People v. Welles (James)

77 Misc. 3d 129(A), 2022 NY Slip Op 51151(U)

• Court: Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York
• Decided: November 22, 2022
• Docket: 570598/19
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

People v Welles (2022 NY Slip Op 51151(U)) [*1]

People v Welles (James)

2022 NY Slip Op 51151(U) [77 Misc 3d 129(A)]

Decided on November 22, 2022

Appellate Term, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on November 22, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Hagler, J.P., Tisch, Michael, JJ.
570598/19

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

James Welles, Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant appeals from an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Robert Rosenthal, J.), dated July 25, 2019, which, after a hearing, adjudicated him a level one sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C).

Per Curiam.

Order (Robert Rosenthal, J.), dated July 25, 2019, affirmed.

The delay between the underlying attempted possessing a sexual performance by a child conviction (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 263.16) and the SORA hearing did not violate defendant's right to due process. Correction Law § 168—l(8) provides that a failure by a state or local agency to act or by a court to render a determination within the time period specified by the Sex Offender Registration Act shall not affect the obligation of a sex offender to register or verify under SORA, nor shall such failure prevent a court from making a determination regarding the sex offender's level of notification. SORA is regulatory rather than criminal in nature and, as such, "the due process protections required for a risk level classification proceeding are not as extensive as those required in a plenary criminal or civil trial" (People v Baxin, 26 NY3d 6, 10 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Considering that defendant was already under a lifelong obligation to register as a Tier III sex offender in Louisiana, as a result of a 2006 federal conviction for the transportation and possession of child pornography (see People v Gallagher, 129 AD3d 1252, 1253 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 908 [2015]), we conclude that the delay herein was not "so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority" (People v Gonzalez, 138 AD3d 814, 815 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 913 [2016]; see People v Lumpkin, 168 AD3d 1111, 1112 [2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 907 [2019]; compare People v Gregory, 71 AD3d 1559, 1560 [2010]).

All concur

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Clerk of the Court
Decision Date: November 22, 2022