People v. White

2024 IL App (1st) 232245

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 19, 2024
• Docket: 1-23-2245
• Status: Published

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 232245 No. 1-23-2245B Opinion filed March 19, 2024

Sixth Division

___________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ___________________________________________________________________________ ) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 23500003101 v. ) ) The Honorable ELIJAH WHITE, ) Maryam Ahmad, ) Judge, presiding. Defendant-Appellant. )

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 The law presumes defendants are eligible for pretrial release. To rebut this presumption,

the State must prove three factors by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the State paid little heed

to the procedures under article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known

as the Pretrial Fairness Act. The State put on no evidence that pretrial detention was necessary and

stood silent as the officer from the Office of Statewide Pretrial Services (Pretrial Services)

recommended release. Thus, the State failed to satisfy its burden when seeking to detain Elijah

White. We reverse and remand for trial court to impose pretrial release conditions. ¶2 Background

¶3 Weeks after a deadly car crash, the State petitioned to detain Elijah White, whom it had

charged with reckless homicide and a litany of vehicle code violations and petty offenses.

¶4 The State’s petition consists of a preprinted form that tracks the three elements the State

must prove to detain White under section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)).

For the first element, the State checked a box stating, “[t]he proof is evident or presumption great”

that White committed reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2022)), an offense qualifying

for pretrial detention. For the second element, the State checked a box stating that White “poses a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community” and briefly

described the alleged facts and the police’s initial investigation. For the third element, a preprinted

line asserts, “No condition or communication of conditions set forth in 725 ILCS 5/110-10/(b) can

mitigate that risk.”

¶5 At a hearing on the State’s petition, the parties made proffers and called no witnesses. The

State alleged that White drove toward a red light while traveling nearly 91 miles per hour, seconds

before striking the driver’s side of another vehicle. The other driver died hours later. Of the six

people in White’s five-passenger car, two of them suffered severe injuries. Officers recovered two

open bottles of liquor and plastic cups from White’s car. A video recording from about an hour

before the incident showed White drinking from a plastic cup in which he had apparently poured

liquor.

¶6 The State also alleged that officers arrested White about two weeks afterward. White gave

a “Mirandized” statement (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), admitting driving but

denying drinking alcohol or driving at a high rate of speed. White’s background contained a

-2- sentence of 24 months of Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC) probation that he

had completed successfully.

¶7 Counsel for White, apparently reading from a police report, alleged that a responding

officer had not detected alcohol on White’s breath or performed a field sobriety tests after the

crash. Counsel noted the road that morning was “wet and slippery” and contained “a visible tire

mark,” possibly from White’s car. White’s counsel stated that White was a 23-year-old father of

one, whom he co-parented and supported financially through full-time employment. A lifelong

Cook County resident, White had also earned a GED and, before the arrest, lived with his

grandmother. He had a place to reside if released on electronic monitoring.

¶8 An officer from Pretrial Services informed the court that White’s “new criminal activity”

and “failure to appear” scores were two of six, and Pretrial Services recommended release with

pretrial monitoring, not detention.

¶9 The trial court heard arguments focusing on the second and third factors that the State

needed to prove.

¶ 10 The State argued, for the second factor, that White posed a real and present threat because

he drank alcohol “shortly before driving and then traveling at such a high rate of speed that he

crashed, causing the death of a driver who had the green light at the time.” (Likewise, in rebuttal,

the State stressed that White was “a danger to the community,” given the alleged facts.) For the

third factor, the State argued, “Your Honor, it is the State’s position that no conditions or

combination of conditions can mitigate the risk that the defendant poses.”

¶ 11 White’s counsel argued that, under the second factor, White was not a real and present

threat because the State had not charged him with driving under the influence and offered no

evidence of prior “cases of negligent driving,” a “suspended license,” or “anything of that nature.”

-3- For the third factor, counsel noted that no proffered evidence suggested White had obstructed the

investigation, fled the scene, or tried to persuade witnesses not to cooperate. Also, no proffered

facts specified alcohol present “in the driver console’s area.”

¶ 12 The trial court granted the State’s petition, first finding the proof was evident or the

presumption great that White committed reckless homicide, a detainable offense, and characterized

the allegations as “outrageous.” For the second factor, the trial court found White was “not only

*** a threat, but he is an actual risk to persons in the community because he severely injured two

people who were in the vehicle with him, and he killed another.”

¶ 13 For the third factor, the trial court prefaced its analysis by noting that “[the] question is

more complicated.”

“It is whether any factors can mitigate the risk to the community. Defendant has a

prior felony charge which is not a conviction because it was TASC probation and it was

completed satisfactorily. Defendant works. He has a child. He lives with his grandmother.

He has a GED. So the Court must balance these attributes including a very low public

safety assessment.

New criminal activity scale is a two and the failure to appear scale is a two. The

Court must balance that with whether or not any conditions can mitigate the risk to the

public, and the Court must determine whether based on these allegations the defendant will

return to face the charges.

The Court believes because, as [counsel for White] pointed out, even after law

enforcement had contact with defendant, defendant did return—defendant did not run,

rather. Did not flee the jurisdiction facing this very serious charge.

-4- However, because of the nature of this case because I have a decedent and two

severely injured people, the Court is unwilling to take the risk of any violations.”

¶ 14 The trial court entered a written order summarizing its oral pronouncement. For the second

factor, the trial court wrote that White “recklessly drove a car killing one person and severely

injuring [two] others.” “Severely” was capitalized and underlined. For the third factor, the trial

court wrote, “Due to lack of concern and judgment for the safety of others[,] this Court cannot risk

the release of [White] at this time.”

¶ 15 White appealed, and his notice attached a document, titled “Grounds for Relief.” He raised

two contentions focusing on the third factor. First, the State failed to satisfy its burden to prove

that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate White’s real and present threat to

community safety. And second, the trial court erred by finding no conditions would reasonably

ensure White’s appearance or prevent him from being charged with a subsequent offense.

¶ 16 Analysis

¶ 17 White seeks pretrial release with conditions, raising two claims: (i) based on the specific,

articulable facts of the case, the State failed to prove the real and present threat to the safety of

persons or the community, and (ii) the State failed to prove the third factor regarding the absence

of any conditions that could “mitigate the real and present threat to the community.” We agree

with White’s contention on the third factor and focus on that claim.

¶ 18 Illinois law now presumes defendants are eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a)

(West 2022); id. § 110-6.1(e). The State may detain an accused only by charging an offense

eligible for detention and then proving: (i) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the

defendant committed the detention-eligible offense, (ii) the defendant poses a real and present

threat to the safety of persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case,

-5- and (iii) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate that real and present threat. Id.

§ 110-6.1(e). The State must prove not one, not two, but all three factors by clear and convincing

evidence. See id.

¶ 19 Clear and convincing evidence is “that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt

in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Tiffany W., 2012 IL App (1st) 102492-B, ¶ 12. If the State does not meet its

burden on any one factor, the presumption of release controls and pretrial detention is unlawful.

See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022).

¶ 20 White contends that, far from satisfying its burden of proof on the third factor, the State

parroted the language of the statute by asserting, “[N]o conditions or combination of conditions

can mitigate the risk that [White] poses.” The State does not entirely dispute this. Citing the Code,

the State first counters that it need only “allege” that “ ‘no combination or combinations set

forth’ within the [Code] *** could mitigate” White’s alleged threat or possible flight. See id.

Alternatively, the State contends the trial court properly considered and rejected White’s argument

for pretrial release because it found the alleged facts “outrageous,” showing White’s “lack of

concern and judgment for the safety of others.”

¶ 21 These contentions call for distinct standards of review. We analyze legal questions de novo.

People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 13. Under a de novo standard, we reject as contrary to the

plain language of the Code the State’s contention that it need only “allege” that “ ‘no combination

or combinations set forth’ within the [Code] *** could mitigate” White’s alleged threat or possible

flight. See id. (applying de novo review). Under the Code,

“the State shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that:

***

-6- (3) no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of

Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable

facts of the case ***, or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight[.]” 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e)(3) (West 2022).

Thus, the Code mandates that the State satisfy its burden of proof. The State’s contention

otherwise—that reciting the language of the Code or alleging it has carried this burden—is beyond

the language and intention of the Code and meritless. The State must prove this factor as it must

prove the other factors. Failing that, “defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release.”

Id. § 110-6.1(e).

¶ 22 Next, the parties’ contentions about whether the State met its burden to prove the third

factor requires us, initially, to recognize an unsettled question of law—the standard of review.

Panels have applied the abuse of discretion standard, the manifest weight of the evidence standard,

or a “twofold” approach with “manifest weight of the evidence” used for review of factual findings

and abuse of discretion used for review of the ultimate determination for pretrial release. See

People v. Romero, 2024 IL App (1st) 232023-U, ¶¶ 31-32 (discussing various standards applied

by panels). Still another variation adopts an independent de novo review with findings of historical

fact reviewed for manifest error. E.g., People v. Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶¶ 80-82

(Ellis, J., specially concurring). We need not enter this debate, however. Our decision would be

the same under any of these standards.

¶ 23 We reject the State’s contention that its “proffered facts were sufficient to justify the trial

court’s denial of pretrial release” and “no set of conditions could mitigate the risk of [White’s]

threat to the community.” The State’s analysis ignores swaths of the record. Nowhere in the State’s

-7- argument does it acknowledge: (i) Pretrial Service’s recommendation that White be released on

pretrial monitoring or (ii) the parties’ proffers regarding White’s weekslong contact and

cooperation with the investigation, including on-scene questioning and a later Mirandized

interview. Instead, the State focuses on the trial court’s oral pronouncement describing the alleged

crime as “outrageous” and its written order questioning White’s “lack of concern and judgment

for the safety of others.”

¶ 24 Legal conclusions must rest on proffered facts or other competent evidence. See 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(f) (West 2022) (“Conduct of the hearings”); People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753,

¶¶ 17-18 (State failed to produce evidence relevant to third factor). Pertinent here, section 110-

10(a) establishes mandatory conditions for defendants released before trial. See 725 ILCS 5/110-

10(a) (West 2022). Next, Section 110-10(b) provides discretionary conditions, including (i) “direct

supervision of the Pretrial Services Agency, Probation Department or Court Services Department

in a pretrial home supervision capacity with or without the use of an approved electronic

monitoring” and (ii) for certain offenses, a prohibition “from operating a motor vehicle not

equipped with an ignition interlock device.” Id. § 110-10(b)(5), (6). Section 110-10(b) also broadly

authorizes courts to impose “other reasonable conditions” if those conditions are individualized

and the least restrictive means possible to ensure defendant’s appearance in court and compliance

with pretrial release rules, court procedures, and criminal statutes. Id. § 110-10(b)(9).

¶ 25 A review of the record verifies that the State presented no evidence relevant to this third

factor and sections 110-10(a) and (b). Indeed, the State never discussed this portion of the Code,

despite repeating the language in section 110-6.1(e)(3) to allege to the trial court that “no condition

or combination of conditions” could mitigate White’s alleged threat or possible flight. See id.

§ 110-6.1(e)(3).

-8- ¶ 26 On appeal, the State again overlooks its statutory burden yet concludes, “there is no way

to ensure defendant would not drive or perform some other common activity in a reckless, or

unsafe manner.” But the Code demands proffered facts or other competent evidence. See id. § 110-

6.1(f) (“Conduct of the hearings”).

¶ 27 The facts of the alleged offense are tragic. Yet the issue before us is whether the State

carried its burden to detain White before trial. Having effectively ignored the third factor, the State

has failed to bear its burden as it must. Indeed, the parties’ proffered facts, which describe White’s

ongoing cooperation with the investigation, support the conclusion of Pretrial Services to release

White on pretrial monitoring.

¶ 28 Conclusion

¶ 29 On remand, the trial court must order White’s pretrial release with conditions imposed after

carefully considering evidence pertinent to sections 110-6.1(e)(3) and 110-10(a) and (b) of the

Code.

¶ 30 Reversed and remanded with directions.

-9- People v. White, 2024 IL App (1st) 232245

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 23500003101; the Hon. Maryam Ahmad, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Tai Martin, for Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Amy McGowan, for Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People. Appellee:

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