People v. Wells

2022 IL App (3d) 200038-U

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 200038-U

Order filed June 14, 2022 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-20-0038 v. ) Circuit No. 05-CF-114 ) WILLIE M. WELLS, ) Honorable ) Paul P. Gilfillan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Daugherity and Hauptman concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court properly considered juvenile mitigation factors when sentencing the defendant.

¶2 The defendant, Willie M. Wells, appeals following the Peoria County circuit court’s order

resentencing him to 30 years’ imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault, a consecutive

21 years’ imprisonment for aggravated vehicular hijacking, and a concurrent 6 years’

imprisonment for kidnapping. The defendant argues the court imposed an unconstitutional de facto life sentence because it did not consider the juvenile sentencing factors set forth in section 5-4.5-

105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)).

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-

14(a)(1) (West 2004)), aggravated vehicular hijacking (id. § 18-4(a)(3)), and kidnapping (id. § 10-

1(a)(1)). The defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offenses. The court initially sentenced

the defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault, a consecutive 21

years’ imprisonment for aggravated vehicular hijacking, and a concurrent 6 years’ imprisonment

for kidnapping. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences.

People v. Wells, No. 3-07-0725 (2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶5 In July 2009, the defendant filed a postconviction petition. The circuit court denied the

defendant’s petition, and the defendant did not appeal.

¶6 In June 2016, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition. The defendant argued, in relevant part, that his 61-year de facto life sentence was

unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because he was a juvenile at the time of

the offenses. The court denied the defendant’s motion for leave finding both arguments could have

been raised on direct appeal. The defendant appealed, and this court remanded for a new sentencing

hearing as required by People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. People v. Wells, 2019 IL App (3d)

160636-U.

¶7 At the new sentencing hearing, prior to hearing evidence, the circuit court discussed with

the parties whether, after Buffer, it could sentence the defendant to more than 40 years’

imprisonment but based on the percentages of the sentences that must be served, the defendant

2 could serve less than 40 years. To illustrate its point, the court used a hypothetical sentence of 30

years’ imprisonment at an 85% service rate for aggravated criminal sexual assault and 20 years’

imprisonment at a 50% service rate for aggravated vehicular hijacking. After hearing arguments

from the parties as to whether the hypothetical sentence was allowed, the court began the hearing.

¶8 The State presented the victim impact statement from the original hearing. The defendant

presented testimony from two sisters, a letter from a third sister, and his presentence investigation

report (PSI). The State argued an appropriate sentence would be an aggregate term of 44½ years’

imprisonment. Defense counsel argued an appropriate sentence would be an aggregate term of 20

to 25 years’ imprisonment. In allocution, the defendant took responsibility for the offenses and

described his growth and rehabilitation while in prison.

¶9 The court then discussed the following mitigating factors:

“I mean, when you’re young, you do things that you wouldn’t do as a mature

person. That’s totally an age-related factor. ***

*** [I]mpetuosity doesn’t really apply as much since this entire scenario

played out over a long period of time and gave the Defendant multiple opportunities

to back away from the hours and hours of conduct that was involved here. ***

***

*** [H]is level of maturity was one at the age of 16 years and 8 months as

one of a hardened criminal.

You were a mature criminal at that point in time having been through

everything you have done and all of the actions you committed ***.

3 *** You at age 16 and 8 months did have the ability to consider the risks

and consequences of your behavior because you were constantly taught that ***.

In terms of his cognitive and development disability, in the average range,

even if it was low average. There’s reference to no special education services being

required and acknowledgment that there were no mental health disabilities per se.

In terms of you being subject to outside pressure, I think the peer pressure

here, there was a component of it, but I think that you were the lead—ringleader,

as counsel mentioned, of this particular incident. Really, the others were being more

influenced by you than you by them. ***

*** [Y]ou certainly developed evil characteristics as you grew. Your

siblings didn’t turn that way, even though they were faced with the same family

pressures and abuse.

Negative influences, Ronald Wells’s case has crossed my desk a number of

times since I have been in this position. So you didn’t have good—necessarily good

influences. *** But you could have learned from those positive influences in your

life too.

We have already talked about your family and home environment. Your

educational background is full—is more fully documented in the PSIs. We talked

about the abuse you suffered as a child and the childhood trauma and parental

4 neglect, so to speak. You didn’t even know your mom apparently as she lost rights

to you early on, if I recall correctly.

But that’s hard to then conclude that based on what you have said and that

you’re having normal conversations with siblings now that you’re rehabilitated or

on your way or road to rehabilitation. That’s just difficult to come to a conclusion

on at this point in time. Another element is the circumstances of your offense. I’m

not even going to go there. It is so horrific. The record will speak for itself.

Next element, your degree of participation and specific role in the offense

***. *** [Y]ou were the leader of the pack. You were the one with the gun.

The level of planning, there was malice aforethought here involved. This

was a plan to stop a vehicle, random as though it may be, and then conduct the

behavior that followed over the next course of the rest of the evening.

You were quite capable of participating in your own defense at the time of

the case. We have already talked about your prior juvenile criminal history, which

is bad. And I have acknowledged today at least your expression of remorse, which

may end up with some benefit to you today. ***

Based on everything I referred to above and considering all of the

characteristics and factors of the Defendant’s youth and his attendant circumstances

before imposing a sentence within a discretionary range here today, I am

concluding that your conduct in the case—and this is a fairly easy call—showed

irretrievable depravity ***.”

5 ¶ 10 The court sentenced the defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment at an 85% service rate for

aggravated criminal sexual assault, a consecutive 21 years’ imprisonment at a 50% service rate for

aggravated vehicular hijacking, and a concurrent 6 years’ imprisonment at a 50% service rate for

kidnapping. The court’s sentence would require the defendant to effectively serve 36 years’

imprisonment. Regarding its discretion not to impose a 10-year firearm enhancement, the court

stated:

“This may be attributable to your youth at the time of the offense. It may be

attributable to the arguments you and your attorney made today and your statement

here today. But because it is now by virtue of a change in the law discretionary to

me as to whether to add the 10-year enhancement or add-on to your sentence for

possessing a firearm at this time, I’m exercising my discretion in not adding that 10

years on to your sentence.”

¶ 11 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence and argued the court wrongly

determined he could be sentenced to a de facto life sentence and that his sentence violated Buffer.

The court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The defendant argues the circuit court failed to properly consider the juvenile sentencing

factors set forth in section 5-4.5-105 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)) before

resentencing him, resulting in an unconstitutional de facto life sentence.

¶ 14 At the outset, we note that “[i]t is well settled that a trial judge’s sentencing decisions are

entitled to great deference and will not be altered on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” People

v. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 796, 800 (2007). A reviewing court “must not substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court simply because the reviewing court would have weighed the factors

6 differently.” Id. at 800-01. A sentence that falls within the statutorily prescribed range is

presumptively valid (People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27), and “is not an abuse of

discretion unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense” (People v. Franks,

292 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779 (1997)). We presume the circuit court considered the relevant factors

and mitigation evidence presented. People v. Wilson, 2016 App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11. The court is

not required to “recite and assign a value to each factor.” Id. It is defendant’s burden to show that

the court did not consider the relevant factors. Id.

¶ 15 The sentencing range for aggravated criminal sexual assault is 6 to 60 years (730 ILCS 5/5-

4.5-25(a), 5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 2020)), and the court may, in its discretion, impose a 10-year

sentencing enhancement due to the defendant’s possession of a firearm. Id. § 5-4.5-105(b); 720

ILCS 5/12-14(d)(1) (West 2004). The sentencing range for aggravated vehicular hijacking is 7 to

30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2020); 720 ILCS 5/18-4(b) (West 2004). The sentencing

range for kidnapping is 3 to 7 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020); 720 ILCS 5/10-1(c)

(West 2004). Since the defendant’s sentences of 30 years’ imprisonment for aggravated criminal

sexual assault, 21 years’ imprisonment for aggravated vehicular hijacking, and 6 years’

imprisonment for kidnapping are within the applicable ranges, they are presumptively valid. See

Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27.

¶ 16 The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual

punishments and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. People v. Dorsey, 2021

IL 123010, ¶ 37. Punishment for a crime should be proportionate to the offense. Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions

are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably depraved character. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,

68 (2010). Therefore, the eighth amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in

7 prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,

479 (2012).

¶ 17 “[T]o prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced for an

offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence,

mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider

youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27.

“[A] prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile offender does not constitute a

de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment.” Id. ¶ 41. Further, “a statutory

sentencing scheme that affords a juvenile an opportunity to be released from prison after serving

40 years or less of the term imposed does not constitute a de facto life sentence.” Dorsey, 2021 IL

123010, ¶ 65.

¶ 18 In response to the juvenile sentencing concerns raised by Miller and its progeny, the Illinois

legislature enacted Public Act 99-69 in 2016, which added section 5-4.5-105 to the Code. Pub. Act

99-69 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5-4.5-105). Section 5-4.5-105 sets forth mitigating

factors that a sentencing court must consider when sentencing a juvenile offender. 730 ILCS 5/5-

4.5-105(a) (West 2020). Those factors include:

“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the

offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and

the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any;

(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer

pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;

8 (3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social

background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other

childhood trauma;

(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or

both;

(5) the circumstances of the offense;

(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense,

including the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;

(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her

defense;

(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and

(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an

expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel

chooses not to make a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression

of remorse as an aggravating factor.” Id.

¶ 19 The record in the instant case affirmatively establishes that the court considered the above

factors before it pronounced the defendant’s sentence. Supra ¶ 9. However, the defendant argues

the court merely paid “lip service” to the section 5-4.5-105(a) factors because, during the court’s

presentence discussion, it proposed a hypothetical sentence that was similar to the sentence that it

ultimately imposed. We disagree with the defendant that the court’s discussion of the changes in

the juvenile sentencing law after Buffer indicates that it did not give adequate consideration to the

juvenile factors in mitigation. This discussion occurred well before the court considered, at some

length, the section 5-4.5-105(a) factors. Moreover, the record indicates the court gave significant

9 thought to the factors, as it based its decision not to impose the 10-year firearm enhancement on

the defendant’s youth at the time of the offense.

¶ 20 The defendant further argues the court assigned insufficient weight to the factors that

favored imposing a lesser sentence. In essence, the defendant asks this court to reweigh the factors.

However, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court simply because the

defendant believes we should weigh the factors differently. See Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 800-

01.

¶ 21 Additionally, the defendant argues his cumulative 51-year prison sentence is an

unconstitutional de facto life sentence for crimes he committed as a juvenile. While the defendant

was sentenced to a total of 51 years, if he receives all possible good-conduct credit, his sentence

will be 36 years. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), (iii) (West 2020). Our supreme court recently found

a good-conduct credit scheme that provides the defendant some meaningful opportunity to obtain

release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation before spending more than 40 years in

prison is not a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010,

¶ 65. Thus, based on Dorsey, the defendant did not receive an unconstitutional de facto life

sentence, as he will only be required to serve 36 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 24 Affirmed.