NO. 5-06-0507 N O T IC E
Decision filed 09/16/08. The text of IN THE this dec ision m ay b e changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS P e t i ti o n for Re hea ring or the
disposition of the same. FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Shelby County. ) v. ) No. 03-CF-98 ) PAMELA WILLIAMSON, ) Honorable ) David W. Slater, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:
On July 22, 2003, the defendant, Pamela Williamson, was charged under the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2002)) with the unlawful
manufacture of more than 400 but less than 900 grams of a substance containing
methamphetamine, a Class X felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of between 12
and 50 years (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2002)). Following a jury trial in the circuit court of
Shelby County, the defendant was found guilty, and on June 16, 2004, she was sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of 15 years. Her motions for a sentence reduction and for a new trial
were denied, and on February 28, 2005, the defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On September 11, 2005, while the defendant's direct appeal was pending, the
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (the Act) (720 ILCS 646/1 et seq.
(West 2006)) became law. The Act removed the control of methamphetamine from the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, established new offenses relating to methamphetamine,
and contained new sentencing provisions for those offenses. It specifically provides as
follows:
1 "Applicability. A prosecution for any violation of law occurring prior to the
effective date of this Act is not affected or abated by this Act. If the offense being
prosecuted would be a violation of this Act[] and has not reached the sentencing stage
or final adjudication, then for purposes of penalty the penalties under this Act apply
if they are less than under the prior law upon which the prosecution was commenced."
720 ILCS 646/105 (West 2006).
In light of this provision of the Act, on June 16, 2006, the defendant filed a pro se
motion for resentencing under the Act. The motion argued that under the Act the defendant
would have been more appropriately prosecuted only for the newly created offenses of
possessing methamphetamine-manufacturing material (720 ILCS 646/30 (West 2006)) and/or
unlawful disposal of methamphetamine-manufacturing waste (720 ILCS 646/45 (West
2006)), both Class 2 felonies punishable by a term of imprisonment of three to seven years.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West 2006). The motion argued that had the Act been in effect
at the time of her prosecution, the defendant might have been found not guilty of
manufacture, a Class X felony, but guilty of possessing methamphetamine-manufacturing
material and/or unlawful disposal of methamphetamine-manufacturing waste, both Class 2
felonies. Because the penalty for a Class 2 felony is less than the penalty she received for
her conviction of a Class X felony, the motion sought resentencing under the Act as provided
in section 105 (720 ILCS 646/105 (West 2006)).
On August 30, 2006, the circuit court of Shelby County denied the defendant's motion
for resentencing under the Act for the following reasons:
"1. The Motion for Resentencing is Denied. The Motion is untimely filed as
the sentence was entered 6/22/04 [sic] and the Motion was filed 6/16/06.
2. The Motion is based on a new offense being added to the Criminal Code
which was not in existence on the date of the offense, the date of the trial, or the date
2 of the sentencing. The new offense was added to the Criminal Code with an effective
date of 9/11/05. The Defendant now requests a new sentencing based on a new
statute, not the one she was charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for.
3. The Court is ruling on this motion without a hearing as the M otion is
untimely[] and concerns an issue of law with no valid legal basis."
The defendant filed her notice of appeal on September 21, 2006. On March 6, 2007, the
defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Williamson,
No. 5-05-0112 (2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)).
We now affirm the denial of her motion for resentencing under the Act. Because the issue
on appeal involves only a question of law, the proper interpretation of the Act, our review
is de novo. See People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001).
The defendant was charged under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act with the
unlawful manufacture of between 400 and 900 grams of methamphetamine. The sentence
provided under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act for this Class X felony was a term of
imprisonment between 12 and 50 years. 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(C) (West 2002). The
defendant received a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment.
The Act contains an identical offense, participation in methamphetamine
manufacturing, which is also classified as a Class X felony with a possible range of
imprisonment between 12 and 50 years. 720 ILCS 646/15(a)(2)(D) (West 2006).
By its own terms, section 105 of the Act applies only if the penalties thereunder are
less than the penalties under the prior law upon which the prosecution was commenced. 720
ILCS 646/105 (West 2006). In the case of the manufacture of methamphetamine, the
penalties under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act and the Methamphetamine Control and
Community Protection Act are identical. Accordingly, the Methamphetamine Control and
Community Protection Act does not apply and the defendant was not entitled to, and would
3 not benefit from, resentencing under that act. The circuit court did not err in denying the
defendant's motion for resentencing under that act.
On appeal, the defendant attacks the circuit court's finding of untimeliness, arguing
that because her direct appeal was still pending, the motion for resentencing was timely
because her case had not yet reached "final adjudication." We need not decide this issue
because, in addition to finding that the defendant's motion was not timely filed, the circuit
court also found that it had no valid legal basis. Even if the defendant's motion for
resentencing is deemed timely, the resentencing provision of the Act does not apply where
the penalties under the Act are not lesser than those under the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act under which the prosecution was commenced.
The defendant makes a speculative and specious argument that had the Act been in
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NO. 5-06-0507 N O T IC E
Decision filed 09/16/08. The text of IN THE this dec ision m ay b e changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS P e t i ti o n for Re hea ring or the
disposition of the same. FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Shelby County. ) v. ) No. 03-CF-98 ) PAMELA WILLIAMSON, ) Honorable ) David W. Slater, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:
On July 22, 2003, the defendant, Pamela Williamson, was charged under the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2002)) with the unlawful
manufacture of more than 400 but less than 900 grams of a substance containing
methamphetamine, a Class X felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of between 12
and 50 years (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2002)). Following a jury trial in the circuit court of
Shelby County, the defendant was found guilty, and on June 16, 2004, she was sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of 15 years. Her motions for a sentence reduction and for a new trial
were denied, and on February 28, 2005, the defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On September 11, 2005, while the defendant's direct appeal was pending, the
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (the Act) (720 ILCS 646/1 et seq.
(West 2006)) became law. The Act removed the control of methamphetamine from the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, established new offenses relating to methamphetamine,
and contained new sentencing provisions for those offenses. It specifically provides as
follows:
1 "Applicability. A prosecution for any violation of law occurring prior to the
effective date of this Act is not affected or abated by this Act. If the offense being
prosecuted would be a violation of this Act[] and has not reached the sentencing stage
or final adjudication, then for purposes of penalty the penalties under this Act apply
if they are less than under the prior law upon which the prosecution was commenced."
720 ILCS 646/105 (West 2006).
In light of this provision of the Act, on June 16, 2006, the defendant filed a pro se
motion for resentencing under the Act. The motion argued that under the Act the defendant
would have been more appropriately prosecuted only for the newly created offenses of
possessing methamphetamine-manufacturing material (720 ILCS 646/30 (West 2006)) and/or
unlawful disposal of methamphetamine-manufacturing waste (720 ILCS 646/45 (West
2006)), both Class 2 felonies punishable by a term of imprisonment of three to seven years.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West 2006). The motion argued that had the Act been in effect
at the time of her prosecution, the defendant might have been found not guilty of
manufacture, a Class X felony, but guilty of possessing methamphetamine-manufacturing
material and/or unlawful disposal of methamphetamine-manufacturing waste, both Class 2
felonies. Because the penalty for a Class 2 felony is less than the penalty she received for
her conviction of a Class X felony, the motion sought resentencing under the Act as provided
in section 105 (720 ILCS 646/105 (West 2006)).
On August 30, 2006, the circuit court of Shelby County denied the defendant's motion
for resentencing under the Act for the following reasons:
"1. The Motion for Resentencing is Denied. The Motion is untimely filed as
the sentence was entered 6/22/04 [sic] and the Motion was filed 6/16/06.
2. The Motion is based on a new offense being added to the Criminal Code
which was not in existence on the date of the offense, the date of the trial, or the date
2 of the sentencing. The new offense was added to the Criminal Code with an effective
date of 9/11/05. The Defendant now requests a new sentencing based on a new
statute, not the one she was charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for.
3. The Court is ruling on this motion without a hearing as the M otion is
untimely[] and concerns an issue of law with no valid legal basis."
The defendant filed her notice of appeal on September 21, 2006. On March 6, 2007, the
defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Williamson,
No. 5-05-0112 (2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)).
We now affirm the denial of her motion for resentencing under the Act. Because the issue
on appeal involves only a question of law, the proper interpretation of the Act, our review
is de novo. See People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001).
The defendant was charged under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act with the
unlawful manufacture of between 400 and 900 grams of methamphetamine. The sentence
provided under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act for this Class X felony was a term of
imprisonment between 12 and 50 years. 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(C) (West 2002). The
defendant received a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment.
The Act contains an identical offense, participation in methamphetamine
manufacturing, which is also classified as a Class X felony with a possible range of
imprisonment between 12 and 50 years. 720 ILCS 646/15(a)(2)(D) (West 2006).
By its own terms, section 105 of the Act applies only if the penalties thereunder are
less than the penalties under the prior law upon which the prosecution was commenced. 720
ILCS 646/105 (West 2006). In the case of the manufacture of methamphetamine, the
penalties under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act and the Methamphetamine Control and
Community Protection Act are identical. Accordingly, the Methamphetamine Control and
Community Protection Act does not apply and the defendant was not entitled to, and would
3 not benefit from, resentencing under that act. The circuit court did not err in denying the
defendant's motion for resentencing under that act.
On appeal, the defendant attacks the circuit court's finding of untimeliness, arguing
that because her direct appeal was still pending, the motion for resentencing was timely
because her case had not yet reached "final adjudication." We need not decide this issue
because, in addition to finding that the defendant's motion was not timely filed, the circuit
court also found that it had no valid legal basis. Even if the defendant's motion for
resentencing is deemed timely, the resentencing provision of the Act does not apply where
the penalties under the Act are not lesser than those under the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act under which the prosecution was commenced.
The defendant makes a speculative and specious argument that had the Act been in
effect at the time of her prosecution, she would have been prosecuted and found guilty only
of possessing methamphetamine-manufacturing material and/or unlawful disposal of
methamphetamine-manufacturing waste, and not of manufacturing methamphetamine. She
argues, "[T]he legislature's creation of these offenses and the Act's authorization of
retroactive application provide a window for defendant and others whose methamphetamine
convictions were not final when the Act became law[] to request resentencing to a lesser
sentence under Section 105." We note that a plain reading of section 105 does not lead to
the conclusion that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced for a lesser crime for which she
was neither prosecuted nor convicted just because that crime has been newly created by the
Act. To the contrary, section 105 clearly states, "A prosecution for any violation of law
occurring prior to the effective date of this Act is not affected or abated by this Act." 720
ILCS 646/105 (West 2006). By its own terms, section 105 applies only to the penalty to be
imposed for the prior conviction: "for purposes of penalty the penalties under this Act apply
if they are less than under the prior law upon which the prosecution was commenced."
4 (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 646/105 (West 2006).
The defendant does not argue that she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the unlawful manufacture of between 400 and 900 grams of a substance containing
methamphetamine. A defendant is not entitled by section 105 to have her conviction reduced
to a lesser offense, one for which she was neither prosecuted nor convicted. Section 105
applies only to the penalty to be imposed to that prior conviction. Accordingly, we reject the
defendant's argument.
The circuit court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for resentencing under
section 105 of the Act, and its order is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
DONOVAN and WEXSTTEN, JJ., concur.
5 NO. 5-06-0507
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Shelby County. ) v. ) No. 03-CF-98 ) PAMELA WILLIAMSON, ) Honorable ) David W. Slater, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: September 16, 2008 ___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.
Honorable James K. Donovan, J., and Honorable James M. Wexstten, J., Concur ___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Edwin J. Anderson, Assistant Defender, Office for of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 117 North Tenth Street, Suite Appellant #300, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 ___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Honorable Alan Lolie, Shelby County State's Attorney, Shelby County Courthouse, for Shelbyville, IL 62565; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Appellee Director, Patrick D. Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 ___________________________________________________________________________________