People v. Wilson

2021 IL App (4th) 190445-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 190445-U FILED This Order was filed under Supreme May 14, 2021 Court Rule 23 and is not precedent NO. 4-19-0445 Carla Bender th except in the limited circumstances 4 District Appellate allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Vermilion County TYREN C. WILSON, ) No. 16CF248 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Thomas M. O’Shaughnessy, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court was not required to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry where new counsel was appointed to represent defendant prior to his pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2 Defendant, Tyren C. Wilson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his fourth

pro se amended motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to home invasion, a Class X felony (720

ILCS 5/19-6(a)(5) (West 2016)), arguing this court should remand for a preliminary inquiry

pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). We affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. Charges and Guilty Plea ¶5 In April 2016, the State charged defendant by information with five criminal

offenses, including possession of a firearm without a firearm owner’s identification (FOID) card

(430 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2016)), home invasion with a deadly weapon (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(1)

(West 2016)), home invasion causing great bodily harm (id. § 19-6(a)(5)), armed robbery

(id. § 18-2(a)(2)), and aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(a)(4)). The trial court appointed the

Vermilion County Public Defender’s Office to represent defendant.

¶6 In April 2018, a grand jury returned four bills of indictment charging defendant

with three counts of home invasion (counts VI, VII, and IX) and one count of aggravated battery

(count VIII). As relevant to this appeal, count VII alleged that on April 15, 2016, defendant,

without authority, knowingly entered the dwelling place of another, located at 1002 Glendale,

Apartment 6, in Tilton, Illinois, and remained in such dwelling place until he knew or had reason

to know that one or more persons were present and intentionally caused injury to John L.

Golden, in violation of section 19-6(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2)

(West 2016)), a Class X felony. Following the indictment, defendant filed a motion to substitute

private counsel, Kevin Dixon, which the trial court allowed.

¶7 In July 2018, defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX,

arguing defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court (1) denied the

motion as to counts VI, VII, and IX and (2) allowed the motion as to count VIII, concluding it

alleged the same offense as count V of the information and was therefore duplicative.

¶8 In August 2018, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. In

exchange for defendant’s plea of guilty to an amended count VII, the State agreed to dismiss the

remaining charges and cap its sentencing recommendation at 25 years in prison. Defendant

signed a form titled “Admonishment of Rights Under Supreme Court Rule 402,” which reflected

-2- the terms of the plea agreement. The trial court determined defendant’s plea to be knowing and

voluntary and set the matter for sentencing. In November 2018, the trial court sentenced

defendant to 24 years in prison.

¶9 B. Postplea Proceedings

¶ 10 On November 7, 2018, defendant pro se filed a motion to withdraw his plea of

guilty, alleging his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated and his sentence was excessive.

On November 9, 2018, defendant mailed a letter to the court requesting that counsel be

appointed to represent him, explaining his previous counsel’s representation concluded after final

judgment. On December 14, 2018, the trial court appointed the Vermilion County Public

Defender’s Office to represent defendant.

¶ 11 On December 17, 2018, defendant pro se filed an amended motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, alleging the same claims as the initial motion and adding the following claims:

(1) his statutory and constitutional rights were violated by a finding of probable cause at the

preliminary hearing held on May 12, 2016; and (2) his plea counsel, Kevin Dixon, was

ineffective for (i) promising defendant he would “win an appeal” if he pleaded guilty and

(ii) failing to file a motion to dismiss counts VI through IX on the basis they were time barred by

federal statutes (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161(b), 3162(a)(2) (West 2016)).

¶ 12 On January 3, 2019, the court held a status hearing. At the hearing, the court

advised defendant’s new appointed attorney to (1) review defendant’s pro se amended motion to

withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment, (2) submit a certificate pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), and (3) file any amendments to defendant’s

pro se motion. The court additionally noted “one of the allegations in the amended motion is

ineffective assistance.”

-3- ¶ 13 On February 9, 2019, defendant mailed a letter to the trial court stating he

received correspondence from Michael Mara of the Vermilion County Public Defender’s Office.

The correspondence defendant received contained a document titled “Second Amended Motion

to Withdraw Plea of Guilty or Reconsider Sentence,” which Mara informed defendant he

intended to file on defendant’s behalf. In his letter to the court, defendant stated he informed

Mara he did not wish for him to file the motion because Mara omitted several of defendant’s

claims and requested that Mara either include the omitted claims in the motion or withdraw as

counsel.

¶ 14 On February 19, 2019, defendant pro se filed a second amended motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, alleging the same claims as the first and amended motions and adding

the following claims: (1) his plea counsel was ineffective for causing defendant “mental distress”

when he informed defendant there was no possible defense for the indicted charges and (2) he

pleaded guilty under duress from plea counsel.

¶ 15 On March 12, 2019, defendant pro se filed a third amended motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, alleging the same claims as in his first, amended, and second amended motions

and adding claims that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to present a possible defense

requested by defendant, (2) failing to inform defendant he would be required to serve 85% of his

sentence, and (3) promising defendant (i) he would receive a sentence of less than 15 years in

prison if he pleaded guilty, (ii) a motion to dismiss the indictment would be granted, and (iii) he

would “get [defendant] a plea agreement of 5 years.” Defendant further stated he did not fully

understand the trial court’s admonishments regarding the consequences of pleading guilty.

¶ 16 On March 20, 2019, defendant filed a motion requesting to proceed pro se. At a

hearing on April 4, 2019, the trial court admonished defendant regarding his right to proceed

-4- pro se and asked defendant a number of questions regarding his education and familiarity with

the criminal justice system before allowing the motion.

¶ 17 In May 2019, defendant filed a fourth amended motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, repeating the allegations in his previous motions and adding that his plea counsel was

ineffective for failing to: (1) challenge the amendment to count VII at the time of his plea,

(2) move to dismiss the indictment because it violated his speedy trial rights, (3) move to dismiss

“2 out of the 3 home invasion counts alleged against John Golden, and 1 out of the 2 home

invasion counts alleged against Francis Bond, based on a violation of the double jeopardy

clauses, under one-act, one-crime principles”; and (4) move to dismiss counts VI to IX pursuant

to various sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(11) (West

2016); id. § 109-3.1).

¶ 18 On June 17, 2019, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, concluding that defendant’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and that he had not

made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel “contributing to that plea and

rendering it not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.”

¶ 19 This appeal followed.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 Defendant appeals, arguing this court should remand for a preliminary inquiry

pursuant to Krankel because defendant raised a pro se allegation of ineffective assistance of

counsel following sentencing. The State responds remand is not necessary because defendant

was appointed new counsel and instead elected to proceed pro se. We conclude that under the

particular facts of this case, the trial court satisfied its duties under Krankel.

-5- ¶ 22 “The common-law procedure, which has evolved from our decision in Krankel, is

triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel.” People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11, 88 N.E.3d 732. “Further, a pro se defendant is

not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention.” People v.

Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 79, 797 N.E.2d 631, 638 (2003). A defendant is not required to file a

written motion but may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel orally or through a

letter or note to the court. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11. Additionally, “when a defendant presents

a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should first examine

the factual basis of the defendant’s claim.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78.

¶ 23 In People v. Cunningham, 376 Ill. App. 3d 298, 304, 875 N.E.2d 1136, 1143

(2007), the First District stated:

“The ultimate purpose of a trial court’s initial inquiry into a defendant’s

ineffective assistance claim is to determine whether new counsel should be

appointed. [Citations.] When a defendant’s actual allegations show possible

attorney neglect of the case, the court should appoint new counsel to argue

ineffective assistance, rather than simply having original trial counsel or a

defendant argue the claim.”

¶ 24 In Cunningham, the defendant argued the trial court should have conducted a

preliminary Krankel inquiry into the factual basis of a posttrial complaint he filed with the

Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) against his trial counsel. Id. The

First District concluded the trial court was not required to conduct a Krankel inquiry because the

defendant was subsequently represented by different counsel at sentencing and did not file a

pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. In conclusion, the Cunningham

-6- court stated, “[T]he initial [Krankel] inquiry’s purpose is to determine whether new counsel

should be appointed. Such an inquiry is irrelevant in the present case because defendant received

new counsel.” Id. at 306.

¶ 25 In a later discussion of Cunningham, the First District stated:

“We found no error in the court’s failure to undertake a preliminary Krankel

inquiry. First and foremost, the trial court granted defense counsel’s motion to

withdraw and allowed new counsel to represent the defendant, which ultimately is

the goal of the preliminary Krankel inquiry—to determine whether the claims of

ineffectiveness are sufficient to warrant the appointment of new counsel to pursue

those claims. In other words, the defendant received all that a preliminary Krankel

inquiry could have given him, anyway.” People v. Downing, 2019 IL App (1st)

170329, ¶ 59, 147 N.E.3d 779.

¶ 26 Here, the court satisfied its duties under Krankel when it appointed new counsel

to represent defendant following sentencing. The record shows that following the indictments,

defendant retained private counsel, Kevin Dixon, to represent him. Following sentencing,

defendant filed his initial pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea—arguing only that his

statutory speedy trial rights were violated and his sentence was excessive—and requested new

counsel, explaining Dixon’s representation concluded after final judgment. The court then

appointed the Vermilion County Public Defender’s Office to represent him. It was not until after

the court appointed new counsel that defendant raised his pro se claims of ineffective assistance:

the court appointed new counsel on December 14, 2018, and defendant pro se filed his amended

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which included the new ineffective assistance claims, on

December 17, 2018. At the January 2019 status hearing, the court specifically acknowledged

-7- defendant had raised pro se allegations of ineffective assistance in his amended motion and

directed defendant’s new appointed counsel to review those allegations, confer with defendant,

and file a Rule 604(d) certificate to verify the same. Defendant’s new appointed counsel, Mara,

subsequently sent defendant a draft of a motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea. Defendant

ultimately disagreed with the proposed motion and asked to proceed pro se. Defendant had the

opportunity to have counsel present his claims to the court and ultimately rejected that

opportunity in favor of representing himself.

¶ 27 Based on this record, we conclude no Krankel inquiry was necessary. New

counsel had already been appointed to represent defendant prior to defendant bringing his

ineffective assistance claims to the attention of the court. The court was aware of the ineffective

assistance allegations and directed new counsel to investigate them. Accordingly, “[s]uch an

inquiry is irrelevant in the present case because defendant received new counsel,” (Cunningham,

376 Ill. App. 3d at 306), and “defendant received all that a preliminary Krankel inquiry could

have given him.” Downing, 2019 IL App (1st) 170329, ¶ 59. The court satisfied any duties it had

under Krankel, and remand is not necessary.

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 30 Affirmed.

-8-