People v. Wynne

2024 IL App (1st) 240516-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 6, 2024
• Docket: 1-24-0516
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 240516-U

No. 1-24-0516B

Filed June 6, 2024

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) Nos. 22 CR 13201 ) 24 CR 914 ) FRANK WYNNE, ) Honorable ) Alfredo Maldonado, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Ocasio concur in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Circuit court’s order continuing defendant’s detention at an appearance subsequent to his denial of pretrial release affirmed.

¶2 Frank Wynne appeals the circuit court’s order continuing his detention. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Wynne was charged with various firearm related offenses after his arrest on December 29,

2023. Later that day, he appeared before a judge of the Pretrial Division of the First Municipal No. 1-24-0516B

District of the Cook County Circuit Court, commonly referred to as First Appearance Court,1

where the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)).

¶5 Following a hearing on the State’s petition, the court ordered Wynne detained. 2 The court’s

written order stated the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence the three propositions

required by section 110-6.1 to detain a defendant before trial: (1) the proof was evident and the

presumption great that the defendant had committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses

a real and present safety threat, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate that

threat. See id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). Regarding the first proposition, the court added “[Wynne] had

a loaded gun [with] an extended magazine in plain view in the back seat of his car.” For the second

proposition, the court wrote, “[Wynne] fled from police – hit a civilian in her car – didn’t stop, and

when finally stopped had a loaded 9mm [with extended] mag[azine] in his car.” On the last

proposition, the court stated, “[Wynne] has had back to back felony convictions since 2011. He

has violated probation and one probation was term[inated] unsatis[factory]. He is on probation

now. This offense represents an escalation as most [prior offenses] were drug related.”

¶6 Subsequently, the State filed a petition for violation of probation (VOP) related to Wynne’s

earlier 2022 conviction for possession of a controlled substance (PCS). On January 2, 2024, the

circuit court entered an order detaining Wynne for the VOP in his 2022 PCS case. 3 The court used

the same template detention order the First Appearance Court used to detain Wynne on

December 29. The order indicates Wynne appeared in person. Instead of a finding that Wynne was

1 Formerly referred to as bond court. 2 Neither the State’s petition to deny pretrial release nor a transcript of the December 29, 2023, hearing appear in the record on appeal. 3 No petition or transcripts from this proceeding appear in the record. -2- No. 1-24-0516B

charged with a detainable offense under section 110-6.1, though, the court cited section 110-6 4 and

wrote, “VOP clear and convincing evidence that [Wynne] might be arrested for a new matter and

no conditions can mitigate.”

¶7 The firearm charges were later superseded by indictment or information, which included a

count of armed habitual criminal (AHC). The case was transferred to the Criminal Division before

the same judge presiding over Wynne’s VOP case. Wynne filed a “Petition for Release from

Detention under 725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq.” on February 20, 2024. Wynne’s petition requested that

he be released on both the AHC and VOP cases.

¶8 In his petition, Wynne argued that the evidence was too weak to “support his continued

detention.” He asserted that evidence would show he was taken hostage at gunpoint by a passenger

in his vehicle who forced him to flee from police. Before he fled on foot, according to Wynne, the

passenger tossed the firearm into the back seat where it was later recovered. Wynne’s petition cited

his employment and family circumstances to support his contentions that he did not pose a danger

or flight risk.

¶9 Wynne appeared before the court on February 22 for a hearing on his petition. At the outset,

the State amended its earlier filed detention petition to add the allegation that Wynne poses a risk

of willful flight. Defense counsel argued that the evidence did not support Wynne’s continued

detention since he was taken hostage at gunpoint and forced to flee. The recovered firearm was the

passenger’s, not Wynne’s, and Wynne informed police officers he had been held hostage. Further,

the vehicle was not registered to him, and no additional evidence connected Wynne to the firearm.

For those reasons, counsel submitted, the State could not prove Wynne actually or constructively

possessed the firearm. Counsel went on to describe Wynne’s education and employment history.

4 Section 110-6 of the Code pertains to revocation of pretrial release and violations of conditions of pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2022). -3- No. 1-24-0516B

At the time of his arrest, Wynne had been working at a factory for over a year and had prospects

for promotion. The company indicated Wynne could return to work if he were released. In addition,

Wynne would be residing with his fiancée and their two children. Counsel further reported that

Wynne has medical issues stemming from gunshot wounds he sustained the previous year.

Although Wynne was on probation and had prior criminal convictions, Wynne had no history of

violence. Thus, counsel argued that Wynne did not pose a safety or flight risk and conditions such

as electronic monitoring would suffice if Wynne were released.

¶ 10 The State responded that there had been a preliminary hearing in the AHC case, where the

arresting officers testified and neither their testimony nor written reports contained evidence

supporting the claim that Wynne had been taken hostage. Rather, officers observed a vehicle solely

occupied by Wynne when they attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Wynne sped away and entered

an expressway, where he struck another vehicle. He fled from the scene of that collision and

crashed a second time, a short distance away. No other person was observed riding in or exiting

Wynne’s vehicle. A loaded handgun with an extended magazine was found on the rear seat. At the

scene, Wynne made statements about being taken hostage, but gave no specifics, such as a

description of the person or how it occurred. Based on the proffered allegations and Wynne’s

criminal history, the State argued “it’s proper he remains detained at this time.”

¶ 11 Defense counsel replied that video from police vehicles and body worn cameras, which

may corroborate Wynne’s claim, was not available yet. In addition, Wynne was now naming the

other individual, whom he had picked up before “things kind of went awry.” Counsel further stated

that property belonging to the other individual was recovered from the vehicle.

¶ 12 The court found that Wynne was eligible for detention since he was charged with AHC,

and the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident and the

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presumption great that Wynne had committed the offense. The court cautioned that the finding was

not binding for trial. The court next found that Wynne posed a danger to the community as shown

by his eight prior felony convictions and the recovery of a handgun with an extended magazine.

As for whether conditions could mitigate the risk, the court noted that Wynne had been “through

the criminal justice system several times” and was on probation at the time of the charges in this

case. Based on his criminal history and the high speed chase in this case, the court found that no

conditions of release would be adequate. The court specifically noted that electronic monitoring

and a curfew would be inadequate in light of Wynne’s background. However, the court stated that

it did not find Wynne to be a flight risk. Ultimately, the court ruled that “[d]etention will continue.”

The court’s written order likewise stated that Wynne’s detention was to continue.

¶ 13 Wynne filed a timely notice of appeal using the template form approved for such appeals.

Wynne checked the boxes to assert that the State failed to meet its burden to prove each of the

three propositions. In the spaces provided to elaborate, Wynne echoed his arguments from the

hearing that he was taken hostage, he does not have a violent history, and electronic monitoring

would be a sufficient condition of release. Wynne also checked the box to assert that the court

erred in determining that no conditions of release would reasonably ensure his appearance for later

hearings or prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony or class A misdemeanor. In

the space provided, Wynne only addressed conditions that would ensure future court appearances.

¶ 14 Wynne filed a memorandum in lieu of a brief, as permitted by Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). His memorandum reiterates his arguments before the circuit court.

The State filed a reply memorandum arguing that it had made the requisite showing to detain

Wynne before trial.

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¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 At the outset, we observe that the February 22 hearing seemed to conflate an initial

detention hearing under section 110-6.1(f) of the Code with the requirement of subsection (i-5) to

determine the necessity of continued detention at subsequent appearances. See 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). Both Wynne and the State acknowledged that Wynne was previously

ordered detained. Wynne’s petition and arguments were couched in terms of whether the evidence

supported his “continued detention,” and the State argued it was proper he “remains detained.”

Similarly, the court ultimately ruled that Wynne’s detention would “continue.” Thus, the parties

and court, at times, acted consistent with a continued detention determination under subsection

(i-5).

¶ 17 At the same time, however, the State moved to amend its previously filed petition to deny

pretrial release, even though that petition had already been granted. For his part, Wynne made

arguments directed at the three propositions the State must prove to initially detain a defendant,

even though the Pretrial Division judge already determined the State had proven those

propositions. The court made findings as to each of the three propositions as well. Thus, Wynne’s

petition for release was treated, in part, as though it reopened the initial detention proceeding on

the State’s petition filed under section 110-6.1.

¶ 18 The Code does not provide for repeated, comprehensive detention hearings. The State’s

petition to deny pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1 was heard and ruled upon in the Pretrial

Division on December 29. Wynne was ordered detained at that time. The court’s December 29

order was appealable. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). When the case was transferred

to the Criminal Division, the transfer did not require or permit a repetition of a section 110-6.1

detention hearing. We are cognizant that Cook County differs from most circuit courts in Illinois

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where a defendant generally appears before the same judge throughout their case. In Cook County,

a defendant charged with a felony often appears before two different judges. Like here, a defendant

may appear before one judge on a felony charge before the filing of an indictment or information

and a different judge afterward. While it may be practically necessary to repeat information

proffered before the first judge to familiarize the second judge with the case, the second judge need

not repeat the first judge’s task and redetermine whether the State made the requisite showing to

detain the defendant.

¶ 19 The Code expressly differentiates between subsequent appearances and an initial detention

hearing. For detained defendants, “the Code does not require the court to again make specific

findings that the State proved the three propositions by clear and convincing evidence as required

at the initial hearing.” People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13. Rather, at every subsequent

appearance, the trial court must make a finding whether “continued detention is necessary to avoid

a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the

specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.”

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). “Notably, this portion of the Code, unlike the portions

dealing with petitions for detention, does not prescribe a quantum of evidence or place a burden

of proof on any party.” People v. Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351, ¶ 18. Further, subsection

(i-5) requires the court to make the determination at each subsequent appearance. “This

determination also does not contemplate the filing of a petition for detention.” Id.

¶ 20 Here, Wynne’s arguments on appeal are directed at the three propositions the State must

prove by clear and convincing evidence at an initial detention hearing. But since the Pretrial

Division judge previously determined the State proved those propositions on December 29 and he

did not appeal that order, those issues are not properly before us. See Casey, 2024 IL App (3d)

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230568, ¶ 13 (finding issues regarding the three propositions were not before the court when

defendant only appealed his continued detention following a subsequent appearance).

¶ 21 We note that the State’s apparent acquiescence to a new section 110-6.1 detention hearing

and the court’s findings consistent with such a hearing did not render the proceeding a proper

detention hearing. Since no verified section 110-6.1 petition—which is required to validly conduct

such a hearing—was pending before the court, the proceedings were a nullity insofar as they

replicated an initial detention hearing. See People v. Shockley, 2024 IL App (5th) 240041, ¶ 18

(“no provision within [the Code] permits a circuit court to sua sponte consider the denial of pretrial

release absent the filing of a verified petition as required by section 110-6.1(a).”).

¶ 22 The only issue properly before the trial court on February 22 was whether Wynne’s

continued detention was necessary to avoid a safety threat or prevent his willful flight. Although

Wynne was not permitted to relitigate his initial detention, the Code did not prevent him from

challenging whether his continued detention was necessary. 5 The court couched some of its

findings in terms of an initial detention determination but ultimately found that Wynne’s detention

would continue since he posed a safety risk. Thus, the court’s ruling is consistent with a subsection

(i-5) finding that Wynne’s continued detention was necessary to avoid a real and present safety

threat.

¶ 23 Wynne’s appeal does not challenge whether his continued detention was necessary to avoid

a safety threat. Therefore, Wynne has failed to put the matter before us for review. See People v.

Rollins, 2024 IL App (2d) 230372, ¶ 22 (observing that appellate review under Rule 604(h) is

Subsequent to the trial court proceedings in this case, Rule 604(h) was amended to require a 5

defendant to file a motion for relief in the trial court as a prerequisite to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Following the amendment, a defendant may challenge prior detention orders in the trial court through a motion for relief. -8- No. 1-24-0516B

limited to the arguments raised in the notice of appeal and, if filed, included in the appellant’s

memorandum).

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

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