Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Wildes CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083185
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB23002648)
JARED ELIAS WILDES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gregory S. Tavill,
Judge. Affirmed.
Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Amanda Lloyd
and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 I.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant and appellant Jared Elias Wildes guilty of first degree
residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and the court sentenced him to four years in state
prison. On appeal, defendant argues the matter should be remanded for resentencing
because the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to continue. He
contends that the denial violated his federal constitutional rights to present mitigating
evidence, and to the extent counsel failed to obtain the mitigating evidence and file a
formal continuance motion, counsel was ineffective. Under the circumstances presented,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to continue the
sentencing hearing and the denial did not render the sentencing hearing fundamentally
unfair.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was C.L.’s son-in-law, and his wife, who was C.L.’s daughter, had
passed away several years ago. C.L would help defendant out from time to time,
allowing him to spend the night a couple of times and helping him find work. A week
before the burglary, defendant had stopped by the house looking for work. C.L. asked
defendant to watch the house and placed a tent in the front yard so defendant could stay
there. C.L. did not give him permission to go inside because, despite C.L.’s help,
defendant had a history of breaking into his house.
2 On August 7, 2023, C.L. arrived home after having been out of town and locking
up his home. When he arrived home, C.L. noticed that the front door appeared to have
been kicked in or pried open and there was damage around the locks. When C.L. opened
the door, he heard some scuffling inside the house and saw someone in the kitchen. C.L.
also noticed a suitcase he did not recognize, along with broken wood and trash that had
not been there before. After the intruder, who was later identified as defendant, went up
into the attic, C.L. heard defendant shuffling around in the attic. C.L. called up to the
attic, asking who was there and what were they doing. Defendant responded that it was
him, and C.L. asked him to leave, but he refused. Defendant told C.L. that he was going
to have to call the police to drag him out. C.L. confirmed that was what defendant
wanted to do, and defendant said yes. C.L. then called 911.
Dispatch advised C.L. to wait outside, which he did, and deputies arrived a few
minutes later. C.L. pointed out where defendant was to the deputies. Defendant was
apprehended walking away from the house. C.L. later inspected the house and saw that
his wife’s office had been trashed and items belonging to his wife and daughter had been
placed in bags and left by the front door. C.L. also discovered that about $50-$60 worth
of tools were missing from his home.
On November 29, 2023, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of first degree
residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Thereafter, the trial court found true four
circumstances in aggravation, specifically that (1) defendant’s prior convictions were
numerous or of increasing seriousness (Pen. Code, § 1170(b)(2)(14)); (2) defendant had
served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2)(15)); (3) defendant was on
3 Post Community Supervised Release (PCRS) when he committed the instant offense
(Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2)(16)); and (4) defendant’s prior performance on
probation or PCRS was unsatisfactory (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2)(17)). The court
then asked defense counsel whether counsel wanted to conduct the sentencing hearing
that day or set it out to obtain a report. Defense counsel responded that she wanted to
submit a sentencing brief and have a social worker speak with defendant to prepare a
biopsychological report. The court referred the matter to probation to prepare a
presentence report and scheduled a sentencing hearing for December 28, 2023. The court
informed defendant and his counsel as follows: “You have the right to have a report
prepared by the probation department which includes their assessment of the case and as
well as the social history about you. If you want that report, I will order them to do that.
If you don’t want that report, you don’t have to wait for that, and we don’t have to order
it. And [defense counsel] can certainly argue the points. I’ve got a lot of information
about you already. And [defense counsel] is going to do a write-up. So I’m not sure it
would add anything. But it’s your choice, not my choice. If you want the probation to do
a report, you have the right to have them do that. [¶] The more I think about it, [defense
counsel], I’m just going to order it, the more I think about it. [¶] Matter is referred to
probation for full presentence investigation and report and any recommendations for
restitution, if any.”
On December 18, 2023, the People filed a sentencing memorandum and, on
December 28, 2023, the probation department filed its presentence report. Defendant did
4 not file a sentencing brief. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the court reviewed the
People’s sentencing memorandum and the probation officer’s report.
The sentencing hearing was held on December 28, 2023. At the outset of the
hearing, defense counsel objected to proceeding with sentencing, indicating that
defendant would be requesting a continuance due to the need to “conduct an evaluation of
[defendant] so that [they] can present mitigation to the court.” Counsel argued that denial
of a continuance “would be a violation of [defendant’s] right to sentencing and right to
present mitigating evidence.” Counsel noted that trial had concluded only a month ago,
and although her office had sent social workers to interview defendant and there had been
an effort to conduct mitigation, “it did not get done.” Counsel wanted to meet with
defendant personally to gather mitigation information because, considering the
sentencing options and defendant had been convicted of a strike offense, counsel felt like
mitigation evidence would be “imperative to [the] defense.”
When the trial court inquired why the social worker was unable to complete the
work, counsel responded that “there was a denial on [defendant’s] part,” but defendant
had agreed to speak with her so she believed the interview could be accomplished. The
court then questioned, “He refused to talk to the social worker?” Counsel responded, “He
did for certain reasons, which I don’t believe are relevant at this point.” Counsel also
stated that the request was timely since trial had just occurred and the holidays had
prevented her from personally visiting with defendant to speak to him about the refusal to
be interviewed by the social worker.
5 The prosecutor objected to the continuance because defendant had refused to be
interviewed. The prosecutor also pointed out that the probation officer spoke to
defendant, who provided his personal history but declined to speak about the offense, and
thus defendant had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence but declined to do so.
Moreover, the prosecutor did not believe there were mitigating factors that would warrant
anything less than the aggravated term. Defense counsel responded that defendant had
not chosen to forego presenting mitigating factors but had choose to speak with her—his
attorney. Counsel further asserted that defendant had the right to choose the way he
presented mitigating evidence, and for her to be effective, she needed to visit him to
gather the evidence.
The court denied the request to continue the sentencing hearing. The court noted
the matter had been set for a while, there had been no motion to continue filed under
Penal Code section 1050, and in any event, there was no good cause to continue the
sentencing hearing. After the court denied the request for continuance, defense counsel
added that she had considered filing a motion under Penal Code section 1181 and had
been conducting research on the issue.
The trial court thereafter proceeded to sentencing defendant. As to the sentence,
defense counsel objected to probation’s recommendation that the middle term be
imposed, or any prison time for that matter. Counsel then referenced post-trial statements
made by several jurors indicating they did not believe that defendant intended to steal
anything or had a felonious intent and that because the crime only amounted to a trespass,
anything other than a grant of probation was inappropriate. Counsel also argued that
6 legislation had limited the court’s discretion to sentence defendant to a midterm or
aggravated sentence.
The prosecutor argued that the lower term was not presumptive because no
evidence of psychological issues or childhood trauma existed, and even if such evidence
did exist, it was not a bar to a middle or aggravated term. The prosecutor acknowledged
the discussion with three jurors, and noted, “while they did say something to the extent of
coming to their verdict with a heavy heart, they did express that at the end of the day they
did believe that the defendant did have the intent to steal.” The prosecutor further
asserted that it was not relevant whether or not the jurors believe defendant deserves a
prison sentence, and while it is appropriate to consider the victim’s wishes regarding
sentencing, “the court must also consider protection of the public, the community,” and
for “the court to decide whether or not the defendant is on probation or goes to prison.”
The prosecutor argued that the aggravated term of six years was appropriate due to the
presence of aggravating factors, defendant’s dishonesty with probation regarding his
substance abuse issues, and his failure to express remorse and take responsibility.
The court elected to disregard any argument regarding the juror’s statements,
noting, “What the jurors told anybody in the hallway cannot be used in arriving at the
verdict. The verdict speaks for itself, and the defendant was found guilty of first degree
burglary.” Defense counsel reasserted that she sought a continuance to pursue a motion
under Penal Code section 1181, so the court could act as a 13th juror. The court
responded that even if it were asked to sit as a 13th juror, it would find that the verdict
was supported by the evidence and that defendant is guilty of first degree burglary.
7 The court thereafter proceeded to sentencing defendant. Contrary to the probation
officer’s recommendation or findings, the court found two mitigating circumstances,
namely the existence of trauma in defendant’s life and that defendant did not expect
anyone would be hurt during the burglary. Nonetheless, the court found four aggravating
circumstances were present as well, and there were no unusual circumstances that would
best serve the interests of justice if defendant was granted probation. The court
ultimately imposed the midterm sentence of four years. After pronouncement of
judgment, counsel again objected to the imposition of sentence on the grounds defendant
was denied his right to present evidence in mitigation and denied the effective assistance
of counsel. The court responded that there was no basis to continue and that counsel had
sufficient time to obtain the evidence. Counsel asked again for a continuance and the
court reasserted the request had been denied. Defendant timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue
sentencing and thus the case must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Specifically, he asserts the court abused its discretion in failing to grant the request for a
continuance despite showing good cause and the error rendered the sentencing procedure
fundamentally unfair and arbitrarily denied his due process rights. He further argues if
his trial counsel’s failure to comply with Penal Code section 1050 and articulate good
cause justified the denial of the request for continuance, his counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
8 Continuances in criminal cases may be granted only for good cause. (Pen. Code,
§ 1050, subd. (e).) The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of
establishing an abuse of discretion. (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920
(Beames); accord, People v. Strozier (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 55, 60; People v. Jeffers
(1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 840, 850.) “Under this state law standard, discretion is abused
only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.”
(Beames, at p. 920.) “A reviewing court considers the circumstances of each case and the
reasons presented for the request to determine whether a trial court’s denial of a
continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45
Cal.4th 390, 450 (Doolin).) A trial court may not exercise its discretion over
continuances in a manner that deprives defendants or their attorneys a reasonable
opportunity to prepare. (Ibid.; see People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 70 (Snow).)
“Although a defendant is not entitled to the same procedural safeguards at a sentencing
hearing as he is at trial, the procedures must be fundamentally fair.” (People v. Leffel
(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1318 (Leffel), overruled on another ground in People v.
Bullock (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985, 987-989.)
Not every denial of a request for a continuance constitutes a due process violation,
“even if the party seeking the continuance thereby fails to offer evidence.” (Beames,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 921.) “Although ‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the
face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty
formality[,] . . . [t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a
continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.’ [Citation.] Instead, ‘[t]he answer
9 must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons
presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’” (Ibid.; accord, People v.
Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 791.) “Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and
prejudice, the trial court’s denial does not warrant reversal.” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th
at p. 450.)
As previously noted, a continuance may only be granted for good cause, and trial
courts have broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists. (Pen. Code, § 1050,
subd. (e); People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 934.) We review an order denying
a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th
1101, 1118.) This standard applies to motions to continue sentencing. (See, e.g., Snow,
supra, 30 Cal.4th 43, 77.)
Defendant contends the denial of his motion to continue the sentencing hearing
violated his state and federal constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel
because it prevented his attorney from preparing for the proceeding. Specifically, he
contends the failure to permit a continuance prevented his counsel from obtaining
mitigating evidence. He argues he was entitled to have his attorney interview him to
obtain the mitigating circumstances of his mental health, substance abuse and
homelessness and the alleged error in denying his request for a continuance was
prejudicial because there was a possibility the court would have imposed the lower term.
He further contends if counsel’s failure to comply with Penal Code section 1050 and
articulate good cause justified the denial of the request for continuance, we should find
his counsel was ineffective.
10 In ruling on a motion to continue, the court must consider not only the benefit that
the moving party anticipates, but also the likelihood that such benefit will result, the
burden on other witnesses, jurors, and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice
will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the motion. (People v. Jenkins (2000)
22 Cal.4th 900.) The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of a clear abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; accord, Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 920-921
[“an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked”; “discretion is abused
only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered”].)
Here, after the verdict and making true findings on four factors in aggravation, the
court notified defense counsel that counsel should file a sentencing brief. Defense
counsel expressed her intention to do so and have a social worker speak with defendant to
prepare a biopsychological report. The court then continued the matter for about a
month. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the People filed a sentencing memorandum, and
the probation department filed its presentence report. Defendant did not file a sentencing
brief or a motion for continuance in advance of the hearing.
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel sought a continuance to
conduct an evaluation of defendant so they could present evidence in mitigation. The
court inquired why the social worker was unable to complete the work. Defense counsel
responded that “there was a denial on [defendant’s] part.” Nevertheless, defendant
agreed to speak with her so she believed the interview could be accomplished. Counsel
also stated that the request was timely since trial had just occurred and the holidays had
prevented her from personally visiting with defendant to speak to him about the refusal.
11 The court denied the request to continue the sentencing hearing, noting the matter had
been set for a while, there had been no motion to continue filed under Penal Code
section 1050, and in any event, there was no good cause to continue the sentencing
hearing. Contrary to the probation officer’s recommendation, the court found two
mitigating circumstances, namely the existence of trauma in defendant’s life and that
defendant did not expect anyone would be hurt during the burglary. The court also found
four aggravating circumstances and no unusual circumstances that would best serve the
interests of justice if defendant was granted probation, and ultimately imposed the
midterm of four years.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude defendant has met his burden of
establishing the denial of his request for a continuance constituted a clear abuse of
discretion such that it exceeded the bounds of reason. (See Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 451 [court was within its discretion to deny continuance where additional evidence
would have limited impact, counsel made only a general assertion more time was needed
to prepare a defense, provided no explanation why given time was insufficient to prepare,
and made no showing he could produce specific, relevant mitigating evidence within a
reasonable time]; see also Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. (i) [“A continuance shall be granted
only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence considered at the
hearing on the motion”].)
It is true the trial court may not exercise its discretion “‘so as to deprive the
defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare.’” (Doolin, supra, 45
Cal.4th at p. 450; see People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646 (Sakarias).) But
12 here, the court permitted counsel time to file a sentencing brief, as well as have a social
worker interview defendant. Defendant, however, chose not to speak to the social
worker. In addition, defendant had been interviewed by probation and had provided his
background information, explaining he was homeless and that his wife had passed away
in a car accident in 2014. The probation officer further noted that although defendant
denied any such issues, there was evidence of mental health and substance abuse
problems. The victim also stated that defendant was not a bad person, but needed help
due to his mental health and drug addiction issues. The victim hoped the court would
impose rehabilitative measures and not punitive ones. Counsel had both the probation
officer’s presentence report and the People’s sentencing memorandum prior to the
hearing, and presumably reviewed the documents. Counsel did not discuss what
additional information she would obtain from defendant to proceed in a competent
matter. (Cf. People v. Fontana (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 326, 331 [court abused its
discretion in denying continuance where counsel announced he was not ready to proceed
at parole revocation hearing and detailed what he believed he had to accomplish to
proceed in a competent manner; after 45-minute recess, he represented he had not
finished reading necessary documents or had an opportunity to review certain questions
and matters in preliminary hearing transcript, and was not prepared to cross-examine
victim so would not].) Given these circumstances and the scope of the hearing, we
cannot conclude defendant or his attorney were deprived of a reasonable opportunity to
prepare or present mitigating evidence.
13 Irrespective, a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance does not warrant
reversal absent prejudice to the defendant. (See Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450;
accord, People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 204.) And here, even if the court erred in
denying the continuance, we cannot conclude defendant has established he was
prejudiced by the court’s ruling. Based on the information provided to the court and the
circumstances of the offense, the court found that circumstances in mitigation existed,
specifically, trauma in defendant’s life and the fact that defendant did not expect that
anyone would be hurt during the burglary. Those circumstances were considered in its
sentencing decision. Given that the court considered circumstances in mitigation,
possessed information concerning the areas of mitigation that defendant requested
additional time to explore, and found true four circumstances in aggravation, defendant
cannot show that the continuance would have been useful. And defendant previously had
an opportunity to present mitigating evidence and counsel argued the mitigating evidence
in support of a low term. Thus, even if defendant could have presented further evidence
in mitigation, we cannot conclude another outcome was reasonably likely. (See Doolin,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 450 [no abuse of discretion where continuance was untimely and
unlikely to affect the outcome of the proceedings because evidence sought would have
had little impact in light of other extensive evidence].)
We also cannot conclude defendant has established the denial of the continuance
rendered his attorney’s assistance constitutionally ineffective. Rather, “‘[t]he record
demonstrates neither that counsel performed below the standard of a reasonably
competent attorney in arguing the . . . motion[], nor that the . . . additional step defendant
14 asserts should have been taken was reasonably likely to affect the result.’” (People v.
Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 225; see Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 647.)
For these reasons, we also cannot conclude the denial of defendant’s request for a
continuance was “so arbitrary as to deny due process.” (Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 921.) There are no “‘mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is
so arbitrary as to violate due process.’ [Citation.] Instead, ‘[t]he answer must be found
in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the
trial judge at the time the request is denied.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Given the
circumstances discussed, particularly counsel’s general reasons for the request, as well as
the scope of the hearing, and counsel having the presentence report by probation and the
People’s sentencing memorandum, counsel having time to review the relevant
information, and an opportunity to be heard, we cannot conclude the court’s denial of
defendant’s request for a continuance was “so arbitrary as to violate due process.”
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contentions.
15 IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.