People v. Woodson

2023 IL App (1st) 191353

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 30, 2023
• Docket: 1-19-1353
• Status: Published

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 191353 No. 1-19-1353 Opinion filed June 30, 2023

SIXTH DIVISION

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 12 CR 20136 ) WESLEY WOODSON III, ) The Honorable ) Lauren Gottainer Edidin Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices C.A Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant Wesley Woodson III, age 20, 1 was convicted after a jury trial of one count

of first degree murder for the shooting death of 14-year old Dajae Coleman. In addition to the

murder, the jury also found defendant guilty of multiple counts of attempted murder. The

offenses all stemmed from a single shooting incident that occurred shortly after 10:30 p.m. on

Saturday, September 22, 2012, on a street in Evanston, Illinois. For the murder, the trial court

sentenced defendant to the minimum of 45 years, including a 25-year mandatory firearm

1 This is defendant’s age on the date of the offenses. No. 1-19-1353

enhancement. For the attempted murders, the trial court sentenced defendant to the minimum

of 26 years, including a 20-year mandatory firearm enhancement. Defendant’s total sentence

for both the murder and the attempted murders is 71 years.

¶2 On this direct appeal, defendant claims, first, that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he was the shooter, where there were allegedly weaknesses in the

identifications by the three witnesses who identified him as the shooter, where there was no

confession and no physical evidence linking defendant to the shooting, and where a car that

sped away from the scene of the shooting could have carried the shooter.

¶3 Defendant claims, second, that the State’s introduction of gang evidence was excessive.

On appeal, defendant does not dispute either that defendant was in a gang or that some evidence

was relevant in order to show both that he was in a gang and that his gang was in a conflict

with other gangs in Evanston at the time of the shooting. Defendant’s claim on appeal is that

the State exceeded the relevant amount when it introduced more than a dozen gang-related

crimes that defendant was not involved in. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 The State’s evidence at trial established that shortly after 10:30 p.m. on September 22,

2012, a shooter opened fire at a group of eight teenagers on a street in Evanston. As a result of

the shooting, 14-year old Dajae Coleman died. Three people identified defendant as the

shooter. Two of them—namely, Matthew Berquist and Delanio Robinson—knew defendant

prior to the shooting.

¶6 The State’s theory of the case was that defendant shot at the group because he

mistakenly believed that they were members of a rival gang. Rival gang members had shot

defendant on April 22, 2012. Five months later, on the day of the shooting, defendant’s cousin,

2 No. 1-19-1353

Tyrone Usher, was stabbed shortly before the shooting occurred. The defense states in its brief

to this court that “the defense never denied that defendant was in a gang.”

¶7 A. State’s Pretrial Motion to Admit Gang Evidence

¶8 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit gang evidence. The State argued that the

gang evidence was relevant to establish motive. Although the State is not required to establish

motive, the State argued that this evidence was needed to explain an otherwise inexplicable act

and to establish a continuing narrative for the events in 2012 that led to the night of September

22, 2012. The State acknowledged that gang evidence was prejudicial but argued that, in this

case, it was more probative than prejudicial.

¶9 In its motion, the State alleged that (1) defendant and Usher, defendant’s cousin, were

members of the D Block gang, (2) the D Block gang was in conflict with the O Block gang,

(3) the O Block gang had begun recruiting from the ABM and TTG gangs, such that the D

Block gang was also in conflict with these groups, (4) an O Block member shot defendant and

another D Block member on April 22, 2012, and (5) Usher called defendant’s sister, Tiffany

Woodson, at 10:32 p.m. on September 22, 2012, to report that he had been stabbed on his way

home from a party.

¶ 10 The State asked the trial court to qualify Sergeant Michael Endre of the Evanston Police

Department as a gang expert, and the trial court did. On appeal, defendant does not dispute

either Endre’s qualifications or the relevance of some gang evidence to the issues at trial, so

we take these issues as conceded. Instead, defendant argues on appeal that the evidence

introduced at trial was excessive and that this excess was more prejudicial than probative.

¶ 11 After listening to Sergeant Endre’s testimony at the pretrial hearing, the court heard the

parties’ arguments on November 8, 2016. The State argued that it had “taken great pains to

3 No. 1-19-1353

reduce the prejudicial impact upon the defendant.” The State noted that, although it had

evidence of defendant participating in other crimes, it was not seeking “to get into that

prejudicial material.” Instead, it was “limiting” its motion to “evidence that shows that the

defendant was a D Block member, that his cousin, Tyrone Usher, was a D Block member, and

the fact that D Block was in conflict with other gangs that summer, and that the defendant was

knowledgeable about that.” The State repeated that it would not introduce evidence of criminal

activity by defendant. As a result, the State argued that its motion was “not a proof of other

crimes motion.”

¶ 12 After the State finished its argument, the defense stated that it was objecting to all of

the proposed gang evidence, as more prejudicial than probative. 2 As already noted, this is not

defendant’s position on appeal. On November 14, 2016, the trial court issued its ruling from

the bench. The trial court found that the State had introduced sufficient evidence to show

(1) that defendant was a gang member, specifically of the D Block gang, (2) that he possibly

had a motive to kill based on the conflicts between the street gangs in September 2012, and

(3) that defendant was shot by a rival gang member in April 2012. The court concluded that

“the probative value of the gang evidence with regard to motive and the continuing narrative”

of gang violence “exceeds any prejudicial effect.” The court explained:

“There was a vicious cycle of gang violence that went on through the spring and

summer of 2012. This whole cycle and series of events explains an otherwise

2 The defense argued before the trial court that “[t]he public perception of gang membership is extremely negative” and evidence of gang membership posed “the risk” that the jury “will associate gang membership with a propensity to commit a crime.” The defense argued that the victims were not gang members, that this was “a random shooting,” and that there was no evidence that the shooter or victims used any gang slogans or signals. 4 No. 1-19-1353

inexplicable act. And I believe it is necessary and that its probative value is much

greater than its prejudicial value.”

The trial court found that the State had to be able to introduce a basis for Sergeant Endre’s

testimony, in order to show that he was testifying based on credible evidence. However, it

would not allow “overkill.”

¶ 13 B. Trial

¶ 14 At the trial, which started on September 5, 2017, the State argued in its opening

statement that this was a case of “mistaken retaliation.” The defense, in its opening, stressed

that there was no confession and no physical evidence linking defendant to the shooting. The

defense asserted that “the bottom line of this case, the bottom line [in] this is all about witness

identification.” The defense argued that the witness identifications were unreliable because it

was “pitch black,” the witnesses saw the shooter for only a second or two, they did not see him

face to face, and they were a half a block away from the shooter on a dark street. The defense

asked the jury to pay attention to the fact that what the identifying witnesses first told the police

later changed, and the defense argued that their initial descriptions were vague because they

did not have a good view of the shooter.

¶ 15 The evidence at trial involved three timelines: the timeline of the victims, as they

headed on September 22, 2012, to the corner of Church Street and Ashland Avenue, where the

shooting took place; the timeline of defendant’s whereabouts that same night prior to the

shooting; and the timeline of gang activity in the spring, summer, and fall of 2012, as described

by Sergeant Endre, the gang expert.

¶ 16 As for the victims, the State’s evidence established that a group of teenagers, including

the murder victim and trial witnesses Carl Singletary and Delanio Robinson, left a party in

5 No. 1-19-1353

Evanston and eventually headed north on Dodge Avenue toward Lyons Street, where they

heard a couple of shots fired. There were two sets of shots fired that night: the first set was

fired near Dodge Avenue and Lyons Street at approximately 10:29 p.m.; the second set

occurred approximately five or six minutes later at the corner of Church Street and Ashland

Avenue. It is the second set that is the subject of this case.

¶ 17 When the first set was fired near Dodge Avenue and Lyons Street, the group of

teenagers ran one block south on Dodge Avenue and then turned eastbound onto Church Street.

They walked three blocks on Church Street to the corner of Church Street and Ashland Avenue,

where the second shooting occurred. The first reports of shots fired at Church Street and

Ashland Avenue were received by the police at 10:35 p.m.3 There was a home on the corner

of Church and Ashland; defendant’s home was directly north of that corner home. Berquist,

one of the three identifying witnesses, lived in the home directly north of defendant’s home.

¶ 18 To establish defendant’s whereabouts, the State called defendant’s sister, Tiffany

Woodson; defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica Bowman; and Tiffany’s friend, Rebecca Olasimbo,

who all testified that defendant had been hanging out in the Woodson home on the evening of

the shooting, but that he was not in the Woodson home when the shooting occurred. As

described in more detail below, they all testified that he returned a couple of minutes after the

shooting, by entering through the back door.

¶ 19 Tiffany Woodson, defendant’s younger sister, testified that she was at home with

defendant and their family, as well as a couple of friends, on the night of September 22, 2012.

Tiffany was 18 years old at that time and had already graduated high school. At 10:32 p.m.,

The first reports of shots fired at Dodge Avenue and Lyons Street were received by the police, 3

six minutes earlier, at 10:29 p.m. Curt Keumpel, the Assistant Communications Coordinator of the Evanston Police Department, testified regarding the records of Evanston’s 911 call center. 6 No. 1-19-1353

she received a call from her cousin Tyrone Usher, 4 who told her that he had just been stabbed

and that he wanted Tiffany’s parents to come to Evanston Township High School (ETHS)

football field to pick him up. Tiffany testified that, when she told her family, including

defendant, what Usher had said, defendant appeared “frustrated” and that he stated

“[s]something along the lines of, like, gee, what the f***.” After Tiffany’s parents and sister

Victoria left to pick up Usher, Tiffany went back down to the basement with one of her friends.

Tiffany’s sister, Amber, came down to the basement, and Amber said she heard shots. Amber

turned off the lights in the house and returned to the basement, where Amber asked everyone

to gather on the basement stairs for safety. Defendant was not in the basement, and Amber

asked where he was.

¶ 20 At first, Tiffany testified that defendant came to the basement from the back of the

house less than two minutes later. However, she admitted that she had written in a statement

to the police that it was about two minutes later. On September 26, 2012, when she spoke to

police, they told her to write out a summary of what she had told them. Tiffany started writing,

but her father called her on her cell phone and told her that he did not feel comfortable with

her continuing to speak to the police. When she stopped writing, she initialed where her

statement ended, and the police took her home. In court, she identified the statement, and she

acknowledged that the statement said that defendant entered the basement about two minutes

after she, Amber, and others had hidden there. Tiffany testified that, when defendant entered

the basement, he was wearing sweatpants or pajama pants.

4 Sergeant Endre testified, based on his review of phone logs, that the call from Usher’s phone to Tiffany’s phone was made at 10:31 p.m. 7 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 21 At trial, Tiffany acknowledged speaking with police officers on September 26, 2012,

at 12:30 p.m. at the Lincolnwood Police Department. At this time, the officers asked her to

take out her phone so that they could see the record of the phone call from Usher. Tiffany

denied telling the officers either (1) that, after her parents left the house, defendant started

complaining about how he has to stick up for Usher or (2) that defendant and Usher were both

members of the D Block gang. Tiffany testified that she did not know if D Block was a gang

and that she thought that D Block was a block “where guys hangout.” Tiffany acknowledged

on the stand that her brother was a member of a gang and testified that the name of his gang

was “B.D.,” which stood for Blood Disciple. However, she could not say whether Usher was

in a gang. Tiffany denied telling police that D Block had recently been having a feud with other

gangs. She denied telling police that, six months earlier, defendant showed her a black semi-

automatic handgun that he had in his pants pocket. She testified that she had seen a picture of

him on Facebook “maybe six months” before September 2012 with a semi-automatic gun.

Tiffany denied telling the police that, after defendant was shot on April 22, 2012, he became

more irritable and concerned about defending himself. But she acknowledged that, between

April 22, 2012, when defendant was shot, and September 22, 2012, the night in question,

defendant had slowed down and become “more paranoid.” Tiffany denied telling police that

defendant was frantic and upset that Usher had been attacked. However, Tiffany acknowledged

that, in her statement, she had written that her brother was frantic and upset.

¶ 22 On cross, Tiffany denied seeing her brother in cargo pants on September 22, 2012.

When he entered the basement, he seemed fine, and he was not out of breath. When she told

the police that she was not going to sign the statement, they told her to initial it to represent the

ending of their talk but that the initials did not mean it was an official statement.

8 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 23 Like Tiffany, Jessica Bowman was also at defendant’s home on the evening of

September 22, 2012. Bowman testified that defendant was then her boyfriend. At about 10:30

p.m., she heard defendant’s phone ringing and observed that the caller was Usher. Defendant

had left his phone inside the house when he went into the backyard. When defendant returned

to the house from the backyard, Bowman did not mention that Usher had called. Tiffany

subsequently said that she had received a call from Usher, and the family got together to discuss

what to do about Usher. At some point after Bowman heard that Usher had been stabbed, she

called her mother. While on the phone with her mother, Bowman heard gunshots that were so

loud that her mother heard them through the phone. Defendant was not in the house at the time

of the gunshots. A couple of minutes after hearing the gunshots, Bowman saw defendant enter

the house through the back door. They were in the living room, and then they went down into

the basement. At some point, they came back upstairs, and somebody outside walked up to the

house to throw something in the garbage bin. Defendant told the person to leave. A few minutes

later, defendant’s parents and defendant’s sister Victoria returned to the house with Usher.

¶ 24 On cross, Bowman testified that, when defendant’s parents and sister Victoria went to

pick up Usher, Bowman asked defendant to stay with her and he stayed. At some point, an

investigator asked to see her phone, looked at it, and told her that the conversation with her

mother had started at 10:35 p.m. Bowman testified that she was on the phone with her mother

for a few minutes. During the phone call, Bowman was in the living room, and defendant was

not in the living room. He had gone back out to the backyard. At some point, he came back in,

and they went down to the basement, with his sisters, Tiffany and Amber. Eventually, they

came back upstairs, and Bowman looked out the front window. There were two people

9 No. 1-19-1353

standing in the Woodsons’ front yard. One was a man. Defendant went outside, confronted the

man, and told him to leave their property.

¶ 25 On redirect, Bowman testified that, after the shots were fired, Bowman later observed

defendant reenter the house through the back door. Bowman acknowledged that, to enter the

house through the back door, one has to be in the backyard.

¶ 26 Rebecca Olasimbo, Tiffany’s friend, testified that she was also at defendant’s home on

the evening of September 22, 2012, when shots were fired. At that time, she was 18 and had

already graduated high school. At some point, Olasimbo and Tiffany were in the basement

when Tiffany’s cell phone rang. While Olasimbo did not recall a lot of the details of that night,

she did recall, after being specifically asked, that she later told an assistant state’s attorney

(ASA) that Tiffany went upstairs to report the contents of the conversation to Tiffany’s parents

and that the parents and Victoria left the house to look for Usher. Olasimbo recalled stating

that Victoria and her parents were gone for 10 or 15 minutes. Olasimbo agreed that she had

told the ASA that, after Victoria and her parents left, she observed defendant exit the home

through the front door, and that, 5 to 10 minutes after he left, she was standing by the basement

door when she heard multiple shots. After hearing the “loud noise,” Olasimbo ran down into

the basement because she was scared. Olasimbo agreed that she told the ASA that she was

down in the basement with Jessica and defendant’s sisters, Tiffany and Amber. Olasimbo

agreed that she told the ASA that, after hiding in the basement for a few minutes, she and the

other girls came back upstairs, where she observed defendant enter the home through the back

door. On cross, Olasimbo stated that while she heard loud noises, she “could infer that it was

gunshots.” On redirect, Olasimbo acknowledged that on, September 26, 2012, which was four

days after the incident, she told an ASA that she observed defendant exit his home through the

10 No. 1-19-1353

front door, that she heard shots fired outside, and that she observed him reenter the home

through the back door.

¶ 27 As already noted, the State introduced three identifications. First, Berquist, defendant’s

next-door neighbor, testified that he had no doubt when he identified defendant from a photo

array as the shooter. Second, Robinson, who knew defendant from school, saw defendant,

dressed in a black hoodie and cargo pants, reach into his pants pocket. However, Robinson did

not actually see the gun because he (Robinson) took off running, immediately before the shots

were fired. Singletary, who did not know defendant prior to the shooting, told police that he

was only “40 percent sure” defendant was the shooter. Like Robinson, Singletary observed the

shooter dressed in a black hoodie and cargo pants but did not see the gun itself because he also

took off running. Of the three identifying witnesses, only Berquist observed defendant raise

his arm and start shooting, but Berquist saw only a part of defendant’s face as defendant fired.

¶ 28 Matthew Berquist, age 33 at the time of trial, testified that he was a jewelry artist and

antiques dealer, residing with his girlfriend, Jodie Ricther, at their home on Ashland Avenue

in Evanston. At the time of the shooting, Richter had lived in the home for 15 years, and

Berquist had lived there for 2 years. Defendant’s family, the Woodsons, lived in the house just

to the south, and there was yet another house south of the Woodsons, located at the corner of

Church Street and Ashland Avenue.

¶ 29 Photos of the area, which were admitted into evidence, showed that the Woodsons’

garage is behind their house and at the back of their property. A part of the upper portion of

their house is built over the cement driveway, such that the driveway goes from the street,

under a part of the house, through the backyard, and to the garage. The cement area between

the house and the garage widens into a patio area. The driveway is on the southern side of the

11 No. 1-19-1353

property, and, on the northern side, there is a storage area between the house and a fence. The

fence separates the Woodson home from the Berquist home.

¶ 30 Berquist testified that, at approximately 10:15 p.m. on September 22, 2012, Berquist

was outside, on the middle deck in his backyard, having a cigarette, when he heard what

“sounded like maybe a football game and then some firecrackers,” coming from the northwest.

The deck in his backyard has three levels: the first one, closest to the house, is 4 feet off the

ground; the middle one is two feet off the ground; and the third level is the lowest. There are

lights above his kitchen door leading to the deck, above his side door facing south, and above

the Woodsons’ back door. After hearing the firecrackers, he heard the service door on the

Woodson’s garage being opened from the inside and observed defendant exiting with another

man. Berquist heard a female voice coming from the house, saying to come over here.

Defendant and the other man started walking toward the back door of the house, but then

defendant turned and walked toward the fence that separates the Woodsons’ property from

Berquist’s home. When defendant reached the fence, he ducked down out of view for 15 or 20

seconds. Defendant was near the storage area in the Woodsons’ backyard, between the house

and the fence. Both defendant and the other man then walked toward the back door; and the

other man entered. However, defendant approached the fence a second time, ducked out of

view again for 15 or 20 seconds, and then entered through the back door.

¶ 31 Berquist testified that he heard the front door open and then car doors open and close.

Berquist then got off his deck at the southern end and walked on the garden path, east, toward

Ashland Avenue. An SUV backed out of the Woodsons’ driveway, but Berquist did not recall

in what direction it headed. As Berquist stood in his own driveway, he noticed someone

jogging down the sidewalk, southbound, toward Church Street and Ashland Avenue, and he

12 No. 1-19-1353

heard that person say, “I’ll kill you.” When the person reached the corner, the person raised

his right arm and fired five shots. As the person was shooting, Berquist could see the side of

the person’s face and recognized the shooter as defendant. After dropping down a little,

Berquist ran back along the garden path and entered the back door of his home, into the kitchen.

In the kitchen, his girlfriend, Jodie Richter asked if those were gun shots, and he said yes.

While Richter called 911, Berquist lit another cigarette. After Richter called 911 and Berquist

finished his cigarette, he went to the corner of Church Street and Ashland Avenue, where he

observed police cars. On the ground, Berquist found shell casings. Then Berquist grabbed a

flashlight from his home and returned to the corner where he found more shell casings. When

he returned to his home for the flashlight, he noticed that the Woodsons’ SUV was back in

their driveway.

¶ 32 Berquist testified that he then “strobed” his flashlight to attract an officer. Berquist

explained that he had a strobe setting on his flashlight which flashes in rapid succession. After

an officer responded, Berquist told him about the shell casings. The next day, Berquist returned

to the corner to look for another shell casing because he had found only four casings the night

before and he had heard five shots. The next day, he found the fifth casing. After finding it, he

hailed an officer who was nearby and pointed out the fifth casing.

¶ 33 Berquist testified that, on the night of the shooting, he spoke with a Detective Otis

Velma at Berquist’s home. Berquist told the detective what he had observed but he did not

identify the shooter. When asked to explain why he failed to identify the shooter at that time,

Berquist stated, “He was my next-door neighbor. I didn’t want to believe that he could do

something like that and I was afraid.” In the early morning after the shooting, at 2:45 a.m.,

Officers Musolf and Connelly interviewed him regarding his observations, and Berquist did

13 No. 1-19-1353

not identify the shooter to them either. On September 24, 2012, at the Evanston Police

Department, Officers Bush and Connolly asked Berquist to look at a set of photos. Berquist

identified defendant for the first time, from the photos. Prior to viewing the photos, Berquist

asked the officers to show him “[s]ide face” photos because that is the view that he had had of

the shooter. Berquist testified that, when he identified defendant from the photo array as the

shooter, Berquist had no doubt. On September 26, 2012, Berquist also picked defendant out of

an in-person lineup conducted at the Wilmette Police Department. During the lineup, Berquist

asked the police to ask the men in the lineup to turn. When asked if he had any doubt when he

identified defendant from the lineup as the shooter. He replied, “None.”

¶ 34 On cross, Berquist testified that it was “[n]ot too dark.” Berquist explained that there

were streetlamps and that the actual scene was lighter than the photographs that he had been

shown. While neither bushes nor a fence blocked Berquist’s view of the shooter, a tree

prevented him from having an unobstructed view of the shooter. Berquist observed a side angle

of the shooter for a few seconds. After the shooting, Berquist did not hear anyone running back

toward the Woodson home and did not hear or observe anyone enter the Woodson home.

Berquist also did not see a car speeding down the street by him. When Berquist returned to his

home after the shooting, he did not tell his girlfriend that he had just seen their next-door

neighbor shoot somebody. Berquist testified that he was able to see the gun. However, Berquist

did not tell the first police officer, whom he saw on the scene, that he had seen the gun. Berquist

also did not tell the second police officer who interviewed him that night or the officers who

came to his house early in the morning that he had seen the gun. Berquist did not tell the

officers on either September 24, 2012, or September 26, 2012, that he had seen the gun.

However, Berquist knew immediately that defendant was the shooter. On redirect, he corrected

14 No. 1-19-1353

himself and testified that he believed that he did tell the officers who came to his house in the

early morning that he had seen the shooter holding the gun in his right hand.

¶ 35 Berquist testified that he told Detective Velma that, while sitting on his deck, he heard

three gunshots that he thought were fireworks and that, a short time later, he heard some people

talking in front of his house. Berquist told Velma that he had observed a black man, between

18 and 30 years old, between 5 foot 8 inches and 6 foot 2 inches, and between 160 to 200

pounds, jogging southbound on Ashland Avenue. Berquist believed that he told the police that

the Woodson vehicle passed the shooter before the shooter reached the corner of Church Street

and Ashland Avenue. On redirect, Berquist testified that he (Berquist) was 6 feet 2 inches tall.

¶ 36 Jodie Richter, Berquist’s girlfriend, testified that, at about 10:35 p.m. on September 22,

2012, she was at home when she heard gunshots. Berquist entered through their back door, and

he appeared “shocked.” His movements were “jerky.” Richter called 911 to report shots fired,

and she called a second time after speaking to Berquist. Richter noticed that all the lights were

off in the whole Woodson house, which she thought was unusual.

¶ 37 Carl Singletary, Jr., one of the three identifying witnesses, testified that, on the day of

the offense, he was 16 years old, a junior at ETHS, and not a gang member. On September 22,

2012, at 9 p.m. he was at a party at a house on Emerson Street and Dewey Avenue, where he

stayed for a half hour. Then he and some others left and walked to another party at a house on

Church Street and McDaniel Avenue, located 3 blocks west of the high school. After arriving

at close to 10 p.m., Singletary noticed Tyrone Usher, who was with the D Block gang.

Singletary waited a bit before leaving because he knew “something was brewing” among the

three gangs in the area—namely, the ABMs, D Block, and the Ls. After Singletary left the

15 No. 1-19-1353

party, he walked down Church Street with a group of seven other kids, or eight total. They

figured they would walk to a certain point and then walk to their respective homes.

¶ 38 Singletary testified that they walked east on Church Street, past ETHS, and then turned

left on to Dodge Avenue. As they walked north on Dodge Avenue, they heard a couple of

gunshots coming from the north or ahead of them, from near Dodge Avenue and Lyons Street.

They ran south and turned east on to Church Street. They started to slow down after running a

couple of blocks on Church Street. As they walked east, toward Church Street and Ashland

Avenue, they were talking about what had just happened. They were on the south side of the

street, when they heard a loud voice coming from a man in the street. The man was in a black

hoodie and cargo pants. He said, “which one of you,” either bitches or mother f***. Singletary

took “a quick glance” at the man. When the man reached toward his cargo-pants pocket,

Singletary thought the man had a gun, so Singletary ran and did not look back. Singletary heard

five shots whizzing past. There were pauses in between the shots, “like he was aiming.”

Singletary heard someone else say that Coleman, the murder victim, was down.

¶ 39 Singletary testified that, on that same night, some police officers took him to the ETHS

football field to view a suspect, but Singletary said that the suspect, who he recognized as

Usher, was not the shooter. Later that night, at the police station, Singletary provided a

description of the shooter as having lighter skin, a short and skinny frame, and a pointy hairline.

Singletary looked at some photos and identified defendant as the shooter, saying that he

(Singletary) was “40 percent sure.” On September 25, 2012, Singletary viewed a lineup from

which he identified defendant. Prior to making an identification, he asked the police to ask the

men in the lineup to say, “which one of you little bitches.” Defendant “sounded like the

person,” but defendant’s voice was a little higher pitched than the shooter’s voice had been.

16 No. 1-19-1353

Singletary told the police that defendant was the one who sounded most like the shooter.

During Singletary’s testimony, the State played the video from an ETHS security camera,

which showed the eight-person group, including Singletary, as it walked past ETHS. The

parties stipulated that the video contained “the true and accurate video images captured from”

the ETHS security camera located on the “corner of Church and Dodge the night of September

22nd, 2012.” Singletary testified that, at the point on the tape marked 10:30 p.m., the tape

showed “us eight” as they crossed Dodge. At 10:31 p.m., his group was out of sight of the

camera, but he testified that this was when they heard gunshots coming from the north, and

they ran back.

¶ 40 On cross, Singletary testified that it was dark out, but that there was a streetlight at the

corner of Church Street and Ashland Avenue, although not on the corner that the shooter came

from. Singletary observed the shooter for “a little bit more” than one to two seconds. When

Singletary spoke to the police that night, he said one to two seconds, but that was a rough

estimate. Singletary had never seen the shooter before that night, and the shooter had a hood

on. However, Singletary clarified that “the hoodie wasn’t fully on his head all the way,” so that

Singletary could observe some of the shooter’s hairline. From his observation of the shooter’s

hairline, Singletary told the detective that the shooter’s hair was very short. However,

Singletary did not know if the shooter had long hair in the back. When the shooter reached for

his pocket, he was wearing a black hoodie and cargo pants.

¶ 41 Singletary testified that, from the time that shots were fired at Dodge Avenue and Lyons

Street until shots were fired at Church Street and Ashland Avenue was less than 10 minutes.

Singletary estimated that it took two to four minutes to run away from the first shots to Mason

Park on Church Street and then took roughly five minutes to walk from Mason Park on Church

17 No. 1-19-1353

Street to Church Street and Ashland Avenue, for an estimated elapsed time of between seven

to nine minutes between the two sets of shots. After viewing a six-person photo array,

Singletary testified that, when he identified defendant, the photo “mostly resembled” the

shooter. On redirect, he testified that he told the police that he had seen the shooter pull

something out of his pocket and that, during the lineup, he told them that the person he picked

had the same complexion, hairstyle, and height as the shooter.

¶ 42 Like Singletary, Robinson identified defendant as the shooter after having observed

the shooter just before Robinson took off running. However, unlike Singletary, Robinson knew

defendant prior to the shooting. Robinson testified that in September 2012, after having

graduated ETHS, he was attending Oakton Community College and managing the ETHS

varsity basketball team. On September 22, 2012, at 9 p.m., he was at the same party on

Emerson Street, which Singletary attended. At 10 p.m., Robinson went to a second party, at

Church Street and McDaniel Avenue, where he noticed Usher, who Robinson knew to be a

member of the D Block gang. When Robinson left the party to head home, he was walking

with a group of eight people that included himself, Singletary, and the murder victim. They

walked east on Church Street and turned north on to Dodge Avenue, heading toward Lyons

Street. After hearing shots coming from Lyons Street, they ran in the opposite direction,

running south and then turning east on to Church Street. When they reached Mason Park, they

slowed down and were walking and talking, as they headed east on Church Street toward

Ashland Avenue. Robinson was in the middle of the group at this point, when he noticed

someone walking around the corner at Ashland Avenue, who then said, “which one of you

little” and another word. This person, whom Robinson identified in court as defendant, stood

in the middle of the street, on Ashland Avenue. Robinson recognized defendant, as defendant

18 No. 1-19-1353

was standing in the middle of the street. Robinson knew defendant through defendant’s sisters,

who Robinson had gone to school with. After defendant made the “which one” statement,

defendant reached for his pants pocket, which was on the right side of his cargo pants. In

addition to the cargo pants, defendant was wearing a black hoodie. When defendant reached

for his pocket, Robinson ran back toward Mason Park. Robinson observed defendant for about

seven seconds before Robinson turned to run.

¶ 43 Robinson testified that, after the shooting, he went to a police station, where a detective

asked him if he had seen the shooter’s face. Robinson said that he did not know who it was.

Robinson did not identify the shooter because he “was just in shock” and shaken up. Robinson

did provide a general description that the shooter was male, black, light-skinned, in all-black

clothes, and 18 or 19 years old. The detective asked if he would look at some photos. He said

yes, but he was so shaken up that he just went home with his stepfather. The following Tuesday,

two detectives came to speak to him at ETHS and asked if he was willing to look at photos or

a lineup. He said yes. The officers did not ask Robinson at that time if he knew who the shooter

was, and Robinson did not volunteer that information. The next day, September 26, 2012,

Robinson went to the Wilmette police station and viewed a lineup from which he identified

defendant.

¶ 44 On cross, Robinson testified that, on the night of the shooting, he told the police that

he had not seen the shooter’s face. The next day, Robinson told the police that the shooter was

wearing dark-colored sweatpants. On the night of the shooting, Robinson first observed

defendant as defendant walked to the street from Ashland Avenue. At first on cross, Robinson

testified that he could not recall whether the hood on defendant’s hoodie was up; but later, on

cross, he testified that the hood “was not on.” Robinson recalled hearing three shots, not five.

19 No. 1-19-1353

Of the five people in the lineup, Robinson knew another person in the lineup from high school.

Robinson testified that there were streetlights on both sides of the street. On redirect, referring

to photos, Robinson testified that there was a streetlight on the same side of the street that

defendant was on, which was the north side of Church Street, and that there was another

streetlight on the south side of Church Street. In addition, there were other streetlights on, as

the group had walked down Church Street.

¶ 45 In addition to identification witnesses, the State called a gang expert to try to establish

a motive. Sergeant Michael Endre testified that he had been with the Evanston Police

Department for 13 years, including five years on the “Neighborhood Enforcement Team”

(NET), which is a gang and narcotics unit. At that time, he became in charge of “the gang

files,” where the police keep track of gang activities and members. After serving as a NET

officer, he became an intelligence officer, whose primary responsibility was to put together a

weekly deployment meeting, where information from the prior week was analyzed in order to

plan how to best utilize resources for the upcoming week. Although he became an intelligence

officer, he maintained his responsibilities for the gang files. In March 2017, which was the

year of the trial, Endre was promoted to sergeant, supervising officers in the patrol division.

The court ruled that Endre was allowed to testify as an expert in gang crimes.

¶ 46 Endre testified that, in 2012, there were neighborhood-based gangs in Evanston, the

largest of which was, and is, the D Block gang. In 2012, D Block’s primary area of control

included the area north of Church Street and Dodge Avenue, toward Lyons Street. Other

neighborhood gangs included O Block and ABM-TTG, which was a hybrid gang made up of

two gangs. The average age of D Block was 20 years old, of O Block was 24, and ABM-TTG

was 16. Endre testified that, in his opinion, “to a reasonable degree of certainty,” that in 2012

20 No. 1-19-1353

defendant belonged to the D Block gang, His opinion was based on a number of factors,

including a review of the Evanston gang files, defendant’s social media, defendant’s gang

tattoos, and interviews with defendant’s family and friends. Text messages on defendant’s

phone, which Endre reviewed, discussed “access to firearms.”

¶ 47 While defendant had a continuing objection at trial to all of Endre’s testimony, the

parties agreed to the court’s reading to the jury a limiting instruction. The instruction concerned

evidence that defendant was involved in conduct other than that charged in the indictment. The

instruction stated, among other things, that this evidence was being “received on the issue of

the defendant’s motive and intent and may be considered by you only for that limited purpose.”

¶ 48 Endre’s testimony continued after the limiting instruction was read, and he testified

that, based on his expert opinion, Usher was also, and is still, a member of the D Block gang.

However, the group of eight, who were the victims of this offense, were not members of any

gang. In 2012, the D Block gang was in conflict with both the O Block gang and the ABM-

TTG gang, as well as in a minor conflict with the LOC City Gangster Disciples from another

district. The conflict started on April 22, 2012, with a gang-related shooting over a dice game

in D Block territory, in which defendant and another D Block member were shot. Bryan Miller,

an O Block member, shot defendant in the lower back and shot Dajuan Blackwell in the thigh.

However, the shooter was not charged because the victims refused to cooperate.

¶ 49 Endre testified that the dice game was “a major catalyst for violence that continued all

summer long, including this homicide.” There was a period in early May that was particularly

violent, as well as “much of the month of September leading up to [the] murder” in this case.

On May 10, 2012, a D Block member was located with lacerations to his head, and the victim

identified ABM gang members as the offenders who had beaten him with a golf club and a

21 No. 1-19-1353

brick. However, the victim did not cooperate with the police. There were further altercations

later that same evening, with more than 25 people in the street and at least one person taken to

the hospital. One group, including one person with a sledgehammer, chased an ABM member.

One incident involved a fight with metal poles, rocks, and bottles, and both D Block members

and ABM members were present. On May 12, officers responded to another large group fight.

¶ 50 Endre testified that, on May 13, 2012, an O Block member was taken to St. Francis

Hospital 5 with a gunshot wound in the back. However, the victim and his family refused to

cooperate with police. On May 28, 2012, a D Block member was observed holding a baseball

bat and yelling at a group on Dodge Avenue, near Church Street. On July 13, 2012, the police

received a report of 10 people fighting in the street, near Dodge Avenue and Lyons Street.

Also, on July 13, on Emerson Street, a person riding his bike fired multiple shots in the air. On

July 14, 2012, two ABM members were stabbed in downtown Evanston, during a fight

involving D Block members. A D Block member was found with a knife, but the victims did

not cooperate with police.

¶ 51 Endre testified that, on July 15, 2012, a confidential informant told the police that the

reasons for the violence were, first, that O Block members were trying to recruit younger ABM

members to join O Block’s opposition to D Block and, second, that defendant and the other

victim of the dice game shooting were believed to be cooperating with police. On September

8, 2012, shots were fired shortly after midnight near Dodge Avenue and Lyons Street. 6 An

anonymous texted tip stated that the shooter was the same person who had shot at defendant

Although not stated, St. Francis Hospital is located in Evanston. 5

Dodge Avenue and Lyons Street was the location where the first shots were fired on the night of 6

September 22, 2012, which caused the group of eight to run back toward Church Street. 22 No. 1-19-1353

on April 22, 2012, and that shots were fired at other D Block members. On September 13,

2012, the shooter was arrested in Chicago for unlawful use of a weapon.

¶ 52 Endre testified that, on September 15, 2012, the police went to Lyons Street and Darrow

Avenue, which is also close to Dodge Avenue, where they found a shooting victim, who was

the brother of Dajuan Blackwell, the person who had been shot along with defendant on April

22, 2012. The September 15, 2012, victim, Donte Blackwell, stated that, immediately before

he was shot, the shooter accused him of cooperating with police. Endre reviewed photos taken

on the night of September 15, 2012, that showed D Block members, including defendant, on

the back porch of the Blackwell residence holding firearms. 7 On September 20, 2012, a masked

gunman fired multiple rounds at the sliding glass door of the Blackwell home.

¶ 53 Endre testified that defendant was not named as an offender in any of the incidents

between April 22, 2012, and September 20, 2012, which Endre had just described. The trial

court sustained an objection to a question about whether defendant was knowledgeable about

the conflict occurring during this period. Endre testified that he reviewed a report of the

download of defendant’s cellphone that included photos and text messages. The photos

established that defendant was associated with members of D Block between April and

September 2012. In addition, defendant’s phone contained numerous text messages between

April and September 2012, about the ongoing conflict and about firearms. In the photo taken

the night of September 15, 2012, of defendant and others on the Blackwell porch, defendant

was wearing a custom sweatshirt that had gang symbols and that stated: “N*** say they drill,

they need practice, homie.” Endre explained that “drill” was “slang for shooting a gun.” A

photo with defendant wearing this sweatshirt was seen on defendant’s Facebook page, just

7 Endre later testified that this photo was obtained from a download of defendant’s cell phone. 23 No. 1-19-1353

days prior to the shooting. Endre explained that he found the wording of the shirt significant

because there is usually an uptick of antagonizing posts after major incidents.

¶ 54 Endre testified that he reviewed an interview of defendant by police on September 26,

2022, four days after the shooting at bar. During the interview, defendant stated that ABM and

TTG members at one of the parties on September 22, 2012, had guns. The State introduced a

number of exhibits that included photos from September 2012 of defendant making D Block

hand signs and of defendant with other D Block members, including Tyrone Usher. Also

admitted were photos of defendant’s gang tattoos and photos from his Facebook page and

Usher’s Facebook page. Endre also identified phone calls on a log of calls made from Usher’s

phone on September 22, 2012, the night of the offense. Among the numerous calls, the log

indicated that Usher received a call from defendant at 7:58 p.m. and that Usher called defendant

at 10:27 p.m. Usher then called defendant’s sister, Tiffany, at 10:31 p.m. 8 Endre testified that

the shooting occurred at approximately 10:34 p.m. Usher called 911 at 10:29 p.m. and again

at 10:36 p.m. Defendant’s sister, Victoria, called Usher at 10:44 p.m. and again at 10:47 p.m.

Usher called Victoria three times, and she called him at 10:50 p.m.

¶ 55 On cross, Endre testified again that, with respect to the gang-related incidents between

April and September 2012, about which Endre had just testified on direct examination,

defendant was not involved in any of them, except for the fact that defendant was shot on April

22, 2012, with Dejuan Blackwell. The State called other law enforcement personnel to testify

about other aspects of this investigation, and then the defense elected to put on a case.

¶ 56 The witnesses called by the defendant included Michele Woolridge, who testified that,

at the time of the shooting, she lived on Ashland Avenue, across the street from the Woodson

8 Tiffany had testified that the call from Usher was at 10:32 p.m. 24 No. 1-19-1353

home. Woolridge explained that there was another home straight across the street from her

home and that the Woodson home was next to that one. After she heard three or four gunshots

at about 10:30 p.m. on September 22, 2012, she went out on her front porch to look for her

son. While on the porch, she scanned the street to see where he was, and she called him on her

cell phone to tell him to come home now. At that time, she did not see defendant on the street

and did not see anybody run into the Woodson home. She did see a black car “flying with its

lights off,” traveling north on Ashland Avenue. Woolridge could not say whether the car was

fleeing from the gunshots.

¶ 57 Amy Gabbert testified that she lived on the corner of Church Street and Ashland

Avenue, in the house just south of the Woodsons. Unlike the Woodson home which fronted on

Ashland, her home fronted on Church Street. Gabbert testified that there was no streetlight on

her corner and that “[i]t’s dark.” The perimeter of her house had bushes that were five or six

feet tall, with a walkway through them, to Church Street. The area east of her home, toward

Ashland Avenue, was an open lawn. One could walk up the walkway from Church Street and

across the lawn. Once in this open area, which was to the east of her house, one could jump

over a small waist-high fence to enter the Woodson driveway, since there was a break in the

bushes by the driveway.

¶ 58 Gabbert testified that, after hearing gunshots at about 10:30 p.m. on September 22,

2012, she crawled to her children’s bedroom to keep below the window line and to make sure

they were asleep. After reaching their room, she “just stood there for a little while.” Next, she

went to her office and looked out her office window, where she saw defendant smoking a

cigarette in his backyard. Gabbert heard defendant yell something, as he was looking east

toward Ashland Avenue, and then he walked toward the garage. When asked if he was

25 No. 1-19-1353

wearing a hooded sweatshirt, she replied, “No clue. I mean, I feel like I saw his face, so if I

saw his face he didn’t have a hood on.” When asked how long defendant was out there, she

replied, “I have no idea; a couple minutes.” After hearing the shots, she did not hear anyone

running back through the Woodsons’ garage. Gabbert testified that, as she sat at trial, she

could not recall how much time elapsed between hearing the shots and observing defendant

in his backyard. However, when she spoke to an Evanston detective on April 4, 2017, she

recalled telling him that it was “approximately 5, 10 minutes.”

¶ 59 Defendant also called several law enforcement witnesses, regarding statements that

they obtained from identification witnesses Singletary, Robinson, and Berquist. Detective

David Cepiel testified that on September 22, 2012, Singletary told him that, prior to the

shooting, the shooter stated something to the effect of “you motherf*** were shooting out

there.” Singletary also stated that he saw the shooter for one or two seconds and that he heard

three or four shots. Detective Troy Musolf testified that, on September 25, 2022, he spoke

with Robinson, but Musolf did not recall asking Robinson whether he knew the shooter or

whether he could identify the shooter. Robinson did indicate that he was willing to view a

lineup. Detective Velma testified that, on September 22, 2012, at 11:30 p.m., he spoke with

Berquist, but he did not recall asking Berquist if he saw the shooter or knew the shooter.

Velma recalled that Berquist appeared nervous. Sergeant John Connolly testified that he

spoke with Berquist on both September 23 and 24, 2012. On September 24, 2012, Berquist

stated that a “GMC” drove past the shooter seconds before the shooting. Berquist also stated

that, while the shooter was standing on Church Street, the porch lights from a nearby home

illuminated the shooter’s face, while a tree in the Woodson’s front yard kept the glare out of

his eyes.

26 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 60 Defendant’s father testified that he knew his son was in the D Block gang, but after

defendant was shot in April 2012, defendant became “low key” and hung out with his

girlfriend, “and that was it.” Defendant’s father thought his son had stopped his gang

involvement after being shot. Defendant’s father did not testify about hearing or seeing the

shooter; rather, he, his wife, and his daughter, Victoria, departed their home at about 10:30

p.m., which was prior to the shooting, to go pick up his wife’s cousin, Usher. When his wife

came outside to tell him they had to go pick up Usher, he went back in the house and saw

defendant in the house. Once in the car, his wife, who was driving, pulled their GMC Acadia

out of their driveway and headed south to Church Street and Ashland Avenue. At that time, he

did not see anyone jogging past their vehicle and did not see his son outside. Defendant’s father

also testified that there was one streetlight at the corner that had been out for a long time, and

so it was dark at night.

¶ 61 After listening to closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury deliberated and

found defendant guilty of first degree murder and multiple counts of attempted murder. It found

that defendant had personally discharged a firearm with respect to each count. At sentencing,

the trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 71 years, which was the minimum possible

sentence. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

¶ 62 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 63 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 64 Defendant’s first claim is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he was the shooter, where the principal evidence connecting him to the shooting were the three

identifications and all three were unreliable because the witnesses saw the shooter at night, on

an allegedly poorly lit street, for only a few seconds.

27 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 65 All the sufficiency issues raised by defendant on this appeal, such as the witnesses’

brief time to view and the allegedly insufficient lighting, were raised by counsel “during trial

and argued to the jury who simply did not find them persuasive.” People v. Thompson, 2020

IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 39 (“the sufficiency issues were raised by [defendant’s] counsel during

trial and argued to the jury who simply did not find them persuasive”); People v. Joiner, 2018

IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 63 (“[d]efendant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence

fails because the weaknesses in the evidence that defendant cites on appeal were all presented

to, considered, and rejected” by the factfinder). Below, we address each of the factors that may

affect identifications and explain why we also do not find this claim persuasive.

¶ 66 1. Standard of Review

¶ 67 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, the question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 66. It is the factfinder’s responsibility to resolve

conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences. Aljohani, 2022 IL

127037, ¶ 66. In particular, “[i]t is the responsibility of the fact finder, not the reviewing court,

to determine the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Teague, 2013 IL App (1st) 110349, ¶ 26

(citing People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009)).

¶ 68 When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we will not retry the defendant or substitute

our own judgment for the trier of fact. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 67. All reasonable

inferences are drawn in favor of finding a guilty verdict. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 67.

28 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 69 2. Identification Evidence

¶ 70 As noted, on this appeal, defendant challenges the State’s identification evidence.

Although identification evidence that is vague or doubtful is insufficient to support a

conviction, a single witness’s identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction

if the witness viewed the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification.

Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 42; Joiner, 2018 IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 47.

¶ 71 In assessing the reliability of identification testimony, courts generally consider the five

factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972): (1) the witness’s opportunity

to view the offender during the offense, (2) the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the

offense, (3) the witness’s prior description of the offender, (4) the witness’s level of certainty

at the identification, and (5) the length of time between the offense and the identification.

Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 42; Joiner, 2018 IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 47.

¶ 72 3. Opportunity to View

¶ 73 With respect to the first factor—opportunity to view—defendant argues that the brief

time of the initial viewing casts doubt on all three identifications. All three witnesses viewed

the shooter for only seconds before turning and running themselves. Robinson, for example,

testified that he saw the shooter for about seven seconds before turning and running. Singletary

likewise ran, and Berquist testified that he ducked down and then ran back along the garden

path to his back door. However, “[t]he brevity of a witness’s opportunity to view, by itself,

will not discredit an identification, although it is a factor that a trier of fact may consider when

weighing the testimony.” Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 45 (evidence was not

insufficient, although one witness saw one of the shooters for 5 to 10 seconds and another

witness observed him for less than 5 seconds); People v. Petermon, 2014 Il App (1st) 113536,

29 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 32 (identification was found to be reliable, although “the entire incident took less than a

minute”).

¶ 74 Also, with respect to the first factor, defendant argues that the lighting conditions were

poor. However, what the exact lighting conditions were and whether there was, or was not,

sufficient lighting in the area was a subject of dispute between State and defense witnesses at

trial.

¶ 75 The three identifying witnesses all indicated that there was sufficient lighting for them

to make an identification. On cross, Berquist testified that it was “[n]ot too dark.” Berquist

explained that there were streetlamps, and that the actual scene was lighter than the

photographs that he had been shown at trial. On cross, Singletary testified that it was dark out,

but that there was a streetlight at the corner of Church Street and Ashland Avenue, although

not on the corner that the shooter came from. On cross, Robinson testified that there were

streetlights on both sides of the street. On redirect, referring to photos, Robinson testified that

there was a streetlight on the same side of the street that defendant was on, which was the north

side of Church Street, and that there was another streetlight on the south side of Church Street.

Robinson also testified that there were other streetlights on, as the group had walked down

Church Street.

¶ 76 In contrast to the State witnesses, defense witnesses Amy Gabbert and defendant’s

father both testified that it was dark and that there was no working streetlight on the corner of

Church Street and Ashland Avenue. Specifically, defendant’s father testified that there was

one streetlight at the corner that had been out for a long time; as a result, it was dark there at

night. Similarly, Gabbert testified that there was no streetlight on her corner and “[i]t’s dark.”

30 No. 1-19-1353

This dispute between the State and defense witnesses about the sufficiency of the lighting in

the area was a credibility dispute that was up to the jury to resolve.

¶ 77 In resolving this dispute, the jury could consider that both defendant’s father and

Gabbert testified about what they had observed that night, although they were not speaking

specifically of the Ashland/Church corner. Defendant’s father testified that he did not see his

son outside as their vehicle drove down Ashland to the corner of Church Street, 9 and Gabbert

testified that she looked out her office window and observed defendant in the backyard

smoking a cigarette.

¶ 78 Also, as part of the first factor, defendant argues that Robinson and Singletary did not

see the gun because they turned and ran as the shooting began. Robinson testified that he

noticed someone walking around the corner at Ashland Avenue, who then said, “which one of

you little” and another word. This person, whom Robinson identified in court as defendant,

stood in the middle of the street, on Ashland Avenue. Robinson recognized defendant, as

defendant stood in the middle of the street. Robinson knew defendant through defendant’s

sisters, who Robinson had gone to school with. After defendant made the “which one”

statement, defendant reached for his pants pocket, which was on the right side of his cargo

pants. It was up to the jury whether to draw the inference that what defendant reached for was

a gun, when shots followed almost immediately after. We cannot say that such an inference is

unreasonable or irrational. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 67.

¶ 79 Like Robinson, Singletary did not see the actual gun because he ran. Singletary testified

that the group of eight were on the south side of Church Street, when they heard a loud voice

9 In contrast, Berquist told the police that the Woodson vehicle passed defendant before defendant reached the corner of Church Street and Ashland Avenue. 31 No. 1-19-1353

coming from a man in the street. The man was in a black hoodie and cargo pants, and he said,

“which one of you,” either bitches or mother f***. Singletary took “a quick glance” at the man,

but when the man reached for his cargo-pants pocket, Singletary thought the man had a gun,

so Singletary ran. Singletary did not look back, as five shots whizzed past him. As with

Robinson, it was up to the jury whether to draw the inference that the pocket contained a gun

but, in light of the immediate shots, we cannot find this inference unreasonable.

¶ 80 With respect to the first factor, defendant argues that Berquist was more than 30 feet

away from the shooter when Berquist recognized defendant. However, at trial, Berquist was

not asked to estimate how many feet away he was from the shooter when he recognized him.

¶ 81 Defendant argues that Berquist saw only a part of the shooter’s face. At trial, Berquist

testified that, as he stood in his own driveway, he noticed someone jogging down the sidewalk,

southbound, toward Church Street and Ashland Avenue, and he heard that person say, “I’ll kill

you.” When the person reached the corner, the person raised his right arm and fired five shots.

As the person was shooting, Berquist could see the side of the person’s face and recognized

the shooter as defendant. As the defense acknowledges, defendant was someone Berquist knew

and had just seen that day. A rational juror could have reasonably found that a witness could

recognize someone he knew well from seeing one side of the person’s face. For example, most

of us have no trouble recognizing Lincoln’s side view on a penny or Washington’s side view

on a quarter.

¶ 82 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution as we must, we

cannot find that defendant’s arguments on this factor cause us to believe that no rational trier

of fact could have found defendant guilty. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 66.

32 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 83 4. Degree of Attention

¶ 84 With respect to the second factor, the witnesses’ degree of attention, defendant argues

that their degree of attention was compromised by the level of stress that the shooting itself

created. However, all three witnesses testified that they were basing their identifications on

their views of the shooter prior to shots being fired. In Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265,

¶ 43, this court rejected this same argument for the exact same reason. We stated: “The problem

with this argument is that both [witnesses] observed [the defendant] before the shooting even

started.” (Emphasis in original.) Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 43. As in Thompson,

all three witnesses in the case at bar testified that, although for a brief time, their attention was

“focused on” the shooter. Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 46.

¶ 85 5. Prior Descriptions and Timely Identification

¶ 86 The third and fifth Biggers factors are the accuracy of the witness’s prior descriptions

of the offender and the length of time between the offense and the witness’s identification.

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; see Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 42; Joiner, 2018 IL

App (1st) 150343, ¶ 47.

¶ 87 In the case at bar, the two witnesses who knew defendant previously, both Berquist and

Robinson, failed to immediately inform the police that defendant was the shooter. However,

they explained the reasons for their reluctance. Berquist did not want to “out” his neighbor,

and both felt shaken up immediately after the shooting. When Berquist was asked on direct

examination to explain why he failed to identify the shooter on the night of the shooting,

Berquist stated: “He was my next-door neighbor. I didn’t want to believe that he could do

something like that and I was afraid.” Jodie Richter, Berquist’s girlfriend, testified that, when

Berquist entered through their back door shortly after the shooting, he appeared “shocked” and

33 No. 1-19-1353

his movements were “jerky.” Robinson testified that he did not identify defendant as the

shooter on the night of the shooting because he “was just in shock” and shaken up. Robinson

did provide a general description that the shooter was male, black, light-skinned, in all-black

clothes, and age 18 or 19 years old.

¶ 88 All three identifications, however, came shortly after the shooting and within days of

the offense. Singletary identified defendant that same night. He testified that, on the same night

of the shooting, some police officers took him to the ETHS football field to view a suspect, but

Singletary said that the suspect, who he recognized as Usher, was not the shooter. Later that

night, at the police station, Singletary provided a description of the shooter as having lighter

skin, a short and skinny frame, and a pointy hairline. Singletary looked at some photos and

identified defendant as the shooter, saying that he (Singletary) was “40 percent sure.” As for

the others, Berquist identified defendant on September 24, 2012, just two days after the

shooting, and Robinson identified defendant on September 26, 2012, only four days after the

shooting. Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 46 (finding an identification reliable that

was “a little over two months after” the offense); People v. Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513,

¶ 113 (finding an identification with a three-month time lapse reliable); People v. Daniel, 2014

IL App (1st) 121171, ¶ 22 (affirming the defendant’s conviction where the witness made an

identification within three months after the crime); People v. Malone, 2012 IL App (1st)

110517, ¶ 36 (rejecting defendant’s argument that a time lapse of one year and four months

was “ ‘a seriously negative factor’ ”); see People v. Rodgers, 53 Ill. 2d 207, 213-14 (1972)

(affirming the defendant’s conviction where the witness made an identification two years after

the crime).

34 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 89 We cannot find that these two factors, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

State, are so unreasonable or unsatisfactory as to find that no rational juror could have found

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 114.

¶ 90 6. Certainty

¶ 91 The remaining Biggers factor is the witness’s level of certainty at the identification.

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 42; Joiner, 2018 IL

¶ 92 In the case at bar, Berquist testified that he had no doubt when he identified defendant

as the shooter to police. In contrast, Singletary testified that he was 40% certain. Robinson

testified that he recognized defendant, as defendant was standing in the middle of the street

prior to the shooting. Robinson explained that he knew defendant through defendant’s sisters,

who Robinson had gone to school with.

¶ 93 With respect to Berquist, defendant argues that we should give this factor little weight

because there is a low correlation between a witness’s level of certainty and whether the

identification is correct. However, with respect to Singletary, defendant argues that

Singletary’s identification is worthless because of his low level of certainty. Obviously, both

assertions cannot be true, and the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.

¶ 94 On the one hand, Berquist’s statement may not be as absolutely certain as his words

convey, but it does not have to be. Our system does not require “no doubt” at all, as he testified

to, but rather conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, Singletary’s lack of certainty

does not render his statement worthless. Analogous thereto, if the forecast is for 40% chance

of rain, it would not be unreasonable to still take an umbrella. Additionally, Singletary’s

35 No. 1-19-1353

identification, even at 40%, still provides corroboration for the identifications by Berquist and

Robinson, who both recognized defendant from their prior contact with him.

¶ 95 The difference in certainty expressed by Berquist and Singletary could be accounted

for by their different levels of familiarity with the subject of the identification. 10 Berquist was

familiar with defendant as his next-door neighbor, while Singletary did not know defendant

before the shooting. The difference in familiarity was well-explained to the jury. Thus, we

cannot find that a lack of certainty undercuts a jury verdict, based on three separate and

independent identifications.

¶ 96 Together, these three separate identifications—along with the State’s evidence of

opportunity, proximity, and motive—make it impossible for us to find that no rational person

could have convicted defendant. 11 Based on all this evidence, a rational person certainly could

have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 66.

¶ 97 B. Gang Evidence

¶ 98 Defendant’s second claim is that the State’s introduction of gang evidence was

excessive. On appeal, defendant does not dispute either that he was in a gang or that some

evidence was relevant in order to show both that he was in a gang and that his gang was in a

conflict with other gangs in Evanston at the time of the shooting. Instead, defendant’s claim

on appeal is that the State’s gang evidence was excessive when it introduced more than a dozen

gang-related crimes that defendant was not involved in. Specifically, defendant argues on

10 Defendant argues that prior familiarity with a subject “actually works against the reliability of their identifications,” and he cites one case in support: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Specifically, defendant cites pages 228 and 229, where the court quoted Justice Frankfurter as stating: “ ‘The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.’ ” Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. The court then proceeds to explain why this is so. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228-29. This cite does not further defendant’s argument. 11 We discuss the evidence in more detail below where we consider whether a preserved error requires reversal. Supra ¶¶ 104-107. 36 No. 1-19-1353

appeal: “Since [defendant] was not involved in any of these other gang-related crimes, the

above evidence was irrelevant and so prejudicial that it denied [defendant] his right to a fair

trial.”

¶ 99 In the court below, the prosecutor stated that, although the State had evidence of

defendant’s involvement in other crimes, it would not use that evidence to show the ongoing

conflict, specifically in order to avoid introducing other-crimes evidence. At the pretrial

hearing, the State argued that it had “taken great pains to reduce the prejudicial impact upon

the defendant.” The State noted that, although it had evidence of defendant’s participation in

other crimes, it was not seeking “to get into that prejudicial material.” Instead, it was “limiting”

its motion to “evidence that shows that the defendant was a D Block member, that his cousin,

Tyrone Usher, was a D Block member, and the fact that D Block was in conflict with other

gangs that summer, and that the defendant was knowledgeable about that.” The State asserted

that, since it would not introduce evidence of criminal activity by defendant, its motion was

“not a proof of other crimes motion.”

¶ 100 On appeal, defendant cites caselaw regarding other crimes or bad acts committed by a

defendant. However, as he also argues on appeal, defendant “was not involved in a single one

of these other gang crimes.” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant also cites caselaw regarding

evidence that reveals that a defendant is a gang member. However, he also argues on appeal

that he never disputed that he was in a gang, and he concedes that the court did not err “in

allowing the State to put on some evidence that [defendant] was in a gang 12 and that his gang

was in conflict with other Evanston gangs in September 2012.”

12 In the first paragraph of defense counsel’s closing argument to the jury, he stated: “Nobody is hiding the fact that [defendant] is a gang member.” 37 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 101 The rule that applies when a court must evaluate when some evidence is too much and,

hence, unfairly prejudicial is Illinois Rule of Evidence 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Rule 403

provides that, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

All evidence is prejudicial in the sense that it compels the factfinder in one direction or the

other; the issue posed by Rule 403 is when it becomes “unfair[ly]” so. Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff.

Jan. 1, 2011); People v. Gordon, 2017 IL App (3d) 140770, ¶ 25 (“all evidence is prejudicial

in that it is intended to impact the factfinder’s decision. Why would anyone put on evidence at

trial that did not prejudice the opponent’s case?”). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it casts

a negative light on a defendant for reasons that have little to do with the case on trial. Gordon,

2017 IL App (3d) 140770, ¶ 25. Defendant argues that this error was preserved for our review,

and the State does not argue otherwise. People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 56 (to avoid a

procedural default and preserve an error for later review, a criminal defendant must raise the

issue at trial and in a posttrial motion).

¶ 102 The admission of evidence is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court,

and we will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion. People

v. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial

court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person

would agree with it. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 12. Like other evidentiary rulings,

evidentiary rulings regarding gang-related evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 34. Although there is widespread disapproval of street

gangs, a defendant may not insulate the factfinder from the fact of his gang membership,

despite prejudice toward it, if that fact is relevant to understanding the case. Colon, 2018 IL

38 No. 1-19-1353

App (1st) 160120, ¶ 34. It is also well-established that “[o]ne of the purposes for which gang

evidence is admissible is to ‘provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act.’ ” People v.

Villareal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 233 (2001) (quoting People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1991)

(“admissible *** to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act”)); see Colon, 2018 IL

App (1st) 160120, ¶ 35.

¶ 103 Defendant argues that this evidence was “totally irrelevant because [defendant] was

not involved in a single one of them.” (Emphasis in original.) Although defendant concedes on

appeal that some evidence of the conflict in September 2012 was admissible, he argues that

testimony about the April 22, 2012, dice game and shooting of defendant “would have been

more than sufficient.” The State agrees that the incident on April 22, 2012, was indeed the

catalyst for the ensuing violence in the following months. Evidence that defendant himself had

been a victim of a gangland shooting—plus evidence that defendant’s cousin had been stabbed

that same day, that defendant learned of this stabbing just minutes before the shooting, that

there was no time at all for a cooling-off period before the shooting began, and that the shooter,

who was identified by three people as defendant, approached the group demanding to know

“which one of you” —was sufficient to establish motive and an explanation for an inexplicable

act. A description of numerous other bad acts and gang events, which defendant was not a part

of, was far more prejudicial than probative and simply not necessary to the case at bar. Thus,

we find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this unrelated and prejudicial

evidence.

¶ 104 Our supreme court has recognized three approaches for determining whether a

preserved error requires reversal. People v. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 40. Reversal is not

required (1) if the error did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction, (2) if the other

39 No. 1-19-1353

evidence was overwhelming, or (3) if the challenged evidence was duplicative or cumulative

of other properly admitted evidence. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 40; People v. Lerma, 2016 IL

118496, ¶ 33. In the case at bar, reversal is not required where the other evidence established

defendant’s guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. People v. Tompkins, 2023 IL 127805, ¶ 61;

People v. Effinger, 2016 IL App (3d) 140203, ¶ 18 (no reasonable probability exists that the

verdict would have been different if the irrelevant evidence had been excluded).

¶ 105 In Tompkins, our supreme court found that evidence of a codefendant’s drug possession

was completely irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Tompkins, 2023 IL 127805, ¶ 59. However,

the court agreed with the appellate court that, although the evidence was not duplicative of

other evidence, reversal was not required, where no reasonable probability existed that the

verdict would have been different if it had been excluded. Tompkins, 2023 IL 127805, ¶ 61. In

addition, the supreme court noted that the prejudicial impact of the drug evidence was “greatly

lessened” by the officer’s immediate testimony that it was unrelated to the defendant.

Tompkins, 2023 IL 127805, ¶ 61. Similarly, in the case at bar, the officer’s immediate

testimony that defendant was not involved in any of these events lessened their prejudicial

impact and, for the reasons explained below, there is no reasonable probability that the verdict

would have been different if it had been excluded.

¶ 106 In the case at bar, the State presented not one, not two, but three separate and

independent eyewitness identifications. People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670, ¶ 18 (it is well

established that a “single” eyewitness identification is sufficient to sustain a conviction);

People v. Oliver, 2013 IL App (1st) 120793, ¶ 26 (a single eyewitness identification “alone”

is sufficient to sustain a conviction). Two of the witnesses knew defendant prior to the

shooting, thereby reducing the risks often associated with eyewitness identification. In

40 No. 1-19-1353

addition, there was no allegation that any of these witnesses had a reason or motive to lie.

There was no evidence that they had an issue with defendant or that they were trying to deflect

suspicion from themselves. In that respect, all three identifications were untainted.

¶ 107 In addition to the three identifications, the State presented evidence of opportunity,

proximity, and motive, which were all independent of the evidence that should have been

excluded. Evidence of opportunity included testimony from defendant’s own family and

friends that he disappeared when the shooting occurred and reappeared shortly after it,

reentering the house through the back door. Evidence of proximity included testimony from

defendant’s own family and friends establishing that he was less than a half a block north of

the crime scene both before and after the shooting. Rebecca Olasimbo, Tiffany’s friend, stated

that she observed defendant shortly before the shooting, as he exited the front door of the

Woodson home, located just south of the Berquist home. Her statement dovetails with the

testimony of Berquist, who observed the shooter jogging southward toward the corner, while

muttering “I’ll kill you.” Evidence of motive includes evidence establishing that defendant was

shot in April, that his cousin had just been stabbed, that defendant’s sister told defendant about

the stabbing only minutes before the shooting, leaving no cooling-off period, and that the

shooter stated, immediately prior to the shooting, “which one of you,” which could be a

reference to “which one” stabbed Usher.

¶ 108 With three separate and independent identifications untainted by motives to lie or to

deflect suspicion—plus evidence of opportunity, proximity, and motive—we find that there is

no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different if the irrelevant evidence

had been excluded.

41 No. 1-19-1353

¶ 109 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 110 In conclusion, we do not find defendant’s claims warrant reversal.

¶ 111 Defendant claimed, first, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he was the shooter, where the principal evidence connecting him to the shooting were three

identifications and all three were allegedly unreliable. After carefully considering all five

Biggers factors, we cannot find that these three identifications, particularly when considered

together, were so unreliable that a reasonable juror could not find proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.

¶ 112 Defendant claimed, second, that, while the State’s gang evidence was relevant to the

extent needed to show his gang membership and the gang conflict at the time of the shooting,

it was excessive, where the State presented numerous incidents that defendant was not a part

of. While we agree with defendant that the evidence was excessive, irrelevant, and prejudicial,

we also find that reversal is not required where the result would have undoubtedly been the

same without it.

¶ 113 Affirmed.

42 No. 1-19-1353

People v. Woodson, 2023 IL App (1st) 191353

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-CR- 20136; the Hon. Lauren Gottainer Edidin, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Douglas H. Johnson and Joanna P. Kluzowska, of Kathleen T. for Zellner & Associates, P.C., of Downers Grove, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Hareena Meghani-Wakely, and Tasha-Marie Kelly, Appellee: Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.