People v. Wilboiner

35 Misc. 3d 193
CourtCriminal Court of the City of New York
DecidedJanuary 6, 2012
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 35 Misc. 3d 193 (People v. Wilboiner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Criminal Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Wilboiner, 35 Misc. 3d 193 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

John T. Hecht, J.

The defendant in these two misdemeanor criminal prosecutions was examined to determine if he were fit to proceed. His cases present the issue of whether, despite the general rule that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor is subject to release on recognizance or bail, he could be held without bail pending the competency examination. This issue has not been resolved at the appellate level, and it arises frequently, particularly in the arraignment part of criminal court, where competency examinations are often ordered.

Defendant was arraigned on October 17, 2011, on trespass charges. At that time, the court issued an order of protection in favor of the property owner and released the defendant to reappear on November 17. The issue of competency apparently did not surface at arraignment. When the defendant did not appear in court on November 17, a bench warrant issued for his arrest. He was returned involuntarily on the warrant on November 22, upon a rearrest on charges that, among other things, he had violated the order of protection by returning to the premises that were the subject of the earlier case.

At his November 22 appearance, defendant was arraigned on the new matter and the warrant was vacated. His attorney requested an examination pursuant to article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law to determine if the defendant were fit to proceed. I ordered the examination as requested and remanded the defendant during its pendency. Defense counsel raised no objection to the remand, although at a calendar call three weeks later, when the examiners requested additional time for the examination, counsel objected to continued remand on the ground that remand was not permitted in a misdemeanor case. I continued the remand, and this decision explains why remand is permitted in a misdemeanor case to assure that a defendant will appear for a competency examination.1

The Court of Appeals has recognized that the question presented here is the result of an “ambiguity” in the drafting of [147]*147CPL 170.10 (7) and 530.20 (1), on the one hand, and 730.20, on the other. (See Matter of LaBelle, 79 NY2d 350, 361 [1992]; see also Lawrence K. Marks, New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure § 4:4 [7 West’s NY Prac Series 2011] [“It is unclear whether a person who is otherwise entitled to bail or recognizance may be committed without bail pending a psychiatric examination to determine his or her fitness to proceed”].) One other lower criminal court has addressed this ambiguity and determined that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor may be remanded pending a CPL article 730 examination. As that court held, remand was necessary “to effect the purpose of CPL article 730” where there was “no reasonable likelihood that if the defendant were released on bail or recognizance, he would cooperate in any way with a court-ordered psychiatric examination” (People v Giannelli, 189 Misc 2d 366, 367-368 [Just Ct, Westchester County 2001]).

CPL 170.10 (7), as relevant here, provides that upon the arraignment of a person charged with a misdemeanor, unless there is a disposition, the court must either set bail or release the defendant. In similar fashion, CPL 530.20 provides that “the court must order recognizance or bail” if defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or lesser offense, in contrast to what it may do in the case of a felony, which is that it “may, in its discretion, order recognizance or bail” (see CPL 530.20 [1], [2]; 170.10 [7] [emphasis supplied]).

The same words, “must” and “may,” appear in CPL 730.20 but, significantly, to the opposite effect of their use in CPL 530.20. Whereas CPL 530.20 defaults to release (a court “may” release a defendant charged with a felony but “must” order recognizance or bail if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor), CPL 730.20 defaults to confinement. Thus, a court “may direct that the defendant be confined in a hospital . . . until the examination is completed” if he has previously been released on recognizance or bail and the director of a hospital requests an in-patient examination,2 but “must” order that such examination be conducted at the place of confinement or a [148]*148designated hospital if the defendant is already “in custody” at the time the examination is ordered3 (see CPL 730.20 [2], [3] [emphasis supplied]). In either case, there is no requirement that the court “must” order recognizance or bail, but quite the opposite — the court either “may” or “must” order confinement until the examination is completed.

The defense correctly argues that CPL 730.20 does not specifically use the word “remand.” This is presumably why the Court of Appeals has acknowledged an ambiguity in the statute’s drafting. But reading CPL 730.20 to require either bail or recognizance would make meaningless the language in that section that alternately allows or requires confinement when the director of the hospital requests that the defendant be confined until the examination is completed (see CPL 730.20 [2], [3]). Surely if the statute allows confinement, i.e., remand, at the request of the hospital director, it must also allow remand when the court concludes, on its own, that confinement is necessary to assure that the examination is conducted. (See Giannelli, 189 Misc 2d at 367 [inferring that court may remand from the power to remand at the request of the hospital director].)

Further, to the extent that the defendant here was “in custody” when he was brought before the court on November 22 for arraignment on the new case and as a return on the warrant, his situation would seem to fit comfortably within subdivision (3), which applies to a defendant “in custody.” “Custody,” in a related Penal Law context, is “restraint by a public servant pursuant to an authorized arrest or an order of a court” (see Penal Law § 205.00 [2]) — which perfectly describes the situation of the defendant when he appeared in court on that date. Similarly, CPL article 140, which addresses arrests, uses the words “custody” and “in custody” to describe the status of a person who has been arrested (see CPL 140.20 [2] [a], [b]; [3]; [4]). Thus, a defendant who appears in court after an arrest, either on a new matter or on a warrant, would appear to be “in custody” within the meaning of CPL 730.20 (3) and subject to the remand that that subdivision contemplates.

[149]*149I recognize that there is language in subdivision (3) that might be read to suggest that the custody to which it refers is the sheriff’s custody of defendants who, after arraignment, have been committed to custody, rather than those who appear in court in police custody. Subdivision (3) states that the examination “must be conducted at the place where the defendant is being held in custody” (see CPL 730.20 [3]). A defendant brought before the court for arraignment or on a warrant is not in a “place” where such an examination can be conducted because he has not yet been committed to the sheriffs custody pursuant to CPL 510.40 (1) (c), as he will be after that court appearance. Nonetheless, I think that the statute, if not crystalline, is at least clear enough: a defendant who is before the court either for arraignment or as a return on warrant is “in custody”; therefore, his examination must occur in the place where he is held.4

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

The People v. Warden, Rikers Island
New York Court of Appeals, 2022

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
35 Misc. 3d 193, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-wilboiner-nycrimct-2012.