People's Bank v. David

21 So. 174, 49 La. Ann. 136, 1897 La. LEXIS 546
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 4, 1897
DocketNo. 12,279
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 21 So. 174 (People's Bank v. David) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People's Bank v. David, 21 So. 174, 49 La. Ann. 136, 1897 La. LEXIS 546 (La. 1897).

Opinions

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Milder, J.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment sustaining the intervention of the minor heirs of Joseph David, claiming to be paid their shares out of property of the succession alleged to have been acquired in the partition proceedings by the major heirs of the deceased, afterward mortgaged by them to the plaintiff, the proceeds in controversy being derived from the sheriff’s sale under plaintiff’s writ of seizure and sale.

The deceased, Joseph David, left several major heirs, one minor child and the children of his predeceased daughter, these grandchildren, represented by their tutor, being the intervenors. Shortly after the death of the deceased partition proceedings were instituted, the partition was decreed, and there was the usual reference of the parties to the notary. Under the advice of the family meetings, the private sale of portions of the property was authorized, and the residue, mainly real estate in this city, was sold at auction, the major heirs becoming the adjudicatees. No portion of the price was paid, each act of sale reciting the price was to be accounted for in the partition proceedings. The subsequent proceedings before the notary were the settlement of the accounts, the formation of the active mass, the deductions to be made and the ascertainment of the distributive shares of the heirs, that of the intervenors being fixed at sixteen thousand and forty-five dollars. No cash was paid by the purchasing heirs, and hence none was distributed in the partition proceedings, but the statement is made by the notary that the liability of the heirs by agreement is to be settled “outside the partition.” By the terms of the partition the major heirs were treated as owing the amount of the adjudication, or so much as was requisite to pay the shares of the minor heirs. The partition was homologated. Subsequently, the major heirs, who had purchased but never paid the amounts of the adjudications, mortgaged the property to the plain[138]*138tiff, and under the bank’s writs, as already stated, the property was sold and the proceeds realized.

The intervention of the minors alleges in substance the invalidity of the partition proceedings, because the major heirs never having paid the price, there was no distribution or completion of the proceedings; hence the title of the minors in the succession property was never divested; that the plaintiff had knowledge of the defect in the proceedings, that its mortgages are void as respect the minors and the prayer is that the minors be decreed entitled to receive their distributive shares from the proceeds. The plaintiff excepted to the intervention on various grounds not discussed here, and the exceptions overruled, answered in substance, setting up the partition proceedings, averred that the assets, so far as they consisted in open accounts and bills receivable, purchased by the major heirs at the partition sale, were not collected; that the entire property of the succession was not more than sufficient to pay the debts; that all the heirs guaranteed, minors included, the debts jdue the succession and bills receivable; that the major heirs have paid all the succession debts and have paid the minors all due to them. The judgment of the lower court maintained the oppositions to the extent of directing the payment to the minors of one-eighth of the proceeds. There is an answer to the appeal, praying that'the amount awarded be increased to the full distributive share of the minors fixed in the partition.

The argument on behalf of the bank maintains that the mortgage, having been acquired on the faith of the recorded titles of,the major heirs, is not affected by any irregularities in the partition, or frauds of the major heirs; and it is insisted, in view of the duty of the tutor to protect the rights of the minors in the proceedings, the recourse of the minors should be on him and not against the bank, the mortgagee in good faith.

As we think the good faith of the bank in acquiring the mortgage notes is unimpeached, we have been solicitous to find the basis for extending to it the protection invoked by the argument. The nature of the title on which the bank’s mortgage depends confronts us at the outset. That title, spread on the public records, explicitly states the non-payment of the price by the major heirs. In effect the title was the recital of an adjudication and the unfulfilled obligation of the major heirs imposed by that adjudication. If this purchase by [139]*139the heirs, without one dollar paid under it, is to be deemed sufficient to vest title in the purchasing heir, it must occur that notwithstanding the partition exacted by law and ordered by tne court, it would be in the power of any heir by simply procuring and recording an adjudication to himself to appropriate the entire succession property bp a sale or mortgage, and thus defeat the law and the order of court for an equal partition among all the heirs. It is true such a result would doubtless, be averted by recording the prooes verbal in the manner requisite to preserve the vendor’s privilege, but the heir, desirous of securing to himself the succession property, could obtain this advantage and profit by the omission to record the privilege, if this theory of title without payment of the price is to be sustained. The grave consequences of maintaining this theory is made more impressive by its operation on minors, illustrated in this case, if the theory is maintained, of the loss to the minors of their entire patrimony claimed to result from the mortgage of the property by the major heirs, without payment by them of a dollar of the price, and that non-payment, announced in the act, spread on the public records and notie to all.

The Napoleon Code gave the co-heirs a mortgage on the property sold to effect the partition for the payment of the price of the Imitation, as wellas to secure the return which by the partition one heir is to make to theother. Code Napoleon, Arts. 833, 2109. That Code required the registry of this mortgage within a fixed period, or the mortgage was ineffective. Formerly, our laws gave a similar mortgage, but there is none now, of the co-heirs, arising out of the partition proceedings, except that given by Art. 1333 of the Code, and that must be recorded to affect third persons. The mortgage under Art. 1333, restricted to the return of money the heir is to make, is not as broad as that given by the Napoleon Code. The deduction of the argument for defendant that the minor heirs had no mortgage for their distributive share when the bank took its mortgage note, is clear without reference to the Napoleon Oode introduced in the argument for illustration. Assuming that the privilege of the vendor on the immovable sold applies in favor of the heirs, for none is given to the heirs specifically, it follows, too, there was no privilege, for none was recorded. 0ml Code, Arts. 3271, 3274, amended by Act No. 79 of 1879. In our view the contention of the bank is sustained that, the minors had no mortgage or privilege.

[140]*140The defendant contends with great earñestness for the protection given by law to mortgages accepted on the faith of recorded titles. This protection has been of frequent recognition. Succession of Ashbridge, 1 An. 208; Boudreau vs. Bergeron, 4 An. 84; Broussard vs. Broussard, 45 An. 1085; Thompson vs. Whitbeck, 47 An. 49; Lacassagne vs. Abraham, 46 An. 1160.

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Bluebook (online)
21 So. 174, 49 La. Ann. 136, 1897 La. LEXIS 546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peoples-bank-v-david-la-1897.