No. 2--94--1032
________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No. 94--CF--493
v. )
HENRY WEILMUENSTER, ) Honorable
) John L. Petersen,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:
The State appeals from the order of the circuit court of Kane
County granting the motion of defendant, Henry Weilmuenster, to
dismiss an indictment against him issued by a November 1992
statewide grand jury and originally filed in the circuit court of
Cook County on March 18, 1994. We affirm.
On March 22, 1994, the indictment was transferred from the
circuit court of Cook County to the circuit court of Kane County
for trial. Defendant was charged with one count of calculated
criminal cannabis conspiracy (720 ILCS 550/9(b)(West 1992)) and
three counts of cannabis trafficking (720 ILCS 550/5.1 (West
1992)). Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that
he had been granted immunity from criminal prosecution in a Cook
County proceeding on June 18, 1993, in return for his testimony
before another statewide grand jury. The State responded that, in
return for his testimony, defendant had been given only limited
"use" immunity (725 ILCS 5/106C--2 (West 1992)) rather than the
more complete "transactional" immunity from criminal prosecution
(see 725 ILCS 5/106--1 (West 1992)); and that defendant knew "the
bounds of the immunity granted to him and agreed to cooperate and
testify for the State under a grant of Use Immunity." The State
further alleged that the incriminating evidence which led to the
indictment against him was obtained independently from his
testimony before the grand jury. After an extensive evidentiary
hearing regarding the nature and scope of the immunity promised and
given to defendant, on August 5, 1994, the Kane County court (the
court) granted defendant's motion and discharged him.
The State timely appeals. The thrust of the State's arguments
is that (1) the Cook County circuit court granted use immunity and
defendant understood its parameters; (2) no hearing was necessary
before the Kane County circuit court; and (3) the Kane County court
improperly reviewed the findings of the circuit court of Cook
County and overturned its findings. We disagree for the reasons
that follow.
KANE COUNTY PROCEEDING
At the hearing in the Kane County court, defendant testified
that, prior to May 13, 1993, Ron Wilson and Ron Bartlett, agents of
the Illinois State Police and a drug enforcement agency, visited
him while he was incarcerated in the Department of Corrections
(DOC) at Taylorville, seeking information during the course of a
criminal investigation. Defendant was going to be charged with
conspiracy. When asked if he was threatened, defendant testified:
"I was told that shit rolls downhill and I do not want to be at the
bottom when it all came down." Defendant made a statement to the
officers. Another visit took place at the prison on May 13, 1993.
Defendant testified he had been subpoenaed to testify before
a statewide grand jury on June 18, 1993. Defendant, who was
handcuffed and shackled, was transported by the State Police and
others to a Cook County courthouse. The shackles were removed, but
he remained handcuffed. He was placed in a holding cell until he
was brought before a judge. Prior to that meeting, defendant met
with Amy Bertani, an assistant Attorney General, in an office of
the courthouse. An officer was present during the meeting.
Defendant testified that he was not advised of his right to have an
attorney present. When he asked Bertani whether he needed an
attorney, she said, "Not at this time." They discussed a grant of
immunity. Defendant testified that he was not familiar with the
terms "transactional immunity" and "use immunity" and the
difference between these types of immunity was not explained to him
prior to appearing before the judge.
Defendant further testified that he was brought into a judge's
chambers. The judge (Judge Hett) advised defendant of his fifth
amendment privilege not to testify and to remain silent. Defendant
expected to exercise his right not to testify. The judge explained
that defendant could not be prosecuted for what he was about to
say. Bertani and the officer were present during this exchange.
Defendant testified that he did not ask to have an attorney present
because he was told by Bertani that he did not need one at that
time; he was going before a judge to have immunity papers signed
and he did not need an attorney for that. Defendant believed he
was granted immunity from prosecution.
After defendant testified before the statewide grand jury, he
was sent back to the penitentiary at Joliet to serve the remainder
of his current sentence. Early in 1994, defendant was charged with
offenses for which he was arrested and brought before Judge
Petersen in the circuit court of Kane County. Defendant told the
court he was 33 years old, had an eighth grade education, and
obtained a GED.
On cross-examination, defendant testified that agents Wilson
and Pat Farrey, who interviewed defendant in prison on May 13,
1993, told him not to discuss his conversation with anyone else.
Defendant eventually met Bertani and again met with Farrey just
prior to testifying before the grand jury. Defendant asked Bertani
if he needed a lawyer. He was brought before the judge in
chambers. When the judge asked if he was going to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination if he were called
before the statewide grand jury, defendant stated that was his
intention. When asked if he had a lawyer, defendant said he did
not have the money for a lawyer. The judge did not ask if he
wanted a lawyer. The judge told him that the prosecution would not
be able to use anything he said before the grand jury and that he
would have to testify if he were granted immunity. Defendant said
he understood that. He acknowledged that he gave up his right to
talk to a lawyer. The judge signed an order (of immunity).
When agents Wilson and Bartlett visited him in prison, they
did not tell defendant he would be given immunity if he talked to
them. The first time he heard about immunity was from Bertani,
just before he testified, after he indicated he would invoke his
fifth amendment privilege.
On redirect examination, defendant testified that, when he was
brought before the judge in Cook County, he had a conversation with
Bertani and Farrey. Farrey stepped out at some point in the
conversation. When defendant asked if he needed a lawyer, Bertani
said, "Not at this time." Defendant said he was aware that he had
a fifth amendment right to remain silent. Defendant said the
reason he told the judge he was not looking for a lawyer was
because he was told by Bertani that he did not need one at that
time. No one explained the immunity to him, and he did not know
the difference between transactional and use immunity.
The State moved for a directed finding in its favor, arguing
that it was clear that defendant had been given use immunity in the
Cook County proceeding. Defense counsel argued that defendant
understood he was given transactional immunity from prosecution.
The court denied the State's motion.
Assistant Attorney General Lemons conducted the direct
examination of Amy Bertani, who was on the drug conspiracy
prosecution task force in the Attorney General's office. She
testified she first met defendant in a small room at the courthouse
in Chicago. Defendant was brought in by the DOC. Special Agent
Farrey was present, along with a DOC officer. Bertani explained
her position to defendant. Defendant had asked about immunity.
She explained what immunity was. She had already prepared a
petition and order which she had with her. If defendant invoked
his fifth amendment right, she would appear before a judge and ask
that defendant be given use immunity. She explained to defendant
that whatever he said before the grand jury, "the State cannot use
against you in a prosecution." She denied telling him that the
Attorney General's office was not going to prosecute him.
Defendant appeared to understand this. He asked if he needed a
lawyer. She told him that he could have one if he wanted and that
one could be appointed. She also said that "the process could
occur without that." Defendant continued to talk, indicating he
wanted immunity.
When asked if there were any deals regarding defendant's
girlfriend, Bertani testified, "I do know it was our intent not to
have him serve anymore prison time." The girlfriend, Beverly
Gibbs, testified and was never charged. Defendant was to let
Bertani know if he had any difficulties with his parole officer.
Bertani went to Judge Hett's office. A court reporter was present,
and the DOC guard brought defendant in. When the judge advised
defendant concerning appointment of counsel, defendant said he did
not want one. The judge explained use immunity to defendant and
signed the order. Defendant then testified before the statewide
grand jury.
On cross-examination, Bertani stated that, when she spoke to
defendant, she was acting in her capacity as an assistant Attorney
General. She said she explained the type of immunity she offered
defendant. She could not recall whether she explained what other
types of immunity were available. She believed she explained
transactional immunity to distinguish it from use immunity.
Bertani was shown a motion for an order of immunity dated June 18,
1993, but file stamped June 17, 1994, by the clerk of the circuit
court of Cook County--one year later than the date the immunity
order was requested. Bertani explained that she could not find the
original motion and order. She contacted Judge Hett, who had
signed the original order and brought him a transcript of the June
1993 proceeding. The later order signed by Judge Hett was dated
June 17, 1994. An affidavit signed by Judge Hett and attached to
that order was filed stamped June 17, 1994. Judge Hett signed the
June 17, 1994, order after examining the transcript. The affidavit
states that the judge signed an order granting use immunity which
was the same as the order he signed on June 18, 1993.
Bertani testified she made it clear to defendant that the
immunity did not prevent the State from charging him at a later
time but the State could not use his grand jury testimony directly
or indirectly against him and that what he had previously told the
officer could be used against him. Bertani acknowledged she told
defendant she did not intend to have him serve anymore prison time.
Defense counsel examined Patrick Farrey as a rebuttal witness.
Farrey was employed as an agent of the Illinois State Police from
1987 to October 1993 and was involved in the criminal
investigation. He visited defendant in prison in 1993. The State
had not given Farrey an opportunity to review his reports before
testifying. It was Farrey's understanding that if defendant
cooperated with the investigation he would possibly not be
prosecuted. He did not recall the exact wording of the
conversation with defendant, but it was implied that, if defendant
did not cooperate, he would be going back to prison for the
offenses Farrey was investigating and for which defendant had not
been yet charged. Defendant had information pertinent to the
investigation. Farrey knew Bertani as a prosecutor in the
investigating unit and was present during dozens of conversations
involving Bertani and witnesses. When asked about Bertani's
reputation for truthfulness, Farrey answered evasively. When
further questioned regarding Bertani's veracity, Farrey stated that
he heard statements made by Bertani that were not the way he
remembered the situations; this included some testimony he had
heard.
Farrey was given an opportunity to review some reports, but he
was not given his entire case file; some reports were missing. On
cross-examination, Farrey stated he did not recall any documents
being present when defendant was interviewed regarding immunity at
the Cook County courthouse. He recalled being present during the
entire interview. Use immunity was not explained to defendant in
Farrey's presence. It was his impression from conversations with
his superiors and prosecutors from the Attorney General's office
that defendant would not be prosecuted if he cooperated. Farrey
admitted he was angry for having been subpoenaed by the State; he
was concerned about the loss of income as well as the possibility
of being sued civilly. Defendant cooperated fully with Farrey's
investigation.
Paul West, who was also indicted, testified that he met
Bertani when he was subpoenaed to appear before the statewide grand
jury. Bertani promised him that, if he cooperated, he would not be
prosecuted or receive any jail time.
In surrebuttal, Bertani denied telling Farrey that defendant
would be given complete immunity. She stated she promised West
that he would not be subject to jail or prison and that his
cooperation would be noted. Bertani testified regarding the arrest
of defendant and West. She obtained recognizance bonds (I-bonds)
for them in Cook County. However, this procedure was not honored
in Kane County, and defendant and West were arrested. Bertani
assisted in filing a motion to nol-pros the charges which motion
was granted. However, defendant and West were reindicted at a
later time. The court inquired what penalty Bertani had in mind in
view of the charges being made. She responded that probation or
conditional discharge would be sought.
COOK COUNTY PROCEEDING
The record includes a transcript of the proceeding before
Judge Hett in Cook County on June 18, 1993. There, the court
advised defendant that the grand jury was investigating possible
offenses of cannabis trafficking, calculated criminal cannabis
conspiracy, and money laundering. The court informed defendant
that the State asked that "I grant you immunity. Use immunity and
compel you to testify before the State Wide Grand Jury." The court
asked whether defendant had a lawyer and whether he had money to
hire a lawyer to advise him in connection with the matter.
Defendant replied he did not. The court asked whether defendant
was looking for a lawyer to advise him before he was called to
testify. Defendant said he was not. The court explained that "use
of immunity would prohibit the State from filing any charges or
prosecuting you for anything you might say, anything that they can
learn as a result of what you say in the Grand Jury." Defendant
said he understood. The court explained that, if he lied in
testifying, he could be prosecuted for perjury. The following
exchange took place.
"THE COURT: You have a right to exercise the 5th
Amendment rights. If you do so, *** --if you understand your
rights, I am prepared to grant the State's motion for
immunity, which would give you immunity from prosecution for
anything that you say or things that they could discover as a
result of what you say in the Grand Jury.
Do you understand all of that?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. And do you intend to invoke your 5th
Amendment right, if you appear before the Grand Jury without
immunity?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
* * *
THE COURT: Give up your right to consult with a lawyer in
connection with this?
DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.
THE COURT: Let the record indicate I believe that Mr.
Weilmuenster has knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to an attorney. I am convinced that he will exercise his 5th
Amendment right to not testify in the absence of an order of
immunity. I have explained the details of immunity to Mr.
Weilmuenster. It's my opinion that he understands the scope
of that order of immunity."
KANE COUNTY COURT FINDINGS
After the Kane County court heard the arguments of counsel,
the court noted that the recreated motion and order for immunity
were obtained in a nonadversarial proceeding in June 1994 and did
make reference to "use" immunity--if in fact it was an order
identical to the original one signed the year before. The court
observed that defendant was brought from the penitentiary in
chains, had an eighth grade education, and was unrepresented by
counsel. The court found Farrey's testimony truthful and candid.
Although Farrey was not given an opportunity to look at his notes,
he believed that if defendant testified he would not be prosecuted
but if defendant did not cooperate he would possibly go to prison
on other charges.
The court noted that Bertani interviewed defendant in a
custodial setting and told defendant that she did not want him to
go to jail. The court was concerned that a defendant be
sufficiently and clearly admonished of his rights and of his
understanding especially when he is in a custodial setting and
unrepresented by counsel, when a grant of immunity is being
considered. The court granted defendant's motion.
ANALYSIS
When use immunity is granted, a witness' compelled testimony,
or leads derived therefrom, may not be used in his prosecution.
Under transactional immunity, the witness is fully immunized from
prosecution for any offenses to which his compelled testimony may
relate and transactional immunity will not be transmuted into use
immunity. People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald, 66 Ill. 2d 546, 549,
550-51 (1977). When statutory transactional immunity is granted in
one county, it serves wholly to immunize a person from prosecution
in any other local jurisdiction of the State. Cruz, 66 Ill. 2d at
551. The State argues that the grant of a particular type of
immunity by one county should be honored and recognized by another
county and that one circuit judge may not review and disregard the
orders of another circuit judge. The State asserts that Judge Hett
explained the type of immunity offered (use immunity) and that
defendant understood its scope. Defendant argues, inter alia, that
the circuit court has the inherent authority to dismiss a criminal
prosecution when a violation of due process has been demonstrated.
The difficulty with the State's position is that, without
specifically raising the issue here or below, it is indirectly
arguing that the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel
should be applied in its favor. We do not believe that the circuit
court of Kane County was "reviewing" or disregarding the orders of
another circuit court. Rather, the court examined matters outside
the record to determine defendant's understanding of the immunity
proceeding, whether he voluntarily consented to limited use
immunity, and whether the State made promises which exceeded the
findings reflected in Judge Hett's orders. The court was asked to
grant a dismissal of the charges based on disputed matters of fact
appearing outside the record. See 725 ILCS 5/114--1(a)(3), 1(d)
(West 1994).
A final judgment may have preclusive effects in a subsequent
action under the doctrine of res judicata or of collateral
estoppel. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final
judgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies and, as to them, precludes a subsequent
action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
Stratemeyer v. West, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1096 (1985).
Collateral estoppel is a branch of res judicata which precludes
relitigating the same issue or a finding on a controlling material
fact decided in another, different action between the same parties
or their privies. See Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d
6, 19-20 (1992); see also People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 166
(1990). Res judicata precludes relitigation of a single cause of
action between two parties, extending to both causes actually
litigated and those which might have been, while collateral
estoppel is limited to particular facts and issues in common
between the prior and subsequent actions which are material to the
dispositions of both. Cirro, 153 Ill. 2d at 20.
Because it is obvious that the causes of action in Cook County
and Kane County were not identical in the present case, the
threshold issue before us is whether issue preclusion (i.e.,
collateral estoppel) should be applied. Because of the unusual
circumstances present here, we find that collateral estoppel should
not be applied and that defendant was not precluded from
relitigating issues in support of his motion to dismiss the
indictment.
In deciding whether it would be fair to apply issue
preclusion, courts may consider whether the parties were true
adversaries and whether the party against whom preclusion is sought
was unable, as a matter of law, to appeal the judgment in the
initial action. See Cirro, 153 Ill. 2d at 21-22. Even where all
the usual pleading elements of the doctrine are met, collateral
estoppel will not be applied where an injustice would result or
when the party against whom the estoppel is asserted did not have
a full and fair opportunity and an incentive to litigate the issue
in the prior proceeding (Bulfin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 244 Ill. App.
3d 785, 788, 790-91 (1993)) or where relitigation of the issue is
warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the
procedures followed in the two courts (People v. Filitti, 190 Ill.
App. 3d 884, 886 (1989)).
In criminal cases, application of the doctrine against a
defendant is severely limited, particularly where an issue decided
adversely to the defendant will be effectively insulated from
review. People v. Mordican, 64 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1976). A
defendant may be permitted to relitigate an issue where additional
evidence becomes available or where there are "peculiar
circumstances." Mordican, 64 Ill. 2d at 261. In criminal cases,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be applied with a
hypertechnical, archaic, 19th century approach, but with realism
and rationality. People v. Mordican, 33 Ill. App. 3d 196, 200
(1975), aff'd, 64 Ill. 2d 257 (1976). Collateral estoppel may be
avoided, for example, in a case where the defendant was
inadequately represented by counsel, this resulted in the failure
to present available evidence, and the overall circumstances show
that he was denied a full and fair hearing. See, e.g., People v.
Stiles, 95 Ill. App. 3d 959, 962-66 (1981). Based on the foregoing
principles and the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe
collateral estoppel should not be applied against defendant. Here,
defendant was induced to testify before the grand jury under what
appear to be coercive circumstances, in a proceeding where he was
without the benefit of counsel. There was a gross disparity in the
bargaining power of the parties. Defendant was not offered counsel
and was led to believe he did not need counsel. The Cook County
proceeding was essentially uncontested and lacked truly adversarial
safeguards. His ostensible consent to any order of immunity would
likely have precluded appellate review. To the extent that the
Cook County order could conceivably be viewed as agreed or
consensual (though we recognize it is not technically an agreed
order), it would not ordinarily be subject to review; however, we
believe such an order could be set aside if the order were shown to
be the result of misrepresentation, coercion, incompetence, gross
disparity in the position or capacity of the parties, or newly
discovered evidence. See In re Haber, 99 Ill. App. 3d 306, 309
(1981). If, in fact, defendant mistakenly believed that he had
full immunity, he had little incentive to litigate the scope of the
immunity from prosecution or to appeal.
Furthermore, we observe that the State appears to have failed
to raise specifically the defense of res judicata or collateral
estoppel and participated fully in relitigating the facts and
issues it now contends should not have been considered by the Kane
County court; the State has thus waived the issue whether that
court improperly reconsidered matters already adjudicated.
Caporale v. Shannon Plumbing Co., 20 Ill. App. 3d 511, 513 (1974).
The Kane County court properly considered evidence not
previously of record regarding whether the State made other
enforceable promises to defendant not to prosecute--which promises
were not brought out in the Cook County proceeding. We believe
such promises made in return for a defendant's cooperation, if
supported by the evidence, may be enforced independently of a
statutory grant of immunity. See People v. Starks, 106 Ill. 2d
441, 452 (1985); People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 308 (1964);
People v. Smith, 233 Ill. App. 3d 342, 351 (1992); People v.
Pierson, 230 Ill. App. 3d 186, 189-91 (1992).
Having determined that issue preclusion will not be applied
here because of the peculiar circumstances of this case, we now
consider whether the Kane County court's ruling was manifestly
erroneous. Smith, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 351. A trial court has the
inherent authority to dismiss a criminal indictment where the
defendant has been denied due process or there would be a
miscarriage of justice. People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310, 313-
14 (1995). It is undisputed that defendant fulfilled his part of
the agreement to cooperate and to testify before the grand jury.
The nature and scope of the State's extrajudicial promises made to
defendant and the determination whether defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his constitutional right to counsel and his
privilege from self-incrimination were factual questions which the
trial court resolved in favor of defendant after a full evidentiary
hearing.
Defendant testified that he was not familiar with
transactional and use immunity and the distinctions between them
were not explained to him. Defendant was not offered the
assistance of counsel and believed he did not need the assistance
of counsel based on the State's representations. Acting for the
State in her official capacity, Bertani testified she could not
recall whether she explained what other types of immunity were
available, but believed she had explained the difference between
use and transactional immunity. She acknowledged that she told
defendant that she would help him with his parole officer; it was
her intent that he not serve any more jail or prison time. The
court particularly noted this expressed intent. The court was
troubled with the authenticity of the purportedly identical order
of immunity signed by Judge Hett in an ex parte proceeding one year
later. The court clearly had misgivings regarding whether, in a
custodial setting and unrepresented by counsel, defendant was
sufficiently admonished so as to understand the nature and scope of
the immunity he had received.
Farrey, whom the court found truthful and candid, testified
that it was his impression defendant would not be further
prosecuted if he cooperated. (Farrey's report, dated May 13, 1993,
indicates that defendant was cooperating in the hope of avoiding
further prosecution and incarceration.) He testified that
defendant cooperated fully. Farrey's testimony also tended to
impeach that of Bertani.
A defendant's right to due process is clearly implicated when
the government makes promises of immunity from prosecution. See
Smith, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 350-51. Where the evidentiary record
discloses ambiguity in the scope of the government's agreement to
confer immunity, basic considerations of fairness dictate that any
ambiguity in the agreement should be resolved in favor of the
defendant. See People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1010 (Colo. 1987).
The problem of possible confusion between transactional and use
immunity is not remote. We hold that fundamental fairness requires
that a defendant--particularly one unrepresented by counsel--who is
called upon to surrender his privilege against self-incrimination
in return for a grant of immunity, must be fully and fairly
informed by the State of the scope of the protection being
afforded; an oblique or perfunctory reference to the type of
immunity offered is insufficient. See People v. Masiello, 28
N.Y.2d 287,___, 270 N.E.2d 305, 308-09 (1971). A court entering an
order of immunity must admonish such a defendant carefully of the
nature of the rights being waived and of the consequences of
defendant's decision to ensure that his decision is made knowingly
and voluntarily. See People v. Lego, 168 Ill. 2d 561, 564 (1995).
The State could easily have avoided the problems presented in this
case by reducing the agreement to writing and by being meticulous
in its procedures and its representations to the court.
The Kane County circuit court resolved the conflicts in the
evidence and assessed the credibility of the witnesses. It could
reasonably have found from the evidence that defendant did not
understand that he was given only use immunity and that he thought
he was consenting to transactional immunity. Alternatively, the
court could reasonably have found that defendant was, in fact,
given full immunity from prosecution based on the oral promises
made by the State in return for his cooperation. In either event,
the court implicitly concluded it would be unjust to prosecute
defendant further under the circumstances. We concur. Therefore,
we hold that the court's decision was not manifestly erroneous.
Society reposes in its prosecutors an awesome and sacred
trust. They alone possess the authority to institute the sole
state-sanctioned process through which a citizen's liberty and life
may legally be ended. Not surprisingly, the grant of such
staggering power carries with it commensurate responsibilities.
Prosecutors have as their preeminent goal not victory, but justice.
See, e.g., People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 411-12 (1985)(it is
the prosecutor's responsibility to safeguard the constitutional
rights of all citizens, including the defendant's); see also 145
Ill. 2d. R. 3.8(b)(prosecutor must disclose exculpatory and
mitigating evidence). Without a doubt, prosecutors must discharge
their duties with vigor and zealousness. See United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1042
(1985); see also 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.1, Preamble to Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct. However, prosecutors who--blinded by this
zealousness--lose sight of their ultimate goal breach both their
ethical code and public trust. They do so at their peril.
The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McLAREN, P.J., and RATHJE, J., concur.