Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Wooten CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084186
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF106959)
ISAIAH ISAAC WOOTEN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Joshlyn R. Pulliam,
Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, and Arlyn Escalante,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 I.
INTRODUCTION
When defendant and appellant Isaiah Wooten was 15 years old, he shot a rival
gang member with a shotgun. A jury convicted him of one count of attempted murder 1 (Pen. Code, § 664, 187; count 1), and one count shooting from a motor vehicle
(former § 12034, subd. (c) [now § 26100]; count 2), and found true firearm enhancements
(§ 12022.53, subd (d)) for both offenses. The trial court sentenced him to life with the
possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life, and stayed a five-year term on count 2.
Defendant was sentenced to a minimum term of 32 years (7 years for the attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a), 3046, subd. (a)) and 25 years for gun-use
enhancement).
Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence under section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)(A) (section 1170(d)(1)(A)), which the trial court denied on the ground that
defendant was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a de facto
LWOP sentence.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in finding he was
ineligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A), (2) even if the court did not err, the
statute violates equal protection, and (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to
reflect that the trial court stayed a five-year term on count 2 under section 654.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We affirm the judgment but direct the trial court to correct the abstract of
judgment.
II.
PETITION FOR RECALL OF SENTENCE UNDER SECTION 1170(D)(1)(A)
Under section 1170(d)(1)(A), certain juvenile offenders may petition for recall and
resentencing of their LWOP sentences after they have “been incarcerated for at least 15
years.” Juvenile offenders who were not sentenced to LWOP, but were sentenced to its
“functional equivalent,” also may be eligible for resentencing relief under section
1170(d)(1)(A). (People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 612.) If a defendant
qualifies for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A), the trial court “must recall the
defendant’s sentence and hold a hearing to resentence the defendant.” (In re Kirchner
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1050.)
Defendant was not sentenced to LWOP, but he contends he was sentenced to “de
facto LWOP.” We disagree. In cases where courts have found the defendant was
sentenced to a de facto LWOP sentence, the defendants all were “sentenced to extreme
terms.” (See, e.g., People v. Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 614 [103 years to life],
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1040 [107 years to life].) By contrast, defendant was sentenced to a
term of 32 years to life with the possibility of parole. This is not the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583 [33-years-to-
life sentence not functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
3 941, 949 [defendant’s sentence of 32 years to life “is on its face neither an actual nor an
effective life sentence without the possibility of parole”].) As a result, we conclude the
trial court correctly found that defendant was not entitled to relief under section
1170(d)(1)(A). (See ibid.)
III.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Defendant argues section 1170(d)(1)(A) violates equal protection principles given
that it allows offenders convicted of offenses more serious than attempted murder (e.g.,
first degree murder) to petition for recall and resentencing after serving 15 years while he
must serve 25 years before he is eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing. (See
§ 3051, subd. (b)(3).) We disagree.
As defendant acknowledges, we apply rational basis review to determine whether
section 1170(d)(1)(A) violates equal protection. Under that standard, “‘equal protection
of the law is denied only where there is no “rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”’” (Johnson v. Department of
Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) Thus, “[t]o mount a successful rational basis
challenge, a party must ‘“negative every conceivable basis”’ that might support the
disputed statutory disparity,” which means that “[i]f a plausible basis exists for the
disparity, courts may not second-guess its ‘“wisdom, fairness, or logic.”’” (Ibid.) “The
only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately
4 justified under the applicable standard of review.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th
834, 850-851.)
“This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to
lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Coupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, this high bar
helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on a
court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.” (People v.
Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289.)
The Legislature had a rational basis to provide a means to convert LWOP terms for
juvenile offenders to indeterminate sentences, and to deny resentencing for offenders who
already had indeterminate sentences. The Legislature enacted section 1170(d)(1)(A) in
response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560
U.S. 48, 74-75, which held that states may not impose LWOP sentences on non-homicide
juvenile offenders and must instead offer those offenders “some meaningful opportunity
to obtain release” when their incarceration begins. (See Assembly Committee on
Appropriations (2011-2012 Reg. Sess., Aug. 17, 2011, pp. 2-3; see also (See In re
Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1049 [noting that section 1170(d)(1)(A) “was inspired by
concerns regarding sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders”].)
By enacting section 1170(d)(1)(A), the Legislature made the rational decision to
make the incremental change of eradicating LWOP for juvenile offenders to comply with
Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. 48. (See People v. Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.
5 866.) This reasonable decision alone shows that section 1170(d)(1)(A) does not violate
equal protection, even if the legislation grants no relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to
lengthy, but indeterminate terms.
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Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Wooten CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084186
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF106959)
ISAIAH ISAAC WOOTEN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Joshlyn R. Pulliam,
Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, and Arlyn Escalante,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 I.
INTRODUCTION
When defendant and appellant Isaiah Wooten was 15 years old, he shot a rival
gang member with a shotgun. A jury convicted him of one count of attempted murder 1 (Pen. Code, § 664, 187; count 1), and one count shooting from a motor vehicle
(former § 12034, subd. (c) [now § 26100]; count 2), and found true firearm enhancements
(§ 12022.53, subd (d)) for both offenses. The trial court sentenced him to life with the
possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life, and stayed a five-year term on count 2.
Defendant was sentenced to a minimum term of 32 years (7 years for the attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a), 3046, subd. (a)) and 25 years for gun-use
enhancement).
Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence under section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)(A) (section 1170(d)(1)(A)), which the trial court denied on the ground that
defendant was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a de facto
LWOP sentence.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in finding he was
ineligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A), (2) even if the court did not err, the
statute violates equal protection, and (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected to
reflect that the trial court stayed a five-year term on count 2 under section 654.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We affirm the judgment but direct the trial court to correct the abstract of
judgment.
II.
PETITION FOR RECALL OF SENTENCE UNDER SECTION 1170(D)(1)(A)
Under section 1170(d)(1)(A), certain juvenile offenders may petition for recall and
resentencing of their LWOP sentences after they have “been incarcerated for at least 15
years.” Juvenile offenders who were not sentenced to LWOP, but were sentenced to its
“functional equivalent,” also may be eligible for resentencing relief under section
1170(d)(1)(A). (People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 612.) If a defendant
qualifies for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A), the trial court “must recall the
defendant’s sentence and hold a hearing to resentence the defendant.” (In re Kirchner
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1050.)
Defendant was not sentenced to LWOP, but he contends he was sentenced to “de
facto LWOP.” We disagree. In cases where courts have found the defendant was
sentenced to a de facto LWOP sentence, the defendants all were “sentenced to extreme
terms.” (See, e.g., People v. Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 614 [103 years to life],
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 [140 years to life]; People v. Bagsby (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1040 [107 years to life].) By contrast, defendant was sentenced to a
term of 32 years to life with the possibility of parole. This is not the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583 [33-years-to-
life sentence not functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
3 941, 949 [defendant’s sentence of 32 years to life “is on its face neither an actual nor an
effective life sentence without the possibility of parole”].) As a result, we conclude the
trial court correctly found that defendant was not entitled to relief under section
1170(d)(1)(A). (See ibid.)
III.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Defendant argues section 1170(d)(1)(A) violates equal protection principles given
that it allows offenders convicted of offenses more serious than attempted murder (e.g.,
first degree murder) to petition for recall and resentencing after serving 15 years while he
must serve 25 years before he is eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing. (See
§ 3051, subd. (b)(3).) We disagree.
As defendant acknowledges, we apply rational basis review to determine whether
section 1170(d)(1)(A) violates equal protection. Under that standard, “‘equal protection
of the law is denied only where there is no “rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”’” (Johnson v. Department of
Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) Thus, “[t]o mount a successful rational basis
challenge, a party must ‘“negative every conceivable basis”’ that might support the
disputed statutory disparity,” which means that “[i]f a plausible basis exists for the
disparity, courts may not second-guess its ‘“wisdom, fairness, or logic.”’” (Ibid.) “The
only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately
4 justified under the applicable standard of review.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th
834, 850-851.)
“This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to
lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Coupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, this high bar
helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on a
court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.” (People v.
Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289.)
The Legislature had a rational basis to provide a means to convert LWOP terms for
juvenile offenders to indeterminate sentences, and to deny resentencing for offenders who
already had indeterminate sentences. The Legislature enacted section 1170(d)(1)(A) in
response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560
U.S. 48, 74-75, which held that states may not impose LWOP sentences on non-homicide
juvenile offenders and must instead offer those offenders “some meaningful opportunity
to obtain release” when their incarceration begins. (See Assembly Committee on
Appropriations (2011-2012 Reg. Sess., Aug. 17, 2011, pp. 2-3; see also (See In re
Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1049 [noting that section 1170(d)(1)(A) “was inspired by
concerns regarding sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders”].)
By enacting section 1170(d)(1)(A), the Legislature made the rational decision to
make the incremental change of eradicating LWOP for juvenile offenders to comply with
Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. 48. (See People v. Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.
5 866.) This reasonable decision alone shows that section 1170(d)(1)(A) does not violate
equal protection, even if the legislation grants no relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to
lengthy, but indeterminate terms.
The Legislature had at least one other rational reason for enacting section
1170(d)(1)(A). Its “authors and supporters contend sentencing minors to die in prison is
barbaric.” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg.
Sess.) Aug. 17, 2011, p. 2.) The legislation was thus designed to allow resentencing of
minors that, “should it occur, would result in a life sentence, but one with the possibility
of parole.” (Ibid.) The Legislature could have reasonably concluded that LWOP for a
juvenile offender, regardless of the crime, was unacceptable and that the issue had to be
addressed immediately. (See Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 488 [observing
that the Legislature may make reforms “‘“one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute”’”].) The Legislature was free to “decide to
change the law in this area and not be concurrently concerned with” non-LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders. (People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 205.) It
was not irrational for the Legislature to make a distinction between juvenile offenders
who had no chance for parole and offenders like him whose sentences already permit
parole.
Because the Legislature had a rational basis for enacting the recall and
resentencing procedure in section 1170(d)(1)(A) only for juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP, we conclude the statute does not violate equal protection.
6 IV.
ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT
Defendant argues, the People concede, and we agree that the abstract of judgment
omits that defendant’s five-year sentence on count 2 was stayed under section 654. We
therefore direct the trial court to correct this clerical error in the abstract of judgment.
(See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186-188.)
V.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to issue an amended abstract
of judgment to reflect that defendant’s five-year term on count 2 was stayed under section
654.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.