2025 IL App (1st) 231749-U Fourth Division Filed March 31, 2025 No. 1-23-1749
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County ) v. No. 20400168201 ) XAVIER WATKINS, ) The Honorable John Wellington Wilson, ) Judge, presiding. Defendant-Appellant. )
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s convictions are affirmed where the evidence was sufficient to prove that (1) defendant was operating a motor vehicle and (2) the officer who signaled defendant to stop was wearing a police uniform.
¶2 Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Xavier Watkins, guilty of obstructing
a police officer, driving on a revoked or suspended license, fleeing or attempting to elude a peace
officer, driving on a sidewalk, driving without headlights, and driving without valid registration.
Watkins was sentenced to 36 days of incarceration. Watkins now appeals from his convictions for
fleeing or attempting to elude, driving on a revoked or suspended license, driving without
headlights, and driving without a valid registration. No. 1-23-1749
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The only witness who testified at trial was Maywood Police Department Officer Mullaney.
He testified that on March 11, 2022, at approximately 10:30 p.m., he and his partner, Officer
Lukasik, were on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle. Officer Lukasik was driving. Officer
Mullaney was unable to recall what type of vehicle they were patrolling in on that day, but he
believed it was a blue Dodge Charger. He testified, without further elaboration, that they were
wearing “[p]lain clothes with exterior police body armor bearing police insignias.”
¶5 The officers were driving northbound on 8th Avenue when they saw Watkins, whom Officer
Mullaney identified in court, sitting on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) in a driveway. Officer
Mullaney described the ATV as a “four wheeled motorized vehicle.” At that point, the court sua
sponte took “judicial notice of what an ATV is.” The defense did not object. As the officers
approached, Watkins “drove away on the ATV,” headed eastbound on Congress Street. The officers
turned the corner and followed him. After determining that the ATV did not have a registration or
lights affixed to it, the officers activated their vehicle’s lights and sirens to make a traffic stop.
Watkins looked back and made eye contact with Officer Mullaney, but he did not stop. Instead,
Watkins fled southbound on 7th Avenue, went up a curb, drove through some front lawns, and
came to a stop, at which point he got off the ATV and fled on foot, abandoning it. The officers got
out of their car and pursued Watkins on foot. During the chase, they verbally identified themselves
as police officers and ordered Watkins to stop. Watkins ran into his house, and, due to the
nonviolent nature of the offense, the officers did not try to follow him inside. Instead, knowing
Watkins’s name from past contacts, Officer Mullaney ran it through LEADS and discovered that
Watkins had previously had his license revoked. At that point, he called for a tow for the ATV. An
inventory search did not locate any insurance information or a vehicle identification number.
¶6 The trial court found Watkins guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude, driving on a revoked
or suspended license, driving without headlights, driving on a sidewalk, and driving without a
valid registration. It acquitted him of driving without insurance.
-2- No. 1-23-1749
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Watkins argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of driving on a suspended or revoked
license, driving without registration, driving without headlights, and fleeing or attempting to elude
a peace officer because the evidence did not establish that the object he was driving was a motor
vehicle. He further argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude
a peace officer because the officers were not wearing police uniforms. In assessing whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, “a reviewing court’s inquiry is ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in
original.) People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 326 (2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
318-19 (1979)). “Under this standard, ‘a reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from
the record in favor of the prosecution.’ ” Bush, 214 Ill.2d at 326 (quoting People v. Cunningham,
212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)).
¶9 A. Motor Vehicle
¶ 10 Watkins first argues that the State failed to prove that he was driving a “motor vehicle,” an
essential element of the offenses of driving a motor vehicle without lights, lacking a valid
registration, driving with a suspended or revoked license, and fleeing or attempting to elude a
peace officer. 625 ILCS 5/12-201(b), 3-402(a), 6-303(a), 11-204(a) (West 2022). Specifically,
Watkins argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish that he was operating an
object that qualified as a motor vehicle and that the trial court taking judicial notice of what an
ATV is was insufficient for the State to carry its burden.
¶ 11 The Illinois Vehicle Code defines a motor vehicle as “[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled
and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but
not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs,
low-speed electric bicycles, and low-speed gas bicycles.” 625 ILCS 5/1-146 (West 2022). Watkins
argues that Officer Mullaney’s testimony that the object he was sitting on was a “four-wheel
-3- No. 1-23-1749
motorized vehicle,” was insufficient to prove that the object was a motor vehicle. Watkins contends
that there was no evidence that the object was self-propelled or propelled using electricity from
overhead wires, notes that the State did not introduce a photograph of the object, contends that the
State failed to exclude the possibility that the object was a motorized wheelchair or low-speed
powered bicycle, and highlights the absence of any testimony demonstrating how fast the object
was moving during the chase. He also argues that the State failed to show that the object met the
detailed statutory definition of an ATV. See id. § 1-101.8.
¶ 12 Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the evidence was sufficient to
prove that the object Watkins was riding was a motor vehicle under the Vehicle Code. Officer
Mullaney’s testimony that it was a “motorized vehicle” and that Watkins “drove” it down a street,
up a curb, and across one or more lawns supported a conclusion that it was a self-propelled vehicle.
His testimony that it had four wheels excluded the possibility that it was any kind of bicycle.
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2025 IL App (1st) 231749-U Fourth Division Filed March 31, 2025 No. 1-23-1749
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County ) v. No. 20400168201 ) XAVIER WATKINS, ) The Honorable John Wellington Wilson, ) Judge, presiding. Defendant-Appellant. )
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s convictions are affirmed where the evidence was sufficient to prove that (1) defendant was operating a motor vehicle and (2) the officer who signaled defendant to stop was wearing a police uniform.
¶2 Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Xavier Watkins, guilty of obstructing
a police officer, driving on a revoked or suspended license, fleeing or attempting to elude a peace
officer, driving on a sidewalk, driving without headlights, and driving without valid registration.
Watkins was sentenced to 36 days of incarceration. Watkins now appeals from his convictions for
fleeing or attempting to elude, driving on a revoked or suspended license, driving without
headlights, and driving without a valid registration. No. 1-23-1749
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The only witness who testified at trial was Maywood Police Department Officer Mullaney.
He testified that on March 11, 2022, at approximately 10:30 p.m., he and his partner, Officer
Lukasik, were on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle. Officer Lukasik was driving. Officer
Mullaney was unable to recall what type of vehicle they were patrolling in on that day, but he
believed it was a blue Dodge Charger. He testified, without further elaboration, that they were
wearing “[p]lain clothes with exterior police body armor bearing police insignias.”
¶5 The officers were driving northbound on 8th Avenue when they saw Watkins, whom Officer
Mullaney identified in court, sitting on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) in a driveway. Officer
Mullaney described the ATV as a “four wheeled motorized vehicle.” At that point, the court sua
sponte took “judicial notice of what an ATV is.” The defense did not object. As the officers
approached, Watkins “drove away on the ATV,” headed eastbound on Congress Street. The officers
turned the corner and followed him. After determining that the ATV did not have a registration or
lights affixed to it, the officers activated their vehicle’s lights and sirens to make a traffic stop.
Watkins looked back and made eye contact with Officer Mullaney, but he did not stop. Instead,
Watkins fled southbound on 7th Avenue, went up a curb, drove through some front lawns, and
came to a stop, at which point he got off the ATV and fled on foot, abandoning it. The officers got
out of their car and pursued Watkins on foot. During the chase, they verbally identified themselves
as police officers and ordered Watkins to stop. Watkins ran into his house, and, due to the
nonviolent nature of the offense, the officers did not try to follow him inside. Instead, knowing
Watkins’s name from past contacts, Officer Mullaney ran it through LEADS and discovered that
Watkins had previously had his license revoked. At that point, he called for a tow for the ATV. An
inventory search did not locate any insurance information or a vehicle identification number.
¶6 The trial court found Watkins guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude, driving on a revoked
or suspended license, driving without headlights, driving on a sidewalk, and driving without a
valid registration. It acquitted him of driving without insurance.
-2- No. 1-23-1749
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Watkins argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of driving on a suspended or revoked
license, driving without registration, driving without headlights, and fleeing or attempting to elude
a peace officer because the evidence did not establish that the object he was driving was a motor
vehicle. He further argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude
a peace officer because the officers were not wearing police uniforms. In assessing whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, “a reviewing court’s inquiry is ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in
original.) People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 326 (2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
318-19 (1979)). “Under this standard, ‘a reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from
the record in favor of the prosecution.’ ” Bush, 214 Ill.2d at 326 (quoting People v. Cunningham,
212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)).
¶9 A. Motor Vehicle
¶ 10 Watkins first argues that the State failed to prove that he was driving a “motor vehicle,” an
essential element of the offenses of driving a motor vehicle without lights, lacking a valid
registration, driving with a suspended or revoked license, and fleeing or attempting to elude a
peace officer. 625 ILCS 5/12-201(b), 3-402(a), 6-303(a), 11-204(a) (West 2022). Specifically,
Watkins argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish that he was operating an
object that qualified as a motor vehicle and that the trial court taking judicial notice of what an
ATV is was insufficient for the State to carry its burden.
¶ 11 The Illinois Vehicle Code defines a motor vehicle as “[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled
and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but
not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs,
low-speed electric bicycles, and low-speed gas bicycles.” 625 ILCS 5/1-146 (West 2022). Watkins
argues that Officer Mullaney’s testimony that the object he was sitting on was a “four-wheel
-3- No. 1-23-1749
motorized vehicle,” was insufficient to prove that the object was a motor vehicle. Watkins contends
that there was no evidence that the object was self-propelled or propelled using electricity from
overhead wires, notes that the State did not introduce a photograph of the object, contends that the
State failed to exclude the possibility that the object was a motorized wheelchair or low-speed
powered bicycle, and highlights the absence of any testimony demonstrating how fast the object
was moving during the chase. He also argues that the State failed to show that the object met the
detailed statutory definition of an ATV. See id. § 1-101.8.
¶ 12 Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the evidence was sufficient to
prove that the object Watkins was riding was a motor vehicle under the Vehicle Code. Officer
Mullaney’s testimony that it was a “motorized vehicle” and that Watkins “drove” it down a street,
up a curb, and across one or more lawns supported a conclusion that it was a self-propelled vehicle.
His testimony that it had four wheels excluded the possibility that it was any kind of bicycle.
Whether or not the object fit the statutory definition of an ATV, Officer Mullaney’s use of that label
to describe it permitted an easy inference that it was not a motorized wheelchair—the two things
are not easily confused—and, at any rate, the path it travelled and the fact that it was something
that could be towed provided further support for the conclusion that it was not a motorized
wheelchair. The State presented evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Watkins was operating a motor vehicle.
¶ 13 B. Police Uniforms
¶ 14 Next, Watkins argues that his conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer
should be reversed because the evidence did not establish that either officer was wearing a police
uniform when they gave him the signal to stop.
¶ 15 To prove the charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant disregarded a signal to stop given by an officer
“in police uniform.” 625 ILCS 5/11-204 (West 2004). The statute includes this requirement to
ensure that the defendant is aware that the person ordering him to stop is an actual police officer.
-4- No. 1-23-1749
People v. Cavitt, 2021 IL App (2d) 170149-B, ¶ 174. Nevertheless, because the officer’s attire
being a police uniform is an “essential element” of the offense, the State cannot meet its burden
by showing that the defendant knew or should have known that the person giving the signal was,
in fact, a police officer. People v. Maxey, 2018 IL App (1st) 130698-B, ¶¶ 120-121. A conviction
cannot stand unless there is “proof that the police officers were in uniform.” Id. (reversing
conviction where the evidence failed to establish what the officers were wearing at the time of the
stop).
¶ 16 Here, Officer Mullaney testified that he and his partner were wearing “[p]lain clothes with
exterior police body armor bearing police insignia.” Watkins’s argument is, essentially, that this
kind of attire is insufficiently distinctive or characteristic of police officers to qualify as a uniform.
He acknowledges that this court has, in two recent published cases, found that officers wearing
vests bearing police markings over street clothes were in police uniforms. People v. Davis, 2023
IL App (1st) 220231, ¶¶ 54-57; Cavitt, 2021 IL App (2d) 170149-B, ¶¶ 165-176. He argues that
Davis and Cavitt are distinguishable because, in those cases, there was evidence that the officers
were displaying badges. Here, there was no evidence that either officer had a badge on display, but
we do not think that factual distinction warrants a different result. We agree with Davis and Cavitt
that the State does not need to prove that the officer who gave the signal to stop was wearing “a
traditional police uniform” (emphasis added) and that “a vest with police markings can, under
certain circumstances, constitute a police uniform under the statute.” Cavitt, 2021 IL App (2d)
170149-B, ¶ 174. Given that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, Officer
Mullaney’s description of his attire allowed a trier of fact to rationally conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the officers from whom Watkins fled were wearing police uniforms.
¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 18 The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to sustain
Watkins’s convictions. Thus, we affirm.
¶ 19 Affirmed.
-5-