People v. Womack

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Womack

63 A.D.2d 723, 405 N.Y.S.2d 131, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11651

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 22, 1978

StatusPublished

This text of 63 A.D.2d 723 (People v. Womack) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Womack, 63 A.D.2d 723, 405 N.Y.S.2d 131, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11651 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978).

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Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered August 4, 1975, convicting him of attempted possession of weapons, etc., as a felony, upon a plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal also brings up for review the denial of defendant’s [724]*724motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to accord him a speedy trial. Judgment reversed, on the law, motion granted, and indictment dismissed. The District Attorney, with commendable candor, concedes that in "good faith” he is compelled to "consent to the reversal of appellant’s conviction and dismissal of the indictment” since he has no explanation or justification for the protracted delay. We agree that the delay of some 41 months between arraignment and indictment denied defendant his right to a speedy trial (see People v Staley, 41 NY2d 789; People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625; People v McLaurin, 38 NY2d 586; People v White, 32 NY2d 393, 397-399). Martuscello, J. P., Suozzi, Rabin and Hawkins, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered August 4, 1975, convicting him of attempted possession of weapons, etc., as a felony, upon a plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal also brings up for review the denial of defendant’s [724]*724motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to accord him a speedy trial. Judgment reversed, on the law, motion granted, and indictment dismissed. The District Attorney, with commendable candor, concedes that in "good faith” he is compelled to "consent to the reversal of appellant’s conviction and dismissal of the indictment” since he has no explanation or justification for the protracted delay. We agree that the delay of some 41 months between arraignment and indictment denied defendant his right to a speedy trial (see People v Staley, 41 NY2d 789; People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625; People v McLaurin, 38 NY2d 586; People v White, 32 NY2d 393, 397-399). Martuscello, J. P., Suozzi, Rabin and Hawkins, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

63 A.D.2d 723, 405 N.Y.S.2d 131, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11651, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-womack-nyappdiv-1978.

Opinion

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