Levin, J.
The defendant appeals his jury trial conviction of armed robbery, claiming that the trial judge’s instructions taken as a whole were so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial.
The question presented involves an interpretation of the provisions conferring upon trial judges the power to comment on the evidence when instructing the jury, a power conferred on Michigan trial judges in both civil and criminal eases some 40 years ago as part of general procedural reforms.
Critics of the jury system have proposed substituting trained fact finders in both civil and criminal cases. Those dissatisfied with jury fact finding point to the fact that ours is one of the few countries, perhaps the only major country, where a jury trial is still obtainable in both civil and criminal cases. Most judicial systems function without using juries at all. The critics advocate extending the judge’s power to comment on the evidence.
If they prevail, the means will have been found whereby they can achieve covertly that which is now constitutionally forbidden. If the jury ceases to be truly independent, it will begin to wither away and, having ceased to perform any useful function, ultimately will be abolished.
In
People
v.
Lintz
(1928),
244
Mich 603, the Michigan Supreme Court, considering for the first time the new procedural provision authorizing comment by the judge during his charge to the jury (see footnote 1 for text of the provision) held that the judge (pp 617, 618):
“should not express an opinion as to what he thinks the verdict should be or how he thinks the jury should decide the case. * * * It must be apparent, on review!, that the verdict rendered is that of the jury, and not the expressed opinion of the triad court.”
The
Lints
Court declared that in commenting on the evidence the judge should bear in mind that under our constitution one of the substantial elements of the right of trial by jury (p 611) “is the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits.” The Court concluded that the trial judge in the case then before it had gone beyond permissible comment (p 620):
“We do not think that any intelligent juror who listened to the charge could fail to understand therefrom that the facts stated therein were,
in the opinion of the trial court, fully established
by the proofs and justified the conviction of the defendants, and
that the jury were expected, if not instructed, to so find.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
and thus (p 621) “the constitutional right of the defendants to a trial by jury was invaded in the instructions given.”
In
People
v.
Clark
(1954), 340 Mich 411, 421, the Court reiterated prior statements that it was for the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, citing
People
v.
Padgett
(1943), 306 Mich 545,
where, said the
Clark ■
Court, the conviction “was reversed because of the conduct of the trial judge in seeking to impress on the jury his personal opinion as to the guilt of the defendant and the credibility of witnesses.”
We read these pronouncements of our Supreme Court to mean that the trial judge should not make known his views concerning disputed factual issues, the credibility of witnesses or the ultimate question about to be submitted to the jury. He may review the evidence and organize it for the jury in. an effort to assist their deliberations:
“He may call the attention of the jury to particular facts; marshal and sum up the evidence relating to each issue to be determined; comment upon the tendency, force, and comparative weight of conflicting testimony bearing upon them, and point out
any matter which legitimately affects the testimony of a witness or, his. credibility.”
People
v.
Lintz, supra,
p 617.
The judge’s review should be fair and impartial.
Burpee
v.
Lane
(1936), 274 Mich 625, 627. When he concludes, the jury should be better informed concerning the evidence in the case and its relative importancé, but no better informed than before his commentary began regarding the judge’s personal views on the issues which our constitution requires be resolved by jury determination. He “should not permit his own views on disputed issues of fact
to become apparent
to the jury.” (Emphasis supplied.)
People
v.
Young
(1961), 364 Mich 554, 558. He may no more accomplish by indirection that which he cannot do directly than may the litigant who appears before'him.
A trial judge desiring to see that the case goes to the jury without disclosure of his personal views in the matter should be able, no matter how overwhelming the people’s case, to preserve an appearance • of impartiality in his instructions. By presenting the defendant’s theory, presumably just argued to the jury,
the judge can avoid creating the impression that he has stepped out of his role of impartial judicator and is now plugging for his own point-of-view.
When the judge reviews the evidence favorable to the people, he should not limit his review of the defendant’s position to boilerplate statements regarding presumption of innocence and burden of proof. For the juror who has served on earlier panels, such general statements do not have the impact of the judge’s particularized commentary in his review of the people’s'’evidence. We do not mean to be un
derstood as saying that any particular form of verbiage is required, or that each comment in respect to the people’s case must be counterbalanced by a comment “on the other hand” for the defense. Rather, the important thing is that an appearance of complete impartiality and objectivity be preserved.
In the last analysis, whether the judge has exceeded the bounds of fair and impartial comment, has indulged in argumentative presentation, has sought to impress upon the jury his views of the disputed issues, credibility of witnesses or the ultimate question, is a matter of judgment. We must rely on our life experience in the effort to recreate reality out of the written record before us. Did the trial judge charge for conviction?
Measured by the standard established in the foregoing discussed authorities we are inclined to think the charge in this case was a convicting charge. Nevertheless, we affirm because we are convinced that the error, if there was error, was harmless. Perfection in jury charging is no more attainable than perfection in the proceedings that precede the charge.
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Levin, J.
The defendant appeals his jury trial conviction of armed robbery, claiming that the trial judge’s instructions taken as a whole were so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial.
The question presented involves an interpretation of the provisions conferring upon trial judges the power to comment on the evidence when instructing the jury, a power conferred on Michigan trial judges in both civil and criminal eases some 40 years ago as part of general procedural reforms.
Critics of the jury system have proposed substituting trained fact finders in both civil and criminal cases. Those dissatisfied with jury fact finding point to the fact that ours is one of the few countries, perhaps the only major country, where a jury trial is still obtainable in both civil and criminal cases. Most judicial systems function without using juries at all. The critics advocate extending the judge’s power to comment on the evidence.
If they prevail, the means will have been found whereby they can achieve covertly that which is now constitutionally forbidden. If the jury ceases to be truly independent, it will begin to wither away and, having ceased to perform any useful function, ultimately will be abolished.
In
People
v.
Lintz
(1928),
244
Mich 603, the Michigan Supreme Court, considering for the first time the new procedural provision authorizing comment by the judge during his charge to the jury (see footnote 1 for text of the provision) held that the judge (pp 617, 618):
“should not express an opinion as to what he thinks the verdict should be or how he thinks the jury should decide the case. * * * It must be apparent, on review!, that the verdict rendered is that of the jury, and not the expressed opinion of the triad court.”
The
Lints
Court declared that in commenting on the evidence the judge should bear in mind that under our constitution one of the substantial elements of the right of trial by jury (p 611) “is the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits.” The Court concluded that the trial judge in the case then before it had gone beyond permissible comment (p 620):
“We do not think that any intelligent juror who listened to the charge could fail to understand therefrom that the facts stated therein were,
in the opinion of the trial court, fully established
by the proofs and justified the conviction of the defendants, and
that the jury were expected, if not instructed, to so find.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
and thus (p 621) “the constitutional right of the defendants to a trial by jury was invaded in the instructions given.”
In
People
v.
Clark
(1954), 340 Mich 411, 421, the Court reiterated prior statements that it was for the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, citing
People
v.
Padgett
(1943), 306 Mich 545,
where, said the
Clark ■
Court, the conviction “was reversed because of the conduct of the trial judge in seeking to impress on the jury his personal opinion as to the guilt of the defendant and the credibility of witnesses.”
We read these pronouncements of our Supreme Court to mean that the trial judge should not make known his views concerning disputed factual issues, the credibility of witnesses or the ultimate question about to be submitted to the jury. He may review the evidence and organize it for the jury in. an effort to assist their deliberations:
“He may call the attention of the jury to particular facts; marshal and sum up the evidence relating to each issue to be determined; comment upon the tendency, force, and comparative weight of conflicting testimony bearing upon them, and point out
any matter which legitimately affects the testimony of a witness or, his. credibility.”
People
v.
Lintz, supra,
p 617.
The judge’s review should be fair and impartial.
Burpee
v.
Lane
(1936), 274 Mich 625, 627. When he concludes, the jury should be better informed concerning the evidence in the case and its relative importancé, but no better informed than before his commentary began regarding the judge’s personal views on the issues which our constitution requires be resolved by jury determination. He “should not permit his own views on disputed issues of fact
to become apparent
to the jury.” (Emphasis supplied.)
People
v.
Young
(1961), 364 Mich 554, 558. He may no more accomplish by indirection that which he cannot do directly than may the litigant who appears before'him.
A trial judge desiring to see that the case goes to the jury without disclosure of his personal views in the matter should be able, no matter how overwhelming the people’s case, to preserve an appearance • of impartiality in his instructions. By presenting the defendant’s theory, presumably just argued to the jury,
the judge can avoid creating the impression that he has stepped out of his role of impartial judicator and is now plugging for his own point-of-view.
When the judge reviews the evidence favorable to the people, he should not limit his review of the defendant’s position to boilerplate statements regarding presumption of innocence and burden of proof. For the juror who has served on earlier panels, such general statements do not have the impact of the judge’s particularized commentary in his review of the people’s'’evidence. We do not mean to be un
derstood as saying that any particular form of verbiage is required, or that each comment in respect to the people’s case must be counterbalanced by a comment “on the other hand” for the defense. Rather, the important thing is that an appearance of complete impartiality and objectivity be preserved.
In the last analysis, whether the judge has exceeded the bounds of fair and impartial comment, has indulged in argumentative presentation, has sought to impress upon the jury his views of the disputed issues, credibility of witnesses or the ultimate question, is a matter of judgment. We must rely on our life experience in the effort to recreate reality out of the written record before us. Did the trial judge charge for conviction?
Measured by the standard established in the foregoing discussed authorities we are inclined to think the charge in this case was a convicting charge. Nevertheless, we affirm because we are convinced that the error, if there was error, was harmless. Perfection in jury charging is no more attainable than perfection in the proceedings that precede the charge.
Where it is claimed that error is harmless, two inquiries are pertinent. First, is the error so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it never can be regarded as harmless? See
People
v.
Bigge
(1939), 288 Mich 417, 421;
People
v.
Berry
(1968), 10 Mich App 469, 474;
People
v.
Mosley
(1953), 338 Mich 559, 566. See, also,
Chapman
v.
California
(1967), 386 US 18, 23, 24 (87 S Ct 824, 17 L Ed 2d 705), rehearing denied 386 US 987 (87 S Ct 1283, 18 L Ed 2d 241). Second, if not so basic, can we declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? See
People
v.
Liggett
(1967), 378 Mich 706, 716, 717;
Chapman
v.
California, supra.
Where it is a close question, as here, whether the charge to the jury was a convicting charge (the balance, however, tipping in favor of the conclusion that there was error), reversal as a matter of course will not ordinarily be thought essential to the preservation of a judicial system of value and the constitutional right to jury trial. We are not persuaded that vindication of even the basic rights here involved requires reversal in this case on this charge.
The defendant was apprehended shortly after the crime was committed. Booty and a revolver were found in the automobile in which the defendant was captured. The victim identified the defendant as the hold-up man. There was no opposing evidence. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any instructional error did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction and that upon any new trial which might be ordered the defendant would again assuredly be convicted.
Affirmed.
Fitzgerald, P. J., and T. G. Kavanagh, J., concurred.