People v. Wilder

860 P.2d 523, 17 Brief Times Rptr. 1571, 1993 Colo. LEXIS 831, 1993 WL 412982
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedOctober 18, 1993
DocketNo. 93SA254
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 860 P.2d 523 (People v. Wilder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Wilder, 860 P.2d 523, 17 Brief Times Rptr. 1571, 1993 Colo. LEXIS 831, 1993 WL 412982 (Colo. 1993).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

An inquiry panel of the Supreme Court Grievance Committee approved a stipulation, agreement, and conditional admission of misconduct entered into between the respondent and the assistant disciplinary counsel. The relevant portions of the stipulation are set out in the Appendix to this opinion. The parties recommended in the stipulation that the respondent be disciplined by either a private or public censure. In approving the stipulation, the inquiry panel recommended that a public censure be imposed. After reviewing the stipulation and considering the fact that the respondent has not been previously disciplined in thirty-three years of practice, we accept the stipulation and the recommendation of the inquiry panel. The seriousness of the respondent’s misconduct, which involved at least a reckless disregard of his obligation not to withhold material information from the fact finder in a legal proceeding, precludes a private sanction.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Raymond E. Wilder be publicly censured. It is further ordered that the respondent pay the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $421.62 within thirty days after the announcement of this opinion to the Supreme Court Grievance Committee.

APPENDIX

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO

CASE NO. 92B-66

BEFORE THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE THEREOF

STIPULATION, AGREEMENT, AND CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF MISCONDUCT

The People of the State of Colorado, Complainant,

vs.

Raymond E. Wilder, Respondent.

NOW on this 10th day of August, 1993, James C. Coyle, Assistant Disciplinary [524]*524Counsel and attorney for Complainant; Michael Gross, Esq., attorney for respondent; and Raymond E. Wilder, respondent; enter into the following Stipulation, Agreement, and Conditional Admission of Misconduct and submit the same to Inquiry Panel A and the Colorado Supreme Court for their consideration.

1.Respondent has taken and subscribed the Oath of Admission, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on March 11, 1960, and is registered as an attorney upon the official records of this Court, Registration No. 7010. He is accordingly subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and its Grievance Committee in these proceedings.

[[Image here]]

6. With respect to the allegations contained in the Complaint, respondent and complainant stipulate to the following facts and conclusions:

a. Respondent represented certain trustees and members of the Voter’s Assembly of the Mount Olive Evangelical Church (“Mt. Olive”).

b. [The Mt. Olive Pastor] had apparently attempted to “excommunicate” respondent’s clients and these trustee-clients had apparently attempted to terminate [the Pastor’s] employment. Control over the church was uncertain.

c. [An attorney with respondent’s firm] drew and filed a Complaint on May 16, 1991, asserting eight (8) causes of action against the Pastor and other members of the church. The eight claims were:

1. declaratory judgment
2. preliminary injunction
3. mandatory injunction
4. breach of fiduciary duty
5. trespass to land and chattels
6. conversion
7. accounting
8. civil conspiracy

d. [The defendants’ attorney] entered his appearance on behalf of the defendants.

e. A hearing was set on the preliminary injunction for May 28, 1991, twelve (12) days after the filing of the complaint.

f. Over plaintiff’s objection, the preliminary injunction hearing was continued to June 4, 1991.

g. The preliminary injunction hearing started on June 4 and continued on June 21 and 24, 1991.

h. On June 27, 1991, the court entered an oral ruling requiring that the entire case be tried on its merits on July 29, 1991. The court deferred its ruling on the request for preliminary injunction.

i. [The defendants’ attorney] had previously filed an Answer to the Complaint on June 11, 1991. That answer denied the material allegations of the complaint, and made several affirmative defenses. One of these affirmative defenses was that [the Pastor] did not convert any annuity funds (as alleged in Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim for Relief) and that the funds were authorized by the church for removal and were for [the Pastor’s] exclusive use.

j. All hearings on the case prior to June 27, 1991, dealt with the issue of a preliminary injunction which would prohibit the defendants from disposing of any church assets.

k. The parties had thirty-two (32) days to conduct discovery. No disclosure certificates, discovery plans or discovery schedules were ordered.

l. Respondent and opposing counsel ... agreed to an informal exchange of witnesses and exhibits, and respondent agreed to provide the complete insurance annuity file to [the defendant’s counsel].

m. On July 17, 1991, [the defendant’s counsel] sent a letter to respondent confirming the agreement that respondent would supply him with any and all insurance records respondent received, whether or not respondent would utilize them as exhibits.

n. On July 18, 1991, respondent supplied insurance records he intended to use as exhibits at time of trial.

[525]*525o. Respondent also issued a subpoena duces tecum to ... an official of the insurance company which sold the annuity policy, to produce a copy of the policy and other documents relating to it.

p. On Friday afternoon, July 26, 1991, [the insurance company official] faxed respondent certain documents from the insurance file, including an “Amendment” to the policy which stated that the owner of the policy shall be the annuitant ([the Pastor] ).

q. The amendment had been signed two months after the 1982 application for the annuity by [the Pastor] and by [one of the respondent’s clients], who is a member, trustee, and president of Mt. Olive as well as the insurance agent for the annuity.

r. Respondent first saw the amendment on Monday morning, July 29, 1991.

s. Respondent confronted his client ... with the document late in the afternoon on July 29. His client claimed he didn’t remember this amendment, but admitted that the signature was his. Respondent noted that [the client] had signed this amendment on a signature line reserved for witnesses and not on the signature line for representatives of the owner.

t. Respondent concluded the amendment was ineffective on its face to transfer ownership because the owner of the policy (Mt. Olive) had not applied for the transfer; it had been signed by [the Pastor], the beneficiary, and by [the client] only in his capacity as a witness. All previous annuity documents had been signed by the church treasurer on behalf of Mt. Olive and witnessed by [the client].

u. Respondent determined that he would not offer the exhibit at trial. Respondent states that he then immersed himself into the press of preparing for trial the next day.

v. Respondent did not forward a copy of the amendment to [the defendants’ counsel].

w.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Bertagnolli
861 P.2d 717 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
860 P.2d 523, 17 Brief Times Rptr. 1571, 1993 Colo. LEXIS 831, 1993 WL 412982, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-wilder-colo-1993.