People v. Woods

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Woods

80 A.D.3d 718, 914 N.Y.S.2d 682

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 18, 2011

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 80 A.D.3d 718 (People v. Woods) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Woods, 80 A.D.3d 718, 914 N.Y.S.2d 682 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lott, J., at trial; Gerges, J., at sentencing), rendered April 1, 2009, convicting him of aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

“If upon cross-examination a witness’ testimony is assailed— either directly or inferentially — as a recent fabrication, the witness may be rehabilitated with prior consistent statements that predated the motive to falsify” (People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10, 18 [1993]). During cross-examination, defense counsel implied that the prosecution witness’s testimony was a recent fabrication because she had received certain benefits from the police. By doing so, defense counsel opened the door for the prosecution to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility with a prior consistent statement that predated the motive to fabricate (id. at 18; see People v Sing Yuen Chen, 253 AD2d 898, 899 [1998]). The prior consistent statement did not need to predate all motives to fabricate (see People v Baker, 23 NY2d 307, 322-323 [1968]; People v Jones, 289 AD2d 47, 47-48 [2001]; People v Kanani, 272 AD2d 186, 187 [2000]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly admitted the witness’s prior, consistent statement.

Any error in instructing the jury on the presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3) was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and no significant probability that the error contributed to his convictions (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Mace, 91 AD2d 864 [1982]; cf. People v Williams, 146 AD2d 659, 660-661 [1989]).

The defendant’s challenge to the Supreme Court’s supplemental instructions on the counts charging criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review, [719]*719and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see People v Harrison, 194 AD2d 627 [1993]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lott, J., at trial; Gerges, J., at sentencing), rendered April 1, 2009, convicting him of aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

“If upon cross-examination a witness’ testimony is assailed— either directly or inferentially — as a recent fabrication, the witness may be rehabilitated with prior consistent statements that predated the motive to falsify” (People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10, 18 [1993]). During cross-examination, defense counsel implied that the prosecution witness’s testimony was a recent fabrication because she had received certain benefits from the police. By doing so, defense counsel opened the door for the prosecution to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility with a prior consistent statement that predated the motive to fabricate (id. at 18; see People v Sing Yuen Chen, 253 AD2d 898, 899 [1998]). The prior consistent statement did not need to predate all motives to fabricate (see People v Baker, 23 NY2d 307, 322-323 [1968]; People v Jones, 289 AD2d 47, 47-48 [2001]; People v Kanani, 272 AD2d 186, 187 [2000]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly admitted the witness’s prior, consistent statement.

Any error in instructing the jury on the presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3) was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and no significant probability that the error contributed to his convictions (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Mace, 91 AD2d 864 [1982]; cf. People v Williams, 146 AD2d 659, 660-661 [1989]).

The defendant’s challenge to the Supreme Court’s supplemental instructions on the counts charging criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review, [719]*719and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see People v Harrison, 194 AD2d 627 [1993]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

80 A.D.3d 718, 914 N.Y.S.2d 682, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-woods-nyappdiv-2011.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack