2022 IL App (2d) 210421-U No. 2-21-0421 Order filed September 7, 2022
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 19-CF-1552 ) KAMIL KIRYAKOS YOUSIF, ) Honorable ) John T. Gibbons, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Hudson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s preliminary inquiry into defendant’s pro se claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness satisfied People v. Krankel. The trial court was sufficiently aware of the factual basis of defendant’s claim that trial counsel should have presented evidence that the police frequently harassed and abused defendant. The trial court also properly concluded that the claim had no potential merit.
¶2 Defendant, Kamil Kiryakos Yousif, appeals from his conviction of resisting a peace officer
(720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2018)). He contends that the trial court’s inquiry pursuant to the rule
in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68 (2003), was
inadequate for it to determine whether his claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness had potential 2022 IL App (2d) 210421-U
merit warranting the appointment of new counsel. We hold that, between the court’s inquiry and
the information in the trial record, the court had a sufficient basis to determine the potential merit
of defendant’s claims. We, therefore, affirm defendant’s conviction.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)
(West 2018) (physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a peace officer)) and one
count of resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2018)). On July 15, 2019, the State
raised a doubt concerning defendant’s fitness to stand trial. Two days later, the trial court ordered
a fitness evaluation. On October 2, 2019, the court found defendant unfit, but with a probability
that he would be restored to fitness within one year. The court ordered inpatient treatment. After
90 days, the court found defendant still unfit and ordered further treatment. On January 23, 2020,
the court found him fit.
¶5 Before jury selection at defendant’s April 2021 trial, the court questioned defendant about,
among other things, his satisfaction with the witness list. Defense counsel—the public defender—
explained that the case had arisen when two Cherry Valley police officers attempted to execute an
arrest warrant on defendant stemming from a misdemeanor case. She represented that she and
defendant had discussed calling witnesses from that case, but, as a matter of trial strategy, she had
decided not to. Defendant told the court that, aside from a building manager whom he knew had
died, he had hoped for “witnesses [who] [could] hear [him] screaming from getting beat up” by
the police officers. He was not sure who those witnesses would be. He then mentioned “the
neighbor’s son,” with whom he had conversed several times. He further suggested that defense
counsel call witnesses from the grocery store where he shopped, because they knew he was a good
person. Counsel replied that she and defendant had discussed the use of character witnesses. When
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the court asked defendant if he had any questions for the court before trial, defendant commented
that he had “been abused not only by police officers, but by some judges everywhere.”
¶6 At defendant’s trial, the State called two witnesses, Cherry Valley police officers Andy
Paulson and Bryon Muraski.
¶7 Paulson testified that, on June 20, 2019, he and Muraski executed a warrant for defendant’s
arrest. They went to defendant’s apartment in a 12-unit building. They announced at the door that
they were police officers and had a warrant for his arrest. Defendant told them to go away and that
if they intended to get him, they would have to break down his door and fight him. Paulson received
clearance to force the door open, but that proved unnecessary as a property manager approached
them in the hallway and provided them with a key. Paulson unlocked the door but could not open
it—apparently, defendant was holding the door shut. Paulson forced the door open. Muraski went
in but fell immediately. Paulson entered, and defendant punched him in the face with a closed fist.
Paulson ducked, and defendant hit him a few more times before Paulson pulled him to the ground.
Paulson and Muraski told defendant to put his hands behind his back; defendant did not comply.
Paulson twisted defendant’s wrist. Defendant then allowed the officers to handcuff him. “We got
him up to his feet. Officer Muraski showed me that he had a hammer in his hand. And we escorted
him out to the squad car.” As they brought defendant outside, he asked to talk to a supervisor. They
allowed defendant to speak to a sergeant; defendant complained that the officers injured him. After
defendant was treated at SwedishAmerican Hospital, Paulson took him to jail.
¶8 On cross-examination, Paulson agreed that defendant frequently called the Cherry Valley
police department to make complaints about the police. Paulson also noted that defendant
frequently called the village hall. He agreed that, during the altercation it the apartment, he did not
see defendant with a hammer. He denied that his plan before arriving at defendant’s apartment was
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to kick down the door. However, Paulson admitted that, before executing the warrant, a fellow
Cherry Valley officer sent him a text suggesting that he kick defendant’s door in, to which Paulson
replied, “That’s my plan.” Further, he agreed that, after he arrested defendant, he participated in
an exchange of texts with a detective. The detective texted, “Awesome pinch.” Paulson responded,
“It’s a felony now he punched me in the face and head.” The detective texted back, “Shit. You
okay?” Paulson responded, “Oh, yeah, I’m just dandy. I love that stuff, man.” The detective texted
back, “Awesome.” Paulson then sent a text to the officer he first texted: “Kamils [sic] going
[redacted] he punched me in the face and head.” The officer responded, “What the shit?!!” Paulson
replied, “Yes sir that was fun.”
¶9 On redirect, Paulson said that he felt “good” after he arrested defendant.
¶ 10 Muraski’s testimony was largely consistent with Paulson’s. He stated that he and Paulson
were outside defendant’s door arguing with him for 20 to 30 minutes before they got the door
open. Muraski tripped on the door’s threshold as he entered. He saw defendant swinging his arms
at Paulson and Paulson ducking. When he and Paulson got control of defendant, he discovered a
ball-peen hammer in defendant’s right hand. However, defendant did not strike Muraski during
the struggle.
¶ 11 On cross-examination, Muraski stated that he had had six to eight contacts with defendant
before the June 20, 2019, incident. Defendant was a person who “frequently call[ed] the police.”
¶ 12 The State rested at the end of Muraski’s testimony. The defense moved for a directed
verdict, which the trial court denied. As the court was preparing to adjourn the proceedings for
lunch, defendant interjected and asked to share something he believed the court should know. The
court directed him to discuss the matter with defense counsel. Defendant agreed to raise the issue
later in the proceedings.
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¶ 13 After the adjournment, the trial court engaged defendant in a long colloquy as to whether
he would testify. Defendant ultimately decided not to testify. He said that he believed that the jury,
after seeing the text messages, would understand that the officers were lying.
¶ 14 During deliberations, the jury sent a note suggesting that they were deadlocked and
expressing uncertainty about the meaning of “knowing contact” for purposes of aggravated battery
(see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2018)). The court directed the jury to keep deliberating and
provided them an additional instruction. The jury found defendant not guilty of aggravated battery
but guilty of resisting a peace officer.
¶ 15 Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial, attacking the sufficiency of the evidence
and arguing that the officers’ testimony was perjured. While arguing the motion, counsel alerted
the court that defendant was dissatisfied with her representation because she had not called his
neighbor as a witness. She defended that decision as a matter of trial strategy, but she wanted to
make a record of defendant’s objection.
¶ 16 The court then addressed defendant directly. Defendant claimed that he was receiving
“constant harassment” from the police. Defendant also implied that his neighbor could have
testified that the disorderly conduct charge leading to the warrant for defendant’s arrest was an
aspect of the police harassment.
¶ 17 The court tried to shift the discussion to what defendant believed defense counsel did
wrong. Eventually, defendant said that he told counsel during the trial that police officers abused
him at the hospital:
“THE COURT: I, I understand. Is there, is there anything else though about your
counsel’s representation or is that—
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THE DEFENDANT: Well, *** I was angry at Margie O’Connor [sic] in 2017, I’m
a little bit angry at her.
***
THE COURT: —for not calling that witness?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, not just the witnesses, the two police officers that —the
lie, lie, lie. The—my attorney caught one of them—
THE COURT: ***. So why you mad at her about that?
THE DEFENDANT: —these two police officers lied.
THE COURT: Right. Right. I understand that but what—tell me about [defense
counsel] here, specifically.
THE DEFENDANT: *** [Y]ou, as a judge, gave us, gave me several breaks to talk
to my attorney.
THE DEFENDANT: And I was giving her information to, to mention it to the
Court.
THE DEFENDANT: And *** I know she didn’t do it on purpose or she didn’t do
it, she didn’t do it in a mean way. I’m giving her—during the trial, I’m giving her
information, the police officer abused me in the hospital. These two police officers abused
me of, of violating my right. I’m giving her information to, to, to be found not guilty.
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THE DEFENDANT: To, to share it with the state[‘s] attorney so they can do some
investigation also. Cause I do not go in front of people, your Honor. I’m, as I told you, I’m
a good Catholic.”
¶ 18 After a further colloquy with defendant, the court again asked him to specify his claims
against counsel:
“THE COURT: Are you alleging that your attorney did anything wrong?
THE DEFENDANT: Um, not purposely, I just don’t—I cannot understand why
she, she did not— *** I’m not trying to make her look bad here in court, but she did not
give the Court, during the trial, the information or she did not mention anything to the jury,
these [sic] information that I was giving it to her, telling her about the police officer, telling
her about the—what these police officers did, not only in my apartment but in the hospital,
I just couldn’t—to this day, I do not understand why she did not mention those things.”
¶ 19 The court asked defense counsel if she had any concerns about defendant’s fitness. She
responded that defendant was in the same condition as he was when he returned from inpatient
treatment; she had not observed any deterioration. She believed that she could communicate
effectively with him. The court noted that it believed that defendant understood its questions.
¶ 20 After again confirming with defense counsel that she had no fitness concerns, the court
asked defendant if he had any specific complaints about counsel’s performance beyond wanting
her to have called his neighbor. The following exchange ensued:
“THE DEFENDANT: Well, I, um, like I said, I gave her so much information
during the—getting beat up and after getting—when they—when I demanded—they were
refusing to take me to the hospital because I had bruises and I was—my head was killing
me from being punched, they, they said, ‘Mr. Yousif we’re taking you to jail right away’
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and I demanded to speak to [a] sergeant and I demanded to be taken to hospital at—after
the beating.
THE COURT: What, what did [defense counsel] not present that you wanted her
to present?
THE DEFENDANT: The abuse by those two police officers; not only the lies, I
mean, she did a good job on proving those two police officers lied but she did not mention
the abuse, not—only the abuse of my civil right or my rights the abuse by those two police
officers and by their—’cause several Cherry Valley been in my apartment several times
different police officers.”
¶ 21 After trying to summarize defendant’s complaints against defense counsel, the court asked
defendant if there were any other issues. Defendant said he had mentioned everything. He added
that if counsel had mentioned “the important things” at trial, he would have been acquitted. The
court asked if the “things” defendant referenced were those he had already mentioned. Defendant
responded:
“THE DEFENDANT: Ah, yes, sir, not that the police did not mention—I did not
hear them say we got a warrant because they came in with a warrant in 2018 that I violated
my probation and I, I opened the door for them.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: There was no all this, you know, he attacked us, Mr. Yousif,
we’re here to come and get you. For what? You violated your probation and they put a
handcuff on me and I—I bond out.
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THE DEFENDANT: There was no, he attacked us, or he did this, he did that; I’ve
been arrested ten times, four by Rockford and I just recently got arrested again. Four by
Cherry Valley and one by Loves Park when they came in with Cherry Valley.
THE DEFENDANT: And they all but—I said, I refused to talk to you and the next
thing I knew, one of them was a sergeant, a Loves Park sergeant, I didn’t even know that.
THE COURT: All right.
THE DEFENDANT: They put a handcuff on me and I—they took me. I don’t know
what for—well, I know what for.
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t, I don’t attack police officers; I do not punch police
officers and I’ve, I’ve had enough, it’s just not right.”
¶ 22 At the end of this extended dialogue, the court asked defense counsel if she wished to
respond. She explained that she did not call defendant’s neighbor because her investigation
suggested that the neighbor’s account of the incident leading to the disorderly conduct charge was
consistent with police reports. Also, she did not raise defendant’s claims of ongoing abuse by the
police because there was a risk that the jury would find them not credible and further conclude that
defendant’s false belief in police abuse gave him a motive to strike the officers.
¶ 23 After hearing defense counsel, the court stated that it believed that it had “flushed [sic] out”
all claims of defense counsel’s deficiencies. The court took those issues, and the posttrial motion,
under advisement.
¶ 24 At the next hearing date, defense counsel further explained why she had not sought to
question the officers about their conduct at the hospital:
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“[Defendant] expressed concern that I did not ask questions of the officers about
what happened at the hospital *** after his arrest. The reasons for that would, would again
be strategy reasons. First of all, none of the alleged events happened at the hospital. He had
some concerns about the officers interfering with his treatment at the hospital, which was
one of the things that he wanted me to bring up, but I found that because in the end he was
transported to the hospital and he was, in fact, treated, I didn’t believe that that would go
towards helping his case.
I believe he also wanted me to ask the officers questions about their conduct while
he was at the hospital and statements that they might have made about the, the arrest while
he was at the hospital. My investigation in terms of trying to find additional information
about that left me in a position where if the officers didn’t testify in alignment with how
[defendant] believed that they ought, I would have no options for impeachment other than
to either let the issue fall flat and in front of the jury or [defendant] would be required to
testify for there to be any impeachment and with it being events that all took place after the
actual alleged incidents, I felt that raising that issue and creating that position where my
client would have to testify when I didn’t believe that it was in his strategic benefit to do
so wouldn’t be productive in his representation.”
¶ 25 The court then concluded that it could identify three ineffective-assistance claims by
defendant. First, counsel did not call defendant’s neighbor, who was the complaining witness in
the disorderly conduct case that resulted in the warrant for defendant’s arrest. Second, counsel “did
not sufficiently point out the officer[s’] dishonesty, inconsistencies, specifically lies relating to
their testimony.” Third, counsel failed to bring attention to the police abuse of defendant, “[n]ot
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only with respect to [the] incident *** at the hospital and during the [charged] incident itself, but
also a continued pattern of abuse of police power with respect to [defendant].”
¶ 26 The court explained at length that none of the claims were viable. First, the court noted that
it likely would have barred the neighbor’s testimony as irrelevant. Moreover, based on defense
counsel’s investigation and conclusion that the neighbor’s testimony would have supported the
State, counsel’s decision not to present that testimony was “a very sound decision from a strategic
and tactical standpoint.” Second, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the police officers
and effectively highlighted in closing argument the inconsistencies in their testimony and
“evidence of prior dishonesty.” Third, the court determined that it likely would have found
inadmissible any evidence that defendant suffered past police abuse. Moreover, defense counsel
made a strategic decision not to present such evidence given the risk that it could “essentially
backfire *** and harm [defendant].”
¶ 27 The court also denied defendant’s motion for a new trial.
¶ 28 At sentencing, defense counsel argued for a sentence of time served. She noted that
defendant had a diagnosis of paranoid delusional disorder, which does not respond to medication.
Defendant’s persecutory beliefs were unchangeable. However, despite that condition, defendant
had been compliant with pretrial services requirements. The State asked for a sentence of
conditional discharge.
¶ 29 The court sentenced defendant to 301days in jail with equal credit for time served, finding
as a mitigating factor that “defendant was suffering from a serious mental illness, which though
insufficient to establish the defense of insanity[,] substantially effected [sic] his or her ability to
understand the nature of his or her action to perform his or her conduct to the requirements of the
law.” Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
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¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 In Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 187-89, our supreme court established the principle that, when a
defendant makes a posttrial pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant may be
entitled to new appointed counsel to assist with the development of that claim. The court further
developed that principle in Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78, holding that, when a defendant puts forward
an ineffectiveness claim, Krankel requires the trial court to make a preliminary inquiry to
determine whether the appointment of new counsel is required.
¶ 32 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court failed to satisfy Moore’s inquiry
requirement because it “never fleshed out the specifics” of his complaint that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to develop his claim of “a pattern of abuse by police officers.” Specifically,
he complains “that [defense] counsel did not bring up a pattern of ‘constant harassment’ by Cherry
Valley police officers or that the police officers abused him and made certain statements about his
arrest while he was being treated at the hospital.”
¶ 33 Citing Moore, he argues that Krankel principles require a trial court to examine the factual
bases for a defendant’s ineffectiveness claims. For instance, he contends:
“Here, the court’s questions to [defendant] and trial counsel did not advance this purpose
as they never touched on the factual basis of the claims. The court did not ask the
fundamental questions necessary to understand and evaluate this claim, such as: ‘What
specific events are you claiming the jury could find amount to “constant harassment” by
the police?’ ‘What specifically did the police say at the hospital regarding [defendant’s]
arrest?’ ”
¶ 34 He, therefore, argues that, as “the court did not acquire sufficient information to evaluate
the off-the-record claims, this case must be remanded for an adequate Krankel inquiry.”
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¶ 35 The State responds that Krankel principles require the court to inquire of counsel and—if
necessary—the defendant as to the nature of the defendant’s ineffectiveness claims. Further, under
Moore, the court may base its determination on “its knowledge of counsel’s trial performance and
the insufficiency of the allegations on their face.” The State contends that the court complied with
Krankel’s requirements. Moreover, it argues that any error was harmless because the record shows
that counsel had a strategic basis for the decisions in question.
¶ 36 In reply, defendant contends that the trial court’s inquiry was necessarily incomplete
because the court did not elicit the details of the officers’ alleged abusive conduct at the hospital
or the other alleged police harassment and abuse. Defendant also claims that counsel did not
adequately explain the reasons for her decisions.
¶ 37 We hold that the court’s Krankel inquiry was sufficient. First, the court had enough
information about defendant’s claim relating to the officers’ conduct at the hospital to evaluate
counsel’s explanation for declining to raise the matter at trial. Further, counsel’s explanation fell
squarely within the ambit of reasonable trial strategy. Second, the court likewise had sufficient
information from the record to evaluate defendant’s claim about other police harassment and
abuse. Moreover, the record makes clear why, as a matter of sound trial strategy, counsel declined
to develop that claim at trial.
¶ 38 In Moore, our supreme court explained the Krankel procedure as follows:
“[W]hen a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant’s claim. If the trial
court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then
the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the
allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed. ***
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The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted
an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. [Citation.] During this evaluation, some interchange between the trial court and
trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective
representation is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any,
is warranted on a defendant’s claim. Trial counsel may simply answer questions and
explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s allegations. [Citations.] A
brief discussion between the trial court and the defendant may be sufficient. [Citations.]
Also, the trial court can base its evaluation of the defendant’s pro se allegations of
ineffective assistance on its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the
insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face. [Citations.]” Id.
¶ 39 The substantive law applied in a Krankel inquiry is the two-prong test in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. To prevail on
a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v.
Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 433 (2010). Counsel’s performance is assessed using an objective
standard of competence under prevailing professional norms. Id. “To establish deficient
performance, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s action or
inaction was the result of sound trial strategy.” Id. “As a result, counsel’s strategic choices that are
made after investigation of the law and the facts are virtually unassailable.” Id.
¶ 40 A defendant may raise for the first time on appeal a claim that the trial court’s preliminary
Krankel inquiry was inadequate. See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79 (to preserve the issue for appeal, trial
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counsel need not claim in the trial court that a preliminary Krankel inquiry was inadequate; “[i]t
would be inappropriate for trial counsel to argue a motion that is predicated on allegations of
counsel’s own incompetence”). Further, “[t]he issue of whether the trial court properly conducted
a preliminary Krankel inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo.” People v. Roddis,
2020 IL 124352, ¶ 33.
¶ 41 First, we deem that the trial court sufficiently inquired into defendant’s ineffectiveness
claim concerning the abusive conduct of the police officers while he was at the hospital. Defense
counsel explained to the court that defendant told her before trial that he wanted her to present
evidence that the police had acted inappropriately while he was at the hospital. She then
investigated the matter and concluded that her only choices were to cross-examine the officers or
call defendant to testify, neither of which she believed were strategically sound. The clear import
of this representation is that counsel had tried and failed to find an independent witness to support
defendant’s account of how the police acted at the hospital. Lacking such independent
corroboration, counsel had limited options. She could cross-examine the officers about the hospital
incident and risk that they would simply deny it and thus the claim would “fall flat.” In that event,
she would not want to rely on defendant to contradict their denials “when [she] didn’t believe that
it was in his strategic benefit” to testify at all in the case. Counsel did not expressly mention it, but
undoubtedly defendant’s mental-health struggles and unfocused comments in court made her
question his effectiveness as a witness. Thus, counsel’s decision not to raise the hospital incident
at trial was a reasonable trial strategy.
¶ 42 Defendant cites four cases for the proposition that the trial court had a duty to inquire into
the specifics of defendant’s claim. Of the four cases, the most helpful to him is People v. Mays,
2012 IL App (4th) 090840. He argues that, under May, the court had a duty to ask questions such
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as “ ‘What specifically did the police say at the hospital regarding [his] arrest?’ ” We do not read
Mays (or the other cases) to require such questions under the circumstances here, nor do we think
that such questions would have aided the court in determining whether this claim pertained only
to trial strategy.
¶ 43 In Mays, the defendant filed a pro se motion alleging that defense counsel was ineffective
for, among other things, sending the State a letter containing confidential information, which the
State used as a basis for additional charges. Mays, 2012 IL App (4th) 090840, ¶¶ 36-37, 59. The
trial court did not address the motion. Id., ¶ 37. The reviewing court remanded for a hearing under
Krankel. It held that a Krankel inquiry has two steps that must be performed in sequence:
“(1) understanding the defendant’s claims, and (2) evaluating them for possible merit.” Id., ¶ 58.
It reasoned that how the court performs those steps is largely a matter of the court’s common sense;
still, unless the court understands the claims, there can be no evaluation of merit. Id. The Mays
court suggested that, given the facts at issue, the trial court could not evaluate the defendant’s
claim without knowing the letter’s allegedly prejudicial content. Id., ¶ 59.
¶ 44 Given that the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim in Mays was that the letter’s content
spurred additional charges, we can understand why the Mays court believed that the trial court
needed to know that content to evaluate the defendant’s claim. Here there was no similar need for
additional facts. The essence of defendant’s claim was evident: the officers’ abusive conduct at the
hospital showed their animus toward defendant. The court needed no further detail to conclude
that, because the conduct occurred after the events that formed the basis of the charges, the
evidence was of doubtful relevance to the case. Likewise, the court knew enough to conclude that
counsel had, as noted above, a sound strategic explanation for not seeking to present evidence of
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the hospital incident. “[C]ounsel’s strategic choices that are made after investigation of the law
and the facts are virtually unassailable.” Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d at 433.
¶ 45 Second, the court did not need additional information about defendant’s claim that counsel
should have presented evidence of a pattern of police harassment and abuse. There was sufficient
information in defendant’s on-the-record allegations about such a pattern.
¶ 46 For instance, defendant made such allegations at the July 2019 hearing on the State’s
motion to increase defendant’s bond. Part of the basis for the State’s request was that defendant
had allegedly escalated a practice of making unwarranted calls to the Rockford and Cherry Valley
police departments and “yelling and screaming irrationally.” Muraski testified at the hearing,
stating that Cherry Valley police officers had repeatedly been to defendant’s apartment to discuss
the calls and that Muraski himself had been to the apartment for that reason six to eight times in
the preceding two years. He stated that defendant also had a history of making what the police
deemed to be inappropriate nonemergency calls to the police. Muraski was aware that Cherry
Valley police officers had gone to defendant’s apartment to urge him to stop making such calls.
During the hearing, defendant interjected:
“It’s about harassment by Cherry Valley, knocking my neighbor’s door every day asking
them if I know about money. I don’t know what money they talking about. This police
officer just lied next to the State Attorney’s Office. Uh, they would knock on my neighbor’s
door. Uh, I did not threaten my neighbors. They were knocking. I was in my apartment,
and I can hear them knocking my neighbor’s door, African-American, does he know about,
anything about the money. They came here to me several times. Not six, seven times; more
than six, seven times. They were harassing me.”
At the hearing, the trial court commented on its familiarity with defendant’s history with the police.
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¶ 47 In another example, at the March 2, 2020, hearing on the reinstatement of defendant’s
bond, defendant talked about police harassment. During an extended monologue, defendant stated:
“I’m a normal person, Your Honor. I didn’t move to Rockford to be destroyed, my
life to be destroyed. To be look like I’m a criminal, and I’m not. Uh, this is, like I said, this
is eight arrests. Arrest after arrest after arrest. I feel like three different police officers,
stealing my disability. They arresting me with no crime.
Loves Park and Cherry Valley came in together. One of them was a sergeant not
knowing he was a sergeant. Uh, forcing himself into my apartment and arrest me. Uh,
Room 315, and they dismissed that case. Uh, oops, I’m sorry, we made a mistake. But after
they arrest me, destroyed my life, my fingerprints being taken, my pictures being taken as
a criminal and all you say is oops, I’m sorry, we made a mistake?”
¶ 48 Similar information is found in the fitness reports. Defendant told the examining
psychologist that a Cherry Valley police officer had come to his door and asked him what he was
watching. Another time, Cherry Valley police officers arrived in response to a smoke alarm in the
building. Defendant knew that the police had claimed that he was making unwarranted calls to the
police department. When the examiner asked defendant about people in his support system,
defendant answered:
“ ‘There is some of them back home from my country, Iraq. There are some people
from Egypt. I talk to them a little bit louder because they cannot hear me. I cannot hear
them. I have to shout. Next thing I know I open my door and there is two police officers
right front of my door. They have been harassing me. Knocking. My neighbor. There’s a
young girl cross of my fake. Excuse me, face of my door. I don’t know how old is she. In
the 20’s I believe. Twenty two, twenty three. I can hear them, that he sexually harassed
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you. Um, that’s all I can hear. Cherry Valley police officers knocking my neighbor’s door.
Does he know about the money? I’m sittin’ in my apartment and I can hear them. Um, I’m
like, what money? I’ve been hearing that about. Not only here. I’ve been hearin’ it way
back. Does this guy know about the money? I don’t know what money they are talking
about. To this day I have no idea what money.’ ”
¶ 49 Based on the foregoing comments, and similar ones by defendant elsewhere in the record,
we hold that the trial court had adequate knowledge of defendant’s allegations of police harassment
to evaluate his ineffectiveness claim. Thus, the court complied with Krankel. Moreover, it was
reasonable for defense counsel to decide not to raise the issue at trial for fear that the jury would
disbelieve defendant’s allegations and find instead that his paranoia supplied a motive to assault
the officers who were executing his arrest warrant.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.
¶ 52 Affirmed.
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