People v. Yonkers Contracting Co.

217 N.E.2d 829, 17 N.Y.2d 322, 270 N.Y.S.2d 745, 1966 N.Y. LEXIS 1382
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 5, 1966
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 217 N.E.2d 829 (People v. Yonkers Contracting Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 217 N.E.2d 829, 17 N.Y.2d 322, 270 N.Y.S.2d 745, 1966 N.Y. LEXIS 1382 (N.Y. 1966).

Opinions

Vast Voobhis, J.

These appeals and cross appeals relate to the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury to sustain indictments for grand larceny against Yonkers Contracting Co., Inc. (hereafter called Yonkers) and a number of its officers and employees, also indictments likewise for grand larceny against certain members and employees of an engineering firm known as Briggs, Blitman and Posner. Bribery indictments were also found against Yonkers and two of its officers, as well as one Louis G. Blackball, who was then an engineer in the employ of the State Department of Public Works. The Appellate Division held that the Grand Jury minutes disclosed sufficient evidence to sustain the charges against all of these defendants, but that each of the individual defendants had acquired immunity except the defendant Cipolla on a grand larceny charge, and the defendants Snook and Posner of the engineering firm who, also, were charged with grand larceny. Being a corporation, Yonkers cannot claim immunity (Matter of Bleakley v. Schlesinger, 294 N. Y. 312) and is subject to the charges of grand larceny and of giving or offering bribes. As the case comes to us, Cipolla, Snook and Posner are charged with grand larceny, first degree, and Yonkers is subject to that charge and, alone among the defendants, to the other charge of giving or offering bribes. Each of them appeals. The People appeal from the dismissal of the indictments against individual defendants. In addition to asserting immunity, each defendant contended (and contends before us) that the evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient to establish larceny by anyone even when unexplained and uncontradicted (Code Crim. Pro., § 251).

On December 30, 1954, as a result of competitive bidding on a unit price basis, Yonkers was awarded a contract by the State of New York for the construction of 5.21 miles of the New England Section of the New York State Thruway in the County of Westchester, extending between Mamaroneck and Central Avenues. The bid price computed from the State’s estimate of unit price quantities was $5,056,140. Instead of supervising the work through engineers employed in its Department of Public Works, the State contracted with the said engineering firm of Briggs, Blitman and Posner to supervise and inspect the work done by Yonkers and to certify to the unit quantities including the amount of excavation which was to be paid for at the rate of [330]*330$2 per cubic yard. Yonkers was paid $5,972,408.13 for the entire job on certificates by the engineering firm.

The basis for the indictments concerns the item described as 2BX denominated “ Unclassified Excavation ’ for which Yonkers was paid $2,006,651.80. The alleged overpayments related entirely to the quantities of “ unsuitable material which Yonkers claimed to have excavated under this category. The State contends that Yonkers was overpaid at the rate of $2 per cubic yard for 63,318 cubic yards of unsuitable material in excess of what was removed. In dollars that would amount to $126,636 which is the figure stated in the indictment.

The trouble appears to have arisen due to the disintegration of the engineering firm. Briggs and Blitman had for many years been competent professional engineers. Defendant Posner, now 80 years of age, retired in 1952 after 36 years on the engineering staff of the New York Central Railroad, where he became engineer of structures and in charge of the bridge department for the railroad. In 1953 he joined the Briggs firm as an associate consulting engineer and took over the bridge design department (approximately 50 bridges were involved in the supervising work which his firm did on the New England Section of the New York State Thruway). In 1957 Robert Briggs, founder and chief executive of the firm, died. Blitman had another business, several of their key employees left for other more promising opportunities, and the responsibility fell upon Posner of concluding the supervision of some $22,000,000 of contracts after which the firm expected to and did dissolve. Whatever may have been the cause, it is undisputed that at or about this time the supervisory work of the Briggs firm was considerably neglected.

One of the important responsibilities of the engineering firm in supervising the performance by Yonkers of this road construction contract consisted in keeping track of the quantity of unsuitable material excavated by Yonkers under 2BX of the contract at $2 per yard. Before building the road the grades were blueprinted for east and westbound lanes and mall in the middle. In some places the grade of the road coincides with the ground level. Elsewhere the ground level needs to be lowered or raised. When that has been accomplished the road surface is covered with a foot in thickness of gravel which is [331]*331compressed by rollers to nine inches. Above that is laid the reinforced concrete surface for the highway. The usable material which is excavated to reduce the road level is employed as fill where necessary to raise the road level. If, as was true in this portion of the New England Section of the Thruway, more fill is required to raise (“ embank ” is the technical phrase) the level than is obtainable from excavation to lower the ground level, the additional fill which is required is obtained from outside the limits of the highway. Such fill is technically described as “borrow”. Under the terms of the contract, Yonkers was required to exhaust the usable fill from within the highway limits before resorting to 1 ‘ borrow ’ ’ obtained elsewhere. The contractor was paid at the rate of $2 per cubic yard for removing usable fill from places where the highway grade was below the ground level and putting it where the highway grade was above the ground level. Likewise the contractor was to be paid $2 per yard for “ borrow ” to be obtained at the contractor’s expense from places outside of the highway limits and added to the fill obtained from within the highway limits in order to embank the base of the highway where the plans called for locating it above the ground level. In addition to those items, the contractor was required to remove unsuitable material, which is the subject matter of these indictments. Unsuitable material, so-called, lies beneath the highway level. In technical parlance, it is below what is called the “ prism ” of the highway. It consists of muck or other substances unsuitable to form a base for the roadway. In other words, for example, if the ground level coincided with the highway level, where no excavation would otherwise be necessary, muck or other unsuitable material has to be removed and replaced with suitable fill, inasmuch as it would not do to superimpose the gravel and concrete on swampland. Even where the road level is below ground level, unsuitable material would still have to be removed and replaced if it existed below what would otherwise be the bottom of the excavation. There might be places, also, even where the road is “embanked” (road level above ground level) where it is necessary to remove unsuitable material before putting in the fill for the embankment. As has been previously stated, the contractor receives $2 per cubic yard for removing unsuitable material which has to be trucked away from the job and disposed [332]*332of however the contractor wishes without accountability. It is regarded as useless material, and the only concern of the State regarding it is to get rid of it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
217 N.E.2d 829, 17 N.Y.2d 322, 270 N.Y.S.2d 745, 1966 N.Y. LEXIS 1382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-yonkers-contracting-co-ny-1966.