People v. Young
Opinion
NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 170756-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED NO. 4-17-0756 September 14, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County JOSHU’AH K. YOUNG, ) No. 17CF51 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Heidi N. Ladd, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the State proved defendant guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) counsel did not provide deficient performance by failing to call an expert witness, (3) the trial court did not err in finding no Brady violation, (4) the trial court did not err in admonishing jurors under Rule 431(b), and (5) defendant’s 40-year sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
¶2 In November 2016, the State charged defendant, Joshu’ah K. Young, with three
counts of first degree murder. In July 2017, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder.
In September 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment and a 3-year
term of mandatory supervised release.
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) a witness’s identification of defendant was
unreliable and did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel where the defense strategy was to challenge the witness’s identification but trial counsel failed to call an expert witness to support the defense; (3) the trial
court erred in finding that, although the State failed to tender discoverable material to the
defense, there was no Brady violation because the letter was not material; (4) the court erred in
admonishing the potential jurors under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012);
and (5) defendant received a de facto life sentence without the court finding he was permanently
incorrigible for an offense that occurred when he was a juvenile, in violation of the eighth
amendment. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In November 2016, the State charged defendant with three counts of first degree
murder for the shooting death of Rakim Vineyard. In February 2017, the State filed amended
charges, adding that there was “excluded jurisdiction” pursuant to section 5-130 of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2016)) (“The definition of delinquent minor
under Section 5-120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of the offense
was at least 16 years of age and who is charged with: (i) first degree murder ***.”). The State
also brought a fourth count of first degree murder.
¶6 A. Voir Dire
¶7 In July 2014, the matter proceeded to trial. During jury selection, the trial court
read all Rule 431(b) principles in one list to the prospective jurors by articulating the following
statements. “The Defendant is presumed innocent of the charge against him. Before a
Defendant can be convicted, the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his own behalf. And, if a Defendant does not
testify, it cannot be held against him.” The court then asked each juror, “[D]o you understand
and accept each of those principles?”
-2- ¶8 B. Trial
¶9 During the trial, the jury heard the following evidence relevant to this appeal.
¶ 10 1. Bruce Ramseyer
¶ 11 Bruce Ramseyer testified he was on duty with the Champaign Police Department
on July 19, 2014, and responded to a report of shots fired at approximately 12:30 p.m.
According to Ramseyer, a male in his twenties was found on the sidewalk by 1010 North Sixth
Street with obvious injuries. Ramseyer identified People’s exhibit No. 2 as a satellite image of
the area where the shooting occurred that showed the house at 1007 North Sixth Street was
immediately to the south of 1011 North Sixth Street.
¶ 12 2. Russell Beck
¶ 13 Russell Beck, a Champaign police officer, testified that, on July 19, 2014, he was
called to assist with the crime scene. At the time, Beck had the opportunity to walk around the
scene and note the location of driveways, streets, and houses. In February 2017, Beck returned
to the scene, where the layout of the driveways, sidewalks, houses, and streets appeared to be the
same as it was the day of the shooting. In February 2017, Beck photographed the scene from the
perspective of 1007 North Sixth Street. Beck took photographs from the porch of 1007 North
Sixth Street showing a clear view of the street and sidewalks to the north of the house.
¶ 14 3. Enjole Bowens
¶ 15 Enjole Bowens testified that in July 2014, she lived in a blue house at 1007 North
Sixth Street. On July 19, 2014, at approximately 12:23 p.m., Bowens had just sent her children
inside for lunch and she sat on her front porch waiting for her mother. According to Bowens, she
saw a man walking down the street with “a big old gun.” Bowens testified, “I didn’t think it was
real because I’m like, ain’t know nobody walking down the street with no gun like this.” The
-3- man walked past Bowens and stopped at her neighbor’s driveway. Bowens stated, “Rakim was
standing across the street, and he was talking to some other guys that were at another house on
the corner. And, [defendant] got to my neighbor[’]s driveway and he was, like, ‘you a b***
a*** n***,’ and just started shooting.” According to Bowens, defendant was right by her, but he
did not see her.
¶ 16 Bowens testified defendant “emptied the clip,” turned, and went back down the
street toward Douglas Park in a fast walk. Once defendant was out of sight, Bowens went to the
victim and tried to help him. Bowens stated, “The guys that [the victim] was talking to at the
house came over to me and was, like, [‘]don’t call the police, he dead.[’] ” Bowens called 911
and stayed with the victim until police arrived. Bowens testified she stayed on her porch while
officers taped off and photographed the crime scene. Bowens pointed out her blue house in
photographs of the crime scene and pointed out where she could see herself sitting on the porch
in the photographs. According to Bowens, she had a clear view of what happened. The victim
did not “pull out anything.”
¶ 17 Bowens testified she had seen defendant before. According to Bowens, she
visited her younger brother a few times when he lived in Prairie Green. When Bowens visited
her brother, she saw “all the boys around there hanging out.” Defendant was one of those
persons. Bowens testified defendant’s lips and nose were distinctive features, and defendant had
“perfect lips.” Bowens was confident defendant was the person she saw shoot Vineyard.
According to Bowens, defendant wore a white button up shirt with blue on the sleeve and dark
color jean shorts on the day of the shooting. Bowens testified defendant had a low hightop fade
hairstyle.
-4- ¶ 18 On the day of the shooting, Bowens told officers defendant was in his early 20s
but might be older. Bowens acknowledged she did not tell police she was familiar with the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 170756-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED NO. 4-17-0756 September 14, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County JOSHU’AH K. YOUNG, ) No. 17CF51 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Heidi N. Ladd, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the State proved defendant guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) counsel did not provide deficient performance by failing to call an expert witness, (3) the trial court did not err in finding no Brady violation, (4) the trial court did not err in admonishing jurors under Rule 431(b), and (5) defendant’s 40-year sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
¶2 In November 2016, the State charged defendant, Joshu’ah K. Young, with three
counts of first degree murder. In July 2017, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder.
In September 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment and a 3-year
term of mandatory supervised release.
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) a witness’s identification of defendant was
unreliable and did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel where the defense strategy was to challenge the witness’s identification but trial counsel failed to call an expert witness to support the defense; (3) the trial
court erred in finding that, although the State failed to tender discoverable material to the
defense, there was no Brady violation because the letter was not material; (4) the court erred in
admonishing the potential jurors under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012);
and (5) defendant received a de facto life sentence without the court finding he was permanently
incorrigible for an offense that occurred when he was a juvenile, in violation of the eighth
amendment. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In November 2016, the State charged defendant with three counts of first degree
murder for the shooting death of Rakim Vineyard. In February 2017, the State filed amended
charges, adding that there was “excluded jurisdiction” pursuant to section 5-130 of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2016)) (“The definition of delinquent minor
under Section 5-120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of the offense
was at least 16 years of age and who is charged with: (i) first degree murder ***.”). The State
also brought a fourth count of first degree murder.
¶6 A. Voir Dire
¶7 In July 2014, the matter proceeded to trial. During jury selection, the trial court
read all Rule 431(b) principles in one list to the prospective jurors by articulating the following
statements. “The Defendant is presumed innocent of the charge against him. Before a
Defendant can be convicted, the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his own behalf. And, if a Defendant does not
testify, it cannot be held against him.” The court then asked each juror, “[D]o you understand
and accept each of those principles?”
-2- ¶8 B. Trial
¶9 During the trial, the jury heard the following evidence relevant to this appeal.
¶ 10 1. Bruce Ramseyer
¶ 11 Bruce Ramseyer testified he was on duty with the Champaign Police Department
on July 19, 2014, and responded to a report of shots fired at approximately 12:30 p.m.
According to Ramseyer, a male in his twenties was found on the sidewalk by 1010 North Sixth
Street with obvious injuries. Ramseyer identified People’s exhibit No. 2 as a satellite image of
the area where the shooting occurred that showed the house at 1007 North Sixth Street was
immediately to the south of 1011 North Sixth Street.
¶ 12 2. Russell Beck
¶ 13 Russell Beck, a Champaign police officer, testified that, on July 19, 2014, he was
called to assist with the crime scene. At the time, Beck had the opportunity to walk around the
scene and note the location of driveways, streets, and houses. In February 2017, Beck returned
to the scene, where the layout of the driveways, sidewalks, houses, and streets appeared to be the
same as it was the day of the shooting. In February 2017, Beck photographed the scene from the
perspective of 1007 North Sixth Street. Beck took photographs from the porch of 1007 North
Sixth Street showing a clear view of the street and sidewalks to the north of the house.
¶ 14 3. Enjole Bowens
¶ 15 Enjole Bowens testified that in July 2014, she lived in a blue house at 1007 North
Sixth Street. On July 19, 2014, at approximately 12:23 p.m., Bowens had just sent her children
inside for lunch and she sat on her front porch waiting for her mother. According to Bowens, she
saw a man walking down the street with “a big old gun.” Bowens testified, “I didn’t think it was
real because I’m like, ain’t know nobody walking down the street with no gun like this.” The
-3- man walked past Bowens and stopped at her neighbor’s driveway. Bowens stated, “Rakim was
standing across the street, and he was talking to some other guys that were at another house on
the corner. And, [defendant] got to my neighbor[’]s driveway and he was, like, ‘you a b***
a*** n***,’ and just started shooting.” According to Bowens, defendant was right by her, but he
did not see her.
¶ 16 Bowens testified defendant “emptied the clip,” turned, and went back down the
street toward Douglas Park in a fast walk. Once defendant was out of sight, Bowens went to the
victim and tried to help him. Bowens stated, “The guys that [the victim] was talking to at the
house came over to me and was, like, [‘]don’t call the police, he dead.[’] ” Bowens called 911
and stayed with the victim until police arrived. Bowens testified she stayed on her porch while
officers taped off and photographed the crime scene. Bowens pointed out her blue house in
photographs of the crime scene and pointed out where she could see herself sitting on the porch
in the photographs. According to Bowens, she had a clear view of what happened. The victim
did not “pull out anything.”
¶ 17 Bowens testified she had seen defendant before. According to Bowens, she
visited her younger brother a few times when he lived in Prairie Green. When Bowens visited
her brother, she saw “all the boys around there hanging out.” Defendant was one of those
persons. Bowens testified defendant’s lips and nose were distinctive features, and defendant had
“perfect lips.” Bowens was confident defendant was the person she saw shoot Vineyard.
According to Bowens, defendant wore a white button up shirt with blue on the sleeve and dark
color jean shorts on the day of the shooting. Bowens testified defendant had a low hightop fade
hairstyle.
-4- ¶ 18 On the day of the shooting, Bowens told officers defendant was in his early 20s
but might be older. Bowens acknowledged she did not tell police she was familiar with the
shooter during her conversations with officers that day. Bowens testified, “I was not familiar
with him, like, I didn’t know him. Like, I said, we live in Champaign. Champaign is a small
town, so you see everybody. So, I didn’t know him. I didn’t know his name, nothing.” Bowens
stated she did not know at the time that she had seen defendant before. Approximately one
month after the shooting, Bowens spoke with Detective Patrick Kelly and described the
perpetrator as “young.” Bowens did not inform Kelly that defendant was someone she had seen
before because, at that time, she did not know that she had seen him before. Bowens testified
she did not remember telling another detective that she was unsure if she could identify the
suspect. Bowens was not shown a photo line-up of suspects.
¶ 19 Bowens met with Kelly a second time in 2016. During the second meeting,
Bowens told Kelly defendant was someone she had seen before but she did not know his name.
Bowens described the shooter as “a young, light skinned guy,” which was the “[s]ame
description [she] gave the day that it happened.” Bowens testified, “I did talk about his lips
because that was, like, one of the features that I really remembered, yes. It was his lips.”
Bowens testified she had previously seen defendant around town in Urbana and Prairie Green
before the shooting. According to Bowens, she also told Kelly that she saw defendant on
Facebook after the shooting.
¶ 20 Bowens met with Kelly a third time in 2017. Bowens did not know if the third
meeting took place after defendant had been arrested. According to Bowens, Kelly brought up
defendant’s name during the third meeting. Bowens had a conversation with Detective Jeremiah
Christian in January 2017. Defense counsel asked Bowens if she referred to a conversation she
-5- had with someone about the summer of 2014 where she stated, “I don’t know Josh.” Bowens
responded, “I don’t know, but I don’t know him. I’m not friends with him. I don’t know Josh.”
Bowens testified that to “know” someone “you have talk[ed] to them, *** worked with the
person, been around this person.” According to Bowens, “knowing” someone was different from
having seen someone but not having talked to the person. Bowens testified she was 100%
positive defendant was the person she saw shoot Vineyard. Bowens acknowledged defendant
was facing away from her while he fired the gun, but she testified she was focused on defendant
as he walked away past her house because she did not know if defendant saw her sitting on her
porch. Bowens shifted her attention to the victim once defendant left.
¶ 21 4. Patrick Kelly
¶ 22 Detective Patrick Kelly testified he investigated the shooting death of Vineyard.
Kelly attended Vineyard’s autopsy where two projectiles were removed from the victim’s body.
Kelly sent four spent bullets and eight Federal .40-caliber shell casings for testing at the Illinois
State Police Forensic Science Laboratory. According to Kelly, the spent bullets and shell casings
were tested to determine whether they were fired from the same weapon based on identifiable
striations. Kelly did not have the bullets and casings tested for fingerprints or DNA. Kelly
testified DNA testing was not requested because the high heat generated from firing the weapon
destroyed any DNA on the bullets and the projectiles recovered from the victim would only have
the victim’s DNA.
¶ 23 5. Shiping Bao
¶ 24 Dr. Shiping Bao, an independent forensic pathologist, conducted the autopsy on
Vineyard’s body. Dr. Bao testified Vineyard was shot five times and one bullet perforated his
aorta. According to Dr. Bao, the perforation of the aorta was a fatal wound. Dr. Bao recovered
-6- the bullet “under the skin of the left lateral epi.” Dr. Bao testified there was no stippling or soot
on the victim’s body so Dr. Bao could not determine how far away the shooter was.
¶ 25 6. Jonte Powell
¶ 26 Jonte Powell testified his cousin was best friends with defendant. Powell
acknowledged he was currently serving a prison sentence for unlawful possession with intent to
deliver a controlled substance in Champaign County case No. 14-CF-1035. Powell also had a
prior conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in
Champaign County case No. 13-CF-638. Powell signed an agreement with the State Attorney’s
office where Powell promised to tell the truth about the events of the day of the shooting and, in
exchange, the State would not file any criminal charges against him regarding his involvement or
knowledge of the death of Vineyard.
¶ 27 On the day of the shooting, Powell was at his home with defendant, Paradise
Williams, and two females when he received a call from someone who wanted heroin.
According to Powell, defendant asked if he could go with Powell and the two females asked
Powell to drop them off at their house. Powell testified, “But when we got in the car,
[defendant] got in on the passenger side and we went to drop the females, we went to drop the
females off. *** And after that, I went to go drop the dope off, and as I’m dropping the dope
off, [defendant] was, like, [‘]man, let me see your phone,[’] he started texting somebody.”
According to Powell, defendant then told Powell to “pull up at Shamario[’s] crib.” Defendant
went into Shamario’s house and the two men returned to the car. Defendant asked Powell to take
him to Sixth Street “to make a hit,” which Powell understood to mean a drug transaction.
¶ 28 Powell parked his car on Eureka Street, just west of Sixth Street and facing
toward Fifth Street. Defendant exited the vehicle and began walking down Sixth Street. Powell
-7- testified he could not see defendant after he turned the corner and walked down Sixth Street.
Approximately four or five minutes later, defendant knocked on the passenger door. Powell
testified, “I opened the door, and he, like—he like, [‘]go, go, go, go, they shooting.[’] And then
I’m like, I tell him, [‘]like man, what’s going on.[’] He like, [‘]they got to blowing at me so I got
to blowing back.[’] ” Powell testified defendant had a black automatic firearm with him when he
returned to the vehicle. According to Powell, he took back streets at Shamario’s suggestion and
Shamario asked to be dropped off at an auction his father was attending. Before Shamario left
the vehicle, he asked defendant to give him the gun. Shamario took the black automatic from
defendant and left. According to Powell, defendant lived right next door to Powell, so Powell
drove home.
¶ 29 When they returned home, defendant went to his house and Powell and Paradise
went to Powell’s house. Approximately half an hour later, Powell learned that Vineyard had
been shot and killed. Powell testified,
“I went, I—as soon as I found out, I went next door, and
I—I tell [defendant], I’m like, [‘]man, I hope you ain’t shoot
Rakim, bro,[’] he—man, he like, [‘]bro, they got to blowing at me
so I got to blowing back.[’] *** I say, man, bro, I’m like, [‘]I
ain’t going down for nobody murder, bro.[’] He’s like *** [‘]man,
calm down. If them people come get us, bro, I’m going to take my
weight,[’] and he was, like, [‘]let me find out the mother f****r
telling, you next,[’] and I just left it at that.”
-8- Powell testified he had not spoken to defendant since the incident. Powell identified his vehicle,
a gold “2000 Crown Vic,” in surveillance videos showing his vehicle traveling on Fifth Street
and Eureka Street between 12:19 p.m. and 12:23 p.m. on the day of the shooting.
¶ 30 One video shows a gold car traveling north on Fifth Street. The second video
shows a similar car traveling east on Eureka Street. The vehicle stops, a figure walks away from
the car, and the car turns around to face the other way. A short time later, a figure runs toward
the car and the car drives toward Fifth Street. The surveillance footage then showed a gold car
traveling south on Fifth Street.
¶ 31 Powell denied having a conversation with Shaundrell Brown about the shooting.
Powell acknowledged the surveillance video did not depict anything unique to his car, but
Powell stated he knew what happened that day and knew it was his car. Powell testified police
officers attempted to speak with him about the shooting on multiple occasions but Powell
invoked his right to an attorney. In November 2016, police officers visited Powell at the Big
Muddy Correctional Center and offered Powell immunity for his involvement on the day in
question. The agreement required Powell to provide truthful testimony. Powell testified he did
not speak with police earlier because of the threat defendant made when Powell confronted him
about Vineyard’s murder on the day in question.
¶ 32 7. Nathan Mixon
¶ 33 Nathan Mixon testified he previously lived in Champaign County and came to
know defendant. Mixon was currently in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.
Mixon acknowledged the following criminal convictions: residential burglary in Champaign
County case No. 16-CF-1399, obstructing justice in La Salle County case No. 13-CF-242, and
burglary in Champaign County case No. 10-CF-552. On the day of the shooting, Mixon was in
-9- Chicago but subsequently had a conversation that caused him to gain some knowledge about the
shooting. In April 2017, Mixon was presented with a cooperation agreement that stated the State
would not charge Mixon for his involvement in or knowledge of the death of Vineyard or for his
involvement in an unrelated residential burglary in exchange for Mixon’s truthful statement
regarding the shooting.
¶ 34 In February 2015, Mixon had a face-to-face interaction with defendant in his
room they used to record rap sessions. Prior to the February 2015 conversation, defendant’s
house had been shot up. Mixon asked defendant why someone was shooting at his house.
According to Mixon, defendant “said that they shooting at the house because he shot up Rakim.”
¶ 35 8. Kemion Dorris
¶ 36 Kemion Dorris testified he was currently imprisoned for a burglary conviction in
Champaign County case No. 16-CF-226. Dorris was previously adjudicated a delinquent minor
for the offense of criminal damage to property in Champaign County case No. 14-JD-213 and for
the offense of robbery in Champaign County case No. 13-JD-123. In 2015, Dorris was
incarcerated in the Harrisburg Juvenile Department of Corrections with defendant. Dorris
testified he spoke with defendant about Vineyard’s death. Defendant told Dorris he pulled up
with Powell and saw Vineyard on a porch. According to Dorris, defendant said he called
Vineyard by name and defendant “emptied his clip” on Vineyard. Dorris was not promised
anything in exchange for his testimony. Dorris testified Courian Atkins was present during his
conversation with defendant.
¶ 37 9. Courian Atkins
¶ 38 Courian Atkins testified he was currently incarcerated following his conviction of
possession of a firearm by a gang member. Atkins stated he was at the Harrisburg Youth
- 10 - Correctional facility at the same time as Dorris and defendant. According to Atkins, he was
never in the presence of defendant and Dorris at the same time. Atkins testified he never heard
defendant say he killed Vineyard.
¶ 39 10. Shaundrell Brown
¶ 40 Shaundrell Brown testified he was adjudicated a delinquent in 2010 for criminal
damage to property and in 2011 for aggravated battery. Brown testified he was also convicted of
possession of a controlled substance in 2013 and 2014, and he was recently convicted of
possession of a controlled substance and was awaiting sentencing. Brown testified Powell was
his cousin and best friend and the two were held in the Champaign County jail at the same time
in 2014. According to Brown, he had a conversation with Powell about Vineyard’s murder
where Powell made the following statements: (1) “I’m not about to go to jail over what
happened,” (2) “if n*** come at me, I’m going to say that [defendant] did it,” (3) “[defendant]
owes me money for heroin,” and (4) “I don’t give no f*** if [defendant] didn’t do it, f*** him.”
¶ 41 Brown testified he had multiple convictions for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance. In 2013 and 2014, Brown occasionally used heroin and he was currently
awaiting sentencing on a case involving heroin. Brown testified that, during the previous five
years, he had periods where he did not use heroin, but when he did use heroin, he “use[d] it
sometimes every day.”
¶ 42 11. Verdict
¶ 43 Following closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury reached a verdict.
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The jury further found the allegation that
defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused death to another person was proven.
¶ 44 C. Posttrial Motion
- 11 - ¶ 45 In August 2017, defense counsel filed a motion for acquittal or in the alternative a
motion for a new trial. In part, the motion alleged defendant was denied a fair trial because the
State was in possession of exculpatory evidence that it failed to disclose to the defense. The
evidence the State allegedly withheld was a letter from Takario Green, a defendant in an
unrelated murder case. In the letter, Green recounted a conversation he had with Oshea Cotton
in Georgia. During the conversation, “Cotton t[old] Takario Green that he, Cotton, fled to
Georgia from Champaign because ‘ “KO” killed a guy named Rakim, his name Rockie.’ ” “KO”
was the street name of Anthony Fowler, an individual who “was described by witnesses as
someone who had had a physical confrontation with victim Rakim Vineyard at the High Drive
Club in Champaign, in the time period leading up to Rakim Vineyard’s murder.”
¶ 46 Following a hearing on the posttrial motion, the trial court noted the State
conceded the letter was within its possession and it should have been disclosed to the defense.
The court further noted “that it was an inadvertent violation of the Brady material requirements,
but it was a violation not to turn that over.” The court then considered whether the letter was
material and stated as follows:
“The description of that letter is someone else confessing to
a murder, is certainly overstated. What was contained in that letter
was one sentence, in several pages, that referred the fact that
O’Shay Cotton had told Green, the author of the letter, that O’Shay
Cotton had moved to Georgia because someone identified as KO
killed a guy name[d] Rakeem, R-a-k-e-e-m, dash, his name,
Rakim, R-a-k-i-m. That was the extent of the material that was not
turned over that’s relevant to this analysis and relevant to this case.
- 12 - It's hardly a confession. It’s certainly a suggestion or
implication that there was hearsay from Mr. Cotton as to his
theory, beliefs, speculation or repeating other hearsay, that
someone named KO had killed a guy name[d] Rakim. There was
then—has been certainly evidence that KO is a nickname for
Anthony Fowler, and I don’t believe that’s being disputed.
The [d]efendant has not demonstrated how not having that
information prejudiced him in any way. We had multiple pretrial
motions that demonstrated multiple people in the community were
making statements and discussing the shootings, and speculating,
theorizing or engaging in conversations about who may have been
responsible for those shootings. There’s nothing in this letter
that’s other than speculation predicated on hearsay that then was
communicated to Mr. Green.”
The court further found defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different or that the guilty verdict would be undermined or
questioned as to its soundness. The court also noted the lack of testimony to suggest that Cotton
could testify to anything other than his opinion, speculation, and hearsay or that Fowler admitted
to anything or made any incriminating statements.
¶ 47 The trial court further noted Cotton was made available to both parties as a
witness and named as a witness by the State. The State tendered a statement from Cotton
identifying defendant as the shooter. The court finally found that “any suggestion that this may
have been useful as impeachment evidence for Mr. Cotton is now eviscerated by the fact he was
- 13 - never called as a witness.” The court concluded that although there was a technical discovery
violation, it had no import on the outcome of the proceedings.
¶ 48 D. Sentencing
¶ 49 Prior to sentencing, defense counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of
defendant’s juvenile cases. These files showed defendant was committed to juvenile detention
numerous times in Champaign County case Nos. 11-JD-168, 12-JD-174, 12-JD-225, 13-JD-106,
14-JD-137, 15-JD-46, and 15-JD-138. When defendant was 13 years old, he was diagnosed with
several mental health and behavioral issues, including a mood disorder, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and a past diagnosis of posttraumatic stress
disorder.
¶ 50 At the sentencing hearing, the State called Detective Dustin Sumption, who
testified that as part of the investigation into the shooting, he discovered a bullet from the
shooting entered a home and grazed a 14-year-old boy’s thigh. Ryan Snyder, the Lieutenant of
Operations for the Champaign County Sheriff’s Office, testified about several disciplinary
incidents while defendant was in the Champaign County correctional center. The disciplinary
incidents included yelling at a correctional officer, engaging in a verbal argument with another
inmate and throwing suspected urine at the inmate, and flooding his cell. The incidents also
include several instances where defendant “refused housing.”
¶ 51 Matthew McCallister, a correctional officer with the Champaign County Sheriff’s
Office, testified that after the verdict was issued, defendant turned to the victim’s family “and
stuck both middle fingers up.” According to McCallister, defendant also mouthed “f*** you”
toward the victim’s family. Detective Christian testified about a telephone call defendant made
after he was convicted, and the State admitted the recording into evidence. According to
- 14 - Detective Christian, he found the call noteworthy for the following reasons: “There was a portion
of the conversation where [defendant] started talking about his possibility of an appeal process.
Then he continued on and mentioned, he can come back, the person he referred to as ‘dude’
could not come back because he was in the dirt.” The victim’s grandmother read a victim impact
statement.
¶ 52 The trial court stated it considered the presentence investigation report, the
evidence at trial and at sentencing, and the relevant statutory factors, “including but not limited
to, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the evidence and applicable factors in
aggravation and mitigation, the character, history and rehabilitative potential of the [d]efendant,
and the arguments and recommendations of counsel.” The court noted defendant was 16 years
and 10 months old when he committed the offense. Although defendant refused to fill out a
social history form or be interviewed about any topic, the court carefully reviewed the juvenile
files and found defendant grew up with his mother and three siblings. Defendant was not close
with his father, who appeared to be “the victim of one of the violent assaults as referred to in
some of the reports in the juvenile matters.”
¶ 53 The trial court noted defendant was detained 11 times as a juvenile, putting him
“on notice that the choices he was making and the conduct he was choosing to engage in and
repeat were taking his life down the wrong path.” Defendant generally behaved while in the
juvenile detention center, indicating he could understand and follow the rules when it served his
purpose. The court further considered defendant’s mental health and substance abuse issues.
Defendant was adjudicated a delinquent minor three times and provided with multiple services,
including counseling and substance-abuse treatment. The court stated as follows: “[Defendant]
does present a history of two and a half years of involvement with the Juvenile Justice system.
- 15 - Multiple cases. Multiple opportunities to deal with his problems. Supportive services. People
who were trying to assist him in re-directing his life. He did not utilize those opportunities, over
and over.”
¶ 54 The trial court specifically noted it must consider special sentencing factors
because defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense, including the diminished culpability
and greater prospects for reform that young people offer. The court noted it was “prohibited
from imposing de facto life sentences defined as sentences of such a length that the [d]efendant
has no reasonable expectation of parole.” The court stated as follows:
“I wanted to make it clear this [c]ourt has evaluated all of
those factors, giving them careful consideration, as I must,
including the [d]efendant’s life, his history, his family life, and I—
as much as that is available to this [c]ourt. I’ve considered his
diminished capacity. I’ve considered the fact he was sixteen years,
ten months old. I have considered the fact that minors are
immature, can be irresponsible, reckless, impulsive and vulnerable
to negative influences. And as the [c]ourts have observed, can lack
control over their environment.”
The court discussed case law regarding what constituted a de facto life sentence for a minor,
including cases that drew a bright line and cases that instead determined that all the factors must
be weighed. The court determined it must be mindful of all the factors and give each due
consideration. The court addressed the factors at great length and in great detail, and the court
determined the appropriate sentence was 40 years’ imprisonment followed by a 3-year term of
mandatory supervised release (MSR). This appeal followed.
- 16 - ¶ 55 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 56 On appeal, defendant argues (1) Bowens’s identification of defendant was
unreliable and did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel where the defense strategy was to challenge the witness’s
identification but trial counsel failed to call an expert witness to support the defense; (3) the trial
court erred in finding that, although the State failed to tender discoverable material to the
defense, there was no Brady violation because the letter was not material; (4) the court erred in
admonishing the potential jurors under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012);
and (5) defendant received a de facto life sentence without the court finding that he was
permanently incorrigible for an offense that occurred when he was a juvenile, in violation of the
eighth amendment. We turn first to Bowens’s identification of defendant.
¶ 57 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 58 Defendant first argues Bowens’s identification of him was unreliable and did not
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 59 A defendant may only be convicted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is charged. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we
do not retry the defendant. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242, 860 N.E.2d 178, 217
(2006). Instead, we must resolve “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d
237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
We allow all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. People v.
- 17 - Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 944 N.E.2d 319, 323 (2011). We reverse only where the evidence
is so unsatisfactory, unreasonable, or improbable that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004).
¶ 60 “A positive identification by a single eyewitness who had ample opportunity to
observe is sufficient to support a conviction.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 870
N.E.2d 403, 411 (2007). It is the province of the finder of fact to determine the credibility of a
witness and the finding is entitled to great weight. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 542, 708
N.E.2d 365, 370 (1999). Although the trier of fact is afforded great deference, a jury’s
determination of the evidence is not binding or conclusive. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d
274, 280, 818 N.E.2d 304, 308 (2004). “[W]here the finding of guilt depends on eyewitness
testimony, a reviewing court must decide whether, in light of the record, a fact finder could
reasonably accept the testimony as true beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 279. Eyewitness
testimony may be found insufficient, “but only where the record evidence compels the
conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 280.
¶ 61 “To determine the reliability of eyewitness identifications, we look to the totality
of the circumstances and consider five factors: (1) the witness’s opportunity to observe the
offender at the scene, (2) the witness’s level of attention at the time of the crime, (3) the accuracy
of prior descriptions, (4) the witness’s level of certainty at the identification confrontation, and
(5) the time between the crime and confrontation.” People v. Luellen, 2019 IL App (1st) 172019,
¶ 59, 145 N.E.3d 623. Illinois courts apply an additional sixth factor: acquaintance with the
offender before the crime. Id.
¶ 62 In this case, the jury was instructed to consider the first five factors outlined
above. These factors, taken as a whole, support the reliability of Bowens’s identification of
- 18 - defendant. Bowens observed the shooting from her front porch during the daytime. She had a
clear and unobstructed view of the sidewalk and her neighbor’s driveway, as shown in the
photographs taken from her porch. Bowens’s attention was drawn by the fact that defendant
carried a large gun in his hand. Although Bowens thought the gun was fake at first, she testified
her attention was focused on defendant throughout the shooting.
¶ 63 At trial, Bowens testified defendant’s lips and nose were distinctive features, and
defendant had “perfect lips.” Bowens was confident that defendant was the person she saw shoot
Vineyard. According to Bowens, defendant wore a white button up shirt with blue on the sleeve
and dark color jean shorts on the day of the shooting. Bowens testified defendant had a low
hightop fade hairstyle. The day of the shooting, Bowens described the shooter to a police officer
“as a black male with light skin tone, approximately 5’9”, skinny, white shirt with a blue stripe
going down the side, dark denim jean shorts and a box style fade haircut.” The description given
on the day of the shooting supports both that Bowens had ample opportunity to observe the
shooter and her high level of attention.
¶ 64 Defendant argues Bowens’s identification of defendant is unreliable because her
description was too generic. Bowens’s description was more specific than descriptions deemed
“generic.” People v. Simmons, 2016 IL App (1st) 131300, ¶¶ 49, 95, 66 N.E.3d 360 (finding “a
male black,” “a male black with a clean look, clean hair,” and “a female black [with] long hair”
generic descriptions). Bowens described the shooter as more than “a male black.” Bowens
described the shooter’s height, body type, clothing, and hairstyle. Although Bowens provided
additional details during her testimony, such as describing defendant’s lips, than she did in prior
descriptions of defendant, that sort of arguable inconsistency is a matter for the trier of fact to
sort out and defense counsel questioned Bowens extensively as to these arguable inconsistencies.
- 19 - “The weight to be given the witnesses’ testimony, the credibility of the witnesses, resolution of
inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
testimony are the responsibility of the trier of fact.” Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 242.
¶ 65 As to the fourth factor, Bowens testified she was 100% certain defendant was the
shooter and had confidence in her identification. Defendant does not argue this factor weighs
against the State. Accordingly, we find Bowens’s confidence in her identification supports the
reliability of her testimony.
¶ 66 Finally, defendant argues Bowens failed to identify defendant until two years after
the shooting and only after she saw his picture on Facebook and in newspapers despite a prior
acquaintance with him. The length of time between the crime and Bowens’s identification of
defendant does not necessarily weigh against the reliability of her identification. “The lapse of
time goes only to the weight of the testimony, a question for the jury, and does not destroy the
witness’s credibility.” People v. Rodgers, 53 Ill. 2d 207, 214, 290 N.E.2d 251, 255 (1972)
(finding a two year lapse of time before identification did not render the identification
unreliable). Additionally, Bowens testified she recognized the shooter’s face in a photograph on
Facebook and later realized she had seen him before. Defendant argues this renders her
identification unreliable. However, defense counsel rigorously cross-examined Bowens on this
point and the resolution of any conflicts or inconsistencies in her testimony was a matter for the
jury. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 242.
¶ 67 Even if Bowens’s identification was unreliable, there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction. Powell testified defendant was in his car the day of the shooting and asked
him to stop the car less than a block from where the shooting occurred. According to Powell,
defendant exited the vehicle and walked up the block of Sixth Street where the shooting
- 20 - occurred. Defendant returned a short time later, holding a black firearm and telling Powell to
“go, go, go, go” because of the shooting. Powell testified defendant told him “they got to
blowing at me so I got to blowing back.” And when Powell learned of Vineyard’s death and
confronted defendant, defendant again said they got to “blowing” at him, so he had to “blow”
back. Powell’s testimony was partially corroborated by the surveillance video showing his gold
vehicle in the vicinity of the shooting. Moreover, Mixon and Dorris also testified that defendant
admitted to shooting Vineyard.
¶ 68 Defendant argues this additional evidence of defendant’s guilt was impeached.
However, the jury was fully apprised of the witnesses’ prior convictions and of Powell’s and
Mixon’s immunity agreements with the State. The jury also heard Atkins’s testimony that
conflicted with Dorris’s testimony. People v. Wheeler, 401 Ill. App. 3d 304, 312, 929 N.E.2d 99,
106 (2010) (“The jury was aware of all of the evidence used to impeach the witnesses, and it was
its duty to assess the witnesses’ credibility in light of those impeaching factors.”). The evidence,
even without Bowens’ testimony was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to
justify reversal of the jury’s determination that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
¶ 69 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 70 Defendant next asserts his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
where the defense strategy was to challenge Bowens’s identification, but trial counsel failed to
call an expert witness to support the defense. The State contends counsel’s performance was not
deficient.
¶ 71 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the familiar
framework set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “To prevail on a claim of
- 21 - ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” People v. Domagala,
2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36, 987 N.E.2d 767. The deficient-performance prong requires a defendant to
show that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional
norms. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30, 89 N.E.3d 366. The prejudice prong requires a
showing that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Id. A defendant must satisfy both prongs to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under a
bifurcated standard of review. People v. Nowicki, 385 Ill. App. 3d 53, 81, 894 N.E.2d 896, 897
(2008). We defer to the trier of fact unless the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of
the evidence, but we review the ultimate legal conclusion of whether counsel’s actions support a
claim of ineffective assistance de novo. Id.
¶ 72 Illinois courts “have previously held that defense counsel’s decision to call or not
to call witnesses is presumed to be a tactical choice which will not support an ineffectiveness
claim.” Id. at 84. Matters of trial strategy are generally immune from claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432, 719 N.E.2d 664, 673 (1999).
“Moreover, a mistake in trial strategy or an error in judgment by defense counsel will not alone
render representation constitutionally defective.” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80, 106
N.E.3d 944. “Only if counsel’s trial strategy is so unsound that he entirely fails to conduct
meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case will ineffective assistance of counsel be
found.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 355-56, 864 N.E.2d 196, 222 (2007).
¶ 73 Here, defense counsel’s trial strategy was not so unsound that he failed to conduct
meaningful testing of the State’s case. Nor was his strategy so irrational that no reasonably
- 22 - effective counsel in similar circumstances would use that strategy. People v. Macklin, 2019 IL
App (1st) 161165, ¶ 36, 125 N.E.3d 1246. Counsel might have decided against calling an expert
witness because the State would have called its own expert witness to bolster the accuracy of the
eyewitness identification. People v. Hamilton, 361 Ill. App. 3d 836, 847, 838 N.E.2d 160, 170
(2005) (“Counsel’s failure to call an expert witness is not per se ineffective assistance, even
where doing so may have made the defendant’s case stronger, because the State could always
call its own witness to offer a contrasting opinion.”).
¶ 74 Moreover, in resolving issues related to counsel’s performance, reviewing courts
must consider the totality of counsel’s conduct, not just an isolated incident. Id. Here, defense
counsel rigorously cross-examined all the witnesses, called a number of witnesses to impeach
Bowens’s testimony, and thoroughly argued the issue of identification. Defense counsel argued
the factors the jury was to consider when evaluating identification testimony and called into
question Bowens’s certainty.
¶ 75 Defendant relies on People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, 47 N.E.3d 985. In Lerma,
the Illinois Supreme Court found a trial court abused its discretion in excluding a defense expert
witness on the reliability of eyewitness identification. Id. ¶ 26. In that case, the only evidence
against the defendant was identification by two eyewitnesses, one of whom did not testify and,
thus, was not subject to cross-examination. Id. The supreme court acknowledged “expert
eyewitness testimony is both relevant and appropriate.” Id. The supreme court found an abuse of
discretion where the trial court denied the defendant’s request to present relevant and probative
testimony from an expert witness. Id. ¶ 32.
- 23 - ¶ 76 Although the supreme court acknowledged that expert testimony on the reliability
of eyewitness identification was “relevant and appropriate,” we find defendant’s reliance on
Lerma misplaced.
“[T]he issue in Lerma—whether the trial court abused its
discretion in rejecting proffered expert testimony—is manifestly
different than the issue presented here, i.e., whether defense
counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable
standard based on the failure to call an expert witness at trial. The
finding that ‘research concerning eyewitness identification[ ] ***
is well settled, well supported, and in appropriate cases a perfectly
proper subject for expert testimony’ [citation] does not, standing
alone, support the conclusion that trial counsel here was per se
ineffective for not presenting such expert testimony or that expert
testimony is required in every case.” Macklin, 2019 IL App (1st)
161165, ¶ 39.
The Macklin court went on to explain that counsel may well choose not to call an expert witness
to avoid “a counterdesignation by the State, which would highlight and bolster the accuracy of
the eyewitness identification.” Id.
¶ 77 Here, counsel rigorously cross-examined Bowens, presented impeachment
evidence, and zealously argued the reliability of Bowens’s identification, refuting the argument
that defense counsel failed to conduct meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case. As
such, we conclude defendant has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s decision not to call an
expert witness—a matter of trial strategy—constituted deficient representation.
- 24 - ¶ 78 C. Discovery Violation
¶ 79 Next, defendant argues the trial court erred in finding that, although the State
failed to tender discoverable material to the defense, there was no violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the letter was not material.
¶ 80 “A Brady claim requires a showing that: (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable
to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by
the State either wilfully or inadvertently; and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the
evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73-74, 890
N.E.2d 500, 510 (2008). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 74. A
“reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
¶ 81 Defendant contends our review of this issue is de novo because the facts giving
rise to discovery violation are not in dispute. In support, defendant relies on People v. Lovejoy,
235 Ill. 2d 97, 919 N.E.2d 843 (2009). In Lovejoy, the parties did not dispute that an expert
failed to include a finding that a test produced a false negative and did not state her reason for the
negative test in her report. The supreme court concluded the issue was a question of law subject
to de novo review. Id. at 118. We note Lovejoy involved a discovery violation under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 412 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001). The State contends the supreme court applied a
manifest weight standard of review in Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 72-73. Indeed, the Beaman court
addressed the standard of review as follows:
“The circuit court heard testimony on the Brady claim at
the evidentiary hearing and found that the evidence on Doe as a
- 25 - viable suspect was remote and speculative. In making that
determination, the circuit court was required to weigh the
evidence. Additionally, the assessment of materiality under Brady
involves weighing the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the
verdict. [Citation.] Accordingly, the Brady claim does not present
a pure question of law. Rather, it requires applying established law
to the facts, including those elicited at the evidentiary hearing. In
these circumstances, we review the circuit court’s decision for
manifest error. [Citation.] Manifest error is error that is ‘clearly
evident, plain, and indisputable.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Morgan,
212 Ill. 2d 148, 155, 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004)).
The trial court in this case did not hear testimony on the Brady violation, but it did weigh the
impact of the undisclosed evidence on the verdict. We need not resolve this dispute, because we
conclude the court did not err under either standard of review.
¶ 82 Here, defendant argues the State’s failure to disclose a four-page letter from
Green to the Champaign County State’s Attorney was a Brady violation. Defendant argues the
letter was material because disclosure could have allowed counsel to (1) investigate an alternate
suspect and (2) show the police conducted an inadequate investigation. The State argues
defendant has forfeited this second argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. We agree.
The record shows counsel clearly only argued the letter’s materiality as to the possibility of
defense counsel investigating and presenting evidence of an alternate suspect. We therefore turn
to defendant’s argument that the letter was material evidence he could have used to investigate
- 26 - an alternate suspect and, had it been disclosed, there was a reasonable probability the result of
the proceedings would have been different.
¶ 83 First, we note the trial court found the State clearly failed to disclose this letter.
The State does not dispute this point and we accept the trial court’s conclusion that there was a
failure to disclose the letter. The letter contained a single line indicating that Cotton told Green
he moved to Georgia because “KO” killed a person named “Rakeem.” As the trial court noted,
the letter was not a confession. The letter constituted hearsay about who Cotton thought killed a
person named “Rakeem.” Further, nothing in the letter indicated its disclosure would have led to
the discovery of admissible evidence. It was undisputed that “KO” was a nickname for Anthony
Fowler, a person defendant was aware of. Indeed, defendant disclosed his intent to present an
alibi defense that he was with Fowler at the time of the shooting and Fowler’s name was
“mentioned all over the reports.” Moreover, defendant notes the State disclosed evidence of a
prior altercation between defendant, Fowler, and Vineyard, which gave Fowler motive and
defense counsel reason to investigate Fowler as an alternate suspect.
¶ 84 Additionally, Cotton was listed as a witness by the State, he was made available
to both parties, and the State tendered a statement from Cotton identifying defendant as the
shooter. The letter did not indicate Cotton could testify to anything other than his own opinion,
speculation, and hearsay. Although the letter indicated “KO” killed someone named “Rakeem,”
it is sheer speculation that its disclosure would have led to the discovery of admissible evidence
to present Fowler as an alternative suspect or to attack the police investigation, particularly in
light of the fact that Fowler’s name was all over the reports and defendant was aware of Fowler’s
prior fight with Vineyard. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err when it determined
- 27 - that defendant failed to demonstrate the undisclosed letter prejudiced him where the letter was
not material to guilt or punishment. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 73-74.
¶ 85 D. Rule 431(b)
¶ 86 Defendant next contends the trial court violated Rule 431(b) by collapsing the
four essential, yet separate principles of Rule 431(b), and failing to adequately ensure that each
juror understood and accepted each principle as required under Rule 431(b). Defendant failed to
raise this issue before the trial court, thus rendering the issue forfeited. People v. Kitch, 239 Ill.
2d 452, 460-61, 942 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (2011). However, we may consider a forfeited claim
where the defendant demonstrates a plain error occurred. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).
To prevail under the plain-error doctrine, a defendant must first demonstrate a clear or obvious
error occurred. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. If an error occurred, we will only reverse where
(1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice
against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error” or (2) the “error is so serious
that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial
process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” Id. In considering whether the court
committed a clear and obvious error with respect to its compliance with Rule 431(b), our review
is de novo. People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 41, 23 N.E.3d 325.
¶ 87 Under Rule 431(b),
“The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in
a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following
principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the
charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be
convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a
- 28 - reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any
evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does
not testify it cannot be held against him or her; however, no
inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant’s
decision not to testify when the defendant objects.
The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an
opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the
principles set out in this section.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1,
2012).
¶ 88 We first consider whether the trial court erred by asking about the four principles
in compound form. In this case, during jury selection, the trial court read all Rule 431(b)
principles in one list to the prospective jurors by articulating the following statements:
“The Defendant is presumed innocent of the charge against him.
Before a Defendant can be convicted, the State must prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not required
to offer any evidence on his own behalf. And, if a Defendant does
not testify, it cannot be held against him.”
The court then asked each juror, “do you understand and accept each of those principles?” The
record indicates the jurors answered in the affirmative.
¶ 89 In People v. Willhite, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1191, 927 N.E.2d 1265 (2010), this court
considered whether the trial court violated Rule 431(b). This court held the trial court did not
violate Rule 431(b) by asking the jurors if they understood the four principles in compound form.
Id. at 1196-97. This court concluded the plain language of Rule 431(b) does not require separate
- 29 - questions of the jurors about each individual principle. Id. “Nor does the rule require separate,
individual answers from each juror.” Id. at 1197.
¶ 90 Defendant relies on People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 939 N.E.2d 403 (2010),
in support of his argument. In Thompson, the supreme court found the trial court failed to
comply with Rule 431(b), noting it entirely failed to address one of the four principles and did
not ask the jurors if they both understood and accepted another principle. Id. at 607. The
supreme court pointed out that Rule 431(b) requires the trial court to “address each of the
enumerated principles” and to determine whether the jurors understood and accepted each of the
principles. Id. In so holding, the supreme court noted the committee comments to the rule
“emphasize that trial courts may not simply give ‘a broad statement of the applicable law
followed by a general question concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the law.’ ” Id.
(quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 431, Committee Comments (eff. May 1, 1997). The court further held the
rule required a specific question and response process, but the questioning may be performed
individually or in groups so long as there was an opportunity for a response from each juror. Id.
¶ 91 Nothing in Thompson requires the circuit court to address each principle
individually. Rather, Thompson was concerned with the court’s failure to address one principle
entirely and to determine the jurors’ acceptance of another principle. Moreover, the plain
language of Rule 431(b) contains no requirement that the court must recite each principle
separately when determining the jurors’ understanding and acceptance of the principles.
¶ 92 We are not persuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. McCovins, 2011 IL
App (1st) 081805, 957 N.E.2d 1194. First, to the extent this case interprets Thompson as
requiring a trial court to question jurors about each principle individually, we disagree for the
reasons discussed above. Second, McCovins is clearly distinguishable from this case. See id.
- 30 - ¶ 36 (“[T]he trial court failed to abide by the mandatory question and response process required
by Rule 431(b). In contravention of Rule 431(b), the trial court merely provided the prospective
jurors with a broad statement of legal principles interspersed with commentary on courtroom
procedure and the trial schedule, and then concluded with a general question about the potential
jurors’ willingness to follow the law.”).
¶ 93 Here, the trial court properly addressed each principle and provided each juror an
opportunity to express whether they understood and accepted each principle. For the foregoing
reasons, we conclude the court did not err by asking about the four principles in compound form,
and the court’s method of inquiry adequately ensured each juror understood and accepted each
principle.
¶ 94 E. De Facto Life Sentence
¶ 95 Finally, defendant argues he received a de facto life sentence without the trial
court finding that he was permanently incorrigible for an offense that occurred when he was a
juvenile, in violation of the eighth amendment. The State contends defendant’s 40-year sentence
is not a de facto life sentence.
¶ 96 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), stands for the proposition that a
court must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles. A life sentence for a juvenile, whether mandatory or
discretionary, is disproportionate and violates the eighth amendment unless the court considers
the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40,
91 N.E.3d 849. Therefore, an eighth amendment claim exists where a juvenile (1) received a
“life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed
to consider youth and its attendant characteristics ***.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27,
- 31 - 137 N.E.3d 763. The Illinois Supreme Court has held “a prison sentence of 40 years or less
imposed on a juvenile offender does not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the
eighth amendment.” Id. ¶ 41.
¶ 97 The State argues defendant’s sentence of 40 years is not a de facto life sentence
under the holding in Buffer. Defendant argues this court should include the three-year term of
MSR and find the 43-year aggregate to be a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth
amendment. However, these arguments ignore the second part of a successful eighth amendment
claim. An eighth amendment claim exists where a juvenile (1) received a “life sentence,
mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider
youth and its attendant characteristics.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 27. Here, the trial court
thoughtfully considered all the relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court’s
comments span more than 20 pages in the record. The court specifically and repeatedly
addressed defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics. Therefore, it does not matter
whether defendant’s sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence because the court thoughtfully
and extensively considered defendant’s youth, as well as the other relevant factors in mitigation,
and determined a 40-year term of imprisonment was appropriate. We appreciate the thorough
and extensive comments made by the trial judge and conclude the 40-year term of imprisonment
was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 98 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 99 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 100 Affirmed.
- 32 -
2020 IL App (4th) 170756-U (People v. Young) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.