People v. Weyrick

2022 IL App (3d) 200098-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 28, 2022
• Docket: 3-20-0098
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 200098-U

Order filed October 28, 2022 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-20-0098 v. ) Circuit No. 18-CF-425 ) JAMIE L. WEYRICK, ) The Honorable ) Paul P. Gilfillan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Hettel concurred in the judgment. _____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: In an appeal in a criminal case in which defendant was convicted of first degree murder and unlawful possession of a weapon by a person previously adjudged delinquent, the appellate court found that the trial court did not err in: (1) denying defendant’s motion to suppress the videotaped statement defendant made to police; and (2) denying defendant’s motion in limine, made in the alternative, requesting that certain portions of defendant’s videotaped statement be redacted. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

¶2 After a jury trial, defendant, Jamie L. Weyrick, was convicted of first degree murder (720

ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2018)) and unlawful possession of a weapon by a person previously adjudged delinquent (720 ILCS 5/24-3.1(a)(2) (West 2018)) and was sentenced to consecutive

prison terms of 80 years and 1 year, respectively. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court

erred in: (1) denying defendant’s motion to suppress the videotaped statement he made to police;

and (2) denying defendant’s motion in limine, made in the alternative, requesting that certain

portions of defendant’s videotaped statement be redacted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 8, 2018, at about 9:14 p.m., Terrence Stone was shot and killed in the 900 block

of West Nebraska Street in Peoria, Illinois, while he was standing at the trunk of his car trying to

fix his vehicle.1 Defendant, who was 18 years old when the shooting occurred, was on juvenile

parole at the time and was required to wear an ankle monitor that continuously showed his

location through the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. A few days after the

shooting occurred, the police were able to determine from the data generated by defendant’s

ankle monitor that defendant was at the location of the shooting when the shooting took place.

The police took defendant into custody and interrogated defendant. Defendant gave a videotaped

statement denying that he had committed the shooting but also made certain incriminating

remarks. The State subsequently charged defendant with first degree murder and unlawful

possession of a weapon by a person previously adjudged delinquent in relation to the shooting

death of Stone.

¶5 During pretrial proceedings, defendant filed a combined motion seeking either

suppression or redaction of his videotaped statement to police. In the motion to suppress part of

the combined motion, defendant claimed that his videotaped statement was not a voluntary

1 It is unclear from the record whether the vehicle that had broken down was the victim’s vehicle or someone else’s. For the purpose of simplicity, however, we will refer to that vehicle here as the victim’s vehicle. 2 statement and was required to be suppressed because it was taken after defendant had invoked

his right to remain silent. In the motion in limine part of the combined motion, defendant

requested, in the alternative, that certain portions of his videotaped statement be redacted as

being too prejudicial because those portions referred to defendant being on parole or contained

derogatory statements that the interrogating officer made to or about defendant (such as, that

defendant was “stupid”).

¶6 In June 2019, a hearing was held on the combined motion over two separate dates in the

trial court. On the first court date, the parties stipulated to the foundation for the admission of

defendant’s videotaped statement into evidence for the purpose of the hearing. No other

evidence was presented on the motion. Of relevance to this appeal, at the beginning of the

videotaped statement, defendant was read his Miranda rights and verbally indicated to the police

officer that he understood those rights. However, when the officer asked defendant if he was

willing to speak to the officer (after informing defendant of his rights), defendant shook his head

“no” for about a second and then immediately said something. Although difficult to discern on

the video, it appears that defendant immediately said “what” after he shook his head. The officer

informed defendant that he “need[ed] a yes or a no” and that “body language [did not] count with

[him].” Defendant responded, “yeah.”

¶7 The interview proceeded after that point. Defendant changed his story multiple times

throughout the interview as he was confronted with additional information regarding his

whereabouts or activities shortly before, during, or after the murder occurred (from the GPS data

generated by the ankle monitor and/or video surveillance obtained by the police after using the

ankle-monitor data to ascertain defendant’s location at various times throughout the evening).

Defendant eventually admitted during the interview that he was by himself at the location of the

3 shooting when the shooting occurred and that he heard the shots fired but denied that he had

committed the shooting. Defendant also indicated that the victim had stated something to

defendant for which someone had to kill the victim and that defendant was happy that the victim

had been killed because the victim was a member of the Bomb Squad (apparently, one of the

gangs in the area) and was on the wrong side of town.

¶8 On the second court date, the attorneys made their oral arguments on the combined

motion, and the trial court announced its ruling. After watching the videotaped statement and

considering the oral arguments, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the

videotaped statement, finding that defendant’s decision to speak to the police was entirely

voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court

commented that defendant’s momentary head shaking motion was an ambiguous gesture and that

the police officer conducting the interview had a right, therefore, to follow-up with defendant to

determine what defendant’s ambiguous gesture meant. Of relevance to this appeal, the trial court

stated further, “[i]n order to invoke a person’s right to cut off questions or to refrain from

answering questions in the first place, a suspect or defendant has to either state he wants to

remain silent or states [sic] that he does not want to talk to police.”

¶9 The trial court also denied defendant’s motion in limine, finding that defendant’s parole

status and the fact that defendant was on a GPS monitor were an integral part of the police’s

investigation into the matter. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court stated, in pertinent part,

as follows:

“Normally that type of stuff is things we don’t want the jury to hear, that a

defendant was convicted of a prior crime. Someone might conclude, well, if he

did some prior crime, he must have done this crime. That is highly prejudicial.

4 Any evidence against a defendant by definition is prejudicial. And this

case, because no two cases are the same, provides a perfect example of why that

evidence should come in. It is probative.

It is part of the investigation, based on what I have learned in watching the

DVD, as to what eventually led to the Defendant’s arrest and being charged with

this particular crime here.

Without reference to him being on a GPS, the State would be gutted of a

large portion of its case. And they’re entitled to present all of their evidence

against a defendant to show, if they can, that he was guilty of this crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.

And part of that is placing him at the scene and how the officers knew it

and why that then led them to conclude that he did commit this crime.”

¶ 10 The trial court cautioned the State, however, not to overemphasize defendant’s parole

status to the jury, stating:

“Now, I will agree that that evidence should come in as is, and it will not be taken

advantage of by the State or overemphasized to the point where they are clearly

trying to use this in a fashion that would cross that prejudicial line by emphasizing

it over and over again to the jury either by questioning of the witnesses or in

opening statements or closing arguments. That’s not going to happen.

Defense counsel should always have that on his list of objections when the

topic comes up for there may be a point where it does cross the line and need [sic]

to be stamped out.”

5 ¶ 11 In November 2019, a jury trial was held in defendant’s case. The trial took three days to

complete. The evidence presented at the trial established the following. On the evening of July

8, 2018, shortly before the shooting occurred, defendant was riding around in Ty Pullen’s black

Saturn sedan with Pullen and Deangelo Coleman. Pullen was driving, defendant was in the

front passenger’s seat, and Coleman was in the rear seat of the vehicle. Defendant was on parole

at the time for a prior juvenile offense and was wearing an ankle band with a GPS device in it

that monitored defendant’s location.

¶ 12 As defendant and the others were driving around in Pullen’s car, the victim had stopped

in his vehicle on West Nebraska Street because he was having car trouble. The victim’s

girlfriend, Mariah Jackson, and another person, Mikel Satcher, were with the victim at the time.

Jackson was texting Michael Smith, the father of her child. While Jackson was at that location

on Nebraska Street, Michael came to that location to drop off his and Jackson’s child with

Jackson. Michael had his two brothers, Mykell and Miray Smith, with him. A verbal argument

ensued between Jackson and Michael, followed by a brief physical altercation between the

victim and Michael. After the altercation was over, Michael and his brothers left the Nebraska

Street location.

¶ 13 Shortly thereafter, defendant and the others rode past the victim’s location in Pullen’s

black Saturn. After driving past the victim three or four times, Pullen pulled his vehicle into or

by a nearby alley. Defendant took the gun that Pullen kept behind the driver’s seat, got out of

the vehicle, and walked down the alley toward the victim. Pullen and Coleman stayed in the

vehicle. Defendant was gone from the vehicle for a few minutes. During that time, Pullen heard

gun shots. Defendant returned to the vehicle, got back in, and put the gun back in its original

location. Defendant, Pullen, and Coleman then left the area in Pullen’s vehicle.

6 ¶ 14 Just before the shooting took place, Jackson got out of the front seat of the victim’s

vehicle. The victim was standing at the back of the car reaching into the open trunk of the

vehicle. Jackson looked over at the victim and saw that there was a thin, light-skinned male

standing behind him. The male subject had a shirt over his nose and mouth. The male subject

fired several shots at the victim and then took off running up the alley. The police responded to

the scene a few minutes later. The victim died shortly thereafter. Jackson told the police what

had occurred, gave the police a description of the shooter, and also told the police that the

shooter had part of his face covered. Jackson identified the shooter as Mykell Smith (the brother

of her child’s father, Michael Smith) because of the physical altercation that had occurred

between the victim and Michael a short-time earlier and because Mykell was the only one of the

three Smith brothers that was light-skinned. The detective who was in charge of investigating

the shooting, however, had some concerns about Jackson’s identification and did not have

Mykell arrested at that time.

¶ 15 The police processed the scene of the shooting and found three spent shell casings on the

ground and one spent bullet in the trunk of the victim’s vehicle. Two additional spent bullets

were recovered from the victim’s body during the autopsy.

¶ 16 A few days after the shooting occurred, defendant’s juvenile parole officer returned to

work for the week following his days off and checked the GPS status of the juvenile subjects he

had on parole, one of which was defendant. Defendant had been on the parole officer’s caseload

“several different times.” Upon checking the status of his juvenile subjects, the parole officer

noticed that defendant’s GPS information indicated that defendant was at or near the scene of the

shooting when the shooting occurred. The police were contacted, and they obtained a search

warrant for the GPS information. After reviewing the GPS information, the police went to

7 various locations in the area and obtained video footage from nearby cameras for the time period

leading up to, and just after, the shooting. From the GPS and video information, the police were

able to determine that defendant had been riding around in Pullen’s black Saturn sedan shortly

before and after the shooting, that the sedan stopped by a nearby alley minutes before the

shooting occurred, that defendant got out of the vehicle and walked down the alley, that

defendant was at or near the location of the shooting when the shooting occurred, that defendant

ran back up the alley after the shooting, that defendant got back into Pullen’s vehicle, and that

defendant and the others immediately left the area in Pullen’s vehicle.

¶ 17 After obtaining all of that information, the police questioned Pullen several times. Pullen

repeatedly lied to the police about his involvement in, and knowledge of, the shooting.

Eventually, Pullen told the police about defendant getting out of Pullen’s vehicle with the gun in

the area of the shooting, about hearing gunfire, and about defendant returning to the vehicle with

the gun a few moments later. Pullen took the police to where the gun was located, rolled up in a

towel in the attic of a home on Alexander Street.2 The police recovered the gun at that time.

Subsequent firearm testing showed that the shots that had killed the victim had been fired from

Pullen’s gun.

¶ 18 Based upon the information that they had gathered, the police took defendant into

custody. Defendant was interrogated and made incriminating statements as indicated above. He

was later charged with the offenses in the instant case.

¶ 19 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both offenses and also

found that defendant had personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the murder.

2 Pullen had been charged with a firearm offense and with obstructing justice. Pullen testified at the trial that he was hoping to get probation on those offenses but denied that he had been promised anything by the State. 8 Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial (motion for

new trial), arguing, among other things, that the trial court had erred in denying both aspects of

defendant’s combined motion. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial and, after

a sentencing hearing, sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 80 years for first degree

murder (55 years for first degree murder plus a 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement) and 1

year for unlawful possession of a weapon by a person previously adjudged delinquent.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. Defendant

appealed.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 A. Motion to Suppress Statement

¶ 22 As his first point of contention on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in

denying defendant’s motion to suppress the videotaped statement defendant made to police (the

motion to suppress portion of defendant’s combined motion). Defendant asserts that the motion

should have been granted because the videotape showed that: (1) defendant clearly invoked his

right to remain silent by shaking his head “no” when he was asked if he was willing to speak to

the police after he had been given his Miranda warnings; and (2) the police failed to

scrupulously honor defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent when they ignored

defendant’s refusal and pressured defendant into providing a verbal response and continuing the

interrogation. In addition, defendant asserts that the trial court’s ruling was also erroneous

because during the hearing, the trial court found that defendant had to state that he either wanted

to remain silent or that he did not want to talk to police, which was contrary to the law on this

issue. For those reasons, defendant asks that we reverse the trial court’s ruling, denying

9 defendant’s motion to suppress the videotaped statement, and that we remand this case for

further proceedings.

¶ 23 The State argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. In support

of that argument, the State asserts first that the police officer in this case was not required to stop

talking to defendant because defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent. According to

the State, defendant’s momentary shaking of his head did not clearly establish that defendant had

invoked his right to remain silent, especially since defendant had given a verbal response to the

other questions that the officer had asked defendant in reading defendant his Miranda rights, and

it was proper, therefore, for the officer to request clarification from defendant. Upon the officer

doing so, defendant responded affirmatively that he was willing to speak to the police. Second,

and in the alternative, the State asserts that even if the trial court erred in this case by not

suppressing the videotaped statement, any error that occurred was harmless because the evidence

of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. For those reasons, the State asks that we reject

defendant’s argument on this issue.

¶ 24 In reply to the State’s arguments, defendant makes three primary assertions. First,

defendant asserts that the police officer understood that defendant was refusing to speak to the

police but questioned that response because he did not like the answer. Second, defendant

asserts that it contravenes the law and fundamental fairness to say that a defendant can

sufficiently agree to talk to the police by nodding his head “yes” but cannot sufficiently refuse to

talk to police by shaking his head “no.” Third and finally, defendant asserts that any error that

occurred in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant’s

videotaped statement was the strongest evidence against defendant. For those reasons and the

initial reasons that defendant stated, defendant again asks that we reverse the trial court’s ruling,

10 denying defendant’s motion to suppress the videotaped statement he made to police, and that we

remand this case for further proceedings.

¶ 25 A reviewing court applies a two-part standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a

motion to suppress statement. See People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008). The trial court’s

findings of fact and credibility determinations are given great deference and will not be reversed

on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. However, as to the

ultimate legal question posed by the motion of whether suppression is warranted, de novo review

applies. Id.

¶ 26 The federal and state constitutions guarantee that no person will be compelled to be a

witness against himself or herself in any criminal case (the privilege or right against self-

incrimination). U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. To protect that

constitutional right, the law requires that police interrogation must cease once a suspect indicates

in any manner and at any time prior to or during custodial interrogation that he wishes to remain

silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966); People v. Flores, 2014 IL App

(1st) 121786, ¶ 37; People v. Kronenberger, 2014 IL App (1st) 110231, ¶ 33. The right to remain

silent may be invoked either verbally or through nonverbal conduct that clearly indicates a desire

to end all questioning. Flores, 2014 IL App (1st) 121786, ¶ 37. However, to be given legal

effect, an individual’s invocation of the right to remain silent must be clear, unambiguous, and

unequivocal. Kronenberger, 2014 IL App (1st) 110231, ¶ 33. At a hearing on a motion to

suppress statement where a defendant claims that his statement to police was not voluntarily

given, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant’s statement was voluntarily made. See 725 ILCS 5/114-11(d) (West 2018); Slater,

228 Ill. 2d at 149.

11 ¶ 27 In the present case, after reviewing the record and defendant’s videotaped statement, we

find that defendant did not clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously invoke his right to remain

silent. See Kronenberger, 2014 IL App (1st) 110231, ¶ 33. Although defendant shook his head

“no” for about a second, he immediately stated “what” after doing so, which prompted the

officer to seek clarification and to tell defendant that defendant needed to give a verbal response

to the officer’s question of whether defendant was willing to speak to the police about the matter

under investigation. Defendant responded “yeah” to that question, and the interrogation

proceeded. We, thus, conclude from the evidence presented that the trial court properly

determined that defendant’s head shaking was ambiguous, that the officer was justified in

seeking clarification from defendant, and that defendant’s decision to talk the police was

voluntarily made. The trial court, therefore, properly denied the motion to suppress part of

defendant’s combined motion on that basis. See id. ¶¶ 31-38.

¶ 28 Contrary to defendant’s assertion on appeal, this is not a case such as People v. Nielson,

where the invocation of the right to remain silent, although nonverbal, was clear, unambiguous,

and unequivocal. See People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 287 (1999) (finding the defendant had

invoked his right to remain silent when he placed his hands over his ears, turned his head to the

ceiling, and chanted “nah nah”). Nor do we believe that the trial court’s comment—that a

defendant has to “state” that he wants to remain silent or that he does not want to talk to police—

is significant here. By our view, taken in context, the trial court’s statement in that regard was

merely an expression of the law in this area that requires a defendant’s invocation of the right to

remain silent be clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal. See Kronenberger, 2014 IL App (1st)

110231, ¶ 33.

12 ¶ 29 Having found that defendant did not clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously invoke

his right to remain silent in this case, we need not address the parties’ other arguments on this

issue.

¶ 30 B. Motion in Limine

¶ 31 As his second point of contention on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in

denying defendant’s motion in limine, requesting that certain portions of defendant’s videotaped

statement to police be redacted to remove the references made to defendant being on parole.

Defendant asserts that in denying the motion in limine (the request for redaction), the trial court

failed to properly balance the prejudicial impact of the statements about defendant being on

parole against the probative value of those statements. According to defendant, the statements in

the videotaped interview about defendant’s parole status, along with the parole officer’s

testimony at the jury trial about defendant being on his caseload several times, indicated to the

jury that defendant had multiple criminal convictions, was not necessary for the jury to hear for

the jury to understand that defendant was wearing an ankle monitor, and was highly prejudicial

because that information appealed to an improper basis for the jury to find defendant guilty—the

jury’s contempt for parolees and individuals with a criminal record. In addition, defendant

maintains, the trial court failed to take any corrective action to limit the jury’s consideration of

the police’s statements that defendant was on parole. 3 For those reasons, defendant asks that we

reverse his convictions and that we remand this case for a new trial, presumably with the

information about defendant being on parole redacted or excluded from the evidence.

3 It does not appear from the record in this case that the jury was given Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (4th ed. 2000) on the consideration of other-crimes evidence. 13 ¶ 32 The State argues that the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine was proper and

should be upheld. The State asserts that in making its ruling, the trial court clearly considered

the probative value of the parole status/GPS monitoring evidence, the context in which that

evidence was mentioned, and the prejudicial effect of that evidence. According to the State, the

parole status/GPS monitoring evidence was extremely probative in this case and was essential to

explain the police investigation that led to the arrest of defendant (how defendant was arrested

and how the officers were able to obtain screenshots of defendant’s location at various times on

the night of the murder). The State also points out that as part of its ruling, the trial court

instructed the prosecution not to emphasize the evidence of defendant’s parole status and that

there was no mention during defendant’s jury trial of the specific crime of which defendant was

previously convicted. As for the parole officer’s testimony that defendant had been on his

caseload multiple times, the State asserts that defendant has forfeited any argument on that issue

because defendant failed to object to that testimony at trial and failed to raise the issue in his

posttrial motion. For all of the reasons set forth, the State asks, therefore, that we reject

¶ 33 In reply to the State’s argument, defendant disputes that he forfeited the issue regarding

the parole officer’s testimony and states that the matter was properly preserved for appellate

review because defendant raised the issue about his parole status in his motion in limine, the

matter was litigated in the trial court, and the factual information relative to that issue is well

established in the record, even though defendant acknowledges that he did not specifically

include that matter in his posttrial motion. In the alternative, defendant asserts that even if that

issue was potentially forfeited, this court should reach the merits of that issue, nevertheless, as a

14 matter of plain error. Defendant again asks, therefore, that we reverse his convictions and

remand this case for a new trial.

¶ 34 A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, including a ruling upon a motion in

limine, will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See People v. Pikes, 2013

IL 115171, ¶ 12; People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991); In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439,

460 (2008). The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is high one and will not be

overcome unless it can be said that the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or

unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court.

See Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460; People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003). When

considering the admission of other crimes evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, the

reviewing court owes some deference to the trial court’s ability to evaluate the impact of that

evidence on the jury. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 186. Reasonable minds can disagree about whether

such evidence is admissible without requiring a reversal of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling when

the abuse of discretion standard applies. Id. In addition, even if the trial court has committed an

abuse of discretion in the admission of evidence, it will not warrant a reversal of the trial court’s

judgment unless the record indicates the existence of substantial prejudice that affected the

outcome of the trial. Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460.

¶ 35 As the above discussion implies, the parole status/GPS monitoring evidence in the instant

case was in the nature of other-crimes evidence. The common law rule is that other-crimes

evidence is not admissible to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes. People v. Dabbs,

239 Ill. 2d 277, 283 (2010); Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 170; Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

The concern with other-crimes evidence is not that it has too little probative value, but that it has

too much, and that it may overpersuade a jury to convict a defendant merely because the jury

15 believes that the defendant is a bad person who deserves to be punished. See People v. Manning,

182 Ill. 2d 193, 213-14 (1998). However, other-crimes evidence may be admissible, in the

discretion of the trial court, for any other relevant purpose, such as to show modus operandi,

intent, identity, motive or absence of mistake. See id. at 214; Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364-65. When

a party seeks to admit other-crimes evidence, the trial judge must weigh the probative value of

that evidence against its prejudicial effect, and may exclude the evidence if the prejudicial effect

substantially outweighs the probative value. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d at 214. Because of the high

risk of prejudice involved with other-crimes evidence, the erroneous admission of such evidence

ordinarily requires a reversal. See id.

¶ 36 In the present case, after reviewing the record, we decline to apply the forfeiture rule to

any part of defendant’s argument here. See People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 19 (noting that

the forfeiture rule is a limitation on the parties and not on the court). As defendant correctly

notes, he did raise an issue about his parole status in his motion in limine, albeit in the context of

his videotaped statement, and the relevant underlying facts have been sufficiently established in

the record for us to review the merits of this entire issue.

¶ 37 Turning to the merits, then, we find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s

motion in limine (the motion in limine portion of defendant’s combined motion). As the trial

court correctly found, defendant’s parole status and the fact that defendant was on a GPS monitor

at the time of the shooting were an integral part of this case. Although the trial court could have

redacted the term “parole” from the videotaped statement and from the parole officer’s

testimony, the jury still would have been informed that defendant was on a GPS monitor at the

time of the offense and would have realized that defendant was being monitored by the criminal

justice system. While the trial court allowed the term “parole” to be stated in front of the jury, it

16 preemptively cautioned the State not to emphasize that information. The State apparently

followed that instruction as defendant makes no claim on appeal that the State improperly

emphasized the parole status information to the jury. Finally, even though the parole officer’s

brief statement in testimony that defendant had been on his caseload “multiple different times”

was somewhat problematic, the State did not linger on, or emphasize, that response and promptly

moved on to the next question. In addition, and contrary to defendant’s assertion on appeal, the

parole officer’s statement in that regard did not indicate whether defendant had been on juvenile

parole for multiple cases, as defendant suggests, or merely for a single case multiple times.

Thus, under the particular circumstances of the instant matter, we conclude that the trial court

properly exercised its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion in limine. See Leona W., 228

Ill. 2d at 460; Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 182. We, therefore, affirm defendant’s convictions and

sentences.

¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County.

¶ 40 Affirmed.