The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY December 24, 2025
2025COA94
No. 22CA1977, People v. Wilson — Crimes — Violation of Custody Order or Order Relating to Parental Responsibilities — Unit of Prosecution; Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Double Jeopardy — Multiplicity
As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of
appeals considers whether the unit of prosecution for violating a
child custody order under section 18-3-304(2), C.R.S. 2025, is the
number of custody orders violated or the number of children
affected. Based on the plain language of the statute, the division
concludes that the unit of prosecution is the number of children
affected. The division further concludes that no evidentiary error
occurred here and that sufficient evidence supports the violation of
a child custody order and child abuse convictions. Accordingly, the
judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded for the trial court to
merge the separate knowing or reckless and negligent child abuse convictions into a single conviction and to amend the mittimus
accordingly. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA94
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1977 Mesa County District Court No. 21CR982 Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Tiffany Jean Wilson,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur
Announced December 24, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Emily Hessler, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Tiffany Jean Wilson, appeals her convictions on
four counts of violation of a custody order, one count of child abuse
(no injury, knowing or reckless), one count of child abuse (no
injury, negligence), one count of resisting arrest, and one count of
obstructing government operations.
¶2 Wilson raises three challenges on appeal. She contends that
(1) insufficient evidence supports her convictions for violating a
child custody order and child abuse; (2) extrinsic bad character
evidence was erroneously admitted; and (3) her four convictions for
violation of a custody order are multiplicitous because the unit of
prosecution under section 18-3-304(2), C.R.S. 2025, is the number
of custody orders violated, not the number of children affected.
Wilson also contends, and the People agree, that merging her
negligent child abuse conviction into her knowing or reckless child
abuse conviction is required.
¶3 Wilson’s section 18-3-304(2) argument raises a novel issue of
statutory interpretation. Based on the statute’s plain language, we
conclude that the unit of prosecution for violating a child custody
order is the number of children affected, not the number of custody
orders violated. Accordingly, we reject Wilson’s argument and,
1 because we disagree with her evidentiary arguments, affirm the
judgment. We remand the case for the trial court to merge Wilson’s
child abuse convictions into a single conviction and to amend the
mittimus accordingly.
I. Background
¶4 In June 2021, Maggie Hellard, a social caseworker with the
Mesa County Department of Human Services (MCDHS), received an
emergency custody and pickup order (the Order) for Wilson’s four
children. Hellard and another MCDHS caseworker, Erica Sebring,
along with Grand Junction Police Officers Kaelyn Dennis and Travis
Wright, approached Wilson in the driveway of her then boyfriend’s
house. Wilson and her oldest child, J.W., were standing outside
her car, while the remaining three children were inside her car.
¶5 Hellard identified herself as a caseworker with MCDHS, read
the Order to Wilson, said that the children were required to come
with her, and said that a shelter hearing would take place in two
days. Hellard did not show Wilson the Order.
¶6 Initially, Wilson was calm and said she understood. After
Hellard and Sebring repeated the Order, Wilson grew agitated and
said that she was done “playing games” and that she would see
2 MCDHS in court. Wilson got in her car, instructed J.W. to get in
the car, and began backing out of the driveway with the passenger
side door open. Wilson then left with her children.
¶7 Approximately thirty minutes later, Hellard received a tip from
B.P., a former foster parent of two of Wilson’s children and a friend
of Wilson, that Wilson was at her own house. When B.P. arrived at
Wilson’s house, she found Wilson in a back bedroom. Wilson was
holding her eighteen-month-old son, C.S., while smoking
marijuana. Wilson was very upset, threatened to “effing kill
herself,” and grabbed a pair of scissors. Wilson was “elevated” and
crying, and she told B.P. that she was not going to lose her
children. When Dennis and Wright knocked on the front door,
Wilson began stabbing herself in the head with the scissors.
¶8 Shortly thereafter, J.W. let Dennis and Wright into Wilson’s
house and they entered the back bedroom. Wilson was still sitting
on the bed with C.S. in her left arm and a pair of scissors in her
right hand. B.P. was lying on the bed, trying to restrain Wilson’s
right arm. B.P. told the officers that Wilson had attempted to stab
herself. Dennis jumped on the bed to retrieve the scissors. After a
struggle, Wilson was arrested.
3 ¶9 The People charged Wilson with four counts of violating a
custody order, two counts of child abuse, resisting arrest,
obstructing government operations, and reckless endangerment. A
jury acquitted her of reckless endangerment and convicted her of
the remaining charges. The court sentenced Wilson to forty-five
days in jail and two years of probation.
II. Sufficiency
¶ 10 Wilson contends that insufficient evidence supports her
convictions for violation of a custody order and child abuse. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 “We review the record de novo to determine whether the
evidence presented was sufficient in both quantity and quality to
sustain a defendant’s conviction.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,
¶ 63. In doing so, we assess whether the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a reasonable
conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Tomaske, 2022 COA 52, ¶ 17. We will overturn the verdict
only if, despite drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the
prosecution, the record is unsubstantial and insufficient to support
4 a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark v. People, 232
P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Colo. 2010).
B. Violation of a Child Custody Order
¶ 12 Under section 18-3-304(2),
any parent or other person who violates an order of any district or juvenile court of this state, granting the custody of a child or parental responsibilities with respect to a child under the age of eighteen years to any person, agency, or institution, with the intent to deprive the lawful custodian or person with parental responsibilities of the custody or care of a child under the age of eighteen years
violates a custody order.
¶ 13 Wilson contends that the prosecution failed to prove that
(1) she violated the Order; (2) she had the intent to deprive a lawful
custodian of custody; and (3) the Order was issued by a district or
juvenile court. We are not persuaded.
¶ 14 The evidence demonstrated that a judge ordered the children
to be placed in MCDHS’s temporary custody. Hellard testified that
she knew Wilson from previous interactions as a caseworker. Body
camera footage further showed that Hellard told Wilson that a judge
“signed over custody”; Wilson said she knew what to do about the
shelter hearing and was “not going to play your . . . charades
5 anymore”; Sebring told Wilson the children had to come with
MCDHS and Wilson said “no, they are not”; and when Hellard
reiterated that MCDHS had custody of the children by court order,
Wilson replied that she was “not doing this with [MC]DHS anymore”
and drove away.
¶ 15 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a jury could reasonably conclude that Wilson violated
the Order by leaving with the children after Hellard explained that it
required the children to come with her.
¶ 16 We reject Wilson’s argument that the prosecution did not
prove that she violated the Order because the Order required law
enforcement officers to take physical custody of the children before
transferring them to MCDHS. The Order said law enforcement
“shall accompany [MCDHS]” and law enforcement “may enter . . .
retrieve . . . and deliver the children to the [MCDHS’s] custody.”
See People v. Garcia, 2016 COA 124, ¶ 13 (“shall” is generally
mandatory, whereas “may” is generally indicative of a grant of
discretion or choice among alternatives). Moreover, it explicitly
stated that MCDHS shall exercise custody, not that law
enforcement shall exercise custody.
6 ¶ 17 To the extent Wilson contends that a defendant may only
violate section 18-3-304(2) by “taking” a child from a lawful
custodian, we disagree. When interpreting a statute, we focus on
legislative intent. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 11. We may not
add or subtract words from a statute. Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d
563, 567 (Colo. 2007). Section 18-3-304(2) only requires “the intent
to deprive,” which can be committed by taking a child or by refusing
to surrender a child.
¶ 18 The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to reasonably
conclude that Wilson understood the Order and acted with the
intent to deprive MCDHS of custody. Insofar as Wilson argues that
conflicting evidence shows she did not understand the Order
because Hellard did not provide her with a copy or explain its
contents or her rights and remedies, it was up to the jury to resolve
such conflicts. See People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 31 (“A court
must not invade the province of the jury by second-guessing its
conclusion when the record supports the jury’s findings.”).
¶ 19 Finally, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support a
finding that the Order was issued by a district or juvenile court.
Wilson asserts that the prosecution failed to present evidence that
7 the magistrate who issued the Order was properly appointed to
issue temporary protective custody orders acting as a district or
juvenile judge under sections 13-5-201(3) and 19-3-405(1), C.R.S.
2025. But the Order said “District Court, Mesa County, Colorado,”
provided the court’s address, and was signed “By the Court.” From
this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably infer that the Order
was issued by a Colorado district court. Again, to the extent the
evidence could have supported a contrary conclusion, the issue was
for the jury to decide. Perez, ¶ 31.
C. Child Abuse
¶ 20 A person commits child abuse if she “permits a child to be
unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to
the child’s life or health.” § 18-6-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 21 Wilson argues that the prosecution failed to prove that she
permitted C.S. to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed
a threat to his life or health and, to the extent C.S. was in danger, it
was due to B.P. and the officers confronting her and wrestling with
her while she was holding him. We disagree.
¶ 22 B.P. testified that Wilson held C.S. while smoking marijuana
and stabbed herself in the head before B.P. or the police officers
8 physically engaged with her. Viewing this evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude it was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to conclude that Wilson, not B.P. or the police
officers, permitted C.S. to be unreasonably placed in a situation
that posed a threat of injury to his life.
¶ 23 Wilson also argues that the prosecution failed to prove that
she acted with any of the requisite mental states. Again, we
disagree. Wilson was charged with two counts of child abuse: one
committed knowingly or recklessly, and one committed with
criminal negligence. A person acts knowingly when “[s]he is aware
that h[er] conduct is practically certain to cause the result.” § 18-1-
501(6), C.R.S. 2025. Acting knowingly necessarily includes acting
recklessly and acting with criminal negligence. People v. Rigsby,
2020 CO 74, ¶ 22.
¶ 24 As discussed, B.P. testified that Wilson stabbed herself in the
head while holding C.S. The evidence also showed that Wilson
continued to resist even when B.P. and the police officers began to
wrestle with her to remove the scissors and C.S. This evidence is
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Wilson was aware
that her conduct was “practically certain” to place C.S. in a
9 situation that posed a threat of injury to his life. See People v.
Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145, 1154 (Colo. App. 2009) (“In assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence, . . . a defendant’s mental state may be
inferred from his or her conduct and other evidence, including the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime . . . .”).
¶ 25 We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support Wilson’s convictions.
III. CRE 404(b)
¶ 26 Wilson next contends that the trial court erroneously admitted
extrinsic bad character evidence that her children had previously
been placed in foster care. We disagree.
¶ 27 We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Abad, 2021 COA 6, ¶ 8. A court abuses its
discretion when it misapplies the law or when its ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v.
Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 23.
¶ 28 CRE 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of evidence of
uncharged misconduct for the purpose of proving that a defendant
acted in conformity with a character trait on a particular occasion.
It governs admissibility “when the trial court determines that
10 uncharged misconduct evidence supports an improper inference of
the defendant’s character.” Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 43. If
extrinsic evidence does not suggest bad character, CRE 404(b) does
not apply, and the evidence is admissible if it is relevant and its
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Id. at ¶ 52; CRE 401-403.
¶ 29 Before trial, Wilson filed a motion in limine to preclude the
introduction of “any statements or evidence alluding to prior
[MC]DHS or child abuse cases.” Specifically, she argued that her
statement about killing herself and “not going through this again”
while stabbing herself in the head was inadmissible because it
alluded to a prior instance where she lost her children and could
only be used for propensity purposes. The trial court ruled that
Wilson’s statement was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and not
admissible at trial.
¶ 30 At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that Wilson’s
children were previously in foster care. During opening and closing
statements, it referenced the fact that B.P. fostered Wilson’s
children, and it also elicited testimony from B.P. and Hellard that
B.P. had fostered two of Wilson’s other children, M.J. and N.F.
11 ¶ 31 Importantly, however, the prosecution did not introduce
evidence that Wilson said she was “not going through this again.”
So despite Wilson’s arguments, no evidence was admitted in
violation of the trial court’s pretrial ruling.
¶ 32 To the extent Wilson argues that other evidence showing her
children were in foster care violated the trial court’s pretrial ruling,
we disagree. B.P.’s and Hellard’s testimony that M.J. was
previously in foster care did not state or suggest that the foster
placement resulted from Wilson’s prior criminal conduct, prior
instances of child abuse, or even MCDHS’s involvement. To the
contrary, B.P. testified that she was Wilson’s family friend and was
trying to cultivate a good relationship with her. Because this
evidence did not suggest bad character, CRE 404(b) does not apply.
Rojas, ¶ 52. Evidence that Wilson had experience with the foster
care system was further relevant because it rebutted Wilson’s
assertion that she did not understand or was confused by Hellard’s
explanation of the Order. Given that there was no accompanying
suggestion of bad character, we conclude the probative value of this
evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Accordingly, we discern no error.
12 IV. Unit of Prosecution for Violation of a Custody Order Convictions
¶ 33 Wilson next contends that the unit of prosecution for violating
a custody order is per order, not per child, and asks us to vacate
three of her convictions. As a matter of first impression, we
conclude that the unit of prosecution is per child affected.
¶ 34 We review de novo a claim that a conviction violates a
defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
People v. Arzabala, 2012 COA 99, ¶ 19.
¶ 35 Multiplicity is the charging of the same offense in several
counts, culminating in multiple punishments. Multiplicitous
convictions are prohibited because they violate the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. We analyze a multiplicity
claim in two steps. People v. Vigil, 251 P.3d 442, 448 (Colo. App.
2010). First, we examine the statute to determine the “unit of
prosecution.” People v. Bott, 2020 CO 86, ¶ 9. “The unit of
prosecution is the manner in which a criminal statute permits a
defendant’s conduct to be divided into discrete acts for purposes of
13 prosecuting multiple offenses.” Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209,
215 (Colo. 2005).
¶ 36 To determine the unit of prosecution, we look to the statute.
Arzabala, ¶ 23. In construing a statute, we must discern and
effectuate the intent of the legislature based primarily on the plain
and ordinary meaning of the language. Id. We read the language at
issue in the context of the statute as a whole and the context of the
entire statutory scheme. People v. Sexton, 2012 COA 26, ¶ 16. If
the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we look no
further. People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588, 590 (Colo. 2009).
¶ 37 Second, we examine the “factual components of each
prosecution and the evidence in support thereof.” Woellhaf, 105
P.3d at 215 (citation omitted). At the second step, “we look to all of
the evidence introduced at trial to determine whether the evidence
was sufficient to support distinct and separate offenses.” People v.
McMinn, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 22.
¶ 38 In pertinent part, the violation of a custody order statute
provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2.5) of this section, any parent or other person who violates an order of any district or juvenile
14 court of this state . . . with the intent to deprive the lawful custodian or person with parental responsibilities of the custody or care of a child under the age of eighteen years, commits a class 5 felony.
§ 18-3-304(2).
B. Analysis
¶ 39 Looking first to the words chosen by the legislature, we
observe that section 18-3-304(2) links violation of a custody order
to “a child,” using broad, indefinite terms. The statute provides
that “any parent or other person who violates an order . . . granting
the custody of a child . . . with the intent to deprive the lawful
custodian or person with parental responsibilities of the custody or
care of a child” violates a custody order. § 18-3-304(2) (emphasis
added). The legislature did not use the definite article “the” but
instead used the indefinite articles “an” and “a.” Cf. Coffey v. Colo.
Sch. of Mines, 870 P.2d 608, 610 (Colo. App. 1993) (use of the
definite article “the” particularizes the subject it precedes (citing
City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1988))); see also
Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (Colo. 1969) (the definite article
“the” “is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or
generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an’”). We conclude this language is
15 unambiguous and suggests that the legislature did not intend to
require a unique custody order for each individual child. Instead,
its repeated reference to “a child” in defining violation of a custody
order evinces an intent to criminalize violation of a custody order
with respect to each child identified in the order.
¶ 40 The plain language of section 18-3-304 focuses on protecting
the child, criminalizing the taking or enticing of any child from
another’s rightful custody, and creating an affirmative defense for
doing so when it is reasonably believed necessary to protect the
child from danger.1 The statute’s placement in article 3 of the
Criminal Code, entitled “Offenses Against the Person,” further
shows that the intent of the statute is to protect each individual
child. For such victim-based offenses “defined in terms of
committing an act causing harm to another person,” the unit of
prosecution is defined by the impact of the defendant’s actions, not
1 In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Colorado Supreme
Court has affirmed a defendant’s conviction on two counts of violation of a custody order — one for each child involved. See People v. Coyle, 654 P.2d 815, 817 (Colo. 1982). While the legislature has since amended the violation of a custody order statute, it has not changed the plain language focusing on the child or otherwise evidenced disapproval of the supreme court’s interpretation.
16 the defendant’s actions themselves. Magana v. People, 2022 CO 25,
¶¶ 25-26 (quoting People v. Espinoza, 2020 CO 43, ¶ 13); see also
People v. Snider, 2021 COA 19, ¶ 50 (by contrast, obstruction of a
peace officer is a non-victim-based crime, and its unit of
prosecution is defined in terms of discrete volitional acts of
obstruction, not the number of officers involved).
¶ 41 Based on the statute’s plain language and a reading of the
statutory scheme as a whole, we therefore conclude that the unit of
prosecution for violation of a custody order is the number of
children affected.
¶ 42 The out-of-state authority on which Wilson relies is
distinguishable.
¶ 43 In Llorens v. State, 520 S.W.3d 129, 139 (Tex. App. 2017) the
Texas court determined that the unit of prosecution for Texas’
interference with child custody statute is the order, not the child,
because the focus of the statute is on the order itself and the rights
of the person under the order who has legal control of the child
rather than on the child themselves. Further, the court determined
that the statutes placement in the criminal code under “Offenses
17 Against the Family” rather than “Offenses Against the Person”
supported their conclusion. Id.
¶ 44 Likewise, in State v. Hunter, 117 P.3d 254, 263-65 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2005), the court concluded that the relevant statute was
ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution. We have concluded that
the plain language of section 18-3-304 is unambiguous. And
despite Wilson’s attempt to distinguish the statute discussed in
People v. McCoy, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476, 478 (Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding multiple punishments for multiple violations of statute
prohibiting violation of child custody order), we conclude that the
California statute at issue in that case is like section 18-3-304 in
that it prohibits any person from violating a custody order with the
intent to deprive another of the custody and care of “a child.”
¶ 45 For these reasons, we conclude that the unit of prosecution for
violating a child custody order is the number of children affected.
We further conclude, at the second step of our multiplicity analysis,
that Wilson’s conduct constituted factually separate offenses
because each charge had a different victim. See People v. Harris,
2016 COA 159, ¶ 56. We therefore reject Wilson’s claim that
vacatur is required.
18 V. Merger
¶ 46 Finally, Wilson contends and the People concede that her
convictions for knowing or reckless child abuse and negligent child
abuse must merge. We agree.
¶ 47 “Whether convictions for different offenses merge is a question
of law that we review de novo.” People v. Sims, 2020 COA 78, ¶ 37
(citing Page v. People, 2017 CO 88, ¶ 6). “[I]f one offense is included
in another offense, a defendant may not be convicted of both
offenses.” Friend v. People, 2018 CO 90, ¶ 32. An offense is a
lesser included one if it “is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged.” § 18-1-408(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 48 Both of Wilson’s child abuse charges were based on identical
conduct — Wilson’s stabbing herself in the head while holding C.S.
Therefore, the criminal negligence charge was a lesser included
offense of the knowing or reckless abuse charge. Reyna-Abarca v.
People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 64; see Rigsby, ¶¶ 21-22. We therefore
remand the case for the trial court to merge Wilson’s child abuse
convictions and to amend the mittimus accordingly.
19 VI. Disposition
¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded with
directions.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.