions of the policy excerpts are added for emphasis throughout this opinion.
4 People’s Trust’s obligation to cover Gunsser’s loss, including his tear out and
replacement costs:
SECTION I – EXCLUSIONS A. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. These exclusions apply whether or not the loss event results in widespread damage or affects a substantial area. .... 3. Water This means: a. Flood, surface water, waves, including tidal water and tsunami, tides, tidal water, overflow of any body of water, or spray from any of these, all whether or not driven by wind, including storm surge; b. Water which: (1) Backs up through sewers or drains; or (2) Overflows or is otherwise discharged from a sump, sump pump or related equipment. c. Water below the surface of the ground, including water which exerts pressure on or seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, swimming pool or other structure. ....
Indeed, rust and corrosion caused Gunsser’s toilet to overflow, and not a tsunami, a
sump pump discharge, or a swimming pool leak.
Third policy section: WDX endorsement. But, for a $151 premium credit,
Gunsser contracted with People’s Trust to modify the definition of “water.” The
third policy section at issue, the WDX endorsement, replaced the policy’s water
exclusion. It now defined water to mean, among others, discharge or overflow of
5 water from Gunsser’s plumbing system, as long as “human, animal forces, or any
act of nature” caused it:
WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSION
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES YOUR POLICY, PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY
For a premium credit, your policy is changed as follows:
....
Under SECTION I – EXCLUSIONS item 3. Water is replaced by the following:
3. Water, meaning: .... e. Discharge or overflow of water or steam from within a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or from within a household appliance; . . . .... caused by or resulting from human or animal forces or any act of nature.
All other provisions of your policy that are not affected by this endorsement remain unchanged.
Gunsser disputes that corrosion is an “act of nature.” If it is not, the WDX
endorsement does not apply, and Gunsser’s loss—including tear out and
replacement costs—is not “otherwise excluded” by his original policy. If corrosion
is an “act of nature,” then the WDX endorsement would leave Gunsser uncovered.
Fourth policy section: LWD endorsement. But a fourth policy section could
prevent this outcome, because for an additional $91 premium, Gunsser bought back
6 limited water damage coverage via the LWD endorsement. This endorsement covers
“[s]udden and accidental direct physical loss” due to water discharge from within a
plumbing system. But critically, the parties agreed to limit this type of loss only to
“covered property” and a set amount per occurrence:
LIMITED WATER DAMAGE COVERAGE
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES YOUR POLICY, PLEASE READ CAREFULLY
AGREEMENT “We” will provide the insurance described in this endorsement in return for an additional premium paid by “you” and “your” compliance with all applicable provisions of this policy.
The policy is endorsed to provide the following:
Sudden and accidental direct physical loss to covered property by discharge or overflow of water or steam from within a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or from within a household appliance.
LIMIT OF LIABILITY: The Property Coverage limit for liability for all covered property provided by this endorsement is shown on your Declaration Page, per occurrence.
This coverage does not increase the Property Coverage limit(s) of liability that apply to the damaged covered property.
All other provisions of your policy that are not affected by this endorsement remain unchanged.
The policy’s Declaration Page provided for $10,000 in coverage per LWD
occurrence.
7 People’s Trust insists that the LWD endorsement only covers Gunsser’s water
damage and not his tear out and replacement costs. Gunsser responds that the LWD
endorsement is ambiguous on tear out and replacement coverage, and therefore, we
should construe the policy in his favor. Alternatively, Gunsser claims that because
the LWD endorsement is silent on tear out and replacement costs, the first policy
provision covering these items still applies.
The parties framed their interpretive arguments below through competing
summary judgment motions. The trial court determined that the WDX endorsement
applied because corrosion was an “act of nature.” But it interpreted the LWD
endorsement to include tear out and replacement costs. The case proceeded to trial,
where a jury awarded Gunsser water damages of less than $10,000 and vastly larger
tear out and replacement costs necessary to fix his plumbing system. The trial court
ultimately entered judgment in Gunsser’s favor.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Insurance Law
We review the policy de novo, guided by the principle that its text is
paramount. See Gov’t Emps. Ins. v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2017);
Auto-Owners Ins. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). Indeed, we interpret
insurance contracts according to their plain language, as bargained for by the parties.
See Auto-Owners Ins., 756 So. 2d at 34. We read the policy as a whole, endeavoring
to give each provision its full meaning and operative effect. See U.S. Fire Ins. v.
8 J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007); see § 627.419(1), Fla. Stat. (2019)
(requiring every insurance contract “be construed according to the entirety of its
terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or
modified by any application therefor or any rider or endorsement thereto”). We will,
however, liberally construe any ambiguity remaining in favor of coverage and
against People’s Trust. See Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943,
949–50 (Fla. 2013). A provision is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to two reasonable
interpretations, one providing coverage and the other excluding coverage.” Fayad
v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 2005).
III. Legal Analysis
The trial court correctly determined the WDX endorsement applied because
corrosion is an “act of nature.” It erred, however, in concluding that the LWD
endorsement covers tear out and replacement costs. The LWD endorsement only
applies to “covered property” that suffers “[s]udden and accidental direct physical
loss.” The policy initially covered these ancillary losses unless they were “otherwise
excluded.” The WDX endorsement did precisely that, and regardless, ancillary slab
damage caused by tear out is not a direct physical loss, much less a sudden and
accidental one. The policy thus does not cover tear out and replacement costs, and
an amended final judgment must exclude them.
9 A. The WDX endorsement applies because corrosion is an “act of nature.”
The WDX endorsement applied to Gunsser’s claim for water damage because
corrosion to his cast iron plumbing system was an “act of nature.” Gunsser
disagrees, claiming that the policy does not define “act of nature,” and that we should
find this phrase synonymous with “act of God.” Gunsser contends an “act of God”
is an uncontrollable or unpreventable event like a hurricane, tornado, or flood, and
not a natural process like corrosion. He also categorizes it as a “term of art” in
insurance policies, and accordingly, relies on Black’s Law Dictionary, an insurance
treatise, and federal case law to define it instead of non-legal dictionaries and case
law from other states. He argues that at best, “act of nature” is ambiguous, and we
should therefore construe it in his favor.
Three of our sister courts have rejected Gunsser’s arguments. See Dodge v.
People’s Tr. Ins., 321 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), Rosa v. Safepoint Ins., 350
So. 3d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022); Santana v. People’s Tr. Ins., 366 So. 3d 1130 (Fla.
3d DCA 2023). The Dodge court analyzed identical policy language on the same
facts. See Dodge, 321 So. 3d at 832–33. As here, the parties agreed that corrosion
caused the insureds’ plumbing leak. See id. at 832. Because “act of nature” is not
defined in the policy, the Dodge court analyzed both legal and non-legal dictionary
definitions to find the ordinary meaning of “act of nature.” See id. at 833–34; see
also Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1113 (“When a term in an insurance policy is undefined,
10 it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may look to legal and
non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning.”). Citing two out-of-
state cases, 3 the Dodge court concluded that the ordinary meaning of “act of nature”
is “something that naturally occurs” and includes ordinary natural processes like rust
or corrosion—“the chemical reaction between iron and moist air.” Dodge, 321 So.
3d at 834–35 (noting “rust” is defined as “reddish brittle coating formed on iron
especially when chemically attacked by moist air” and “corrosion” is defined as “the
action, process, or effect of corroding,” which is “to wear away gradually by
chemical action” (quoting Rust and Corrosion, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (11th ed. 2003))). It does not require an uncontrollable or unpreventable
event. See id. at 835.
The Rosa court, analyzing similar policy language in an identical factual
context, adopted Dodge’s reasoning and its definition for “act of nature” as
“something that naturally occurs.” Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 470. It also noted the
operative policy separately referenced “an Act of God” more than once. This
undermined the insured’s argument that the definitions of “an act of God” and “any
3 See Holben v. GC Acquisition Corp., No. 1996-CA-261, 1997 WL 115843, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1997) (natural accumulation of snow and ice on rooftop); Coyle v. City of Waterbury, No. 96884, 1991 WL 270291, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1991) (growth of tree root into abutting sidewalk); see also Bibeau v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins., 244 A.3d 712, 714 (Me. 2021) (gradual earth movement below home’s foundation).
11 act of nature” were interchangeable. See id. at 471 (citing Ahearn v. Mayo Clinic,
180 So. 3d 165, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“[W]here the document has used one term
in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the
different term denotes a different idea.” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 25, at 170 (2012)))). 4
We find the Dodge and Rosa courts’ reasoning persuasive. Here, context is
key. The only contextually reasonable meaning of “act of nature” is “something that
naturally occurs,” and therefore, includes a naturally occurring process like rust and
corrosion. See Dodge, 321 So. 3d at 834–35; Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 471; see also Scalia
& Garner, supra, at § 70 (“Most common English words have a number of dictionary
definitions, some of them quite abstruse and rarely intended. One should assume the
contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think
otherwise.”).
At bottom, Gunsser’s alternative interpretation requires us to view “an act of
nature” synonymously with “an act of God,” or an uncontrollable or unpreventable
event. We do not look solely to legal dictionaries like Black’s Law Dictionary to
find the plain and ordinary meaning of an undefined insurance policy term like “act
4 The Santana court followed Dodge and Rosa in a citation opinion. 366 So. 3d at 1130. Later, in a case involving identical policy language and a similar fact pattern, the Third District emphasized that it had “chosen to follow the precedent set by Dodge and Rosa.” See People’s Tr. Ins. v. Banks, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1819, D1820 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 13, 2023).
12 of nature.” See Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1113 (quoting Botee v. S. Fid. Ins., 162 So.
3d 183, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). Non-legal dictionaries are also fair game. Id.
So, we reject Gunsser’s invitation to stop with Black’s Law Dictionary and go no
further. Black’s Law Dictionary is not contextually appropriate here. It defines “act
of God” inconsistently with the circumstances and references broadening the
definition based on an inapplicable federal statute:
[A]n overwhelming, unpreventable event caused exclusively by forces of nature, such as an earthquake, flood, or tornado. The definition has been statutorily broadened to include all natural phenomena that are exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible, the effects of which could not be prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight. 42 USCA § 9601(1). – Also termed act of nature . . . .
Act of God, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).
We cannot rely on Gunsser’s cited insurance treatise either, because it does
not define “act of nature.” See 11 Couch on Insurance § 153:3 (3d ed. 2023)
(defining “forces of nature” and “natural processes”). Gunsser’s federal case law
also provides no help because every situation involved an “act of God.” See Legree
v. United States, No. 5:05-CV-173-SPM, 2006 WL 2190580 (N.D. Fla. July 31,
2006) (tornado during hurricane destroys warehouse facility); Chartis Prop. Cas.
Co. v. Inganamort, Civ. No. 12-040075, 2019 WL 1277518 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2019)
(unpublished) (boat sinks during heavy rain, lightning, and heavy thunderstorms);
Fed. Ins. v. PGG Realty, LLC, 538 F. Supp. 2d 680, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (megayacht
13 capsizes amid extreme weather), aff’d sub nom., 340 F. App’x 5 (2d Cir. 2009); see
also Rivera-Carraquillo v. Centro Ecuestre Madrigal, Inc., 812 F.3d 213, 227 n.25
(11th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff flung from horse is force majeure or superior force).
Instead, the Fourth and Fifth Districts’ examinations of non-legal dictionary
definitions and applicable case law in Dodge and Rosa to analyze the phrase’s usage
provides a better process to determine the contextual meaning of “act of nature.”
And in the context of this policy, we agree with Dodge and Rosa that the everyday
interpretation of the phrase “act of nature” means “something that naturally occurs,”
rather than an uncontrollable or unpreventable event, such as a hurricane, flood, or
tornado, usually classified as an “act of God.” See Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 471
(determining that “any ‘act of nature’ is an act that occurs naturally and encompasses
rust or other corrosion”); Dodge, 321 So. 3d at 834 (agreeing with insurer that
“ordinary meaning of the term ‘act of nature’ is something that naturally occurs”);
see also People’s Tr. Ins. v. Banks, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1819, D1820 (Fla. 3d DCA
Sept. 13, 2023) (agreeing with Dodge and Rosa that phrase “act of nature” used in
insurance policy included ordinary natural processes).
Even if we construed some overlap between the definitions of “act of nature”
and “act of God,” additional contextual clues in Gunsser’s policy preclude the
finding of an ambiguity. Gunsser’s policy specifically references “an Act of God”
more than once in its Cancellation and Nonrenewal sections. We agree with the
14 Rosa court that the separate uses of “an Act of God” and “any act of nature” in the
same policy connote different meanings of the terms. See Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 471;
see also Kel Homes, LLC v. Burris, 933 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“As a
general proposition, the use of different language in different contractual provisions
strongly implies that a different meaning was intended.”). For these reasons, the
trial court correctly ruled that it could not read “act of nature” synonymously with
“act of God.” In context, synonymous interpretation is unreasonable. The only
contextually reasonable definition of “act of nature” in this specific insurance policy
is “something that occurs naturally” that is not necessarily an “act of God.”
Gunsser’s WDX endorsement therefore excluded any coverage here. Accordingly,
we must now analyze the LWD endorsement.
B. The LWD endorsement provides water loss coverage that does not include tear out and replacement costs.
The LWD endorsement’s coverage does not include tear out and replacement
costs because they are not “covered losses,” much less “[s]udden and accidental
direct physical losses.” Unlike the first policy section, the LWD endorsement does
not mention tear out and replacement costs. And we cannot conclude that the
destruction of a concrete slab and its subsequent replacement following a water leak
are direct, sudden, or accidental. By their nature, they are instead indirect, delayed,
and purposeful. The LWD endorsement’s plain language, therefore, does not cover
tear out or replacement costs.
15 We therefore reject Gunsser’s contention—grounded in a Fifth District
decision with different LWD endorsement language—that this provision is
ambiguous. See Sec. First Ins. v. Vazquez, 336 So. 3d 350, 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022);
see also Sec. First Ins. v. Nichols, 363 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citation
opinion to Vazquez). Like Gunsser’s policy, the Vazquez policy covered tear out and
replacement costs in connection with water damage not otherwise excluded from a
plumbing system. See Vazquez, 336 So. 3d at 352. But Vazquez is different from
this case in at least two ways.
First, we agree with our sister courts that we can distinguish Vazquez because,
unlike here, the parties stipulated that the LWD endorsement included tear out and
replacement costs. See Vazquez, 336 So. 3d at 352; Panettieri v. People’s Tr. Ins.,
344 So. 3d 35, 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); Banks, 48 Fla. L. Weekly at D1821.
Second, the LWD endorsement’s language in Vazquez differs significantly
from the language in the LWD endorsement here:
Gunsser: Vazquez:
“The Property Coverage limit for “The limit of liability for all damage to liability for all covered property covered property provided by this provided by this endorsement is shown endorsement is $10,000 per loss. This on “your” Declaration page, per coverage does not increase the limit of occurrence.” (Emphasis added). liability that applies to the damaged covered property.” (Emphasis added).
The Vazquez court noted that the LWD endorsement there limited liability for “all
damage to covered property” while observing that the water leak did not damage the
16 concrete slab. 336 So. 3d at 353. It also remarked that if the insurer had wished to
tie the limitation of liability to that part of the property damaged by water, it could
have used the term “water damage loss” instead of “damage to covered property.”
Id. Finally, it opined that even if a water damage loss included both direct damage
to covered property and indirect damage in the form of tear out costs, there was no
reason why an LWD endorsement necessarily applied to both categories of loss. Id.
On the other hand, the Vazquez court reasoned that “damage to covered property”
could also include tear out costs because the insured’s concrete slab would be
damaged in connection with the plumbing repairs. Id. Based on these observations,
the Vazquez court concluded that the LWD endorsement drafted by the insurer was
ambiguous, and therefore, it should be interpreted in the insured’s favor. Id.
Here, the LWD endorsement limits recovery “for liability for all covered
property.” It does not raise the ambiguity of what “damage” means in connection
with a subsequent slab repair; it only asks whether the loss is covered. In this sense,
People’s Trust accepted the Vazquez court’s tacit invitation to define its liability
limits more clearly. Id. Unlike Vazquez, Gunsser’s LWD endorsement is clear and
unambiguous; it does not cover tear out and replacement costs.
The policy’s plain language also impedes Gunsser’s argument that tear out
and replacement costs are covered despite what the LWD endorsement
unquestionably declares. The policy’s only reference to tear out and replacement
17 costs is in the first policy section, and that provision only applies “[u]nless the loss
is otherwise excluded.” When Gunsser agreed to the WDX endorsement in
exchange for a lower premium, his amended policy did not just exclude tear out and
replacement costs suffered in connection with a plumbing leak, but all water damage
from leaks in his plumbing system caused by human or animal forces or any act of
nature. The WDX endorsement, therefore, “otherwise excluded” water damage
coverage in the first policy section, and Gunsser’s exclusive coverage for this type
of loss now comes only from the LWD endorsement. Put differently, the LWD
endorsement’s silence on tear out and replacement costs does not resurrect the first
policy section’s inclusion of them.
We are not the first to interpret this policy language, and our sister courts share
our interpretation. See Panettieri, 344 So. 3d at 39–40 (“A plain reading of the
exception to [the first policy section] indicates that tear out coverage is included as
part of the loss to property unless the loss is excluded. Therefore, no separate and
distinct coverage exists for tear out costs apart from water damage.”); Banks, 48 Fla.
L. Weekly at D1820–21 (holding that limited water damage coverage endorsement
did not cover “tear out” costs associated with replacement of insured homeowners’
old cast iron plumbing pipes after pipes caused water damage; endorsement only
covered sudden and accidental direct physical loss by water). Gunsser is therefore
18 entitled to recover for his water damage loss, but not his ancillary tear out and
replacement costs.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the WDX endorsement
applies but reverse its determination that the LWD endorsement includes tear out
and replacements costs. These determinations moot People’s Trust’s remaining
appellate arguments relating to the trial. We remand for entry of an amended final
judgment that does not include tear out and replacement costs.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
GANNAM, J., concurs. MIZE, J., concurs specially, with opinion. _____________________________
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED _____________________________
MIZE, J., concurring specially, with opinion.
I fully concur in Section II and Section III.B. of the majority's opinion. As to
the remainder of the opinion, I concur in result only.
_____________________________
Mark D. Tinker and Francesca M. Stein, of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Mark A. Nation, of The Nation Law Firm, Longwood, Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., of Buell & Elligett, P.A., for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.