Filed 6/18/14 P. v. Woodis CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF D064244 CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SDC123601) v.
DENO EUGENE WOODIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kenneth K.
So and Timothy R. Walsh, Judges. Appeal dismissed as moot.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland,
Kathryn Kirschbaum and Alastair J. Agcaoili, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent. INTRODUCTION
Deno Eugene Woodis appeals from an order extending his involuntary
commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.)
Woodis contends we must reverse the order because the trial court erred by (1) failing to
hold a Marsden1 hearing following his written Marsden motions, and (2) allowing his
trial attorney to waive his right to a jury trial over his objection. We conclude these
contentions are moot and dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1996 Woodis pleaded guilty to committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child
under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The victim was a four-year-old girl.
Woodis admitted he orally copulated her and had her both orally copulate and masturbate
him. He denied other sexual activity with her, stating he "would not have [had] sexual
intercourse with her until she was of legal age or puberty, maybe 12 or 13." He also
admitted he had previously taught two young boys, whom he babysat, to masturbate and
orally copulate him and one another.
After serving his prison sentence, Woodis was involuntarily committed to a state
hospital as an MDO in 2004. His commitment was extended annually through May
2012.
In January 2013 the People petitioned to extend Woodis's commitment another
year. In March, the court received two letters from Woodis. In the first letter, labeled
1 See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-126 (Marsden). 2 "Marsden Motion," Woodis stated he was filing the motion against his court-appointed
attorney because his attorney had not visited him and had not responded to his
correspondence or calls. He also said he wanted a jury trial and he wanted his attorney to
subpoena his prison records.
In the second letter, also labeled "Marsden Motion," he reiterated his desire for a
jury trial. He also expressed some opinions about child molesters and the circumstances
under which they deserved to be released into the community. Unlike the first letter, the
second letter did not mention his attorney by name or criticize any aspect of his attorney's
performance. Instead, the letter simply acknowledged the court would provide him with
an attorney, the attorney needed to represent him to the fullest of the attorney's ability,
including obtaining past prison records, and the attorney must meet with him and show
him the planned defense.
The court subsequently set the matter for a status conference. Meanwhile, Woodis
sent the court a third letter inquiring about the status of his Marsden motion and
requesting a court date to hear the motion "as [he] now [had] a tentative court date on the
principal issue included in the Marsden."
Shortly before the status conference, two court-appointed psychiatrists evaluated
Woodis. Both psychiatrists diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type
and pedophilia, nonexclusive. In addition, both psychiatrists opined these disorders were
not in remission and he continued to pose a substantial danger of physical harm to others
because of them. The psychiatrists' opinions were based in part on Woodis's failure to
3 meet most of his recovery plan goals, poor attendance in group therapy, and recent
incidents of agitated and assaultive behavior.
At the status conference, the court, at Woodis's request, set the matter for trial, but
left open the question whether the trial would be a jury trial or a court trial. Because the
trial would occur after Woodis's maximum commitment date, the court asked Woodis
directly whether he waived his right to have the trial occur sooner. Woodis affirmatively
indicated his waiver. Neither he, his counsel, nor the court addressed his prior Marsden
correspondence.
At trial, defense counsel waived Woodis's right to a jury trial over Woodis's
objection. The parties then submitted on the psychiatrists' reports. After reviewing the
reports and considering the parties' arguments, the court granted the recommitment
petition, finding beyond a reasonable doubt Woodis suffered from a severe mental
disorder, the disorder was not in remission, and, because of the disorder, he presented a
substantial danger of physical harm to others. The court then extended Woodis's
commitment for another year to May 7, 2014. Although Woodis interjected multiple
times during the trial, he did not inquire about his prior Marsden correspondence, request
a Marsden hearing, or otherwise state he was dissatisfied with and wanted to replace his
attorney.
DISCUSSION
Woodis contends the court erred by failing to hold a Marsden hearing and by
allowing his attorney to waive his right to a jury trial over his objection. By the time
Woodis filed his reply brief, the challenged commitment was due to expire in
4 approximately one month. Since the remedy he sought for both claimed errors was a new
trial, which we could not provide him within the time remaining on the challenged
commitment, we requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties
addressing whether his appeal was moot and, if so, whether we should decide it
nonetheless.
After reviewing the supplemental briefing, we conclude that, even if we were to
decide this appeal entirely in Woodis's favor, we cannot provide him with any effective
relief at this late juncture. We cannot provide him with a new trial because the
commitment he is challenging will have expired before our decision becomes final.
Similarly, we cannot effectively remedy any opportunity he may have lost to preempt his
former attorney or former attorney's office from representing him in any pending
commitment proceedings as those proceedings will likely have concluded before our
decision becomes final. Moreover, the mere fact he may have been denied a Marsden
hearing in this case would not have precluded him from attempting to challenge the
attorney in any pending commitment proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude this appeal
is moot. (People v. Travis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1280 [an appeal is moot when
the appellate court cannot grant any effective relief].)
Nonetheless, we have the discretion to decide moot issues involving matters of
public interest likely to recur and yet evade review.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Filed 6/18/14 P. v. Woodis CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF D064244 CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SDC123601) v.
DENO EUGENE WOODIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kenneth K.
So and Timothy R. Walsh, Judges. Appeal dismissed as moot.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland,
Kathryn Kirschbaum and Alastair J. Agcaoili, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent. INTRODUCTION
Deno Eugene Woodis appeals from an order extending his involuntary
commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.)
Woodis contends we must reverse the order because the trial court erred by (1) failing to
hold a Marsden1 hearing following his written Marsden motions, and (2) allowing his
trial attorney to waive his right to a jury trial over his objection. We conclude these
contentions are moot and dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1996 Woodis pleaded guilty to committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child
under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The victim was a four-year-old girl.
Woodis admitted he orally copulated her and had her both orally copulate and masturbate
him. He denied other sexual activity with her, stating he "would not have [had] sexual
intercourse with her until she was of legal age or puberty, maybe 12 or 13." He also
admitted he had previously taught two young boys, whom he babysat, to masturbate and
orally copulate him and one another.
After serving his prison sentence, Woodis was involuntarily committed to a state
hospital as an MDO in 2004. His commitment was extended annually through May
2012.
In January 2013 the People petitioned to extend Woodis's commitment another
year. In March, the court received two letters from Woodis. In the first letter, labeled
1 See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-126 (Marsden). 2 "Marsden Motion," Woodis stated he was filing the motion against his court-appointed
attorney because his attorney had not visited him and had not responded to his
correspondence or calls. He also said he wanted a jury trial and he wanted his attorney to
subpoena his prison records.
In the second letter, also labeled "Marsden Motion," he reiterated his desire for a
jury trial. He also expressed some opinions about child molesters and the circumstances
under which they deserved to be released into the community. Unlike the first letter, the
second letter did not mention his attorney by name or criticize any aspect of his attorney's
performance. Instead, the letter simply acknowledged the court would provide him with
an attorney, the attorney needed to represent him to the fullest of the attorney's ability,
including obtaining past prison records, and the attorney must meet with him and show
him the planned defense.
The court subsequently set the matter for a status conference. Meanwhile, Woodis
sent the court a third letter inquiring about the status of his Marsden motion and
requesting a court date to hear the motion "as [he] now [had] a tentative court date on the
principal issue included in the Marsden."
Shortly before the status conference, two court-appointed psychiatrists evaluated
Woodis. Both psychiatrists diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type
and pedophilia, nonexclusive. In addition, both psychiatrists opined these disorders were
not in remission and he continued to pose a substantial danger of physical harm to others
because of them. The psychiatrists' opinions were based in part on Woodis's failure to
3 meet most of his recovery plan goals, poor attendance in group therapy, and recent
incidents of agitated and assaultive behavior.
At the status conference, the court, at Woodis's request, set the matter for trial, but
left open the question whether the trial would be a jury trial or a court trial. Because the
trial would occur after Woodis's maximum commitment date, the court asked Woodis
directly whether he waived his right to have the trial occur sooner. Woodis affirmatively
indicated his waiver. Neither he, his counsel, nor the court addressed his prior Marsden
correspondence.
At trial, defense counsel waived Woodis's right to a jury trial over Woodis's
objection. The parties then submitted on the psychiatrists' reports. After reviewing the
reports and considering the parties' arguments, the court granted the recommitment
petition, finding beyond a reasonable doubt Woodis suffered from a severe mental
disorder, the disorder was not in remission, and, because of the disorder, he presented a
substantial danger of physical harm to others. The court then extended Woodis's
commitment for another year to May 7, 2014. Although Woodis interjected multiple
times during the trial, he did not inquire about his prior Marsden correspondence, request
a Marsden hearing, or otherwise state he was dissatisfied with and wanted to replace his
attorney.
DISCUSSION
Woodis contends the court erred by failing to hold a Marsden hearing and by
allowing his attorney to waive his right to a jury trial over his objection. By the time
Woodis filed his reply brief, the challenged commitment was due to expire in
4 approximately one month. Since the remedy he sought for both claimed errors was a new
trial, which we could not provide him within the time remaining on the challenged
commitment, we requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties
addressing whether his appeal was moot and, if so, whether we should decide it
nonetheless.
After reviewing the supplemental briefing, we conclude that, even if we were to
decide this appeal entirely in Woodis's favor, we cannot provide him with any effective
relief at this late juncture. We cannot provide him with a new trial because the
commitment he is challenging will have expired before our decision becomes final.
Similarly, we cannot effectively remedy any opportunity he may have lost to preempt his
former attorney or former attorney's office from representing him in any pending
commitment proceedings as those proceedings will likely have concluded before our
decision becomes final. Moreover, the mere fact he may have been denied a Marsden
hearing in this case would not have precluded him from attempting to challenge the
attorney in any pending commitment proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude this appeal
is moot. (People v. Travis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1280 [an appeal is moot when
the appellate court cannot grant any effective relief].)
Nonetheless, we have the discretion to decide moot issues involving matters of
public interest likely to recur and yet evade review. (See, e.g., People v. Cheek (2001) 25
Cal.4th 894, 897-898.) Woodis does not seriously contend we should decide the jury trial
issue despite its mootness. He acknowledges the California Supreme Court is currently
reviewing whether a person subject to MDO proceedings must personally waive his or
5 her jury trial right. (People v. Blackburn (2013) Cal. LEXIS 6688, review granted
Aug. 14, 2013, S211078.) Given the Supreme Court's impending guidance, there is no
public interest to be served by our deciding the issue.
Conversely, Woodis contends we should decide the Marsden issue for two
reasons. First, he contends we should decide the issue because there is no case authority
directly applying Marsden to MDO proceedings. There is only case authority applying
Marsden to analogous sexually violent predator and conservatorship proceedings.
(People v. Hill (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 646, 652; Conservatorship of David L. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 701, 710-712.) While the absence of direct authority will sometimes
persuade us to exercise our discretion to decide an otherwise moot issue, it does not
persuade us in this instance because the parties both agree Marsden applies to MDO
proceedings. (See, e.g., Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
161, 176 [declining to decide a moot petition absent a material question requiring a
decision].)
Woodis also contends we should decide the Marsden issue because the parties
disagree on whether Woodis properly sought a Marsden hearing, whether he later
abandoned his desire for a Marsden hearing, and the appropriate remedy for a Marsden
violation. However, as the People point out, the resolution of the Marsden issue is
essentially fact-driven and, consequently, unlikely to provide much guidance in future
cases. We, therefore, decline to decide the issue notwithstanding its mootness. (See, e.g.,
MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204,
215 [dismissing moot appeal "given the fact-driven nature of the questions presented"];
6 Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 228 [declining to decide a moot issue
"dependent upon the specific facts of a given situation"].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
IRION, J.